

Army and Society in Ptolemaic Egypt

CHRISTELLE FISCHER-BOVET

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This is the only substantial and up-to-date reference work on the Ptolemaic army. Employing Greek and Egyptian papyri and inscriptions, and building on approaches developed in state-formation theory, it offers a coherent account of how the changing structures of the army in Egypt after Alexander's conquest led to the development of an ethnically more integrated society. A new tripartite division of Ptolemaic history challenges the idea of gradual decline and emphasizes the reshaping of military structures that took place between *c.* 220 and *c.* 160 BC in response to changes in the nature of warfare, to mobilization and demobilization, and to financial constraints. An investigation of the socio-economic role played by soldiers permits a reassessment of the cleruchic system and shows how soldiers' associations generated inter-ethnic group solidarity. By integrating Egyptian evidence, Christelle Fischer-Bovet also demonstrates that the connection between the army and local temples offered new ways for Greeks and Egyptians to interact.

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To my mother and to the memory of my father

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Preface

This book emerged from a PhD dissertation defended at Stanford University in June 2008, and it has been revised and expanded to become part of the series *Armies of the Ancient World*. I would like to thank my advisor Joseph Manning for introducing me to the Egyptian side of Hellenistic Egypt and to the use of social theory to approach pre-modern states. From our reading of bilingual families' archives of soldiers, it became clear that a reassessment of the role of military power in Egypt in the centuries after Alexander's conquest was needed. I am grateful for his support throughout the years, his friendship and his trust in my work. The project would not have been the same without the guidance of Walter Scheidel and Ian Morris, whose approach to history and specifically to ancient state formation has profoundly influenced my research. Walter Scheidel's input on the role and cost of armies in the ancient world and his clarity of thought helped me articulate the larger questions at stake in this study. Ian Morris' incisive comments encouraged me to reshape my arguments, improving the project immensely. I am indebted to both of them and to many other faculty and former graduate students at Stanford for their support, including Josh Ober and Richard Roberts, who served on my defense committee, Susan Stephens, Andrew Monson, Eirene Visvardi, Lidewijde De Jong, James Collins and Marcus Folch.

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to work in a stimulating academic environment, thanks to my colleagues in the Department of Classics at the University of Southern California, who have protected me from various duties.

I am grateful to many scholars who shared their work in advance with me, including Nick Sekunda, Jean-Yves Carrez-Maratray, Thorolf Christensen, John Bauschatz, Philippe Matthey, Andrew Meadow, Cathy Lorber, Daniel Wolff, Sandra Lippert, and the "French triad" Gilles Gorre, Damien Agut-Labrodère and Anne-Emmanuelle Véïsse, who also invited me to exchange ideas with other European scholars at a conference devoted to the army in Egypt. At various stages of the project I benefited from discussions with and comments and moral support from friends and colleagues, in particular Saskia Hin, who shared her expertise in demography, John Lee, Stanley Burstein, Uri Yiftach-Firanko, Philip de Souza, Silvia Barbantani, Arthur Verhoogt, Roberta Mazza and Paul Schubert. My gratitude goes also to Carolin Arlt and Darian Totten, as well as to S. Douglas Olson, for their careful reading of the manuscript at different stages and for identifying many errors of writing and thought. Marike Van Aerde, Günther Hölbl and Edda Brescianni generously allowed me to use their photographs for the illustrations. I would also like to thank Michael Sharp at Cambridge University Press as well as the editor of the series, Nick Sekunda, and the anonymous reader for Cambridge University Press, for their comments and judicious suggestions about expanding and rearranging the manuscript. Any defects of substance or style are my responsibility alone.

I owe a personal debt to Andrew Monson, with whom I spent countless hours sharing ideas about Hellenistic and early Roman Egypt, discussing the use of social theory and reading papyri. He has been and remains exceptionally inspiring and supportive, and I thank him for opening up new intellectual perspectives for me during my time in graduate school. Finally, I wish to thank my family, especially Denise and Eric Bovet, who read earlier drafts of this book and encouraged me many times over the telephone and during their visits. I also owe an enormous amount to my husband Jean Bovet for his unconditional support, first by flying across the ocean to visit me as often as possible, and then in California for his deep and constant trust in my undertakings. I am particularly grateful to him for leading me through the meanders of many computer software programs while caring for our two children. But none of this would have been imaginable without the support and encouragement of my mother, Anne-Lise Fischer, and her partner, Maurice Frainier. I dedicate this work to her and to the memory of my father, Claude Fischer.

Notes on abbreviations

I refer to editions of papyri and ostraca according to the abbreviations used in the *Checklist of Editions of Greek, Latin, Demotic and Coptic Papyri, Ostraca and Tablets*, which is updated online.[1] For inscriptions, I use the abbreviations proposed in the *Guide de l'épigraphiste*.[2] For unpublished papyri or inscriptions, I give the inventory number. Unless specific comments from editors are mentioned, editions of all such texts are not included in the bibliography. In many cases, I indicate when a papyrus or inscription has been republished with the sign "=" and provide the date and provenance of the text according to the online database of the *Heidelberger Gezamtverzeichnis des Griechischen Papyrusurkunden Ägyptens*, e.g. P.Cair.Zen. II 59254 = SB III 6992 (Arsinoite, 252 BC). *PP* is my abbreviation for Peremans and Van 't Dack's *Prosopographia Ptolemaica*, which collects soldiers and officers in volumes I and II, with corrections in volume VIII. For periodicals, I use the abbreviations of *L'Année philologique*. I have not abbreviated ancient authors' names, in order to make the references as accessible as possible to non-Classicists.

Greek names and proper names are generally given Latinate forms. Egyptian names that appear in Greek texts have been transliterated according to the Greek spelling. When a person is known by two significantly different transliterations, I give both, for example Pachou/Pasas. I indicate in parentheses the vocalization of the most common Demotic words when they occur for the first time (e.g. *mr-mšʿ*, vocalized *mer-mesha)*. Because some sections of this book contain a large number of technical terms, I have compiled a glossary with straightforward definitions, which can be complemented by standard introductions to Hellenistic Egypt.[3] I thus use *chōra*, for example, with its traditional meaning in papyrological studies, referring to all villages and cities of Egypt except the territories of Alexandria, Naucratis and Ptolemais, which are defined as Greek city-states

[1] Sosin *et al.* (2011); http://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/scriptorium/papyrus/texts/clist_papyri.html.


[2] Bérard and Briquel (2000).

[3] E.g. Bagnall and Derow (2004), Pestman (1994).


(poleis).[4] To avoid confusion, I generally use the Greek word polis (plural poleis) to distinguish these three places from other Egyptian cities.

4 Euergetis, a late foundation by the *epistratēgos* Boethos, is regarded by Cohen (2006) 347–8 as a fourth Egyptian polis because the term is used to describe it in the papyri.


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
Map 1 Map of Egypt



Map 2 Distribution of cleruchs and garrisoned soldiers



Map 3 Distribution of soldiers and officers with priestly functions



Map 4 Soldiers funding Egyptian temple-building

1 Introduction

1.1 A social and military history of the Ptolemaic state

War as a Cultural and Social Force, the title of a recent edited volume on warfare in pre-modern states, encapsulates the approach of the present study, which explores the role of the army under the Ptolemies (323–30 BC), the Greek rulers who succeeded Alexander the Great in Egypt.[1] The editors of the volume in question, Bekker-Nielsen and Hannestad, defend the notion that "the military," a modern concept, must be considered along with civilian and religious issues. War has long been neglected by modern historical scholarship, as if it could produce only the "kings and battles" type of history.[2] While many essays in the Bekker-Nielsen–Hannestad volume are devoted to Mediterranean antiquity, however, none analyzes the case of Hellenistic Egypt, suggesting a certain disinterest on the part of historians toward one of the best-documented ancient armies. The omission may also point to a lack of comprehensive studies of the army in Egypt framing the relationship between its organization, composition and cost and state formation, and the connection between state formation and socio-economic and cultural developments within society.

The present work is aligned with what historians refer to as the "new military history" or, more explicitly, "war and society" history.[3] This trend emerged several decades ago in reaction to traditional military history, which focused for many years on strategy and battles, although it has now moved far beyond those aspects of warfare. The "war and society" approach has been criticized for "being interested in everything about armies except the way they fought, interested in everything about war except campaigns and battles."[4] In this book I try to avoid these problems by examining the relationship between the composition of the army and the effect of military institutions on society, on the one hand, and the nature of warfare and military reforms, on the other hand. My study offers a description of

[1] Bekker-Nielsen and Hannestad (2001). [2] Bekker-Nielsen and Hannestad (2001) 15.
[3] For a brief overview of the trends in military historical studies, see Citino (2007).
[4] Citino (2007) 1071.

military institutions and how they changed over time, the foremost goal of the series *Armies of the Ancient World*. It combines a reconstruction of the organization of the Ptolemaic army from technical terms found in the papyri, and a presentation of basic equipment and weapons, with a larger explanatory framework that aims to understand the impact of military institutions on society.

Put another way, this study attempts to go against the tendency to treat military and political history apart from socio-economic and cultural history. Such an approach has been suggested and applied by some ancient historians. Alston's recent study of the Roman army in Egypt, for example, focuses on the relationship between soldiers and society rather than on military institutions *per se*.[5] More closely related to the present volume, Austin has produced a fundamental article entitled "Hellenistic kings, war and the economy" and, more recently, an essay in the edited volume referred to above on "War and culture in the Seleucid empire," while Chaniotis has written *War in the Hellenistic World: a Social and Cultural History*.[6] But Chaniotis' work centers on the Greek city-states of Asia Minor and the Aegean, while Austin focuses on the Seleucids and examines culture in the narrow sense "Greek culture."

This book emerged from my reading of the work of historical sociologists on state formation, including Mann, Tilly and Turchin.[7] In *The Sources of Social Power*, Mann develops his *IEMP* model, in which the four main sources of social power – ideological, economic, military and political – explain the emergence and organization of states. Mann defines "military power" as "concentrated coercion" that "derives from the necessity of organized physical defense and its usefulness for aggression" and sees its role as promiscuous.[8] Drawing on his idea that complex relationship exists between institutions and their functions and changes over time, I aim to explore how military power required economic and ideological support and how military institutions played economic, social and ideological roles in Ptolemaic Egypt.[9]

My project was also greatly stimulated by Tilly's work on state formation in Early Modern Europe, in which he explores how continuous warfare led to the formation of states he defines as "coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial

5 Alston (1995). 6 Austin (1986), (2001); Chaniotis (2005).
7 Mann (1986); Tilly (1992); Turchin (2003).
8 Mann (1986) 20, 25. 9 Mann (1986) 18–19, 521.

territories."[10] The Hellenistic period has often been characterized as an era of large-scale warfare in comparison with the previous period and the *pax romana* following the disappearance of the Hellenistic states. Until recently, however, little attention has been paid to the connection between warfare and state formation in antiquity or to the similarity of state-formation processes in the Hellenistic Eastern Mediterranean and Early Modern Europe. I suggest that intensive state formation similar to that which took place in Early Modern Europe happened several times in world history, although the scale or success of its outcome differed according to variables specific to each case. This parallel between antiquity and Early Modern Europe has been drawn elsewhere, notably by Callataÿ in his article on warfare and minting in the Hellenistic period, although his research focuses on the military budgets of the Greek city-states.[11] So too, state-formation theory is currently stimulating work on late antiquity and the Early Modern period, as a conference volume on statehood and state formation recently published in Germany illustrates.[12]

Finally, I draw on Turchin's *Historical Dynamics* and his refined interpretation of Goldstone's model in *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* to shed light on the role of the elite, in particular the military elite, in the making of the state and its degree of stability or instability.[13] Building on Turchin's model, which treats socio-economic and ethnic affinities as the two main vehicles for collective action, I attempt to show that the army brought similar socio-economic status and ideological cohesion to people from different ethnic backgrounds, and that this had a positive effect on local civilian communities. As I explain in more detail in the section that follows the review of scholarship on Ptolemaic Egypt, I use the theoretical approaches sketched above to question the idea of the Ptolemaic army as a

[10] Tilly (1992) 1; his study draws on previous work, mainly from the 1980s, that examines the impact of international competition on state formation in Early Modern Europe. Burke (1993) 146 summarizes this type of approach, notably the influential work of Parker (1988), thus: "The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were an age of 'military revolution' in which armies grew larger and larger. To pay these armies, rulers had to squeeze more out of their subjects in taxes. The armies in turn helped to enforce the collection of taxes, thus setting up what Samuel Finner has called an 'extraction-coercion cycle.' The rise of the centralized state was not so much the result of a plan or a theory (such as 'absolutism') as an unintended consequence of competition for power in the international arena." It goes without saying that the comparison between the Hellenistic states and Early Modern Europe must be adjusted in terms of scale, making the Hellenistic states comparatively less centralized and less able to coerce those who lived in their territory.

[11] Callataÿ (2000), esp. 340.

[12] Eich *et al.* (2011).

[13] Turchin (2003); Goldstone (1991). For the concept "praetorianism" used in my framework, see Andreski (1968).

mere tool of colonial domination and to refine the concepts of Hellenization and Egyptianization that emerge from study of it.

1.2 Previous views of Ptolemaic Egypt and the army

For many years the tendency among ancient historians was to look at Ptolemaic Egypt from an Hellenocentric point of view using categories inspired by the modern colonial experience: Greek rulers created a new, rational and efficient system to exploit their dominion – the royal economy – and generally favored Greeks, notably the Greek soldiers who were settled on private plots of land and are usually called cleruchs. Since the 1970s the picture of Ptolemaic Egypt has become more complex, with scholars increasingly emphasizing the role of the Egyptian elite and local elite within Ptolemaic institutions; the existence of a mixed, Hellenized local elite; the difficulties of enforcement; and the actual functioning of institutions (as seen in petitions and in the inaccuracy of some land surveys), all of which creates space for approaching Ptolemaic Egypt as a society marked by the interaction of and tension between groups. Egypt is often designated a "multicultural" or "multiethnic" society. But these terms have been interpreted in opposite ways, either as representing an ensemble of populations with the same rights in a sort of "mixture," implying that culturally distinctive populations mingled with one another, or as illustrating the "juxtaposition" of such populations.[14] In the mid 1980s Will proposed a colonial approach to analyzing Ptolemaic Egypt as an essentially segregationist state, a view shared by some other scholars.[15] Bagnall, by contrast, stressed the weaknesses of Will's model and concluded that "an approach through colonialism grasps only a fragment of power relationships in question."[16]

Without denying that Alexander's conquests gave an impulse to a type of colonization in the territories previously belonging to the Persian empire, ancient historians over the last decade have tended to emphasize continuity between the Hellenistic states and their predecessors rather than rupture.[17]

[14] For an overview of these concepts, see Bagnall (1982–3) 18–20. For the rejection by modern scholars of Egypt as a "mixed culture," see Heinen (1989) esp. 122–5, 132–3, and more recently the questioning of the existence of a mixed culture by Préaux (1978); Bingen (1984); Will (1985); Montevecchi (2001).

[15] Will (1985); e.g. Bingen (1978b), translated into English in Bingen (2007a) 215–28; Anagnostou-Canas (1989), (1994).

[16] Bagnall (1995) 101–6 and (1997) 228.

[17] For example, Sherwin-White and Kuhrt (1993); Manning (2003).

One example related to the organization of the army illustrates such continuity: before the Greeks used mercenaries and settled foreign soldiers in Egypt the Persians relied on very similar strategies, as did the Egyptian pharaohs of the Twenty-sixth dynasty and of the New Kingdom.

The nature and the role of the army are at the heart of debates about the army as a tool of domination and about multiculturalism. Lesquier concludes the first fundamental work on the Ptolemaic army by asserting the two opposed views that would prevail thereafter about the army's role in the Ptolemaic state: first, focusing on the military aspect of the army, he underscores how the Successors of Alexander and their descendants "remained Macedonians vis-à-vis subject races . . . [and] relied on their army, Macedonian in theory, Hellenic in practice, as the safest moral and material foundation of their domination."[18] But a few lines later, after mentioning the military reform of the late third century BC, he explains that the army "also offers, with the cleruchic system, a remarkable example of the fusion of Hellenic and indigenous civilizations that characterizes the Hellenistic period."

These two theses have been developed further since then, sometimes resulting in extreme interpretations. At one end of the spectrum, Launey, applying dubious racial theories, deplores the disappearance of the Greek "race" in Egypt because of "racial degeneracy" through intermarriage.[19] At the other end, Anagnostou-Canas, relying on the "colonial hypothesis" mentioned above, denounces the army as the tool of colonial domination *par excellence*:[20] it dispossessed natives of cultivable land, caused the spiritual dispossession of the colonized through their enrollment in the colonizers' army and was a site of forced contacts between colonizers and colonized that failed to result in large-scale acculturation. Strangely enough, these opposite approaches have sometimes led to the same conclusion. For example, both Anagnostou-Canas and Launey regard the gymnasium as a stronghold of "Greekness," although the former denounces its exclusive character, while the latter is relieved by the preservation of some Greek elements in Egypt.

Most work in recent decades, however, finds a middle way. Papyrologists have generally acknowledged the role of the army as a tool of domination, at least implicitly. The absence of military violence in the conquest of the country by Alexander and Ptolemy (as satrap and then king) – recognized even by Anagnostou-Canas – does not erase the military aspect of the occupation.

[18] Lesquier (1911) 288, translated by Fischer-Bovet.

[19] Launey (1949), e.g. 1089–90.

[20] Anagnostou-Canas (1989), e.g. 236.

Scholars have devoted most of their attention to one feature of military occupation: the cleruchy, the system of distribution of land in exchange for military service to men who served only when needed, in contrast to professional troops continuously in active service. The most recent work on the Ptolemaic army, by Scheuble-Reiter, is a study of the cavalry cleruchs.[21] This is due mainly to the nature of the sources, which provide considerable information about cleruchic land, the civil life of soldiers and their financial situation, whereas information about the military functions of cleruchs and garrisoned soldiers is scarce. Part II of this book is in part a response to previous views of the cleruchic system regarding the place of residence of cleruchs, for example, and the so-called "progressive devaluation" of the cleruchic system, and it seeks to explain the development of the system in connection with the making of the Ptolemaic state.[22]

As for multiculturalism, over the last few decades scholars have reasserted the presence in the army of Egyptians – although as a minority – and other non-Greeks.[23] But introductory or general works on the Hellenistic world often neglect the role of Egyptians in the army.[24] Intermarriage of soldiers with Egyptian women also provided the army with recruits of a mixed cultural and linguistic background. Clarysse's work points out the frequency of double names among soldiers and officials and the new light that the combination of Greek and Demotic documents sheds on Ptolemaic society.[25] Similarly, Van 't Dack has underscored the army's multiculturalism, although he refuses to regard it as the reflection of the entire society, pending deeper multidisciplinary research.[26]

Finally, the hiring of a large number of Egyptians by Ptolemy IV to fight the Seleucid king at Raphia in 217 BC has generally been interpreted as the cause of the revolts that followed, on the basis of Polybius' take on the event (5.107). The first three Ptolemies are therefore usually considered powerful and militarily successful rulers, whereas their successors led the state into a spiral of decline until the Romans annexed Egypt in 30 BC. A new approach to the role of the army in the making of the Ptolemaic state should help to clarify this question.

21 See the various articles by Sandra Scheuble cited in the bibliography. Scheuble-Reiter (2012) appeared too late to be taken into account here.

22 For the place of residence, see esp. Bingen (1973), (1978c), (2007a). For the devaluation of the cleruchic system, see Van 't Dack (1977).

23 For example Peremans' articles in *Ancient Society*; Winnicki's numerous articles; Clarysse (1985); the unpublished dissertation of Marrinan (1998); Lloyd (2002b) on the Egyptian elite.

24 Launey (1949), for example, does not even mention them (see the preface to the new edition, p. XIV), although his work is still the standard study of the Hellenistic armies.

25 E.g. Clarysse (1985), (1992).

26 Van 't Dack (1992).

1.3 A new approach

The Greco-Macedonian cleruchs settled in the Fayyum in the third century BC did indeed serve as a tool of domination for the new foreign rulers in Egypt. But the communities of professional soldiers living in Upper Egypt in the second century can no longer be interpreted within this framework. So too, while interaction between ethnic groups was slow in the third-century Fayyum, it became common a century later, with some variation throughout Egypt. This shows that none of the approaches to the Ptolemaic army mentioned above – as a colonial tool, on one end of the spectrum, or as a place of interaction, on the other – can, if applied in an exclusive manner, explain the army's role in Egypt and its development over the course of three centuries. An extreme schematization would suggest that the army developed from a tool of domination to a locus of ethnic interaction.

The goal of this study is accordingly to go one step further, by providing a larger framework that describes the various functions of the army in order to make sense of its role in the making of the Ptolemaic state and its interaction with society. This approach reveals how internal factors (above all settlement and marriage patterns) and external factors (in particular the pressure of the Seleucids and the intervention of the Romans) drove the evolution of the army's role in Egyptian society. I argue that a century after Alexander's conquest the army came to function as an engine of socio-economic and cultural integration at the same time as it was growing less powerful in military terms.

The socio-economic roles of soldiers illuminate the mutual impact of the army on state structures and society. The impact of the army on state structures mostly concerns the means the state was forced to develop to pay soldiers and to keep them loyal; the impact on society is mainly related to the level of social differentiation between soldiers and the civilian population. The socio-economic status of soldiers depends on how the state pays and/or settles them, which can promote or prevent interaction between soldiers and civilians. Conversely, if the state's means to remunerate soldiers are diminished, and/or if the relationship between different population groups within the society changes, the state may recruit from a different pool of people and modify the organization of the army, which in turn affects the relationships between soldiers and between soldiers and civilians.

The evidence from Ptolemaic Egypt points to a time of crisis, transition and reform between *c.* 220 and *c.* 160 BC that reshaped the relationship between state, army and society. From a larger point of view, this period corresponds to increasing Roman involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Period A	Period B	Period C
323–*c.* 220	*c.* 220–*c.* 160	*c.* 160–30

Figure 1.1 Periodization of Ptolemaic history

By 168 BC the Romans were able to ask the Seleucids, who had just invaded Egypt, to leave the country with their army.[27] At that point, the international function of the Ptolemaic army had almost disappeared. From an Egyptian perspective this period was a time of political instability and economic distress due in part to the overwhelming expense of supporting a series of wars against the Seleucids. In demographic terms, the situation was different from the previous period, since substantial Greco-Macedonian immigration had ended and marriages between Greeks and Egyptian women had become more and more frequent. Most Greeks in Egypt had been there for three, four or even five generations. Some had Egyptian ancestors and many lived in the countryside, where they had integrated into local social networks and become involved in community traditions. Matters may have been different, however, in the three Greek cities (poleis) of Egypt. Just as immigration had mainly brought Greek soldiers, the end of it led to an increase in the number of Egyptian soldiers in the army. In addition, new ways of remunerating soldiers, which correlate to a decrease in their bargaining power, created less social differentiation and led the army to enhance socio-economic and cultural integration among some population groups.

Previous scholarship has noted Egypt's lack of participation in Mediterranean politics and military action but has ignored the effect of the end of immigration and of the new relationship between soldiers and society. The present study argues that the new situation within state and society affected the army in two ways. Its functions became broader, but its military function became weaker on an international scale, at the same time that it was penetrated more and more by the indigenous Egyptian elite and by soldiers with a Greco-Egyptian background. The periodization in Figure 1.1 can be used as a heuristic tool to understand changes in Ptolemaic Egypt, with the intervening period of crisis between *c.* 220 and *c.* 160 BC.

This schema resembles the traditional periodization used by Hölbl in his *History of the Ptolemaic Empire* but aims to provide a chronological perspective for a new framework that draws on the sociological approaches

[27] On this episode, involving C. Popillius Laenas, see Polybius 29.27.1.




Figure 1.2 Rethinking Ptolemaic "decline"

sketched above and departs from traditional views.[28] The latter assert a quasi-teleological decline of the Ptolemies after Raphia, either because of a so-called Egyptianization of the dynasty or because a so-called Egyptian nationalist movement emerged. Consequently, the prevailing view describes Period A as a time of intense state building and expansion, and, from at least the 280s BC onward, as a century of balance between the Hellenistic states. Then, after the victory of Ptolemy IV at Raphia in 217 BC, there was a straightforward decline of the dynasty, in large part due to the recruitment of vast numbers of Egyptians. My study proposes a more complex approach to "decline" and a different explanation for it. If sketched in a curve that impressionistically represents the Ptolemaic state's expansion and the kings' degree of coercive power over time, a synthetic view would resemble Figure 1.2.

As has recently been pointed out, there was no true balance of power in Period A, but instead a continuous competition that drove the different actors to maximize their revenues.[29] The Ptolemies were in a difficult situation when the Seleucid king attacked in 217 BC. They had to increase their military expenditures and then face the postwar demobilization, which resulted in a chain reaction of revolts. The period of crisis was thus not caused by the so-called Egyptianization of the rulers or by a nationalist movement. Six decades later, the Ptolemies were again able to rule their state, albeit a state that had shrunk dramatically. During the period of crisis, the Ptolemies reshaped the state and the army but were forced to withdraw

[28] Hölbl (2001) 304–11.
[29] Austin (1986); Lévêque (1999); Heinen (2003); Eckstein (2006).

from the international battlefield. The period that followed did not consist of a long, straightforward decline, but of complicated power relations between the kings, the elite and local communities. Moreover, the final decades of the Ptolemaic dynasty were inextricably entangled with Roman politics.

From Period B onward, the evidence shows that the army was a unifying force between ethnic groups in certain strata of the population. Ptolemaic history cannot be reduced to a zero-sum game between Greeks and Egyptians, and integration went on in both directions between soldiers and local elites. Papyrologists use the concepts of Hellenization or Egyptianization, or of Hellenized/Hellenizing Egyptians and Egyptianized/Egyptianizing Greeks.[30] But these terms scarcely reflect the complexity of the new situation, in which there must have been great variation in the extent to which a Greek was familiar with Egyptian culture or an Egyptian adopted Greek culture. The traditional scheme also obscures the fact that many (although not all) Hellenized/Hellenizing Egyptians and Egyptianized/Egyptianizing Greeks were the product of mixed marriages. In this study I call Greco-Egyptians the offspring of intermarriage but otherwise refer mostly to Greek or Egyptian origin.[31] As in other fields that explore cultural interaction, we may need to begin evaluating the use of terms such as creolization and hybridization to describe what happened in certain strata of Egyptian society.[32] I say "certain strata" because the Greek population, which represented perhaps only 5 percent of the population of Egypt, was largely well-to-do at the Greek polis level, the Egyptian city level and the village level. Intermarriage and integration, happening for the most part through the army, could affect only a small portion of the Egyptian population.[33]

30 These expressions are traditional in the field of papyrology, for example in Lewis (1986) 154.

31 Chauveau (1997) 208 is among the few historians to apply the concept of Greco-Egyptianness to certain strata of Ptolemaic society. See also Bagnall (2000) and, on mixed families, e.g. Véïsse (2004) 99–102 and (2005), esp. 219–20.

32 Dyson (2003) 105, for example, ends his work *The Roman Countryside* thus: "The face-off between imperialists and post-colonialists has sometimes led scholars to miss the process of blending and integration, of what Jane Webster has called 'creolization,' which created a new society that was one of the most impressive achievements of Rome." Webster (2001) 218 suggests a framework for understanding ethnic groups and culture changes "not [as] the gradual replacement of one way of life by another, but [as] the blending of both, in a clearly nonegalitarian social context."

33 Contrary to the numerous articles by Peremans on the subject, I do not believe that intermarriage occurred most often among the lower strata, but rather at the local elite level. See Chapter 7.

Finally, scholars usually deplore the condition of the cleruchs or soldiers from the second century onward. This book aims to show that joining the army gave new groups of the population certain privileges in the second century, and thus that the army still allowed for upward mobility. If the living standards of cleruchs in the second and first centuries BC were not as high, on average, as those in the third century, they were still higher than those enjoyed by most of the population and allowed for social leveling among soldiers. If the scant evidence suggests that wages were lower in the second century, this seems to have been a general tendency in Egypt at the time. In any case, the condition of soldiers remained enviable throughout the period, with a comfortable standard of living in comparison with unskilled workers and even many farmers. Moreover, some groups of cleruchs were in a still better socio-economic situation, as were officers and commanders, who clearly belonged either to local elites throughout the country or to the court elite in Alexandria.

1.4 Methodology, sources and outline

This book aims to shed new light on how military institutions shaped power and social structures within villages and between local and central state institutions, providing a framework that explains how the army became a unifying force between certain strata of ethnic groups in Egypt from the second century onward. It combines analysis of Greek and Egyptian texts on papyri, ostraca and inscriptions with archaeological material and social theory. The study is divided into three parts. Part I, "Structure and role of the army," investigates the ethnic composition of the army in Egypt from the seventh century BC, and the military and economic forces driving the development of its organization until the first century BC. Part II, "Economic status and social networks of soldiers and officers," considers the bargaining power of soldiers in terms of their compensation and their relationship with the king and with civilian communities. Part III, "The Army and Egyptian temples," examines the overlap between the two major institutions of Ptolemaic Egypt, as well as the cultural interaction of their members. Each chapter or group of chapters relies heavily on a specific type of source and method briefly sketched out in the chapter outline that follows.

After the brief introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 examines the role of Greek and other foreign mercenaries hired by the Egyptian kings

of the Late period (664–332 BC) and considers what aspects of the pre-Ptolemaic army the Ptolemies may have retained. By combining Greek literary sources with archaeological and epigraphical evidence, this chapter emphasizes new techniques of warfare, new equipment brought to Egypt by the Greeks, and the degree of interaction between foreigners and Egyptians. The number of Greek soldiers, however, was far smaller than that of Egyptian soldiers, and their role was exaggerated by literary sources because of the authors' Hellenocentrism. The Ptolemies took over a number of features of the previous military organization and reused the main garrisons. They probably retained part of the fleet and some Egyptians and mercenaries stationed in garrisons.

Part I assesses change in the organization and composition of the army between Period A and Period C. Chapter 3 offers an explanatory framework that encompasses the main military and economic problems faced by Hellenistic rulers and places warfare at the center of the legitimating process. By comparing the cost of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid armies, and by connecting mobilization and demobilization, as well as the nature of warfare, to military organization, this chapter explains why and how the Ptolemies came to reshape their military institutions between *c.* 220 and *c.* 160 BC (Period B). A survey of military events involving the Ptolemaic army is followed in Chapter 4 by a sketch of the system of remuneration used by the Ptolemies (for both cleruchs and professional soldiers) and a description of the force-types and of the upper hierarchy of the army. The lack of material objects belonging to soldiers from this period, combined with a paucity of iconographic evidence, limits the possibility of reconstructing in detail the equipment and weapons of different types of soldiers. Moreover, the overall structure of military units and of the military hierarchy is difficult to extract from papyrological documents that report technical terms without explaining them and that treat only disconnected elements of the system. Even so, it is possible to identify a series of reforms during Period B concerning cavalry units, the internal organization of infantry regiments, new garrisons with locally recruited professional soldiers in the south, and even the disappearance of special troops such as elephants.

Rather than considering Egyptian troops a separate group in the military structure, as is usually done, Chapter 5 begins to explore how Egyptian soldiers integrated into the professional and cleruchic troops, a topic pursued further in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 5 shows that from the beginning the Ptolemies did not avoid employing Egyptians in their army, although they relied mainly on the immigrant population, at least during the first decades

of the third century. Yet the Greeks remained a small minority, which must have had an impact on the marriage patterns examined in Chapter 7. The diversity of the provenance of cleruchs and soldiers is assessed on the basis of geographic labels used by individuals in official documents. Some of these labels, called "ethnic designations" by papyrologists, took on a different meaning in Period C, the best-known cases being the "Persians" and the "Macedonians." But the organization of the largest regiments and units does not seem to have been based on ethnic designations, which often reflected the ethnicity of those who bore them only imperfectly.

Part II is devoted to the socio-economic role of soldiers and officers and draws primarily on papyrological evidence. Chapter 6 considers the army as a vehicle for land distribution: the Ptolemies dispatched soldiers paid in land (the cleruchic system) throughout the country to lower the cost of their military, a system already used in pre-Ptolemaic Egypt and in the Eastern Mediterranean. It seems to have been to the advantage of both the soldiers and the king that the plots be passed on to the closest heir. But the emphasis on the part of the state on cultivation as a means of maximizing fiscal revenues, and on the part of the soldiers on land management, was detrimental to the military capacity of the system, which evolved toward demilitarization and partial decentralization of the troops. Chapter 7 turns to sources for the socio-economic status of soldiers and their relationship with civilians, in particular by looking at the increase in marriages between Greek soldiers and Egyptian women. It explores the army as a basis for upward social mobility and as a generator of group solidarity and social networks, including diverse types of soldiers' associations such as the gymnasium and the *politeumata*.

Part III focuses on the milieu where the army and the Egyptian temples overlapped. The analysis relies mainly on epigraphical material in hieroglyphic and Demotic Egyptian, as well as in Greek. Chapter 8 examines the tendency among certain Egyptian priestly families to have military functions – functions Greeks had largely taken over after the conquest. I argue that the Ptolemies encouraged this pre-Ptolemaic social pattern to secure the loyalty of the Egyptian elite and to be able to rely on local power. Chapter 9 examines how soldiers' dedications to Egyptian gods reflect their financing of temple-building and demonstrates that soldiers and officers took over a large share of this funding from the second century BC on. This trend illustrates the formation of a local elite made up of Greek, Egyptian and Greco-Egyptian soldiers acting for the local gods, and challenges the idea of professional and ethnic divisions.

By reconstructing the diverse parameters that led to the evolution of the army's role in Egyptian society, this book aims to make a twofold contribution: offering a model that allows historians to compare the Ptolemaic case with other contemporary Hellenistic states, and re-examining the role of military power in relation to the mechanisms of state formation in various historical contexts.

2 The army in Late period Egypt (664–332 BC)

This chapter surveys the role and organization of the army in Late period Egypt and aims to answer two questions: what part did Greeks and other immigrants play in the army in comparison with the Egyptian troops? And to what extent did Alexander and Ptolemy I take over the personnel or structure of the existing army in the late fourth and early third centuries BC? After a brief survey of the historical developments of the Late period, the second section of the chapter argues that Greek mercenaries played a significant role in the military events of the period, although Greek authors tend to exaggerate their importance. The Egyptian troops, the so-called *machimoi*, played a fundamental role as well and were more numerous in battles. Officers and commanders, and even the generals of all the foreign troops grouped together, were generally Egyptian, although in at least one case the supreme chief of the expedition and the general in charge of the foreign troops were Greek.[1] An indirect consequence of the settlement of Greeks during the three centuries preceding Alexander's conquest of Egypt might be that it facilitated the waves of immigration of the late fourth and early third centuries BC. The third section of this chapter examines the Egyptian side of the army and what can be reconstructed of the military organization of Egypt. Some military personnel were probably retained at the end of the period during the second Persian invasion (343–332 BC) and then under Alexander, at least in the fleet and in certain garrisons.

2.1 Brief historical survey

The Late period was a time of great prosperity in Egypt.[2] It traditionally begins when King Psamtek I forced the Assyrians to abandon Egypt

[1] Chevereau (2001) 312–13. For high military officers accompanying King Apries, see Smoláriková (2008) 39–40. For Greek commanders, see the new interpretation below (Table 2.1) involving Psammetichos and Potasimto.

[2] This section is based on recent surveys of the period. See Perdu (2010); Huss (2001) 20–51; Lloyd (2000); Kuhrt (1995) 638–46, 661–4; Agut-Labordère (2012a), and specifically on the periods of Persian occupation, Agut-Labordère (2013); Chauveau and Thiers (2006); Briant (1996) 61–72, 488–99, 675–8, 704–6.

in 664 BC. During the previous four centuries, state power in Egypt was fragmented. Libyan warlords controlled Lower Egypt, and the warrior-priests of the temple of Amun in Thebes ruled Upper Egypt, while at some point the Nubians took power and established the Twenty-fifth dynasty. After the brief Assyrian occupation (671–664 BC), Psamtek I from Sais, originally a vassal of the Assyrians, took control of the entire Delta (660 BC) and reunified Egypt as far as the First Cataract by diplomatic means (Twenty-sixth dynasty, 664–525 BC). To maintain power, Psamtek made use of the century-old concept of divine kingship and established control over Upper Egypt by sending his daughter as God's wife of Amun.[3] Militarily, and to some extent economically, he relied on foreign relations. He hired mercenaries, notably from the eastern part of the Greek world, because of their technological sophistication, including their use of elaborate bronze armor and new military tactics, and offered them land to settle in Egypt. His successors Necho II (610–595 BC) and Psamtek II (595–586 BC) continued his policies and employed Greek mercenaries, who left behind graffiti such as those engraved in Abu Simbel when Psamtek II's army returned from a successful expedition into Ethiopia in 591 BC (Herodotus 2.160–1). Necho developed a fleet with the help of Phoenicians and Greeks, and it played an important role under Apries (589–570 BC) in preventing Babylonian expansion on the Levantine coast. Apries' reign, however, ended with a civil war against his general Amasis between 570 and 567 BC (Herodotus 2.161–3, 169; Diodorus 1.68.1–5). Amasis finally defeated Apries and ruled until 526 BC, a period of prosperity and stability facilitated by the decline of Babylonian power. Amasis conquered Cyprus and consolidated diplomatic relationships within the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular with the Greeks (Herodotus 2.178–82; Diodorus 1.68.6). His internal policies have also been interpreted as philhellenic, as he granted Naucratis to the Greeks (Herodotus 2.178) and moved the Greek mercenaries settled by Psamtek I on the Pelusiac mouth of the Nile to Memphis to protect him (Herodotus 2.154; Diodorus 1.67.1–2). These actions were part of a broad reorganization of the country and its administration.[4]

The most radical political change during the Late period was the Persian occupation (also called the Twenty-seventh dynasty, 525–404 BC) that followed the defeat of Psamtek III – Amasis' son – and his army by the Persian king Cambyses (Herodotus 3.10–14).[5] Egypt became a Persian satrapy, along with Libya, Cyrene and Barca (Herodotus 3.91), and was governed

[3] Caminos (1964); Kuhrt (1995) 638; Lloyd (2000) 369–70; Smoláriková (2008) 17–30.

[4] Perdu (2010) section 2, Amasis.

[5] On the invasion, see Cruz-Uribe (2003).

by a satrap in Memphis, who had to ensure the payment of the tribute to the royal treasury. The Persians relied primarily on existing garrisons in the Delta and on the southern border in Elephantine, where Jewish troops were settled (see section 2.2.4.4 below). Garrison commanders were usually Persian, but the garrison commander of the Hermopolite nome during the fifteenth year of Darius' reign was Egyptian.[6] That the Persians kept Egyptian soldiers is also shown by Herodotus' mention of Egyptian troops in the Persian army during the Persian Wars (Herodotus 7.135; 9.32). Moreover, the Persians relied on the Egyptian elite, not only at the highest level, as is known from the collaboration of the Egyptian admiral Udjahorresnet and from the maintenance of an Egyptian as *senti* (planner), a sort of finance minister, but also for administering and policing the country at the nome level.[7] Similarly, the role of the temples and their priesthood was not disrupted, and in theory the Persian king acted as Pharaoh.[8] One important exception was the removal from power of the priests of the temple of Amun in Thebes, and the disappearance of the institution of the God's Wife of Amun.[9] It is difficult to evaluate the extent of anti-Persian feeling because the two clearest pieces of evidence, the *Demotic Chronicle* and a mention of a foreign ruler in the Satrap stele, actually date after the events in question.[10] There were several attempts to expel the foreigners, especially in the Western Delta, and these are interpreted as "popular" rather than "nationalist" by Devauchelle.[11] Finally, in 404 BC Amyrtaios succeeded and took the name Psamtek, after the first king of the Saite dynasty, as a way of legitimizing his power.

During the next six decades, indigenous kings ruled Egypt; this period is traditionally divided into three dynasties (Twenty-eighth to Thirtieth, 404–343 BC).[12] A major characteristic of the period, and within it of the kings of the Thirtieth dynasty, is the amount in temple-building, which stands in contrast to the Persian period.[13] Another development is the extensive use of Greek mercenaries to prevent another Persian invasion, notably with the help of the Athenian general Chabrias (see 2.2.3.2). We are better informed on this aspect of Egyptian politics, as it was of interest to Greek writers, in particular Diodorus and the author of the *Oeconomica*, a treatise on economics composed in the late fourth century by one of

6 Agut-Labordère (2013); H. S. Smith and C. J. Martin (2009). On Hermopolite, see Chauveau (2000).
7 On Udjahorresnet, see p. 26 with note 46. On the police, see Agut-Labordère (2013).
8 Chauveau and Thiers (2006) 380–2.
9 Agut-Labordère (2013).
10 Devauchelle (1995), esp. 76–7.
11 Devauchelle (1995) 79; Perdu (2010) section 3.
12 For a general survey, see Ray (1987a).
13 Chauveau and Thiers (2006) 383; Perdu (2010) section 3; Matthey (2012) 30–4.

Aristotle's students. In 343 BC the Persian king Artaxerxes III conquered Egypt again. The second period of Persian occupation lasted barely more than ten years, until Alexander the Great took over Egypt in 332 BC, but it seems to have been harsher and to have created stronger anti-Persian feelings.[14] During this occupation the indigenous king Khababash ruled for two years, but little is known about him, as he is attested only in the Satrap stele, which is dated to the time of Ptolemy satrap, and in five other documents.[15] He must nonetheless have had sufficient military support to challenge Persian power.

This survey reveals the extent to which Herodotus and Diodorus of Sicily remain the primary sources for our understanding of the Late period. Herodotus often had to rely on hearsay and then had to process this information, which unsurpisingly led to inaccuracies and misinterpretations that reflect Greek preconceptions of Egypt.[16] Diodorus' main source for the sections of his history that concern Egypt down to the Late period, meanwhile, is Herodotus, although he criticizes the latter's taste for fairy tales (1.69.7).[17] Both historians rely at times on a comparison between Egypt and Sparta and tend to schematize Egyptian society. As the following sections make clear, the reliability of their claims must be tested where possible against other evidence.

2.2 Mercenary service in Egypt from the reign of Psamtek I

Mercenary service triggers a series of basic questions. The chronology and reasons for immigrating into Egypt, the length of soldiers' stay, and their functions can be reconstructed mainly from literary sources. Their provenance and distribution and the effect of their presence on their new environment are mostly assessed on the basis of archaeological evidence.[18] Indeed, mercenary service is not solely a matter of military activity, as the lives of thousands of men, mostly from the Aegean, were transformed by contact with Egypt and their settlement in a new country.

It was probably mainly young men who emigrated as mercenaries. Often from poor areas, they were looking for wealth and land to settle, and perhaps for adventure.[19] Greeks and Carians from Asia Minor may have initially

14 Devauchelle (1995) 68, 79–80.
15 Burstein (2000).
16 Lloyd (1975a) vol. I, esp. 75–7; Haziza (2009), esp. 105–6.
17 Chamoux *et al.* (1993) XXVII, 11–14.
18 Bagnall (1984) raises similar issues with regard to the cleruchs of the Ptolemaic period.
19 Immigration is not to be explained only in terms of lack of economic prospects. In Arcadia, for example, it became a familial strategy to have more than one son to work the land, since the others could serve as mercenaries. See Roy (2000), esp. 346–9.

launched raids on Egypt without formal backing from their poleis, creating the first opportunities to interact with the Egyptian kings of the marshes. The whole process began because Psamtek I from Sais (664–610 BC) needed such soldiers, since he knew they used new military techniques and were well equipped.[20] In the fifth century BC another type of mercenary appeared: men belonging to the military forces of a city came temporarily to support the Egyptian revolts against Persia. Famous generals and their troops, as well as individual soldiers, were also hired in the fourth century.

2.2.1 Length of soldiers' stays and waves of immigration

The first wave of immigration from the Greek world took place in the middle of the seventh century. This is suggested by literary sources complemented by archaeological evidence.[21] The arrival of Carians and Ionians was not a matter of chance, as Herodotus claims, but a well-planned military expedition on the invitation of Psamtek, as Diodorus and Polyaenus acknowledge.[22] Psamtek settled his mercenaries in the Eastern Delta to protect the Egyptian border, in the regions called "the Camps" or *Stratopeda* (Στρατόπεδα), the name of the Carian and Ionian camps on each side of the Pelusian branch of the Nile (see Map 1). The Carians and Ionians stayed there until Amasis transferred them to Memphis.

According to Austin, the mercenaries came in the time of Psamtek I and stayed permanently in Egypt, and some presumably married indigenous women, but according to Laronde they came continuously to Egypt during the Twenty-sixth dynasty, knowing they would obtain well-paid jobs.[23] There may have been 30,000 Greek mercenaries (*epikouroi*) around 570 BC (Herodotus 2.161–3; Diodorus 1.68.1), and new waves of immigrants from the Aegean later came to Egypt to settle, having heard about the good terms being offered.[24] Matters changed after the Persians conquered Egypt in 525 BC. Their king Cambyses discharged the Greeks in Memphis after his failed expedition to Ethiopia, and they left by sea.[25] Greek immigration into Egypt thus seems to have stopped in the final quarter of the sixth

[20] Herodotus (2.151–2) and Diodorus (1.66.10–12) both give their own accounts, the latter criticizing the former. See below, section 2.2.1.

[21] See section 2.2.4; Herodotus 2.154; Diodorus 1.67.1–2.

[22] Austin (1970) 18; Laronde (1995) 30–1.

[23] Austin (1970) 18 suggests that when Ionians and Carians married indigenous women, they produced offspring who could in turn be employed as Greek mercenaries by Egyptian kings; Laronde (1995) 34–6.

[24] There is no evidence to generalize the theory, proposed by Wallinga (1991), esp. 183–90 and mentioned by Vittmann (2003) 208, that the type of boat used shows that the soldiers were coming to Egypt for a short period of time, perhaps a four-year term of service.

[25] Herodotus 3.25.

century BC, although there were still Greek mercenaries, presumably the descendants of men employed during the Twenty-sixth dynasty. In the fifth and fourth centuries BC, mercenaries, now called *misthophoroi* by Greek authors, were hired by kings or would-be kings when needed, often through an agreement with a Greek polis or one of its generals, and were thus probably more inclined to return home.[26] Sometimes they were even called allies/*symmachoi* (e.g. Diodorus 16.44.1). If the Athenians, however, had been able to liberate Egypt from Persia when they supported the revolt of Inaros in the mid fifth century BC, some Greeks might have stayed and received a share in the kingdom, as Inaros promised (Diodorus 11.71.4).

2.2.2 Military equipment

The emphasis on the equipment of the Carian and/or Ionian soldiers in the literary sources makes it clear why the Egyptian kings hired soldiers from the Aegean world. Indeed, equipment is mentioned in the three stories about oracles announcing imminent help to the future Psamtek I, although these similarities are due in part to the Hellenocentrism of the Greek authors.[27] While Diodorus' and Polyaenus' accounts both appear to be partly doublets of Herodotus' story, Laronde interprets the details of the armament in the three accounts as evidence of their antiquity. The crested helmet undeniably fits perfectly with the reality of the seventh century BC. The Ionians and Carians then disembarked in bronze armor (ὁπλισθέντας χαλκῷ), which indicates that they were using the defensive arms of the hoplite, a type of armament and a technique of warfare developed in late eighth- and seventh-century Greece. Laronde believes that Psamtek must have known about this when he hired the mercenaries. In fact, the Egyptians had been using bronze armor since the Eighteenth dynasty, "but it consisted of nothing more elaborate than metal scales sewn onto a leather base."[28] They must thus have admired Greek armor, which covered much more of the body. In addition to literary evidence, iron armor and weapons of a non-Egyptian

[26] The etymology of the Greek words used for "mercenary", i.e. *epikouroi* for the earlier period and *misthophoroi* for the later period, hints at this evolution; see Trundle (2004) 10–21; Lavelle (1997). Similarly, Austin (1970) 15 and 53 note 5 points out that Diodorus (1.66–8) uses the word *misthophoros* anachronistically when speaking of Ionian and Carian mercenaries in the Twenty-sixth dynasty.

[27] Herodotus 2.151–2; Diodorus 1.66–8; Polyaenus, *Stratagems* 7.3; Laronde (1995) 29–32; Lloyd (1988) 133–5.

[28] Lloyd (1988) 134 on Herodotus 2.151; the bronze plate-armor, the two-handled shield and the Corinthian one-piece helmet were Greek innovations, and the Greeks were also experienced in melting and working iron. See e.g. Snodgrass (1980) 49–50, 101–7.



Figure 2.1 Amathus bowl

type found in Egypt attest the work of Greek blacksmiths specialized in making and fixing weapons in the military settlements of Daphnae and Migdol.[29] The Carian equipment may resemble that of the hoplites represented on the Amathus bowl found in a tomb in Cyprus and dated to the time of Psamtek (see Figure 2.1).[30]

New military techniques, equipment and naval skills developed in Archaic Greece are the fundamental reasons for the development of Carian and Ionian mercenary service in Egypt. These soldiers probably played an important part in the successful reunification of Egypt by Psamtek I, but the Hellenocentrism of Greek authors led them to neglect the presence of Asiatic mercenaries in the army of Psamtek and his successors, as well as the role played by the Egyptian soldiers, as will be shown in the sections that follow.[31]

29 Haider (1996) 98; Vittmann (2003) 234.

30 The Egyptian symbols on the bowl indicate a connection with Egypt; see plates and description in Myres (1933). I thank John Lee for pointing out the iconography of this object to me.

31 Lloyd (1988) 134 rejects the idea that Psamtek also used Arab mercenaries because it is based on an inaccurate reading of a minor manuscript of Diodorus 1.66.12.

2.2.3 Role of mercenaries

Mercenaries took part in military expeditions and protected the eastern and southern frontiers.[32] Some were in the fleet, others became royal guards from the time of Amasis onward, and others made and repaired weapons. Many of those who came to Egypt during the seventh and sixth centuries BC settled there, and some married Egyptian women.[33]

2.2.3.1 The civil war between Apries and Amasis

The episode of Apries' fall and Amasis' coup (570 BC) is the most detailed story we have about a central political and military event of the sixth century BC.[34] Egyptian survivors of an attack on the Greek colony of Cyrene revolted from Apries because they believed the expedition was intended to eliminate them, so that Apries could rule Egypt more securely (Diodorus 1.68.2). Apries sent Amasis to the troops to resolve the conflict, but they chose him as their new king. Then all the Egyptian troops joined Amasis to fight Apries and his 30,000 Ionian and Carian mercenaries, who were defeated although they fought well, according to Herodotus.

This story raises two issues: (1) the role played by the mercenaries and the nature of the revolt/coup; (2) the reliability of the Greek sources and their contradictions regarding Amasis, who is characterized here as pro-Egyptian but later as a philhellene.

(1) Herodotus' narrative focuses on the opposition between Egyptian soldiers and Greek mercenaries. This may explain why his excursus on the *machimoi* (2.164–8) is inserted between the gathering of the troops at Momemphis and the battle, rather than in the first part of Book II. As Legrand suggested, Herodotus tried to make the Greek mercenaries look better (viz. than they looked in Amasis' propaganda) by stressing the number of Egyptian soldiers against whom they had to fight.[35] Herodotus' Hellenocentrism led scholars to interpret the events as a nationalist revolt, with Amasis as champion of the Egyptians. According to him, they revolted because they were jealous of the privileged position of the Ionian and Carian mercenaries in the army, as in the story of the Egyptian soldiers who rebelled against Psamtek I in Elephantine, at Daphnae and in Mareia, and who left for

32 For an analysis and comparison of the various attempts to invade Egypt during the Late period, see Kahn and Tammuz (2008).

33 See Kaplan (2003) for an overview of the functions of mercenary troops in the Late period and their interaction with other ethnic groups.

34 Herodotus 2.161–3, 169; Diodorus 1.68.1–5.

35 See Legrand (1948) 20–1 on Herodotus 2.164–8.

Ethiopia (Herodotus 2.30–1; Diodorus 1.67.3–7). In fact, under Apries the Libyan, Greek, Asiatic and foreign mercenaries at Elephantine also revolted and threatened to go to Nubia.[36] Controlling troops at the southern border was an issue, regardless of their ethnicity. Herodotus may not have known about this second revolt because it was a minor event, but its absence from his account reinforces the generally favorable tone of his treatment of Greek troops.

(2) In addition, Greek authors seem to have misunderstood or mixed up events following the battle between Apries and Amasis.[37] Apries was still recognized as king at Thebes eight months after the battle(s) of 570 BC (P.BM 10113), which calls Herodotus' report of a total desertion of Apries by the Egyptians into question: "it may even suggest that the perception of Apries' support as essentially Greek was not a universal contemporary one, but the consequence of a vigorous and effective publicity campaign by his victorious opponent."[38] This resolves the apparent contradiction in the Greek authors, who were too credulous of Amasis' propaganda regarding both his accession to the throne and his philhellenic reputation.[39]

2.2.3.2 Mercenary service from Cambyses to the second Persian occupation

During the Persian occupation and the six decades of independence the nature of Greek mercenary service, the mercenaries' loyalty to their employers and the extent to which they played – or did not play – a fundamental role in the history of Egypt were noticeably different. Greek soldiers – this time

[36] See the inscription of Neshor (Louvre A 90) below, note 64; Smoláriková (2008) 40; Lloyd (1988) 170; Leahy (1988) 198. Gozzoli (2006) 177 note 97 thinks that the rebellion against Psamtek reported by Herodotus 2.30–1 in fact refers to the revolt reported in the inscription of Neshor.

[37] See Leahy (1988) and Edel (1978) for the documentary sources on the end of Apries' rule and the role of mercenaries and Egyptian soldiers in the *coup d'état*: a papyrus from Thebes (P.BM 10113, most recently published with an image by Donker van Heel [1996] as P. Louvre Eisenlohr [Diss.] 23); the Elephantine stele of Amasis (Aswan Nubian Museum no. 19 and below, note 64); and a fragment of a religious text (BM 33041) associated with the *Babylonian Chronicle*. See Sack (2004) 137 note 18 and publication in Wiseman (1956) 94–5. In Leahy's judgment, the ancient Greek authors were deceived by Amasis' propaganda, which emphasized his use of Egyptian soldiers against Apries' "privileged" mercenaries.

[38] Leahy (1988) 197.

[39] Amasis – like his predecessors – showed some interest in the Greek world through his alliance with the Cyreneans, his friendship with Polycrates of Samos (Herodotus 3.39–43), and offerings to temples in Greece. But his image as a "philhellene" has certainly been exaggerated. The grant of Naucratis to the Greeks (Herodotus 2.178–80 with Lloyd [1988]), for example, is better seen as restrictive in character, since it was a convenient means of controlling their trading activities.

from mainland Greece – fought on the side of the Egyptian rebels against the Persians, in accord with a general anti-Persian attitude that had spread through the Greek cities, above all Athens. Literary sources are vague about the presence of Greek mercenaries on the Persian side. Herodotus (3.25) reports that Cambyses dismissed the Greek mercenaries he had left in Memphis before going to Ethiopia, but he also claims (3.139) that the Greeks went to Egypt to trade or as mercenaries when Cambyses attacked Egypt.[40] Archaeological and epigraphic evidence shows that Greek and Carian communities remained in Memphis during the Persian period (see 2.2.4.3) and, most important, Greek graffiti carved by mercenaries in the *Memnonion* of Abydos confirm their presence (see 2.2.4.1). But ancient authors insist on the role played by Athenian contingents sent to Egypt during the revolt led by the Libyan king/chief Inaros.[41] Initially successful in Memphis, most of the Athenians on board the two hundred ships died in 454 BC, trapped on the island of Prosopitis. In addition, Megabyzus' Persian forces destroyed sixty vessels.

In this episode a Greek state organized the intervention of Greek soldiers who were motivated not only by Egypt's legendary wealth but by the possibility of acquiring land. Greek military intervention abroad in the fifth century appears to be a mixture of the old and new forms of military service: on the one hand, the old characteristics, such as acquisition of land and long-term settlement, are present, while on the other hand new elements such as money, short-term settlement and organization by the mercenaries' state of origin, become visible. In contrast, there is no hint that the Persians hired Greek mercenaries when they occupied Egypt. Instead, they used the mercenary troops already there and added soldiers from Persia and Southwest Asia. During the Persian wars they mobilized Egyptian troops (Herodotus 7.135; 9.32).

The enrollment of Greek mercenaries increased again under the last Egyptian pharaohs, who used both Greek mercenaries and Egyptian soldiers for military expeditions, for example when Teos attacked the Persians in the late 360s BC. But they also stationed them together in their garrisons, as during the second Persian invasion.[42] Teos hired new mercenaries from the Greek cities and profited from the support of the Spartan king Agesilaus

40 For Laronde (1995) 34–5, Herodotus (3.139) confirms the presence of Greek contingents in the Persian army during Cambyses' campaign. Cambyses sent a Mytilenean ship to negotiate with Psamtek's army, which suggests that he was considering employing Greek mercenaries (Herodotus 3.13).

41 In 460–454 BC: Diodorus 11.71; Thucydides 1.104, 109–10.

42 Diodorus 15.90–2, where Teos is called Tachos; Diodorus 16.49.7 on garrisons.

and 1,000 hoplites as allies. In total, Diodorus reports, Teos accumulated 10,000 *misthophoroi* mercenaries from Greece and 80,000 Egyptian soldiers, although these numbers are probably exaggerated. Whatever the actual number, the author of the *Oeconomica* (25a and b) describes the new fiscal measures Teos developed on the advice of the Athenian general Chabrias to support the expense these troops represented. In his interpretation of the text Agut-Labordère shows that in addition to new taxes on landownership, on sales of grain and on trade, these fiscal reforms targeted temples and their priests: donations to the temples were suppressed unless the priests paid a tax in silver, and orders were issued to reduce the expenses of the temples by 90 percent and to loan the savings to the king.[43] Finally, all precious metal had to be loaned to the king who needed it to mint coins for his mercenaries. Agut-Labordère also suggests that hints of similar measures by Teos' predecessor, Nectanebo I, are visible in Chapter 10 of the *Demotic Chronicle.*

In 343 BC, seventeen years after his coup against Teos, Nectanebo II gathered 20,000 Greek mercenaries, 20,000 Libyans and 60,000 Egyptians to fight Artaxerxes III and his huge army that included 10,000 Greeks.[44] How Nectanebo obtained his Greek mercenaries is not explained, but he probably recruited most of them outside Egypt. Indeed, the number of Greek mercenaries settled in Egypt could not have doubled naturally in twenty years. Moreover, the Greeks fighting for Teos betrayed him when they saw the possibility of returning home with as much wealth as possible.

This raises the question of the loyalty of such troops. The main prejudices regarding mercenary service are that men follow the richest employer, and they shift to the side about to win in order to save their lives and find new work. There is no particular comment in our sources about such behavior during the Twenty-sixth dynasty, and Apries' Ionian and Carian mercenaries, for example, stayed with him until he died. They were integrated into the troops of the new king, probably because they had land allotments in Egypt.

Two cases of treason at the highest level of command are known during the first Persian occupation. Phanes of Halicarnassus, an important mercenary (*epikouros*) serving Amasis, betrayed the Egyptians to join Cambyses and told him the best way to enter Egypt.[45] But Egyptians also cooperated with the enemy, although only after their king was defeated: Udjahorresnet, the Egyptian admiral of Amasis and Psamtek III – or whatever his real and in

43 Agut-Labordère (2011), esp. 632–6; Matthey (2012) 77–80. On Chabrias, see Bianco (2000).

44 Diodorus 16.40–8. On the coup of Nectanebo II, see Matthey (2012) 86–9.

45 Herodotus 3.4 and 3.11.

any case powerful position was – collaborated with the Persians.[46] As a rule, the elite accepted foreign rulers in order to maintain its privileged position.

In the final period of Egyptian independence (404–343 BC), when a high commander decided to join another employer, in general the very enemy he was fighting, his troops often followed him. Agesilaus' betrayal of the ruling king Tachos in favor of Nectanebo II exemplifies such behavior, although Xenophon's account exaggerates the role of Greek mercenaries in the episode.[47] At other times, the initiative to switch to the other side came from the mercenaries themselves, as in the re-conquest of Egypt by the Persians in 343 BC.[48] Once the Egyptian king withdrew to Memphis, the Greeks fighting on Nectanebo's side made a deal with the Greek commander of the mercenaries employed by the Persians, allowing them to be conveyed back to Greece with whatever they could carry. It seems unlikely that the 20,000 Greek mercenaries all went home, but the implication is that fourth-century mercenaries intended to return home once they had acquired some wealth.

While Greek mercenaries sometimes appear unreliable, Egyptian troops were also unpredictable, for example during the previous coup by Nectanebo II.[49] Diodorus (16.49.7–50.3) gives even more details about the invasion of 343 BC: the Greek mercenaries (*misthophoroi*) and Egyptian soldiers (*enchōrious*) garrisoned with them were all ready to betray their king, and a conflict arose between the two groups. As Agut-Labordère rightly argues, the Persian king had strategically announced he would treat soldiers who surrendered well, creating tensions between different groups and thus weakening Nectanebo's army.[50]

Independent of the issue of loyalty/disloyalty, Egyptian kings continually relied on mercenaries as an important, well-trained part of the army during the Late period. In addition, the Athenian general Chabrias might have recommended long-term strategies such as new fortifications of the Pelusiac

46 Cruz-Uribe (2003) 13–15 and bibliography; Chevereau (2001) 330–1. See Chapter 7, section 7.2.2.

47 Xenophon, *Agesilaus* 2.28–31. Diodorus (15.92.4–5) and Plutarch (*Agesilaus* 37.3–38), by contrast, insist on the Egyptian troops' support for Nectanebo, as a sort of "remake" of the civil war between Apries and Amasis. Diodorus later stresses that the support of Agesilaus and his 1,000 soldiers (*stratiōtai*) saved Nectanebo II in his fight against a usurper. To what extent Agesilaus and his 1,000 Greeks could have such an impact on the outcome of the events remains uncertain.

48 Diodorus 16.40–51.

49 Diodorus 15.92 and Lloyd (2000) 380, who calls the Egyptian soldiers *machimoi*, whereas Diodorus does not.

50 Agut-Labordère (2008) emphasizes that the troops were not fighting for a "common ideal" but for their own interests; Kahn and Tammuz (2008) 56 stress the king's successful strategy.

mouth of the Nile under Nectanebo.[51] Yet several elements in Herodotus' and Diodorus' narratives suggest that they exaggerated the impact Greeks had on political events in Egypt. First, the numbers they offer are unreliable. Second, they suppose that the good treatment granted to Greek mercenaries by the pharaohs made Egyptian soldiers jealous, and that this in turn caused the departure of 240,000 *machimoi* under Psamtek I and the revolt of the *machimoi* under Apries. Finally, Greek mercenaries or allies always fight well, often win, and, if not, switch to the side of the victor in time. In the worst case, the victorious opponent re-employs them, for example in the conflict between Apries and Amasis, or they are sent home, as probably by Cambyses and after the conquest of 343 BC.

2.2.4 Provenance and distribution

Our knowledge of the provenance and settlement of mercenaries can be refined in the light of epigraphic and archaeological evidence. While literary sources mention only Greek and Carian mercenaries – perhaps 30,000 in the sixth century (Herodotus 2.163) – and a "Tyrian Camp" (Herodotus 2.112.2), other evidence attests mercenaries from Phoenicia, Syria and Judea during the Twenty-sixth dynasty.[52] During the Persian occupation, Cypriots, Elamites, Cilicians, Persians, Arabs and Babylonians can be added to the list.[53] Finally, in the last decades of independence soldiers also came from mainland Greece, and Diodorus mentions a large number of Libyans.[54] These men were mainly settled in the Delta, in Memphis or in Abydos, or they stayed temporarily in Thebes, Buhen or Abu Simbel.[55]

The number of mercenaries remained small compared with the population of Egypt as a whole. They did not have much effect on the land where they settled or on Egyptian culture, but cross-cultural exchange did occur. For example, the Greeks, like any foreign settlers, were permitted to build temples for their gods, and they imported and traded Greek goods, as numerous amphorae show. Some lived in Naucratis, which over time acquired the main features of a Greek polis, or in the Greek quarter of the

51 Kahn and Tammuz (2008) 54 and 58, on the basis of Diodorus 15.42 and the name of the fortress near Pelusium, "Chabriou Charax."

52 Vittmann (2003) 44–119.

53 Vittmann (2003) 120–54, 180–93; Kaplan (2003) 9–10; Kuhrt (1995) 696.

54 It goes without saying that Libyan mercenaries were already hired during the New Kingdom (Spalinger [2005] 271–2) and formed a powerful political force in the Third Intermediate period.

55 For the Saite forts, see Smoláriková (2008). For bibliography on the location of the garrisons in Egypt during the Persian occupation, see Cruz-Uribe (2003) 40 notes 144 and 145.

Hellenomemphitai in Memphis. The overview of the provenance and distribution of mercenaries that follows offers elements of comparison with the later composition and organization of the Ptolemaic army. At the same time, evidence of multilingualism, intermarriage, respect for different religious beliefs, and economic activity reflected in contracts between foreigners and Egyptians suggests that these communities were assimilated to different degrees according to time, place and circumstance.[56] On a spectrum with complete assimilation at one end and no assimilation at the other, Arameans and Carians show a strong pattern of assimilation, while Greeks and Jews assimilate to a lesser degree, notably because they maintained their own languages.

2.2.4.1 Epigraphic evidence for Greeks in Egypt

The earliest attestation of Ionian mercenary service in Egypt independent of Herodotus' account may be a Greek inscription on an Egyptian "statue cube" found in Priene in Ionia, which records the reward given to the Greek Pedon, a mercenary who probably served as military governor in Egypt.[57] Masson and Yoyotte date the monument to the reign of Psamtek I (664–610 BC), but Vittmann suggests a later date, in the final years of Psamtek I or under Psamtek II.[58] Agut-Labordère reconciles these views by assuming that Pedon obtained the statue under Psamtek I but had it engraved under Psamtek II.[59]

The earliest epigraphic evidence for Greek mercenary service in Egypt would seem to be the seven graffiti carved by Ionian and Dorian mercenaries of Psamtek II in 591 BC, as they were returning from an expedition to Nubia.[60] These inscriptions provide information about the organization of the army in the Twenty-sixth dynasty and the role of the Greek mercenaries, in particular the longest one, which was published by Bernand and Masson, and later by Meiggs and Lewis with minor changes (Text 2.1 below). The word *alloglōssoi*, also found in Herodotus, is used to designate the

[56] Kaplan (2003). Ray (1992), by contrast, sees the Jews as an exception to the pattern of assimilation.

[57] *SEG* XXXVII 994; succinct *editio princeps* by Şahin (1987) with tables 1–3; Hauben (2001) 53 note 1 and 70–1; Agut-Labordère (2012b). For the Greeks in Egypt in the Late period, see Vittmann (2003) 194–235; Haider (1996) 95–115.

[58] Masson and Yoyotte (1988) 171–80; Vittmann (2003) 203–6.

[59] Agut-Labordère (2012b) 294.

[60] Vittmann (2003) 200–2; Hauben (2001); Haider (1996) 104–11; A. Bernand and Masson (1957) 1–20.

Text 2.1. *Greek inscription from Abu Simbel, 591 BC*

Meiggs and Lewis (1989) no. 7a	Translation by Meiggs and Lewis (1989) with modifications
Βασιλέος ἐλθόντος ἐς Ἐλεφαντίναν Ψαματίχο, ταῦτα ἔγραψαν τοὶ σὺν Ψαμματίχοι τõι Θεοκλõς ἔπλεον, ἦλθον δὲ Κέρκιος κατύπερθε, υἷς ὁ πόταμος ἀνίη· ἀλογλόσος δ᾽ ἦχε Ποτασιμτο, Αἰγυπτίος δὲ Ἄμασις ἔγραφε δ᾽ ἁμὲ Ἄρχον Ἀμοιβίχο καὶ Πέλεϙος Οὐδάμο	When King Psamtek came to Elephantine, those who sailed with Psammetichus son of Theocles wrote this; they came above Kerkis as far as the river allowed; Potasimto had command of those of foreign speech and Amasis of the Egyptians; and Archon the son of Amoibichos wrote us, along with Peloqos the son of Eudamos.

Table 2.1. *Commanders under Psamtek II after Hauben*

Psamtek II	Supreme chief of the expedition (stays in Elephantine)
Psammetichos, son of Theocles	Commander in chief of the Nubian expedition
Amasis	General of the Egyptian infantry troops on the ships[a]
Potasimto	General of the "foreign" (*alloglōsoi*) infantry troops on the ships
Anaxanor of Ialysos (Rhodian)	Commander of some infantry troops

[a] Amasis and Potasimto were *mr mnfyt* ("head of the troops, head of the infantry"), while Potasimto was also found as *mr ḫꜣstyw* ("chief of the foreign unit"), *ḫrp ḫꜣstyw* ("commander of the foreign unit") and *mr Ḥꜣw-nbwt* ("chief of the unit of the *Ḥꜣw-nbwt*"); see Hauben (2001) 61–2 note 43 and 66 note 69. For the meaning of *Ḥꜣw-nbwt*, see below and note 65.

mercenaries as "those who speak a foreign language."[61] The Greek mercenaries were not the only *alloglōssoi*, and other soldiers in fact carved their names at Abu Simbel.

Hauben's new interpretation of the military ranks of the officers in this inscription is given in Table 2.1 above. Hauben rehabilitated the Greek Psammetichos as the head of the expedition, contrary to the subaltern role assigned to him by the original editors.[62] Below Psammetichos were the

[61] Herodotus 2.154. For *alloglōssos* and the question of the acculturation of Greeks in Egypt, see Vëïsse (2007a); Hauben (2001) 65–9, 71–7. Hauben shows that the use of this term by the Greeks themselves does not mark any cultural uprooting, *contra* Bertrand (1992) 36.

[62] Hauben (2001) reinterpreted Bernand and Masson's understanding of the functions and ranks of the different officers. Psammetichos was the supreme chief of the expedition because of the

Egyptian generals Potasimto and Amasis, the former in charge of the foreign troops, the latter of the Egyptians. As literary sources suggest, the high command could thus be Greek. Yet Egyptians like Potasimto or Bakenrenef, who belonged to a priestly family from the Delta and was chief commander (*ḥry mšʿ*) of the Greeks, could lead foreign troops.[63] The army was organized in two large sections, the Egyptian units and the foreign troops, although we do not know the size of either. On the basis of the graffiti, Bernand and Masson doubt that there were more foreign mercenaries than Egyptian soldiers. Soldiers from distant areas in the Mediterranean probably wanted to leave a written trace of themselves at this remote and impressive site.

According to an inscription from the first year of Amasis, King Apries employed men from *Ḥꜣw nbwt* (vocalized conventionally *Ha-u-nebut*), a term some have interpreted to mean the Aegean islands and their inhabitants, but also including Carians.[64] The meaning of the expression is debated, and it might in fact have designated immigrants who settled in the northwest Delta, whatever their provenance at different points in Egyptian history, and thus may not have meant specifically "Greek" before its use in the hieroglyphic texts of the Ptolemaic period.[65] If the Greek historians mentioned only Greek and Carian mercenaries, this was probably owing to Hellenocentrism rather than to the way the Egyptians described their army. Apries, for example, also employed "Asiatics," which could include Jews, Arameans, Phoenicians and others. Moreover, the existence of mercenaries of different origins is archaeologically attested, as the following subsections show.

The inscriptions of the so-called *Memnonion* of Abydos represent the largest group of graffiti carved by mercenaries.[66] They date to the first Persian occupation, most of them to late fifth century BC. A variety of foreigners served in the Egyptian army at this time: Greeks, Carians, Phoenicians

central role of the fleet and the lack of space in the hierarchy for him as general, since Egyptian sources show that the Egyptian Amasis and Potasimto were generals. Bernand and Masson, on the other hand, believed that the Greek Psammetichos had subaltern roles as technician for the fleet. Agut-Labordère (2012b) 299 regards both hypotheses as possible but stresses in any case the key role of Psammetichos.

63 Chevereau (2001) 312–13 gives a list of the titles held by Egyptian commanders in charge of the mercenaries. For Bakenrenef, see statue Zagazig 121 and Guermeur (2006) 117.

64 See the inscription of Neshor (Louvre A 90 with bibliography in Gozzoli (2006) 177 note 97) discussed by Lloyd (1988) 180, and the Elephantine stele (or stele of regnal year I of Amasis, Aswan Nubian Museum no. 19 with bibliography in Gozzoli (2006) 101–2 note 58) discussed by Lloyd (1975b) 59 and note 117. But Lloyd accepts that "from at least the Middle Kingdom it was essentially a generic geographical term applied to the peoples living to the N. and N.E. of Egypt and throughout later Egyptian history it retained that general sense."

65 Nibbi (1975) 51–8; Vandersleyen (1988) 196–8; (1992) 570 note 2; (1999) 69–72.

66 The *Memnonion* was originally the funerary temple of Seti I; see Pedrizet and Lefèbvre (1978).

and Cypriots. Unlike literary sources, epigraphic evidence demonstrates the presence of Greek mercenaries under the Persian occupation. In addition, some of the graffiti indicate the place of residence of the mercenaries in Egypt: Timarchos from Daphnae (no. 614) and Chariandos son of Straton from Memphis (no. 536). They also provide evidence for a Cretan garrison in Egypt, whose mercenaries may have helped Amyrtaeus put an end to the first Persian occupation.

2.2.4.2 Main Greek settlements

The spread of garrisons with foreign mercenaries and the places by which they passed are known because of inscriptions of this kind. Yet only Herodotus and Diodorus provide any hint of the number of settled mercenaries during the Saite period: Apries employed 30,000 Ionian and Carian mercenaries against Amasis and his Egyptian troops in 570 BC.[67] This figure may again be an exaggeration, for the numbers of mercenaries given by Diodorus for the fourth century are lower.[68] Whatever the case, 30,000 Greek and Carian mercenaries represent at best a maximum for the sixth century BC. Herodotus is the only source for the amount of land they received. He reports 12 arouras per man, which would amount to a total of 1,000 km^2, perhaps 5 percent of the cultivable land in Egypt.[69] These numbers are probably inaccurate, but Greek ceramics have been found in some places 20 kilometers from Daphnae.

The military settlements where Greeks lived – the Ionian and Carian "camps" in Daphnae, Naucratis and Tell el-Balamun – were called the *Stratopeda* ("Camps"). There were also settlements in Migdol, in Tell Mogdam/Leontopolis, in the fortress of Rhakotis (in the area of the future Alexandria) and in Memphis.[70] Greek troops were also stationed outside the Delta, in Thebes, Abu Simbel, the Kharga Oasis and perhaps in the still unlocated Greek settlement of Neapolis mentioned by Herodotus (2.91), who reports that it was established close to Achmim. The degree of acculturation varied from place to place and from ethnic group to ethnic group and is difficult to reconstruct from the small amount of material. In Naucratis,

67 Herodotus 2.163; Diodorus 1.68.

68 Diodorus 15.92.2: 10,000; 16.44.1–4: 10,000; 16.47.5–6: 20,000; 16.48: 5,000.

69 $30{,}000 \times 0.033\ km^2 = 990\ km^2$; 20,000 km^2 of cultivable land is the amount usually accepted for the Ptolemaic period; see Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 101; Manning (2003) 107 and note 49; Scheidel (2001) 220–3. If the Egyptians were jealous of the mercenaries, as Herodotus suggests (2.161–2), the latter must have received at least approximately the same amount of land as Egyptian soldiers.

70 Vittmann (2003) 223; Haider (1996) 98, 99, with a map of the Greek sites around 620 BC.

for example, intermarriage between Greeks and Egyptians was perhaps forbidden, although the ban was probably established only once the place became a polis.[71] Memphis, by contrast, was the epitome of a cosmopolitan city. Papyri from the sixth to the early third centuries BC found in Saqqara, the Memphite necropolis, contain Iranian and even Greek names in lists and legal documents full of Egyptian names and mention foreigners whose children bear Egyptian names, suggesting that intermarriage played a role in the process of acculturation.[72] Inter-ethnic marriage involved foreign men and Egyptian women, who usually gave Egyptian names to their children. When marriages between foreigners occurred, their children could receive an Egyptian name and follow certain Egyptian traditions, as the sarcophagus of Wahibre-em-Achet, whose parents were Greek, shows. They could also have a foreign name or a double name.[73] Vittmann and Lloyd both surmise that intermarriage between foreign mercenaries and Egyptian women was common, while Vittmann emphasizes the participation of Phoenicians, Greeks and Carians in Egyptian religious activities.[74]

The *Stratopeda* (the "Camps") and Daphnae. The sites of the *Stratopeda* mentioned by Herodotus (2.154) and Diodorus (1.67) have never been precisely identified. Whether they were close to Daphnae (Tell Defenneh) in the Eastern Delta or Migdol in Sinai is debated.[75] Lloyd questioned this hypothesis, because these sites have material from the time of Amasis, when the Greeks had supposedly been transferred to Memphis.[76] Recently, Spencer identified Herodotus' *Stratopeda* with the tower-like brick structures of Tell el-Balamun, Naucratis and Daphnae.[77] According to him, all of them were fortified camps, although they were actually barracks serving as watchtowers and redoubts, and not elaborate forts as in Migdol.

Whatever the exact location of the *Stratopeda* in the Delta, the settlements of Daphnae, known as a garrison to Herodotus (2.30), have Greek material from the expected period.[78] Daphnae was strategically located at the Syrian

71 Our source is a Roman papyrus, W.Chr. 27, ll. 20–4 (Antinoopolis, after 161 AD), which contrasts the right of marrying Egyptians granted to the citizens of Antinoopolis by Hadrian with the lack of this right in Naucratis.

72 H. S. Smith (1992).

73 Vittmann (2003) 203, 239–41 and table 21 for the sarcophagus.

74 Vittmann (2003) 224, 241–8 also suggests that Greeks usually did not speak Egyptian – surprising if intermarriage was frequent – and that tensions could arise, as between Jews and Egyptians in Elephantine (see below, section 2.2.4.4). Lloyd (1969) explains the Greek games of Neapolis in honor of Perseus-Horus (Herodotus 2.91) as the result of intermarriage between Greek settlers and Egyptian women.

75 For the excavations at Migdol, see Oren (1983). For Tell Defenneh, see Petrie *et al.* (1888); Weber (2006) 145. For the state of research on the site, Carrez-Maratray (1999) 274–86.

76 Lloyd (1988) 137.

77 Spencer (1996) 56–8 and plates 30–9.

78 Smoláriková (2008) 78–82; Lawrence (1965) 93.

entrance into Egypt, in a plain that already contained a fortress from the Ramesside period.[79] The site is large enough for 20,000 people. In addition, Rhodian and Samian ceramics from the sixth century BC were found in the area, along with ceramics different from those found in Naucratis, which suggested to Austin that the sites were independent. Bronze and iron weapons have also been discovered at Daphnae, and pottery finds end around 525 BC, certainly in connection with the Persian invasion. That the site was abandoned is uncertain, however, since a Greek mercenary from Daphnae left a graffito in the *Memnonion* of Abydos in the late fifth century BC, as noted above.[80]

Memphis. According to Herodotus (2.154) and Diodorus (1.67), Amasis (570–526 BC) transferred the Ionian and Carian mercenaries from the *Stratopeda* to Memphis. But the settlements of those who would be called *Hellenomemphitai* and *Karomemphitai* existed earlier, for Greek pottery is attested from the sixth or even the late seventh century BC.[81] Like other foreign populations in Egypt, Greeks built sanctuaries that played a central role in their local organization and may help to explain the survival of their communities until the Hellenistic period.[82]

Naucratis. The "foundation" of the oldest Greek city in Egypt, Naucratis, about fifty miles southeast of the future Alexandria, is far from understood.[83] Herodotus claims that Amasis (570–526 BC) granted the city to the Greeks who came to Egypt, but the archaeological material shows a Hellenic presence already in the middle of the seventh century BC, and the remains of four temples are dated to the seventh and sixth centuries BC.[84] Amasis may thus have codified an already existing situation, and the *Hellenion* may date to his time.

The supposed foundation of the city by Miletus during the reign of Psamtek, reported by Strabo (17.1.17), is certainly a groundless later claim. It is clear from Herodotus himself that the permission of the pharaoh was needed for Greeks to settle there. During the Late period, Egyptians also lived in Naucratis and the pharaoh controlled Greek commerce, as the

[79] Laronde (1995) 32–3; Boardman (1999) 133–4; Verreth (2009) 200–1, 206–7. Daphnae is located 17 miles southeast of Tanis and 45 miles northwest of Bubastis.

[80] Austin (1970) 20–1.

[81] Lloyd (1988) 137–8; Boardman (1999) 134–5. For the late seventh century, see Smoláriková (2003); Austin (1970) 20.

[82] Thompson (1988), esp. 83–4, 93–7.

[83] The bibliography on the archaeology of Naucratis is enormous. For an updated survey, see Villing and Schlotzhauer (2006); Vittmann (2003) 213–20, 301–3; Möller (2000). See also Boardman (1999) 117–33; Muhs (1994); Lloyd (1988) 222–31; Austin (1970) 22–33.

[84] Herodotus 2.178–9.

Naucratis stele records.[85] Austin reminds us that Naucratis was simultaneously a polis and an *emporion*, filled with Greeks from a multitude of cities, presumably from Asia Minor.[86] When Naucratis became a polis, however, is debated – this is not the place for a discussion of the dating of its many temples and finds – and the organization of Greek mercenaries there remains obscure.[87]

Elephantine. If Greek and Carian troops were here in the time of Apries, either the evidence is incomplete or they were removed sometime before the Persian period.[88] No Carian or Ionian mercenaries are mentioned in the fifth-century Aramaic papyri of the Jewish garrison in Elephantine, but there were Greek shipowners.[89]

2.2.4.3 Carians

The history of the Carians, a people from southwest Anatolia whose writing can now be transliterated but only partially read, remains difficult to trace.[90] The epigraphic and archaeological material of Carian mercenaries and settlers in Egypt is essential to the study of the people, for its quality and quantity is much superior to evidence from Caria itself.[91] Ever since antiquity the Carians have been considered a military society, and "Carian"

85 Lichtheim (1980) 86–9; Vittmann (2003) 218–19. Both agree that the decree of Nectanebo II attests that one-tenth of the tax on all goods – not one-tenth of all goods – was given to the temple of Neith. A new copy (SCA 277) has been found in the underwater excavation of the temple of Heracles in Heracleion-Thonis, east of Canopus; see Goddio (2007), esp. 74, 77 and figs. 3.25–3.27; Yoyotte in Goddio and Clauss (2006) 316–21.

86 Austin (1970) 30 explains that "the first [was] composed of citizens resident on the spot, the second of foreigners not included in the civic organization, although the latter were most probably the initial cause of the growth of the Greek Naucratis and were granted important privileges."

87 On the use of the term "polis" for Naucratis, see Bresson (2000) 51–84. Villing and Schlotzhauer (2006) 5 explain that the Great Temenos was perhaps "a much earlier fort for an Egyptian garrison established by Psamtek I (and restored by Ptolemy when he was satrap)."

88 Austin (1970) 19–20.

89 Kaplan (2003) 17 note 77.

90 See Adiego Lajara (2007), esp. 166–97, for a history of the decipherment; Kammerzell (1993), (2001). For the new bilingual inscription found at Kaunos in Caria, see Frei and Marek (1997), (1998); Adiego Lajara (2007) 295–300; Ray (1982).

91 For an updated survey with good illustrations and bibliography, see Vittmann (2003) 155–79, 300–1. For recent archaeological finds, see Williams and Villing (2006). For the new edition of the Carian inscriptions of Egypt, see Adiego Lajara (2007) 30–128. The standard edition of Carian inscriptions in Buhen and North Saqqara was Masson *et al.* (1978). For Carian inscriptions elsewhere in Egypt, Masson (1969); Ray (1994) 55; (1995). Concerning the existence of a Caromemphite community until the Hellenistic period, see Thompson (1988) index under "Carian"; C. J. Martin (1991). Ancient sources on the Carians in Egypt: Herodotus 2.152; Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.2.17; 1.5.7; 1.8.12; Polyaenus, *Stratagems* 7.3.

became a synonym for "mercenary" at the end of the seventh century BC.[92] This can be explained by the limited agricultural opportunities in their country.

The earliest object with Carian writing and hieroglyphs was found in Sais and bears the cartouche of Psamtek I.[93] But the bulk of the epigraphic and archaeological material comes from the Baboon Catacombs in North Saqqara and concerns the Caromemphite community in Memphis.[94] These are mainly funerary steles and false doors, which had been reused or dumped ready for reuse and were originally from the cemetery of the Caromemphite colony, which has not been located but is known from Greek sources.[95] Most of the steles can be dated stylistically to roughly 550–500 BC and thus confirm the literary sources concerning the transfer of Carian mercenaries to Memphis by Amasis (570–528 BC). But this relocation may merely correspond to a new influx of immigrants in that period, since mid-seventh-century documents suggest an initial establishment of Carians who probably assimilated quickly. From a stylistic analysis of the votive images on some of the steles, we can also conclude that the Carian cemetery was looted around 380–343 BC (*terminus ante quem*), or perhaps around 404 BC as vengeance on the Carian mercenaries working for the Persians.[96]

This material, in particular the false doors from Carian tombs – uncommon during the Twenty-sixth and Twenty-seventh dynasties – demonstrates a mix of Greco-Asiatic and Egyptian styles.[97] Masson conjectures that these steles reminded the Carians of their rock tombs in Asia Minor, which could have a similar appearance. In any case, the Carian material reveals strong assimilationist tendencies.[98] Other Carian inscriptions have been found throughout Egypt. The oldest are the graffiti in Abu Simbel dated to 591 BC, the time of the expedition to Nubia by Psamtek II mentioned by Herodotus.[99] Traces of Carians – certainly mercenaries – have been found in Buhen, in Silsile, in Thebes on the tomb of Mentuemhat, in Hou and in

[92] A typical Carian crested helmet was drawn on an ostracon from the archive of Hor; see Ray (1976) no. 35; Vittmann (2003) 158, with a good illustration (fig. 72).

[93] Masson (1969) 35–6; Kaplan (2003) 6–7.

[94] For the Caromemphites in the Late period and in Ptolemaic times, see Thompson (1988) 93–5.

[95] The longer inscriptions in Carian cannot be deciphered because they are not exactly equivalent to the hieroglyphic ones, but they apparently contain names, patronymics, ethnics and professions, and four steles have Egyptianizing votive images; see Masson *et al.* (1978) 16–19. The inscriptions have recently been republished in Adiego Lajara (2007) 34–79.

[96] H. S. Smith, foreword to Masson *et al.* (1978).

[97] For example, stele no. 3, for which we have no Carian parallel, with a young man and a girl greeting one other, certainly two Carians from Memphis. See Masson *et al.* (1978) 7.

[98] Ray (1995) 1190b–1191a.

[99] Herodotus 2.161.

Abydos on the *Memnonion.*[100] Inscriptions in Carian and hieroglyphs discovered in Sais on two votive offerings perhaps date to the reign of Psamtek I (664–609 BC). By the end of the fourth century BC, however, Carian inscriptions disappear. The Carians had probably merged with the more numerous Greek-speaking settlers, except for the descendants of Caromemphites still living in Hellenistic Memphis.[101]

2.2.4.4 A Jewish garrison in Elephantine

Jews and other Southwest Asian settlers served as garrison troops under the Persians, notably in Hermopolis and Memphis.[102] The best-documented of these garrisons is that at Elephantine where, according to the Jewish settlers, their temple was constructed even before the Persian occupation.[103] Fifth-century Aramaic papyri offer glimpses of the daily life of the Jewish mercenaries and their families, for example how they received rations from the provincial storehouse.[104] One violent episode reported by the settlers was the destruction of their temple by the priests of Khnum in 410 BC. The Jewish community petitioned the Persian and Judean authorities and asked to reconstruct their temple, mentioning that there would be no "sheep, ox or goats as burnt-offering."[105] They finally received authorization. Either there had been religious tensions about the animals worshiped by the priests of Khnum, or burnt offerings were supposed to be made only in the Temple in Jerusalem. Other scholars propose that the dispute in fact concerned property rights over land;[106] the failure of the Jewish community to display documents attesting their rights would have initially led the Persian governor to destroy the temple. In any case, the reason for the dispute remains unclear. The final Aramaic document from this archive is dated to 400 BC, suggesting that four years after the expulsion of the Persians, the community began to disintegrate.[107] Even if the Jewish settlers were still in contact with Jerusalem and were less inclined to religious syncretism than other foreign communities, their exception to the pattern of assimilation seems to have

100 About thirty graffiti from the fifth century BC; see note 96.

101 Ray (1995) 1193a.

102 Thompson (1988) 85, 97–9 and (2009) 396–9.

103 Porten (1996) B19, l. 13; B 20, l. 12; B21, ll. 4–5; Kaplan (2003) 8.

104 Kuhrt (1995) 690–1 provides further documents and a bibliography; Porten (1968), (1996).

105 Porten (1996) B22, ll. 9–10 for the quotation; B21, ll. 9–11, commentary *ad loc.* and note 12.

106 Porten (1996) 84; Briant (1996) 620–2, 1008 with bibliography on the dispute between the temple of Khnum and the Jews; Mysliwiec (2000) 156; Lloyd (1983) 317.

107 Porten (1996) B51. Aramaic papyri are still found in the Ptolemaic period; see e.g. Porten and Yardeni (1986) vol. III, C3. 28, where the name Arsinoe is attested (verso, col. VII, l. 82), C3.29; Tcherikover and Fuks (1957) 30 and note 76. Briant (1996) 654 extrapolates from the latter document that the Jewish soldiers supported the native pharaohs.

been exaggerated.[108] The Jewish archive of Elephantine also offers evidence of social bonds with other foreigners and with Egyptians: the other party or witnesses in contracts were from different ethnic groups, oaths to "the gods" show respect for diverse religious traditions, and even intermarriage occurred.[109]

2.2.4.5 Cypriots

The first interaction between Egypt and Cyprus during the first millennium BC dates to the Egyptian domination of the island under Amasis and is marked by the existence of Cypro-Egyptian sculpture.[110] Epigraphic evidence and hints in Hecataeus' account support this chronology. On the basis of the sculptures found in Naucratis from the sixth century BC, Davies argues that Cypriot penetration in Egypt was greater than commonly thought. Most Cypriot sculptures were found in the sanctuary of Aphrodite, one of the first constructions in Naucratis.[111] Yet the Cypriots who settled there were probably traders, and they seem to have mixed with other foreign and Egyptian residents.

The first mention of Cypriot mercenaries is found in the account of Cambyses' conquest of Egypt (Herodotus 3.19). Graffiti from the fifth and fourth centuries BC left by travelers and mercenaries using the Cypriot syllabic writing confirm the employment of Cypriot mercenaries in Egypt from around Cambyses' time.[112] They indicate the presence of Cypriots in several places: around the Great Pyramid of Giza, at the *Memnonion* of Abydos and at a little temple in the sanctuary of Karnak. The graffiti on the latter two buildings probably date to the fourth century BC, when Evagoras of Salamis was in contact with Kings Akoris and Nectanebo.[113]

2.3 Egyptian soldiers and the organization of the army

Egyptian soldiers constituted the largest part of the Late period army and were in fact mostly of Libyan origin, although there were also soldiers

108 Ray (1992) and (1994) 56 considers the Jews an exception because of their tighter family structure, the maintenance of links with their homeland, and the codification of Jewish scripture.

109 Kaplan (2003) 17–21; e.g. Porten (1996) B28, B50, B52 (oaths), B36.

110 Herodotus 2.182; Diodorus 1.68. For the Cypriots in Egypt, see W. Davies (1980) 7–19; Masson (1971) 28–46; Austin (1970) 32.

111 This suggests that Cypriots were involved in the first activities (or appearance of activities) by the Greeks in this city, although Herodotus 2.178 does not mention Cypriot cities among those that supposedly "founded" Naucratis.

112 Two graffiti may come from an earlier period; see Kaplan (2003) 11.

113 Diodorus 15.3; 15.29.1.

of Nubian origin.[114] Far less is known about their role and organization, because of the Greek historians' specific interest in Greek mercenaries. Ancient authors refer to Egyptian soldiers simply as Egyptians or *machimoi* (μάχιμοι).[115] Herodotus (2.164–6, 168; 9.32) describes these *machimoi* as a warrior class and provides an inaccurate account that long obscured our understanding of the Egyptian army in the Late period, as I have shown elsewhere.[116] When read against the Egyptian sources, only a few elements of Herodotus' narrative reflect the actual organization of the army, and with various degrees of distortion. First, in contrast to Herodotus' statement (2.164–5), there was no concept of class within Egyptian society, and no population group was obligated to devote its time exclusively to military matters. This reflects an idealization of Egyptian society by Greek authors and an illusion about similarities between Sparta and Egypt.[117] Yet some Egyptian soldiers did receive land in exchange for military service, as Herodotus explains (2.168), although they were not all granted 12 arouras and their land was not tax-exempt.[118] Second, only a very few soldiers held the titles that are at the origin of Herodotus' two groups of *machimoi*, the *kalasiries* (Demotic *gl-šr.w* or *gr-šr.w* vocalized *gel-sher-u* or *ger-sher-u*) and the *hermotybies* (Demotic *rmt-ḏm.w* vocalized *remet-djem-u*).[119] That said, Egyptian sources imply that the *gl-šr.w* and *rmt-ḏm.w* had functions similar to those of policemen, guards or soldiers and were granted land. Third, the number of Egyptian soldiers never reached a total of 410,000 divided into 160,000 *hermotybies* and 250,000 *kalasiries* (Herodotus 2.165–6). Moreover, Herodotus or his sources omitted other categories of soldiers, some professional troops and some men belonging to a type of militia mobilized when needed. The organization of the troops by nome suggested by Herodotus might nonetheless be accurate.

114 Lloyd (1983) 309 and (1988) 184. On Nubians, see Winnicki (1977) 258.

115 Herodotus (7.185) also uses this word for the troops coming from Asia on the Persian side in 480 BC. The military events in which the native army took part were mentioned above in the survey of the mercenaries' actions; see Smoláriková (2008) 17–44; Chevereau (2001) 305–9, 333–4; Winnicki (1985) 42–6.

116 Fischer-Bovet (2013), with exhaustive bibliography. See mainly Lloyd (1988) on Herodotus 2.164–8; Lloyd (1983); Winnicki (1977), (1998).

117 Herodotus 2.167; Lloyd (1988) 183; Haziza (2009) 159–63.

118 The distribution of equal plots is probably one of the Spartan features attributed to the *machimoi*; see Lloyd (2002a) 428. P.Ashm. 1984.87 (521 BC) shows that land granted to *hermotybies* was subject to a tax; see the forthcoming new edition of the text by Vittmann, previously published by Cruz-Uribe (2004).

119 Herodotus 2.164; 9.32 καλασίρεις and ἑρμοτύβεις. For *gl-šr*, see Winnicki (1977), (1985), (1986), (1992b), (1998); Vittmann (1999) 120–3. For the etymology of *rmt-ḏm* and its occurrences in the papyri, see Thissen (1994) 89–91; Vittmann (1998) 554.

An important development in the army in the Late period – during the reign of Necho II (610–595 BC) according to Herodotus (2.159) – is the construction of two fleets, one in the Mediterranean and the other in the Red Sea.[120] Egyptian soldiers were active on these warships, although whether the ships were really triremes and whether Greeks or Phoenicians built them is debated.[121] Chevereau suggests that Amasis took Cyprus with a fleet composed of native troops, because Herodotus would have mentioned Greek troops if they were involved. Egyptian sources do indeed attest several commanders of the fleet.[122] Under Persian rule, the Egyptian fleet and at least some Egyptian soldiers were integrated into the Persian army. Herodotus portrays the *hermotybies* and *kalasiries* fighting on the Persian side at the battle of Plataea (479 BC) as saber-bearers (*machairophoroi*/μαχαιροφόροι) belonging to marines or infantry troops on ships (*epibatai*/ἐπιβάται, Herodotus 9.32). He previously described the equipment of Egyptian troops – he does not use the term *machimos* – on two hundred ships fighting for Xerxes (Herodotus 7.89): "on their heads they wore knitted helmets; they carried hollow shields with broad rims, naval spears and large battle-axes. The majority wore breastplates and carried huge knives (μάχαιραι)."[123] Part of this equipment resembles that of Greek hoplites and of the Persian king's Egyptian troops, described as hoplites by Xenophon at the battle of Cunaxa in 401 BC.[124] The Egyptian soldiers in Plataea were infantry on ships Mardonius added to his battle line; those under Artaxerxes II also seem to have fought in some kind of phalanx formation. This might show that the military equipment and techniques used by foreign mercenaries in Egypt were to some extent adopted by native troops.[125]

[120] Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 66–8; Chevereau (2001) 319–22; Agut-Labordère (forthcoming).

[121] Lloyd (1975a) 32–8.

[122] Chevereau (2001) 321, 324–5, although the small number of them active under Psamtek I were probably leading ships for transport and warships. But the chief commander of the fleet is not Egyptian under Persian rule.

[123] Translated by Purvis in Strassler and Purvis (2007).

[124] Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.8.9 " . . . hoplites (ὁπλῖται) with wooden shields which reached to their feet, these latter being Egyptians, people said", translated by Brownson (1922); Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 7.1.33–4. These Egyptians had remained in the Persian army after the expulsion of the Persians from Egypt (*Cyropaedia* 7.1.45); Rahe (1980) 84 note 14.

[125] One cannot be certain that these troops fought in a cohesive linear formation corresponding to the Greek classical phalanx; as Wheeler (2007) 192–3 emphasizes, "phalanx" had several meanings and not all linear formations of heavy infantry constituted a phalanx *stricto sensu*. Antecedents of the Greek phalanx are found in the Near East, and Schulman (1995) gives examples of the New Kingdom Egyptian phalanx formation at the battle of Qadesh.

Recruitment of Egyptians in the Late period still took place as in the previous period. Towns mobilized a militia for their own protection and had to provide men to the pharaoh when needed, as the stele of the year nine of Psamtek I attests in the case of a Libyan threat.[126] But part of the army, perhaps 10 percent, was also made up of Egyptian professional soldiers.[127] As noted above, under the Saite dynasty Egyptian troops fought sometimes on the same side as foreign mercenaries, at other times against them. As to the garrisons, rulers did not rely only on mercenaries but also used Egyptian soldiers, for example in Elephantine, where mercenaries speaking Semitic languages later joined them. There were Egyptian "commanders of the borders," who were also in charge of garrisons.[128] Garrisons with Greek and Egyptian troops under the last native pharaoh might in fact reflect common practice.

Overall, our knowledge of the organization of the army is limited: troops were grouped according to the soldiers' origins, with officers belonging to the same ethnic groups; the high command was often but not exclusively Egyptian; and over time the military hierarchy became top-heavy.[129] The extent of continuity between the organization and the personnel of the Late period army and that of the Ptolemaic army is thus difficult to assess. The following chapters show that concepts such as the division of the army according to ethnic groups and grants of land in exchange for military service persisted, although these were not exclusively Egyptian ideas. Unsurprisingly, the location of the main garrisons remained the same, except for the addition of a garrison in Alexandria, the new capital.

When the Persians successfully invaded Egypt for the second time in 343 BC, most of Nectanebo's Greek mercenaries – 20,000 according to Diodorus (16.47.6; 49.2–3) – made arrangements with Artaxerxes III to return home. As Diodorus is mainly interested in the achievements of Greek soldiers, he says nothing about the fate of the 20,000 Libyans and 60,000 Egyptians, whom he calls *machimoi*, or about the multitude of riverboats used for engagements on the Nile. Since the Persians used Egyptian infantry on ships

[126] Goedicke (1962) esp. 35–6, ll. 9–11 and 38–9 translates the hieroglyph of line 9 as *machimoi*, and explains that this is probably an abbreviation for *mšwš*, soldiers of Libyan origin. See Ritner (1998) for a discussion of the term. Chevereau (2001) 310 and note (c) follows Goedicke's ambiguous translation. See also Kitchen (1973) 405 note 955.

[127] Fischer-Bovet (2013).

[128] Chevereau (2001) 268–9, 315, 317, 325. For other military leaders, 322, 326.

[129] Gnirs (1999) 87–91 provides a list of the military titles in the Late period. For an attempt to reconstruct the structure of the Late period army, see Fischer-Bovet (2013); Agut-Labordère (forthcoming).

in the Mediterranean during the first occupation, it would be surprising if they did not maintain part of the fleet and at least some of the Egyptian and foreign soldiers stationed in garrisons.[130] Similarly, when Alexander invaded Egypt in 332/1 BC, he must have kept these professional troops in garrisons, since he left only 4,000 infantry in Memphis and Pelusium with thirty triremes from his own army (see Chapter 3). What remained from the Late period army ten years later, when Ptolemy had to defend Egypt against an invasion for the first time, is unknown. Diodorus records that Ptolemy was able to secure the key positions on the Nile with strong garrisons to prevent Perdiccas from crossing the river (18.33.3). He is likely to have used troops from the previous army to reinforce his mercenaries, especially to navigate throughout the Delta. When in 315 BC Ptolemy sent 100 ships to Cyprus (Diodorus 19.62.3–4), some were probably Egyptian and others were new warships intended to reinforce the thirty triremes inherited from Alexander. The presence of Egyptian fighting forces is confirmed by Diodorus in his account of the Battle of Gaza a decade later, in 312 BC, in which he says specifically of Ptolemy's troops that "a great number were Egyptian, of whom some carried the missiles and the other baggage, but some were armed (*kathōplismenon*) and serviceable for battle."[131] Some Egyptians thus fought like the Macedonians and mercenaries, or at least their function and equipment resembled that mentioned above at the Battles of Plataea and Cunaxa, although modern scholars have debated the military role of Egyptians in the late fourth and third centuries BC (see Chapter 5). In 305 BC, when Ptolemy defended Egypt against Antigonus' invasion, he again had strong garrisons and many riverboats (*skaphai*) equipped with missiles (Diodorus 20.76.3), even triremes from the river according to Pausanias (1.6.6).[132] Four decades later, Egyptians took part in the Chremonidean War as sailors (*nautai*) and, as such, were not supposed to fight against Macedonians on land (Pausanias 3.6.5). Yet the word *nautai* indicates that they were not simple oarsmen but might have been troops ready to fight after boarding a ship.

130 Warships in Egypt were mainly used to transport infantry troops on the Nile; see Kahn and Tammuz (2008) 46, 49, 53.

131 Diodorus 19.80.4, Geer's translation in Oldfather *et al.* (1989): Αἰγυπτίων δὲ πλῆθος, τὸ μὲν κομίζον βέλη καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευήν, τὸ δὲ καθωπλισμένον καὶ πρὸς μάχην χρήσιμον. The two other sources for the battle (Plutarch, *Demetrius* 5; Justin, *Epitome* 15.1) do not mention this detail.

132 For the use of small boats to defend Egypt, as for example by Nectanebo II in 343 BC, see Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 63.

Ptolemy I, like the Persians before him, seems to have retained some military personnel from the Late period army in the fleet and in at least some garrisons. Another area where personnel were retained is the police: the Demotic term *gl-šr* was still used in the Ptolemaic period and was translated by the Greek word for policeman (*phylakitēs*) in a third-century papyrus (see Chapter 5).[133] There is no evidence, however, that Egyptians who served in the Ptolemaic army in the century after Alexander's conquest were included in a category called *machimoi*. First, Greek authors never employ the word *machimos* to designate Egyptian soldiers of the Ptolemaic period. Second, the *machimoi* in the Ptolemaic papyri are not exclusively Egyptian. Most important, grants of land to *machimoi* are attested only in the second half of the third century, and their role as soldiers rather than guards is difficult to establish during the third century.[134] How and when the Ptolemies created this military category is obscured by the lack of papyrological evidence for the early decades of their rule.

In conclusion, Greek mercenaries played an important role during the Late period but their number remained small compared with Egyptian troops. Greeks protected Egypt from several invasions and brought new techniques of warfare and new equipment to bear, yet the Persians were twice able to conquer Egypt. In many cases the Hellenocentrism of the literary sources exaggerated their importance. Epigraphic and archaeological evidence clearly establishes that mercenaries were not exclusively Greek and gives a glimpse of the variety of interactions within foreign communities and with Egyptian society and culture. By going beyond Herodotus' overschematization of Egyptian society, it is possible to understand the broad outlines of the organization of the army, the development of the fleet, and the equipment of Egyptian soldiers. Finally, Diodorus' account of military events in the second half of the fourth century suggests that the Persians and then the Greeks kept some of the military personnel already stationed in Egypt.

These three centuries of interaction between Greeks and Egyptians – sometimes called *Vorgeschichte* by Hellenistic historians – may have had an effect on the idea of a "Greek Egypt": already in the middle of the fifth century, the Athenians sent 200 triremes to Egypt to help Inaros, knowing

[133] P.LilleDem.inv. 3619 (227/6 BC); see Winnicki (1986) 22 and (1992b) 65.

[134] Goudriaan (1988) 121–5 collects the sources to demonstrate that the *machimoi* in the Ptolemaic period were not always Egyptian. For a table showing the attestations of Ptolemaic *machimoi*, see Fischer-Bovet (2013).

they would get "a share of the kingdom" if he succeeded.[135] The existence of Greek settlements in Egypt and the stories told by Greek veterans who returned home in the fourth century may also have inspired young men from the Greek world to emigrate to Egypt. But the chapters that follow suggest that the main factors that initiated soldiers' immigration into the Hellenistic kingdoms were economic.

135 Diodorus 11.71.3–4.

PART I

Structure and role of the army


Chapters 3–5 explain the structure of the Ptolemaic army and its development over time by proposing a framework that connects the organization of the army with the type of warfare, military costs, mobilization and demobilization, and ethnic composition. Whereas the pioneering work of Lesquier suggested that the army's organization remained almost unchanged, new evidence has revealed hints of alterations and reforms and has led some scholars to single out a specific instigator or cause for each modification.[1] A synthesis of the many scattered pieces of evidence for military reforms (Chapter 4) shows that a series of them occurred between *c.* 220 and *c.* 160, a time of deep crisis for the Ptolemaic state, characterized by a high degree of military activity on Ptolemaic territory and thus by a type of warfare different from that of the third century. The modifications of army structures were not *ad hoc* reforms but were at the heart of a large-scale readjustment of the Ptolemaic state in response to several variables. These included the high cost of the fleet and of mercenaries hired hastily to compensate for the failure of the cleruchic system to provide well-trained soldiers, and the risk of riots by dissatisfied soldiers. The latter would be a particular threat after a war, if pay was lower than expected and/or if men were demobilized. Other drivers of reform were the Ptolemaic state's loss of revenues from its external possessions, and the need to control Upper Egypt again after the Great Revolt. As a heuristic tool, the main steps of organizing and financing the army can be divided into three periods (see Figure I.1) including an intervening period of crisis (Period B) that encompasses the military occupation of part of the Ptolemaic state by the Seleucids and internal revolts in the north and south of the country.

The changes in the military structure and in army recruitment, the composition of units, and equipment can be correlated with the different stages of the Ptolemaic state formation process in a framework that considers the main problems faced by Hellenistic states in expanding their coercive power over the largest possible territory. Financing and organizing the army, along with the coming of Rome and political crisis, led to a change in scale from

[1] Lesquier (1911) 8.

Period A	Period B	Period C
323–*c.* 220	*c.* 220–*c.* 160	*c.* 160–30

Figure I.1 Periodization of change






Figure I.2 Percentage of wars, revolts and dynastic conflicts in each period

a large and powerful army competing against other Mediterranean states to an army of modest size limited to handling internal troubles and defending borders. The change in the nature of Ptolemaic warfare can be illustrated by three graphs that depict the percentage of (1) international wars, (2) internal revolts and (3) dynastic conflicts.[2] International warfare characterizes the first century of Ptolemaic rule (Period A), while internal revolt and dynastic conflict predominate in Period B and Period C, respectively.

A survey of military activity under the first three Ptolemies leads to the question of why the Ptolemies were unable to expand further or at least maintain their dominions outside Egypt and why a crisis occurred in Egypt between the late third and the early second centuries BC (section 3.1).[3] The second part of this chapter (section 3.2) sheds light on the role of the army in the second and first centuries BC. Changes in the army's structure and ethnic composition (Chapters 4 and 5) are entangled in its development as an engine of socio-economic and cultural integration for different ethnic groups and for soldiers and civilians in the second and first centuries BC discussed in Parts II and III.

[2] I use the timeline in Hölbl (2001) for these percentages based on the number of conflicts: for period A, wars (87.5%) and revolts (12.5%); for period B, wars (44.5%), revolts (33.3%) and dynastic conflicts (22.2%); for period C wars (28.6%), revolts (14.3%) and dynastic conflicts (57.1%).

[3] On the problematic use of the term "empire" for the Ptolemaic state, see Marquaille (2008) 39.

3 Military challenges faced by the Ptolemies

Power, money, crisis and reform

The main challenges faced by the Ptolemaic state and other Hellenistic states and their plausible consequences are analyzed in this chapter. In Chapter 1, I presented the Hellenistic period as one of intense warfare that had a tremendous effect on state formation. The most salient features of Hellenistic interstate struggle and their plausible outcomes can be sketched in five points summarized in Figure 3.1.

(1) At the death of Alexander in 323 BC, the Successors' main concern was to legitimize their power over certain parts of Alexander's empire. Victories made kings.[1]

(2) To achieve victories, each Successor needed to maintain a large army, if possible larger than those of the others, and to prevent the others from doing the same. Continuous warfare among roughly equal powers led to no supremacy for any of the remaining opponents. After the Battle of Ipsus (301 BC) there were few significant losses or gains over the course of the third century, but none of the Ptolemies, Seleucids or Antigonids explicitly acknowledged a "balance of power."[2] Warfare created an enormous redistribution of wealth from the silver and gold taken from the Persian treasures by Alexander (Strabo 15.3.9).[3] The Successors also competed for silver in order to mint coins to pay their soldiers.

(3) To meet this need, the Successors employed a variety of means. Aperghis explores those the Seleucids undertook to fulfill their need to coin money. On this view, the Ptolemies tried to solve their own shortage of coinage through "a grain export drive to earn the silver they lacked

[1] E.g. Chaniotis (2005) 57–68; Austin (1986) 457–9; Préaux (1978) 181–9.

[2] Austin (1986) and more recently Heinen (2003) question the traditional concept of "balance of power"; see Préaux (1979) 33–4; Billows (2007) 304. Eckstein (2006) 25–6 suggests that in times of international anarchy, as in the Mediterranean in antiquity, all states were to some degrees "revisionist," that is, they were "dissatisfied and [sought] to redress the situation in their favor, sometimes diplomatically but often by violence." The opposite concept is that of "status-quo states," which are "satisfied with the existing principles and distribution of resources and status within an interstate system."

[3] Aperghis (2004) 261 accepts the amount of 180,000 talents or more given by Strabo 15.3.9 for the Persian booty captured by Alexander. Austin (1986) 454–5 and note 34 records 50,000 talents of silver from Susa and 120,000 from Persepolis.




Figure 3.1 Framework: principal problems faced by Hellenistic states

and import restrictions to keep it in the country, and, ultimately, in their possession."[4] Other alternatives for solving this problem, none of them exclusive, were (a) to maximize taxation in coin; (b) to remunerate military service with land, or, when possible, have allies provide soldiers at no cost or a lower cost; (c) to acquire war booty (prisoners as soldiers, slaves to bring back or to sell, precious metals); and (d) to reduce military activities and the consequent demand for new hiring. The final option, however, was not as attractive in the short term as gathering booty. Reasoning of this sort created an "arms race" or what I refer to as a paradox of impossible demobilization. There was at first sight no advantage to breaking the cycle of continuous wars, even if it engendered an increasing need for resources.[5] In the long term this enormous need, even more enormous in the event of defeat or even the simple maintenance of the status quo, could create internal riots and revolts, because the state had to interfere in the economy and/or was unable to pay soldiers and please the elite.[6]

4 Aperghis (2004) 29. On the relationship between trade and the need to pay soldiers, see Will (1979) vol. I, 153–8 and his analysis at 180–200.

5 Austin (1986) 461 emphasizes the need for endless victory and conquest: "Increase of territory meant increase of revenues hence of power, while decrease of territory had the opposite effect and might send the dynasty into a spiral decline." For the Seleucids it had started at least by 140 BC with the loss of Mesopotamia, see Aperghis (2004) 260 and note 19. For the Ptolemies, see this chapter.

6 This is generally recognized by theorists of military organizations, see Andreski (1968) 108–15.

Put another way, the success of Hellenistic rulers at developing measures to cover their needs was central and could lead them on three plausible paths. If they could cover their expenses, cycle I was reproduced in perpetuity. If they earned more than they needed, supremacy over other rulers was the result. Finally, if they had insufficient means or no longer believed that such a large share of state revenues was necessary to maintain their international position, they demobilized and could either maintain the status quo or face internal revolts (cycle II). If they again increased their expenses for warfare, however, they could return to cycle I.

(4) On the other hand, a slowdown in military activity by one actor without achieving supremacy left him an easy target. Demobilization and the creation of regular troops paid in land had as consequences ill-trained soldiers and smaller forces rapidly available. This led to defeats, defensive wars or the maintenance of a costly status quo, notably because of a lack of booty, which otherwise provided the temporary cash flow necessary to stabilize a postwar situation. Demobilization could also directly create rebellions of soldiers dissatisfied with the deal they received or underpaid and, above all else, no longer employed but still in groups.[7] In both cases, demobilization would bring the state back to point (3).

(5) This endless cycle could be broken in two main ways. (a) The resources available for warfare in the different states might change. For example, a ruler's revenues might diminish because of internal revolts or intra-dynastic wars (cycle II in Figure 3.1), whereas a successful military campaign could result in the supremacy of that state. (b) When a new actor entered the game, he might destabilize another actor or simply take over the entire area, thanks to new technology or strategies or other resources. A watershed event of this sort had an impact on the military organization of the entire area.

It should be emphasized that this framework is not deterministic and does not predict any outcome as unavoidable. The point is to sketch what was at stake in international politics and the military events described below. The survey that follows points to the major policies and problems related to building armies, military costs, mobilization and demobilization of soldiers. Chapters 4–5 evaluate how the shape of international warfare influenced the organization and reforms of the Ptolemaic army and its ethnic composition.

[7] Polybius 1.66 describes this mechanism in the revolt of the mercenaries employed by the Carthaginians during the First Punic War.

3.1 Survey of military events, part I (331–221 BC): army numbers and cost

3.1.1 From Alexander to Ptolemy I: building a Ptolemaic army

When Alexander left Egypt in 331 BC, he appointed two Egyptians, Doloaspis and Petisis, as governors – the second soon resigned – while Cleomenes of Naucratis, a local Greek, was in charge of collecting the tribute and governing Arabia.[8] Four thousand of Alexander's soldiers were stationed in garrisons at Memphis and Pelusium, with Pantaleon of Pydna and Megacles of Pella as garrison commanders (*phrourarchoi*), respectively, while the generals (*stratēgoi*) of the army were the Macedonian Peucestas and Balacros, according to Arrian (*Anabasis* 3.5.5), or Peucestas and the Rhodian Aeschylus, according to Curtius (4.8.4–5).[9] In addition, Polemon was the admiral (*nauarchos*) of a fleet of thirty triremes, and the Aetolian Lycidas was in charge of the mercenaries (*xenoi*).[10] The troops were probably Macedonians and Greek mercenaries, since their commanders were drawn from both groups.[11] From the death of Alexander in 323 BC to the end of the fourth century BC, Diodorus is our most comprehensive source. According to him, Ptolemy went to Egypt without an army but with friends who were experienced officers.[12] He also hired mercenaries with 8,000 talents he took from the Egyptian treasury (Diodorus 18.14.1). Two lucky events gave Ptolemy, still satrap, an opportunity to increase the number of his soldiers. First, his conquest of Cyrenaica in 322/1 BC with land and naval forces allowed him to hire Cyrenean soldiers (Diodorus 18.21.7–9). Ptolemy probably expanded his fleet by seizing ships abandoned by Thibron, the Macedonian commander vanquished in Cyrene, and by building new ones thanks to treaties with dynasts in Cyprus (320 BC).[13] He also had access to building material as a consequence of his brief occupation of Coele-Syria (319/18–314 BC). Second, in 320 BC a large number of invading troops led by Perdiccas joined the Ptolemaic army, either expecting a better deal from Ptolemy or because they were left with no employer at Perdiccas'

8 Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.5.1–7. On Cleomenes of Naucratis and a Memphis ostracon attesting Petisis as satrap, see Burstein (2008a); Le Rider (1997).

9 Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.5.3 mentions a certain Aeschylus as overseer (*episkopos*) of the mercenaries.

10 Bagnall (1984) 15–18; G. T. Griffith (1935) 22, 109–11; Lesquier (1911) 1–5.

11 Lesquier (1911) 2, *contra*. G. T. Griffith (1935) 29–30, who suggests that these troops were in fact the 4,000 newly recruited mercenaries in Sidon.

12 Bagnall (1984) 16–17 and note 19, following Welles (1970) 52, suggests that in light of Ptolemy's influence in arranging the compromise in 323 BC, he must have obtained some troops, even if there is no positive evidence, *contra* F. L. Griffith (1972) 109; Lesquier (1911) 1.

13 Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 72.

death (Diodorus 18.21.7–9, 18.33–6).[14] In addition, Ptolemy probably took over a few elephants with their mahouts.[15]

A few years later, in 315 BC, Ptolemy was able to send 13,000 mercenaries and 100 ships to Cyprus and later to Caria, while keeping an army in Palestine (Diodorus 19.62.3–4). These mercenaries must have fought with Ptolemy at the Battle of Gaza (312 BC) along with newly hired mercenaries and armed Egyptians, for a total of 22,000 men including 18,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry (Diodorus 19.80.4). This victory gave Ptolemy forty-three elephants and 8,000 prisoners, mainly mercenary infantry, whom he settled in the Egyptian nomes (Diodorus 19.84.1–4, 85.3; Plutarch, *Demetrius* 5; Justin, *Epitome* 15.1).[16] Even if Ptolemy acquired some of Antigonus' soldiers in the years that followed, Demetrius' defeat on land of Ptolemy's brother in Cyprus, where Ptolemy had 12,000 infantry and about 800 cavalry in garrison, led to the loss of a third of them (Diodorus 20.47.3). Even worse was Ptolemy's naval defeat in 306 BC at Salamis of Cyprus, where Demetrius captured 8,000 infantry on supply ships, along with forty warships, while eighty of Ptolemy's warships were disabled.[17] Ptolemy had to abandon Cyprus and Coele-Syria to Antigonus and lost a total of 16,000 infantry and 600 cavalry (Diodorus 53.1), plausibly half his army. Despite this defeat, his soldiers proclaimed Ptolemy king in response to Antigonus' assumption of that title (Plutarch, *Demetrius* 18.1; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 54; Justin, *Epitome* 15.2.11), and in 305 BC he was able to defend the Egyptian border by using small nilotic ships maneuverable in the Delta, but also by attracting some of Antigonus' soldiers with money (Diodorus 20.75.1–3, 76.7; Plutarch, *Demetrius* 19.1–3; Pausanias 1.6.6).[18]

14 In order to make his army appear larger, Ptolemy had animals of all sorts make large clouds of dust; see Frontinus, *Stratagems* iv.

15 Burstein (2008b) 140.

16 For νομοί, see Bengtson (1952) 19. There is a textual problem in Diodorus 19.85.3 because the text mentions that Ptolemy gave the order to divide the 8,000 prisoners among the naval commands (ἐπὶ τὰς ναυαρχίας). Wesseling suggested correcting the word to νομαρχίας, and this was accepted by Préaux (1979) 306 note 3. For other cases of prisoners brought back to Egypt and attested in the papyrological sources, see Anagnostou-Canas (1994) 174 and note 116. For the events in Syria in 312–311 BC, see Winnicki (1989b) and (1991) esp. 174, about the 8,000 soldiers sent to Egypt, although he does not discuss this textual problem.

17 On the strength of the naval forces and the discrepancies between the ancient authors and within Diodorus' account (20.46.5–47.4; 47.7–52), see Hauben (1976): Ptolemy's fleet consisted of 200–210 warships (no larger than quinqueremes) and 200 transport vessels carrying at least 10,000 men; Demetrius' fleet consisted of 180–190 warships, but was qualitatively better with the *heptēreis* and *hexēreis* that Ptolemy II lacked, which had large decks with arrow- and stone-shooting catapults. See Casson (1994) 92.

18 Ptolemy offered a premium of 2 minas to ordinary soldiers and one talent to officers who would betray Antigonus and join him. For mercenaries' betrayals, see Préaux (1978) 297.

These episodes show that money was central to the survival of what was about to become the Ptolemaic dynasty and to the organization of its army. The events of 305 BC were probably the last opportunity to hire large numbers of Macedonians or Thracian soldiers. In the third century the foreigners joining the Ptolemaic army were voluntary, independent immigrants, groups of soldiers hired for or during specific events, and the descendants of these original soldiers. An army of 30,000–40,000 soldiers and 100 warships, all ethnic groups included, for the entire realm at that time, is a plausible estimate on the basis of the numbers noted above and the description of the Battle of Raphia in 217 BC (see section 3.1.4.3). Intense international warfare remained the norm in the decades that followed and during the second generation of Successors. Ptolemy I's main rivals were Antigonus and Demetrius; their successors, the Antigonids, remained Ptolemy II's principal opponents on sea. Ptolemy I took over some cities in Lycia and Caria but was stopped in Halicarnassus by Demetrius and had difficulty maintaining his garrisons in Greece: by 303 BC he had lost Corinth, Sicyon and Megara (Diodorus 20.37.1–2; Diogenes Laertius 2.115). But Ptolemy had become Rhodes' devoted ally during the siege of the city by Demetrius in 305/4 BC, by providing at least 2,000 soldiers and food supplies (Diodorus 20.88.9, 94, 96.1, 98.1). During the Fourth War of the Successors (303–301 BC), he secured Coele-Syria but did not fight with the other Successors at the final battle against Demetrius at Ipsus. Seleucus did not formally renounce the rights he enjoyed to this region thanks to his military participation at Ipsus but neither, because Ptolemy was a friend and ally, did he ask him to leave it (Diodorus 21.1.5). This ambiguous status was the cause of the numerous Syrian Wars between the Ptolemies and the Seleucids in the third and second centuries BC.[19] The region was essential to Egypt as a buffer zone, a platform for trade and a prosperous region to tax.[20] Ptolemy returned to Egypt with Jews whom he garrisoned in Egypt, although the figure of 30,000 soldiers given by literary sources is an overestimation.[21] In the 290s BC, while the other kings were attacking Demetrius' positions, Ptolemy was able to take back Cyprus and to add Lycia and perhaps already Pamphylia, as well as Sidon and Tyre to his external possessions (295/4 BC). Since his defeat at Salamis he had built up his fleet again to at least 150 warships, which he sent the same year to defend Athens – unsuccessfully – against Demetrius (Plutarch, *Demetrius* 33–4). In

19 For the Syrian Wars, see Grainger (2010).

20 On the last decades of Ptolemy I's reign, see Hölbl (2001) 22–4; Huss (2001) 192–212.

21 Aristeas Judaeus 13 reports 100,000 Jews, among whom were 30,000 soldiers; Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae* 12.1.7; Anagnostou-Canas (1994) 174 note 117; Barclay (1996) 22.

287 BC Ptolemy supported a rebellion against his rival with 1,000 soldiers dispatched from his bases in Andros and led by the Athenian Callias but ultimately opted for a peace treaty with Demetrius.[22] Without winning any major naval battles, Ptolemy I had established a network of fortified bases in the Aegean and provided solid ground for a Ptolemaic thalassocracy. It is likely that he acquired Demetrius' warships in Ephesus, but Lysimachus, who probably seized Demetrius' fleet at Pella, was still a serious rival at sea.[23]

3.1.2 Ptolemy II (285–246 BC): the challenge of a thalassocracy

After the death of Demetrius and that of Lysimachus in 281 BC, Ptolemy II had the most powerful fleet in the Mediterranean.[24] It is in this context that he founded the League of the Islanders and became its first president, as has recently been argued by Andrew Meadow, who rejects the idea that the League was an Antigonid foundation of the late fourth century BC.[25] Modern historians refer to the three decades that follow as the Ptolemaic thalassocracy. Ptolemy's garrisons and fleet dominated the Aegean, but the low level of military engagement of the fleet and the quasi-absence of naval victories over Ptolemy's main rival, the new king of Macedonia, Antigonus II Gonatas (283–239 BC), remained partly an obstacle to total control of the Eastern Mediterranean and the consolidation of an empire. Ptolemy's expansion at the beginning of his reign against his rivals in Anatolia, during and after the Syrian War of Succession (280/79 BC), is visible in the epigraphic sources, and its precise development continues to be refined by new material.[26] This success was valuable for consolidating Ptolemy II's influence early on. He took the opportunity to display his power and wealth publicly by organizing a Greek festival, the Ptolemaia, in honour of his deified father. The delegates of the League of the Islanders met on Samos, a new Ptolemaic possession, to "[vote] that the contest should be equal in rank with the Olympic Games" and to send sacred envoys.[27] The Ptolemaia took place every four years and attracted many visitors between 279/8 BC and at least 233/2 BC. A description of the Grand Procession is preserved in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophists* (5.197c–203e, extract in Text 3.1) drawing on Callixeinus of Rhodes' account, perhaps written a century after

22 Austin (2006) no. 55 = SEG XLIX 113 (270/69 BC).

23 On the seizure of Demetrius' fleet, see Morrison (1996) 213; Walbank (1957–79) vol. I, 565, with no further references.

24 On Hellenistic fleets, see now Murray (2012).

25 Meadows (2013), esp. 31–40.

26 Hölbl (2001) 38.

27 Austin (2006) no. 256 = Syll.[3] 390, *c.* 280 BC.

Text 3.1. *Athenaeus'* Deipnosophists, *5.202f–203a*

Athenaeus' *Deipnosophists* 5.202f–203a	Text and translation by Gulick (1927–41)
ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσιν ἐπόμπευσαν αἱ δυνάμεις αἱ ἱππικαὶ καὶ πεζικαί, πᾶσαι καθωπλισμέναι θαυμασίως. πεζοὶ μὲν εἰς πέντε μυριάδας καὶ ἑπτακισχιλίους καὶ ἑξακοσίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ δισμύριοι τρισχίλιοι διακόσιοι. πάντες δ' οὗτοι ἐπόμπευσαν τὴν ἁρμόζουσαν ἑκάστῳ ἠμφιεσμένοι στολὴν καὶ τὰς προσηκούσας ἔχοντες πανοπλίας. ἐκτὸς δ' ὧν πάντες οὗτοι εἶχον πανοπλιῶν καὶ ἄλλαι πλεῖστοι ἦσαν ἀποκείμενοι, ὧν οὐδὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀναγράψαι ῥᾴδιον. κατέλεξε δ' αὐτὸν ὁ Καλλίξεινος.	After all these marched the cavalry and infantry forces, all wonderfully armed *cap-à-pie*. The infantry numbered about 57,600, the cavalry 23,200. All of these marched dressed in the garments proper to each, and in their appropriate panoply. But beside the panoplies worn by all these troops, there were many others stored in chests, of which it is not easy to set down even the number. Yet Callixeinus gives the list.

the fact.[28] Which occurrence of the Ptolemaia this description represents is unclear.[29] The most widely accepted dates are 279/8 BC, the first Ptolemaia, immediately after the Syrian War of Succession, or 275/4 BC, when Ptolemy II was preparing his troops for the First Syrian War (274–271 BC) after the failed attempt by Magas king of Cyrene to march on Alexandria. But it is unnecessary to connect this description with a military expedition, and the Cyrenean episode was not particularly remarkable: Magas had to cut his assault short because the Libyan tribes rebelled, and Ptolemy did not pursue the Cyrenean army because he had to suppress a revolt by his 4,000 Celtic mercenaries.[30] In any case, Callixeinus reports 57,600 infantry and 23,200 cavalry in the procession, and other units were not present.

Rice, in her study of the Grand Procession, accepts these numbers as representing some percentage of the total army, because Callixeinus had access to official records for his account. In addition, she regards Appian's very high numbers of troops as referring to men from the garrisons in Alexandria and the Delta and from nearby cleruchies: 200,000 infantry, 40,000 cavalry, 300 war elephants, 2,000 armed chariots, and arms in

[28] In favor of the second century BC, see Thompson (2000) 368 with note 8. New edition of P.Lille I 19, l. 9 (156 or 145 BC, Arsinoite, Pyrrheia) in Clarysse and Hauben (1991); Callixeinus, the holder of a *dōrea*, could be the author.

[29] For the date, see Thompson (2000) 381–8. Le Rider and Callataÿ (2006) 176–8 suggest 262 BC.

[30] Hölbl (2001) 39. But Rice (1983) 24–5, 123–6 suggests that soldiers were not grouped there for a coming expedition or for celebrating a specific victory but were kept in a state of preparedness during this period of continuous warfare.

reserve for 300,000 more soldiers (*Praef.* 10, see Text 3.2).[31] Thompson is far more cautious, suggesting that the entire army perhaps consisted of about 100,000 soldiers.[32] Even before her, many scholars had questioned the numbers given by Appian and Callixeinus because the size of the army reported in 305 BC and in 217 BC at Raphia does not correlate with these accounts. Appian supposedly relied on the Royal Records (*Basilikai Anagraphai*) and Callixeinus on official records, but numbers are often dubious in ancient historians' accounts.[33] In both cases, for example, the figures for the cavalry are unrealistically high for Hellenistic armies, which usually had a cavalry/infantry ratio of one to ten.[34] If Callixeinus' total approximates the number of soldiers in the entire army, it probably exaggerates the number of cavalry as well as the number of men present at the Grand Procession.[35] Even with lower numbers, the propagandistic effect of thousands of soldiers on parade remains fundamental, and the event was a clear demonstration of strength, which the ancient writers augmented.

Both Callixeinus and Appian also describe Ptolemy II's naval forces, emphasizing that he had the most powerful navy in the Mediterranean, whether at the beginning of his reign (Callixeinus) or the end (Appian). They are more specific than Theocritus' praise of Ptolemy II (*Idyll* 17, esp. 86–94). Appian's enumeration (Text 3.2) follows his description of the land army and precedes his report of the size of the state treasury, 740,000 Egyptian talents, which is a significant juxtaposition: 2,000 transports (*kontōta*) and other smaller ships, 1,500 galleys (*triēreis*), galley furniture for 3,000, and 800 vessels (*thalamēga*). These numbers are certainly exaggerated, as also for the land army.[36]

By contrast, Callixeinus' description of the Grand Procession includes 112 warships, 224 ships, and 4,000 ships for controlling the islands (numbers calculated on the basis of Athenaeus 5.203d, Text 3.3). In total, there were

31 For Rice (1983) 24–5, 123–6 continuous warfare explains the high numbers. Marrinan (1998) 510–28 attempts to prove Appian's number correct.

32 Thompson (2000) 374.

33 Scheidel (1996). Some of Appian's numbers are ten times larger than those given by Callixeinus or Polybius.

34 Aperghis (2004) 194.

35 Walbank (1996) 124 and note 32, however, does not reject the numbers: "if, for example, they marched six abreast, at four m.p.h., it would have taken the infantry alone nearly three hours to pass a given point."

36 Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 69–70. They also emphasize the high proportion of barges (*kontōta*) of the type that Ptolemy used in 305 BC to defend Egypt. The vessels (*thalamēga*) were luxury boats used for transporting the kings and his officials, probably typically Egyptian.

Text 3.2. *Appian,* Foreign Wars*, Praef. 10*

Text in bold: author's emphasis.

Appian, *Foreign Wars*, Praef. 10 Viereck *et al.* (1939)	Translation by White *et al.* (1912)
καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς βασιλεῦσι μόνοις ἦν στρατιά τε πεζῶν μυριάδες εἴκοσι καὶ μυριάδες ἱππέων τέσσαρες καὶ ἐλέφαντες πολεμισταὶ τριακόσιοι καὶ ἅρματα ἐς μάχας δισχίλια καὶ ὅπλα ἐς διαδοχὴν μυριάσι τριάκοντα. καὶ τάδε μὲν αὐτοῖς ἦν ἐς πεζομαχίαν, ἐς δὲ ναυμαχίας **κοντωτὰ** καὶ ὅσα σμικρότερα ἄλλα, δισχίλια, **τριήρεις** δὲ ἀπὸ ἡμιολίας μέχρι πεντήρους πεντακόσιαι καὶ χίλιαι καὶ **σκεύη τριηριτικὰ** διπλότερα τούτων **θαλαμηγά** τε χρυσόπρυμνα καὶ χρυσέμβολα ἐς πολέμου πομπήν, οἷς αὐτοὶ διαπλέοντες ἐπέβαινον οἱ βασιλεῖς, ὀκτακόσια, χρημάτων δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς θησαυροῖς **τέσσαρες καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα μυριάδες ταλάντων Αἰγυπτίων**. ἐς γὰρ δὴ τοσοῦτο παρασκευῆς τε καὶ στρατιᾶς ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν ἀναγραφῶν φαίνεται προαγαγών τε καὶ καταλιπὼν ὁ δεύτερος Αἰγύπτου βασιλεὺς μετ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον, ὃς καὶ πορίσαι δεινότατος ἦν βασιλέων καὶ δαπανῆσαι λαμπρότατος καὶ κατασκευάσαι μεγαλουργότατος. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων σατραπῶν οὐ πολὺ τούτων ἀποδέοντα. ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐς τοὺς ἐπιγόνους αὐτῶν συνετρίφθη, φθαρέντας ἐς ἀλλήλους, ᾧ μόνως ἀρχαὶ μεγάλαι καταλύονται, στασιάσασαι.	The kings of my own country [Egypt] alone had an army consisting of 200,000 foot, 40,000 horse, 300 war elephants, and 2,000 armed chariots, and arms in reserve for 300,000 soldiers more. This was their force for land service. For naval service they had 2,000 **barges propelled by poles**, and other smaller craft, 1,500 **galleys** with from one and a half to five benches of oars each, and **galley furniture** for twice as many ships, 800 **vessels** provided with cabins, gilded on stem and stern for the pomp of war, with which the kings themselves were wont to go to naval combats; and money in their treasuries to the amount of **740,000 Egyptian talents**. Such was the state of preparedness for war shown by the royal accounts as recorded and left by the king of Egypt second in succession after Alexander, who was the most formidable of these rulers in his preparations, the most lavish in expenditure, and the most magnificent in projects. It appears that many of the other satrapies were not much inferior in these respects. Yet all these resources were wasted under their successors by warring with each other. By means of such civil dissensions alone are great states destroyed.

336 warships, one third of these being quinqueremes or larger ships, whose decks allowed for more catapults and marines. The bulk of the fleet still consisted of triremes. This description, however, indicates maximal capacity rather than actual numbers.[37]

Military naval activity was concentrated in the Mediterranean, but the Ptolemaic navy was also active on the Nile and in the Red Sea toward the

37 Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 73; Van 't Dack (1977) 99 note 5. Van 't Dack is right to explain the 4,000 other ships as an exaggeration reinforcing the importance of Ptolemy II's fleet; Tarn (1969) 456 also considers the number "rubbish."

Text 3.3. *Athenaeus' Deipnosophists 5.203d*

Athenaeus' *Deipnosophists* 5.203d	Text and translation by Gulick (1927–41)
πολλῶν δὲ ὁ Φιλάδελφος βασιλέων πλούτῳ διέφερε καὶ περὶ πάντα ἐσπουδάκει τὰ κατασκευάσματα φιλοτίμως, ὥστε καὶ πλοίων πλήθει πάντας ὑπερέβαλλεν. τὰ γοῦν μέγιστα τῶν πλοίων ἦν παρ' αὐτῷ τριακοντήρεις δύο, εἰκοσήρης μία, τέσσαρες δὲ τρισκαιδεκήρεις, δωδεκήρεις δύο, ἑνδεκήρεις δεκατέσσαρες, ἐννήρεις λ', ἑπτήρεις λζ', ἑξήρεις ε', πεντήρεις δεκαεπτά· τὰ δ'ἀπὸ τετρήρους μέχρι τριηρημιολίας διπλάσια τούτων. τὰ δ'εἰς τὰς νήσους πεμπόμενα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ὧν ἦρχε καὶ τὴν Λιβύην πλείονα ἦν τῶν τετρακισχιλίων.	Philadelphus surpassed many kings in wealth, and devoted himself with enthusiastic zeal to all his establishments, so that he surpassed all others in the number of his ships as well. At any rate, the largest ships owned by him were: two with thirty banks of oars,[a] one with twenty, four with thirteen, two with twelve, fourteen with eleven, thirty with nine, thirty-seven with seven, five with six, and seventeen with five. But the number of ships with rowers ranging from four banks to one and half was double the others. The ships dispatched to the islands and the other states over which he ruled, as well as to Libya, numbered more than four thousand.

[a] To explain the "thirty" of Ptolemy II and the "forty" built by Ptolemy IV, Casson (1994) Chapter 7, esp. 84, 86 suggests catamarans made respectively of two "fifteens" or two "twenties." The higher the number per oar, the larger the deck and thus the more catapults and marines. Ships could not have more than eight rowers per oar. For example, a nine (*ennērēs*) was so called because it had nine oarsmen per oar on one side who could be arranged in different ways: one, two or three levels of rowers, either three rowers by level, or four and five on two levels; see also De Souza (2007b) 357–61.

Indian Ocean.[38] In the latter two regions it served as a police force whose mission was to protect trade, notably commerce in gold and ivory, and to facilitate the transport of elephants captured in the south for military purposes from 270 BC until the late third century BC. Troops were also transported on the Nile, as during the Nubian expedition organized around 275 BC, when Ptolemy II secured the Dodekaschoinos (the approximately 75-mile stretch south of the First Cataract) and perhaps even a larger share of the Kushite kingdom.[39] Ptolemy II's achievements in Nubia and along the Red Sea were remarkable. But his goals in these regions were in large part driven by his military needs in the Mediterranean. A survey of military engagements there allows us to assess the degree of Ptolemaic supremacy during the thalassocracy. The First Syrian War (274–271 BC) began with an attack on Seleucid Syria by the Ptolemaic army but turned into a threat

38 Hölbl (2001) 55–8; Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 77–8. For the fleet in the third century BC, see Préaux (1979) 37–41.

39 Burstein (2008b) 138–40.

of invasion of Egypt by sea and land by Antiochus I (Theocritus, *Idyll* 17.98–101), whose army included twenty Bactrian elephants.[40] Ptolemy II and his sister-wife Arsinoe II went to the border to organize their troops (Pithom Stele, ll. 15–16), but Antiochus soon renounced the attack because of troubles in Babylonia. In fact, the outcome of the war – no details of the engagements are preserved – was a continuation of the status quo but was celebrated as a victory at the Ptolemaia of 271/0 BC, as is clear from Theocritus' *Idyll* 17, composed for the occasion.

Ptolemy II turned to his other rival, Antigonus II, and tried to erode his naval power in the Aegean by making an alliance with Athens and Sparta in the name of Panhellenic freedom. In response, Antigonus attacked Attica in 267 BC, starting a war known as the Chremonidean War (267–261 BC) after the Athenian Chremonides, whose decree before the Athenian assembly sealed the alliance with Ptolemy and Sparta.[41] Ptolemy sent a fleet led by his Macedonian admiral Patroclus with Egyptians on board who, according to Pausanias, were supposed to attack Macedonian soldiers on land from the rear only once the Spartans started the assault (Pausanias 3.6.4–6). But King Areus of Sparta found the situation too risky and returned home. Ultimately Athens had to capitulate and Macedonian garrisons were established in the Piraeus and on the hill of the Museion. Why the instigator of the war, Ptolemy II, apparently contributed so little to it has accordingly been debated at length.[42] Archaeological evidence shows that Patroclus' troops set foot in Attica and on the nearby islands of Keos and Methana and were thus more actively engaged than Pausanias claims.[43] Above all, Patroclus' fleet established a network of Ptolemaic garrisons in the Aegean, notably in Hydrea, Thera and Itanos in Crete. From the Ptolemaic point of view, the war was rather successful, whereas Patroclus' expedition is often used as an example of the lower quality of Egyptian soldiers in contrast to Greeks and Macedonians. But Pausanias' description makes it clear that the troops were not hoplites but marines or infantry on ships (*nautai*), who were not supposed to fight against a Macedonian phalanx on land.[44] This suggests that Ptolemy did not intend a major military

40 Hölbl (2001) 40; Heinen (1984) 416–18.

41 Austin (2006) no. 61 = Syll.[3] 434–5. See also Austin (2006) no. 62 = SEG XXIV 154 and XL 154 with Knoepfler (1993) for the date of the war and no. 63 = SEG XL 412; Justin, Epitome 26.2.

42 Marquaille (2008) 47–8; O'Neil (2008); Hölbl (2001) 40–3; Walbank (1984) 236–43; Will (1979) vol. I, 219–33.

43 O'Neil (2008), esp. 74, 77–8.

44 In this context, it is probably a more accurate translation of *nautas* than "sailors." Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 86–98 suggest that Pausanias meant *epibatai*, the word used at Herodotus 9.32.

engagement on land at this stage and was hoping for a minimum of actual fighting, as was probably the case in the establishment of his garrisons. Either Ptolemy II was generally uninterested in military involvement and his only concern was to protect Egypt – one explanation put forward in this debate – or, as I would argue, he was instead a fine strategist: he decided to let the others fight, so as to weaken his main rival first while securing proper bases from which to launch further attacks if opportunity presented itself.

Around the same time an army led by Ptolemy "the son" was consolidating Ptolemaic influence in Asia Minor, Miletus, Ephesus and perhaps Lesbos, events that no doubt triggered the Second Syrian War against Antiochus (260–253 BC).[45] In this context Antigonus, who supported Antiochus, defeated the Ptolemaic fleet commanded by Patroclus at Cos (Plutarch, *Moralia* 182, 545b; Athenaeus 5.209e; 8.334a), either in 262 BC or around 255 BC; in 255 BC or perhaps 258 BC, the Rhodians won the Battle of Ephesus against the Ptolemaic fleet, this time led by Chremonides.[46] But according to Walbank there is no clear evidence that Ptolemy lost control of the sea after the Battle of Cos.[47] Delos, however, was now Antigonid – as Andros too would be by the end of the 250s (Plutarch, *Aratus* 12.2). Ptolemy was no longer leading the League of the Islanders, which soon dissolved, and he lost important cities in Asia Minor such as Miletus, Samos and Ephesus to Antiochus. Ptolemy II also lost territory in Cilicia and Pamphylia but proved a skilled diplomat, by sealing the peace treaty with the marriage of his daughter Berenice to Antiochus II. Ptolemy II was also able to consolidate his presence in the Black Sea by supporting Byzantium against the Seleucids and their allies in 254 BC.[48] His influence expanded as far as Crimea, where a fresco with a galley, probably a five (*pentērēs*), with the word ISIS engraved on it was found in Nymphaeum.[49] After the war Ptolemy II also settled a large number

45 Hölbl (2001) 41; Heinen (1984) 418–19; Will (1979) vol. I, 234–43.

46 The Battle of Cos may have taken place during the Chremonidean War, but the battle of Ephesus against Rhodes took place during the Second Syrian War in the 250s; see Heinen (1984) 418–19, 433. Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 89 suppose that the Ptolemaic fleet was already in decline during the Chremonidean War. But Huss (2001) 283–5 suggests that the battle of Ephesus happened first, in 258 BC; Hölbl (2001) 44.

47 Walbank (1984) 240–3.

48 Ptolemy provided grain, missiles and money and presumably sent a fleet; see Avram (2003) for the new date of the expedition to the Black Sea during the Second Syrian War and the reconstruction of the alliances at stake; a document from the Zenon archive (SB III 7263) mentions Bosporan envoys in Egypt in the same year. Hölbl (2001) 41–2 dates the Ptolemaic intervention to 270/69 BC; Will (1979) vol. I, 149. On the Ptolemies and the Black Sea, see also Marquaille (2008) 51.

49 Morrison (1996) 207–14 and figs. 13a–c contests the interpretation of the first editor of the fresco, Grac (1984), that ISIS was the name of the ship and thus that it was an Egyptian ship.

of soldiers in Egypt by granting them cleruchic land in exchange for military service, which suggests that it was becoming Ptolemaic strategy to demobilize and decrease the cost of the land army. Ptolemy II's visit to Memphis can be connected with the distribution of land in the Fayyum.[50] Around 250 BC, the Ptolemaic fleet was finally able to defeat Antigonus, according to Aristeas Judaeus (180–1) and Josephus (*Antiquitates Judaicae [AJ]* 12.93). We have no idea where the battle took place, assuming that it really happened. Finally, during the last years of his reign, Ptolemy began to support the Achaean League financially and was able to maintain some influence in the Cyclades, notably through the garrison on Thera, which was still in place under Ptolemy VI.

If by "Ptolemaic thalassocracy" one means a strong network of garrisons in the Aegean with a large fleet freely navigating between them, its peak can be situated in the 270s and its decline in the 250s, as is traditionally assumed, or even later. If the term also implies the ability to defeat rival fleets in naval battle, it is misleading. Even if the fleet was not as large as Appian claims, but rather of the size given by Callixeinus, one wonders why Ptolemy's admirals were unable to defeat Antigonus at Cos. As nothing is known about the battle, we can only hypothesize about causes. But such a major defeat and the material loss it implies easily explain why the fleet was unable to stand against another enemy, the Rhodians, especially if the two battles took place in the same year. At least four criteria can be put forward to evaluate Ptolemaic naval capacity: (1) the material quality of the fleet, including the number and type of warships; (2) the crews and marines; (3) the skills and experience of the captains and admirals; and (4) luck. The only encounter for which we have a description of the Ptolemaic fleet is the Battle of Salamis in 306 BC, where Ptolemy I's fleet was numerically inferior.[51] In addition, he lacked the *heptēreis* and *hexēreis* that made Demetrius' fleet qualitatively better; but by Ptolemy II's time these issues were resolved, notably because Phoenicia, the source of the *heptēreis*, was part of Ptolemaic territory. An anecdote reported three times by Plutarch about Antigonus indicates that the fleet of Ptolemy II or Ptolemy III outnumbered the Antigonid ships at the Battle of Cos (Plutarch, *Moralia* 545b) or Andros (*Pelopidas* 2.2), or at both (*Moralia* 182). In addition, innovations in naval tactics were readily available from engineers in Alexandria, as the *Compendium of Mechanics*

But the new understanding of the political and military situation in the Black sea proposed by Avram (2003) 1207–8, 1212 confirms that it was an Egyptian galley. For the inscription on the fresco, see SEG XXXIV 756 and XLV 997.

[50] Clarysse (1980). Ptolemy I had presumably already started the cleruchic system; see Chapter 6.

[51] See note 17 above.

of Philo attests. The experience of the crew, from oarsmen and marines to the helmsman and captain of a ship, was essential, and in times of international competition it was also costly.[52] But Ptolemy II was certainly not inferior to Antigonus in terms of economic power. Both used ships with local crews, meaning that the Ptolemies employed Greeks, Phoenicians and Egyptians, whose functions were not limited to serving as oarsmen.[53] The skills and loyalty of the marines and the captain were also essential. The only evidence for the ethnicity of the fighting troops on Ptolemaic ships concerns Patroclus' fleet during the Chremonidean War and suggests that they were Egyptian. Van 't Dack and Hauben have proposed that the Ptolemies imitated the Persian model by adding a small number of non-Egyptian marines to each ship (Herodotus 7.96 and 184). They also suggest that the Ptolemaic fleet failed in naval battle because a large share of its crews and marines were of Egyptian origin.[54] But the contribution of Egyptian soldiers to the establishment of garrisons during the Chremonidean War does not suggest that Egyptian marines were unskilled. The only evidence to assess the quality of Ptolemaic marines and sailors goes back to the capture of Ptolemy I's forty warships at Salamis (Diodorus 20.52.6), where they surrendered without a long fight. Either the ships were so damaged that they could not escape, or they were defeated quickly.[55] In any case, they were probably in an unfavorable position, because Demetrius' larger ships carried more marines, making it easier to board ships that carried fewer. The third plausible reason for failure was the quality of the high command and the skills of many captains and helmsmen. Ptolemy II employed a Macedonian, Patroclus, as admiral of the fleet, and thereafter an Athenian, Chremonides, whereas Ptolemy I was commanding in person – still with no success. But as communication between ships was a general weakness of ancient naval warfare, the outcome depended in the end on the tactical and navigational skills of captains and helmsmen.[56] In terms of ethnicity, these positions were mostly given to Greeks.[57] The lack of detailed sources prevents us from asserting that Ptolemy's commanders were on average less skilled than their opponents, but this might have been a factor in his failure. Finally, luck can be important, when an external factor such as a storm destroys part of a fleet before battle, although no such event is reported concerning the Ptolemaic fleet.

[52] De Souza (2007a) 434–7 and (2007b) 363 describes the skills needed in naval battles.
[53] Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 84–6, *contra* Casson.
[54] This hypothesis was put forward by Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 89.
[55] De Souza (2007a) 440. [56] De Souza (2007a) 445–7.
[57] Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 82–4.

In conclusion, even if the reason for Ptolemy II's failure in naval battle cannot be precisely determined, it was not caused by the use of Egyptians in his fleet. It appears that Ptolemy II's successful strategy of establishing naval forces would have allowed him to truly dominate the Aegean, had he been able to defeat his main opponents at sea. His overall strategy – in continuity with his father's policy – leaves open the possibility that Ptolemy II hoped to expand his empire further.[58] This might be confirmed by Ptolemy III's military undertakings at the beginning of his reign.[59]

3.1.3 Ptolemy III (246–221 BC): the climax of the empire

A few months after Ptolemy III came to the throne, Antiochus II died, provoking a dynastic war in the Seleucid kingdom between his first wife Laodice and their oldest son Seleucus II, on one side, and his second wife Berenice and their son (who were also Ptolemy's sister and nephew), on the other. Berenice was recognized as sovereign in parts of the western Seleucid empire and provided Ptolemy III with a perfect motive to campaign against Seleucus II, who quickly murdered Berenice and her son. The so-called Third Syrian War or Laodicean War (246–241 BC) broke out with Ptolemy's campaign in the east, which was probably more than a raid without battles, as is generally believed.[60] Ptolemy marched with his land army, which even included African elephants, through the Seleucid empire as far as the Euphrates. He returned less than a year later to Egypt with booty that amounted to at least 1,500 talents (P.Gurob, col. II, l. 6). It is possible that during this time the fleet led by his half-brother Ptolemy Andromachus and his admiral Opron was defeated at sea near

[58] On a temporary Ptolemaic mint in Sicily and the possibility of troops sent there, see Wolf and Lorber (2011) 31–3.

[59] If this interpretation is correct, it would solve the aporia that Will (1979) vol. I, 208 faced in trying to explain Ptolemy III's military expedition as far as the Euphrates and Thrace. See my discussion in section 3.1.4.5.

[60] See the list of the regions from which Ptolemy III has returned statues of the gods in the trilingual "Alexandrian decree," a priestly decree dated to 243 BC recently discovered, see El Masry *et al.* (2012), and discussed in Altenmüller (2010) along with the Chronicle of Ptolemy III. For a new edition of the so-called "Chronicle of Ptolemy III," a Babylonian text on the military operations around Babylon, see Clancier (2012). See also the copy of a war-operations narrative dictated or written by the king that breaks off after his arrival in Antioch (P.Gurob = Austin (2006) no. 266 = W.Chr. 1 = P.Petr. III 144) and a work of propaganda enumerating the conquered territories (Adulis' inscription = OGIS I 54 = Austin (2006) no. 268). For previous interpretations of the literary, epigraphic and papyrological sources, see Huss (2001) 338–54; Hauben (1990a); Heinen (1984) 420–1. For Ptolemy III, see Hölbl (2001) 46–54.

Andros by Antigonus Gonatas, although the date is uncertain.[61] In any case, this defeat, presumably costly, suggests some erosion of Ptolemaic supremacy.

Ptolemy III had to return to Egypt because a revolt had broken out (June 245 BC). Modern historians consider this the first native Egyptian revolt, but almost nothing is known about it. P.Haun. 6 is the only papyrological source attesting the "revolt of Egyptians" (l. 15, *Aigyptiōn apos*[*tasis*]), an expression that could mean "ethnic Egyptians" but also "inhabitants of Egypt" of any ethnicity. The revolt is usually explained by socio-economic variables rather than religious ones, but in any case it involved proportionally many more Egyptians than Greeks.[62] In addition, the absence of the king and his troops from Egypt, recruitment and confiscations that probably took place in preparation for the expedition, the major floods mentioned in the Canopus decree, and perhaps even the naval defeat at Andros may constitute proximate causes of the revolt.[63] The war lasted a few more years, and the governor Ptolemy III had established in *trans Euphraten* soon lost his province to Seleucus II.[64] But the peace of 241 BC was favorable to Egypt because of rebellions in the Seleucid empire, in Bactria and Parthia (Justin, *Epitome* 27.2.9). Ptolemy III kept control of the territories on the fringes of the Seleucid empire: Seleucia in Pieria (an enclave in Seleucid territory and a harbor of strategic importance for Ptolemy's Aegean possessions), territories in Cilicia and Pamphylia (which he lost again), a number of cities in Asia Minor (Ephesus, Lebedos, Colophon, Priene and Samos) and in the Hellespont and southern Thrace (Ainos and Maroneia), and the island of Samothrace.[65] The Ptolemies were now in possession of most of the Eastern Mediterranean coast, from Libya to Thrace, with inland territories

61 P.Haun. 6, l. 8–9; Plutarch, *Moralia* 183c, *Pelopidas* 2.2; Justin, *Epitome* 27. For Opron instead of Sophron, see Oikonomides (1984). Hauben (1990) 35 suggests that this naval defeat forced Ptolemy to return to Egypt, although there is no positive evidence of a causal relation. In contrast, Huss (2001) 350–1 underlines that the Ptolemies did not lose their influence in the Aegean after the battle. For 246/5 BC, see Avram (2003) 1210 and Walbank (1984) 248–9. For 243 BC, see Hölbl (2001) 50 with appendix.

62 Véïsse (2004) 3–5, 146 on this revolt and 133 on the double "statistical convergence": the Greeks were at the same time more numerous in the higher strata of the population than the Egyptians and very few within the total population; Justin, *Epitome* 27.1.9 alludes to a revolt. For P.Haun. 6 see Bülow-Jacobsen (1979) and Schwartz (1978). The revolt is also mentioned in the new Alexandrian decree, see note 60.

63 Hauben (1990a) 32–4 and bibliography *ad loc.*: a famine increased the economic difficulties of the poorest strata of the population, although it is unclear whether it occurred in 246/5 BC; see the Canopus decree = I.Prose 8, ll. 10–14 = Bagnall and Derow (2004) no. 164.

64 On the identification of the governor Xanthippus as a *triērarchos*, see note 85.

65 Le Rider and Callataÿ (2006) 14 provide a detailed map of the Ptolemaic dominions in 250–240 BC.

in Anatolia. Their external possessions remained broadly similar until the end of the third century.[66]

The absence of military intervention on the part of the Ptolemaic army for the following twenty years, along with papyrological documentation regarding cleruchs, suggests that Ptolemy III decided to lower the cost of his army by settling large numbers of soldiers. He continued the mix of formulas chosen by his predecessors: mercenaries and professional soldiers in garrisons in Egypt and the external possessions, but also men settled on land in exchange for military service and available to be recruited when necessary.[67] During the dynastic war between Seleucus II and his brother Antiochus Hierax, the so-called War of the Brothers (*c.* 241–235 BC), Ptolemy sent soldiers only once, to help Hierax repress the revolt of his Galatian troops.[68] Ptolemy III's foreign policy after the Third Syrian War was in fact limited to supporting the Achaean League financially rather than sending troops, receiving the honorary command as *hēgemōn* (Plutarch, *Aratus* 24.4). When he stopped doing this in 226/5 BC, the Macedonian king Antigonus immediately replaced him and became *hēgemōn*, marking the end of Ptolemaic intervention in the area. In 222 BC, however, when the new Seleucid king Antiochus III ordered his satrap Achaios to take back territory that had fallen into the hands of the King of Pergamon, Ptolemy immediately sent his son Magas with a fleet to Asia Minor against Achaios. His failure to prevent Seleucid expansion into the Attalid kingdom (P.Haun. 6) already attests to the reduction of Egyptian military power after twenty years of peace, a situation Ptolemy IV inherited a few months later on the death of his father.

3.1.4 The cost of an empire: financing land army and fleets

In the century that followed Alexander's death, the need for booty to continue warfare, and the need for warfare to increase taxable territory and bring back booty, created an endless spiral that influenced political decision-making and army organization throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. Military exploits consolidated power and legitimated kingship not only ideologically but economically and politically. The financing of the army was made possible by taxation but was complemented by booty to an extent that cannot be quantified precisely. The early success of Ptolemy

66 Hölbl (2001) 50 stresses that the peace of 241 BC was favorable to the Ptolemies: Seleucus had to handle a revolt in Bactria and Parthia.

67 See Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 417–19 for the term "formula," and Chapter 4 below.

68 Porphyrius, *FGrH* 260 F 32.8. On the War of the Brothers, see Errington (2008) 123–4; Will (1979) vol. I, 296–8.

III in the Third Syrian War suggests that the Ptolemies aimed to maintain or expand their empire, increase their wealth from the tribute of the prosperous coastal areas and eventually eliminate any serious enemies in the Eastern Mediterranean. But none of this happened. Polybius provides a somewhat simplistic explanation of Ptolemaic "decline" resulting from Ptolemy IV's personality (Polybius 5.32), but a deeper understanding of the situation can be obtained. A survey of the challenges faced by the first three Ptolemies sheds light on a combination of factors that help to explain why the Ptolemaic empire did not expand and was in fact dramatically reduced in size by the time of Ptolemy V. First and most obviously, none of Egypt's rivals, for political, economic and ideological reasons, gave up their attempts to expand at the expense of the Ptolemies.[69] Second, the first three Ptolemies were unable to eliminate other powerful fleets to secure and expand the size of their possessions outside Egypt but instead lost part of their fleet – a costly investment – in naval defeats. Third, Ptolemy III decided to withdraw from direct military engagement in the two decades following the Third Syrian War, something no other king dared do in the ongoing state of war that created what I call the "paradox of impossible demobilization." By demobilizing and settling troops on land, Ptolemy III lowered the cost of his army, but he left the state unprepared for new large-scale military engagements. The sections that follow interrupt the narrative of the development of the Ptolemaic state at its height to evaluate the cost of the army and conclude with a general assessment of the first three Ptolemies' policies.

3.1.4.1 Tax revenues and booty

The annual revenues of the Ptolemies in silver and in wheat were considered by several ancient writers and have been discussed by papyrologists and historians.[70] I summarize them in Table 3.1. Since we do not know on what evidence, if any, ancient authors based their numbers, they simply represent a range. Préaux considers the amount in wheat given by Saint Jerome extremely low and relies on the amounts sent by the province of Egypt to Augustus and later to Justinian. In addition, I have evaluated the annual revenue in grain on the assumption that all cultivable land in Egypt

69 Austin (1986) 455–7 stresses that the "ideology of conquest" never disappeared among the Hellenistic rulers, whereas earlier scholars tend to assume a tacit mechanism of balance of power; see note 2.

70 Ancient authors give amounts in Attic drachma, unless they specify that they use the Egyptian talent. See Le Rider and Callataÿ (2006) 171–4 and note 3; Préaux (1978) 364–6 and (1979) 424–6. Rostovtzeff (1941) 1150–2 accepts the amounts given by St. Jerome and Josephus; Wilcken (1979) 411–21.

Table 3.1. *Annual revenues of the Ptolemies*

References	Reign	Type of revenues	Amount in silver talents (except when specified)
St. Jerome (Hieronymus), *Daniel* 11.5	Ptolemy II	total revenue in silver from Egypt	14,800 (Ptolemaic standard) = 12,000 (Attic standard)[a]
St. Jerome (Hieronymus), *Daniel* 11.5	Ptolemy II	total revenue in wheat from Egypt	1,500,000 art.
Appian, *Praef.* 10	Ptolemy II	revenues accumulated in the treasuries	740,000[b]
Strabo 18.1.13	Ptolemy XII	total revenue in silver	12,500
Diodorus 17.52	Ptolemy XII	total revenue (excluding Alexandria?)[c]	6,000
Josephus, *AJ* 12.175 (= Austin [2006] no. 280)	Ptolemy V[d]	Coele-Syria, Phoenicia, Judea, Samaria	8,000
Aurelius Victor, *Epitome* 1.4	Augustus	wheat from the province of Egypt	6,000,000 art.
Justinian, *Edict* XIII §7	Justinian	wheat from the province of Egypt	8,000,000 art.
1 art. per aroura on the whole cultivable territory in Egypt (20,000 km^2)	estimate	wheat from Egypt	7,260,000 art.

[a] Aperghis (2004) 249.

[b] Wilcken (1979) 416–21 shows that this figure is not calculated in copper and believes that, whereas Ptolemy II probably did not have so much in his treasuries, the Ptolemies increased their wealth through interests on loans.

[c] This is the solution that Préaux (1978) 364 suggests. For other opinions: Rostovtzeff (1941) 1153 suggests that Cicero (probably *De rege Alexandrino*) gives the income in the debased currency (12,500 talents) and Diodorus in its real value; Wilcken (1979) 414–15 proposes that this amount corresponds to the taxes on the revenues from the Alexandrians' possessions in the *chōra*.

[d] Josephus places the story of the tax collector Joseph, nephew of the great priest Onias, under Ptolemy V, but this has been debated; see Bagnall (1976) 20–1, esp. note 42.

was taxed one artaba per aroura. This figure seems plausible, given the 6 million artabas of wheat accepted by Préaux.[71]

A few other sources and modern evaluations of the revenues of the Seleucids and of Republican Rome confirm the general range of these estimates.[72]

71 Of course the total area of cultivated land in Egypt may have been smaller, and the taxes and rents four to eight times higher in some cases. For the purposes of rough calculation, I assume that these two variables cancel one another.

72 Le Rider and Callataÿ (2006) 173; Aperghis (2004) 251–2, 259–60. Callataÿ (2000) 355 gives some comparisons in cubic meters of silver.

Table 3.2. *Annual revenues of the Seleucids and of Republican Rome*

References	Period	Type of revenues	Amount in silver talents
Aperghis' evaluation	III BC	total revenues for the Seleucid kingdom	14,000–19,000
Plutarch, *Pompeius* 45.4	Roman Republic, I BC	total revenues for the Roman empire	8,333
Plutarch, *Pompeius* 45.4	Rome, after Pompey	total revenues for the Roman empire after annexation of Bithynia, Pontus, Cilicia and Syria	14,000
Duncan-Jones' evaluation[a]	*c.* 150 AD	total revenues for the Roman empire	37,500

[a] Duncan-Jones (1994) 45.

The evaluation of revenues from the Ptolemies' foreign possessions has always been conjectural because of the scarcity of sources.[73] Wilcken suggests that the 8,000 talents mentioned by Josephus is not impossible.[74] By extrapolating the annual tax rates for Judea of 1.2–2 talents per 1,000 inhabitants to the rest of the Ptolemies' foreign possessions, it is possible to broadly evaluate their revenues, assuming a population of 3–3.5 million.[75] The revenues could have reached 3,600–7,000 talents, but

[73] P.Tebt. I 8 = Austin (2006) no. 278 (202/1 BC) contains the extracts of letters sent by the *dioikētēs* of Alexandria to financial chiefs of several Ptolemaic provinces (Thrace, Lesbos, Lycia and perhaps Caria), with amounts that never reach 3 talents. The limited information does not allow us to evaluate the total revenues of the external possessions; see Rostovtzeff (1922) 332–51, esp. 335. Rostovtzeff's view must be updated by Bagnall (1976), esp. 108–9, 161–2, 166–7, 225–6; Skeat (1981); Lanciers (1991) for the date 202/1 BC as the first editors suggest, *contra* Bagnall (1975). Gygax (2005) points out that there were two financial *oikonomoi* in Lycia and stresses the flexibility of the Ptolemaic administration and its use of the existing system.

[74] Wilcken (1979) 412–13 considers the calculation of Boeckh (1886) vol. I, 13 of *c.* 4,170 talents of silver per year under Ptolemy II too low, since this would represent only one-third of the revenues from Egypt.

[75] Based on Aperghis (2004) 35–58, 168 and 248–51, I calculate the minimum and maximum tax rates of Judea according to a population of 250,000–300,000 and an annual tribute of 300–400 talents. In addition, unquantifiable amounts came from tithes on agriculture, head taxes, tolls and taxes on animals. I follow Aperghis' estimates of about 500,000 inhabitants in Cilicia, 500,000 in western and southern Asia Minor, 500,000 in Lycia, Pamphylia, Pisidia, Lycaonia and part of Phrygia, and 1 million in Coele-Syria. For Cyprus, the recent study by Bekker-Nielsen (2004) 60–2 suggests only that the two important cities and the eight smaller ones represented *c.* 20 percent of the population, which I estimate amounts to around 250,000 inhabitants. The Ptolemaic influence in Pisidia and Pamphylia was reduced at the death of Ptolemy III; see Heinen (1984) 439. Revenues from there thus decreased. I did not find any secure evaluation for Cyrenaica, and I suggest a population slightly larger than in Cyprus. For a

these numbers depend on the number of inhabitants estimated for Cyrenaica, Cyprus, Coele-Syria and the coast of Asia Minor, so they are subject to revision.

Ptolemy III reports in his "Bulletin" of the war (P.Gurob) that his fleet extracted 1,500 silver talents from the Cilician treasure and transported them to Seleucia. This represents around 10 percent of his annual revenue. The only other precise figure of booty preserved for the Ptolemies concerns the same military campaign: Saint Jerome (*Daniel* 11.6–9) reports 40,000 talents.[76] This is certainly an exaggeration, although Le Rider and Callataÿ accept it.[77] Other figures for traveling war chests of the time of the Successors or of booty extracted by the Seleucids from a region or city vary from 500 to 4,000 talents.[78] It is unlikely that Ptolemy had more than twenty-five windfalls like the Cilician treasure in less than a year, even if one adds the revenue from selling captives, but he surely returned to Egypt with more than 1,500 talents. In any case, the average percentage of the state revenue booty represented over a long period cannot be estimated precisely.[79] But the advantages that the prospect of future booty and the actual distribution of booty after a war brought played a fundamental role in military campaigns, because Hellenistic kings used booty to offer gifts to members of the ruling elite and to reward their soldiers.[80] These gains can be assessed for most major military campaigns, either thanks to details recorded by ancient historians and documents, or because booty gave an advantage to the invader over the defender by partially covering military costs.[81]

survey of the Ptolemaic settlements in the Ptolemaic possessions, see Mueller (2006) 41–55 and above note 65.

76 *FGrH* 260 F 43; Austin (1986) 465.

77 Le Rider and Callataÿ (2006) 193 base part of their argument on this figure to show that Ptolemy III had no financial problems.

78 For example, in 319 BC Antigonus seized 600 talents that were sent from Cilicia to Macedonia in order to pay his mercenaries (Diodorus 18.52.7); see Austin (1986) 465 note 20. On booty, see Préaux (1978) 367; Rostovtzeff (1941) index s.v. "booty," and the list of references in Austin (1986) 451 notes 8 and 9. For the Seleucid booty, see Bickerman (1938) 120–2; Aperghis (2004) 171–5. More generally, see Chaniotis (2005) 129–37. Ziolkowski (1986) discusses the plundering of Epirus by the Romans in 167 BC and the economic benefits of selling the enslaved population.

79 Le Rider and Callataÿ (2006) 172–3 believe that booty may have some impact on state finances but only for a limited period, and they accordingly neglect it in their general evaluation of state revenue.

80 See, for example, the harangues of Ptolemy IV and Antiochus III at Raphia at Polybius 5.83.6.

81 Kahn and Tammuz (2008) 47–8. Préaux (1978) 199–200, 296–8, 308, 334, 366–70 points out the importance of booty.

3.1.4.2 Cost of the navy

An approximation of the size and costs of the Ptolemaic navy in the third century BC shows that maintaining it was among the main military expenses. The fleet was financed by the state and by wealthy friends of the king. The existence of "liturgical" trierarchies, as in the Greek poleis, where the richest citizens financed the building of a ship, paid its crew and often commanded the boat, was challenged by Bagnall some decades ago.[82] Hauben, however, refined Bagnall's thesis by re-examining the case of Xanthippus.[83] Although no one might have financed a Ptolemaic warship while acting as a citizen of one of the Greek cities in Egypt or in the external possessions, the trierarch Xanthippus paid to rebuild or repair a nine (*ennērēs*) stationed in Halicarnassus. Thus, according to Hauben, important members of the Ptolemaic court took part in financing warships, although we can only conjecture whether this case can be generalized to the ten other known trierarchs. These "Ptolemaic" or "imperial" trierarchs sometimes commanded their ship.[84] Xanthippus had an agent acting for him in Halicarnassus but may have been in command during military action; Hauben has identified him as the governor established by Ptolemy III to control the short-lived conquests of *trans Euphraten*.[85] Finally, the Ptolemies could also use the fleets of allied cities that were financed locally by rich citizens. These ships remained the property of the city, and their crews consisted of its citizens.[86] Because only two cases are attested, the limited potential savings are not taken into consideration in my calculation of the cost of the fleet.

The system of trierarchs may thus have lowered the cost of the fleet by a few talents, because members of the Ptolemaic elite took care of building and/or repairing boats and perhaps paid the crews. Nonetheless, the savings were negligible compared with the daily cost of the entire fleet. Although the sailors were recruited from the lowest social class, the annual cost of the fleet was enormous.[87] In my calculations I attempt to distinguish

82 Bagnall (1971), esp. 362. Alexander the Great and the Ptolemies adapted the liturgical trierarchy used in the poleis to the structure of their larger state. Thus modern historians use the term "liturgical" only as an analogy to the Athenian or "civic" system, and the system was different in the Ptolemaic empire; see Hauben (1990b) 138.

83 P.Cair.Zen. I 59036 (257 BC).

84 For those in command, see Hauben (1990b) 129 and notes 1, 4, 5 and 6. The other cases cannot be securely evaluated.

85 Hauben (1990b) 120, 134–9.

86 Hauben (1990b) 129 and 132: these cases imply effective command by the trierarchs who were accomplishing a civic liturgy for their city.

87 Van 't Dack (1988a) 22–32 = Van 't Dack (1977) 95–103.

the numbers of oarsmen and of sailors/marines in peacetime and during military expeditions (see below, Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 on p. 76). Approximately 224 warships with about 200 men and 112 larger warships with 300 men paid at a rate of one drachma per day (including wages and food) cost 13 talents per day for about 78,400 men (see Table 3.6).[88] The annual cost to maintain the oarsmen and sailors/marines of such a fleet could easily have reached 4,000–4,800 silver talents, depending on whether the military year lasted ten or twelve months (see Table 3.5). Alternatively, if each trireme cost 10,000 drachmas per month, assuming the same amount per larger warship, since only one experienced oarsman was needed per oar, the fleet cost 5,600–6,700 talents.[89] The total cost of the fleet must have fluctuated: officers' salaries, for example, could be very high during conflicts to prevent them from joining the enemy, for example ten minas per day for the top commander, or more than a talent per week.[90] The cost of building and repairing warships was also high: the trierarch Xanthippus spent almost a talent on fixing or repairing the *ennērē* stationed in Halicarnassus.[91] In wartime the expenses for ships that carried infantry must be added, but in peacetime they were probably employed for non-military purposes. As regards savings, wealthy members of the court contributed money to maintain a few boats, and some Greek cities perhaps did the same during military expeditions. If in peacetime only two-thirds of the fleet was paid nine months per year, the cost could decrease to *c.* 2,500–3,700 silver talents.[92]

88 For 336 ships in total, see Athenaus 5.203d, Text 3.3 above. I assume that the entire crew received the same wages, but the 20–40 sailors/marines were certainly paid slightly more than the oarsmen. Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 73 suggest a maximum of 90,000 oarsmen at the time of Ptolemy II, on the basis of 170 oarsmen per trireme and 270 oarsmen per quinquereme. Using these numbers, I get a total of 68,320 oarsmen ($170 \times 224 + 270 \times 112$). Perhaps Van 't Dack and Hauben obtained their total by adding oarsmen on transports. For the number of men per ship (*c.* 170 oarsmen and *c.* 30 sailors/marines per trireme, *c.* 270 oarsmen on larger ships), see Van 't Dack (1977) 95–6; Aperghis (2004) 198; Casson (1994) 88. Marrinan (1998) 493–502 estimates 40–120 marines/soldiers per quinquereme, that is 8,000–24,000 marines/soldiers in the Ptolemaic fleet in the third century BC but does not include the oarsmen. If there were more than 30–40 soldiers on a ship for a battle, they came from the infantry and are thus included in my calculation of infantry costs.

89 For 10,000 drachmas per month, see the treaty between Rhodes and Hierapytna in Crete, Syll.[3] 581 = Austin (2006) no. 113, §12, *c.* 200 BC. On experienced oarsmen on the large ships, see Casson (1994) 84.

90 Polybius 13.2.3; Aperghis (2004) 205–6.

91 Hauben (1990b) 133, 135: 5,465 drachmas.

92 The *mare clausum* supposedly lasted for five months, from November to March, but this was not as strict as it has been thought; see Hauben (1985) 106 note 4. Even if naval activity decreased during this period, it did not stop but was simply more risky; see Horden and Purcell (2000) 142–3. In an agreement between Eumenes I and his mercenaries (OGIS I 266 = Austin [2006] no. 230), the campaign year is said to last ten months; unfortunately we do not

Table 3.3. *Ptolemaic army numbers at Raphia and at the Grand Procession*

	Raphia (217 BC)		Grand Procession (279/8 BC)	
	Infantry	Cavalry	Infantry	Cavalry
Cleruchs	36,000	700	57,600	23,200
Mercenaries	11,000	2,000		
Libyans and soldiers "enlisted in the country"	3,000	2,300		
Egyptians	20,000	–		
Allies	–	–	–	–
Total	70,000	5,000	57,600	23,200

3.1.4.3 Cost of the land army

Polybius' account of the Battle of Raphia in 217 BC provides a more reliable description of the troops than that of Athenaeus under Ptolemy II (see Table 3.3, and Table 3.7 on p. 80, with more details). If each infantryman received on average one drachma per day, and each cavalryman twice as much, and if officers of various ranks – perhaps 1 percent of the total forces, *c.* 700 men – were paid on average ten times as much as an infantryman, the annual cost of the troops during these years was over 5,000 talents (see Table 3.5 below).[93] Additional expenses sometimes occurred when peace was bought as a sort of indemnity of war, as, for example, at the end of the Second Syrian War in 253 BC. In the case of the Ptolemies, however, this seems to have been a one-time expense and was actually treated as the dowry of Berenice for her wedding with Antiochus II.[94]

The thousands of soldiers still stationed in garrisons in Egypt and within the empire are not included but represented a permanent cost whose amount can only be very roughly estimated. Assuming one hundred garrisons within the external possessions, the small ones with twenty soldiers (one drachma apiece per day) and a commander (4 drachmas per day), as in the city of Teos, and the larger ones with perhaps ten times as many men, as at Ephesus

know whether the men were paid for the final two months; see Chaniotis (2005) 87–8; Aperghis (2004) 203. Aperghis suggests that most sailors and marines were paid "only when on active duty, that is, during the summer sailing months."

93 On the size of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid armies, see Launey (1949) 94–103; Préaux (1978) 303–6. On wages, see G.T. Griffith (1935) 274–316; Launey (1949) 725–80; Préaux (1978) 306–9; Clarysse and Lanciers (1989) 127–32; Salmenkivi (2002) 70–9.

94 Huss (2001) 287.

(Polybius 5.35.11), the total cost could approximate 500 talents per year, or perhaps even double that.[95] For Egypt, Polybius' figures for the *agēma*, the cavalry of the guard, and the peltasts amount to 5,700 men in total. Soldiers fulfilling garrison duties in the Delta, as well as in Middle and Upper Egypt, must also be included. On the basis of the number of garrisons established by Winnicki, around 18,000 soldiers for Egypt and its dominions must be added, for a total cost of about 1,200 talents per year.[96]

Calculating the cost of the land army in peacetime is more problematic, since we do not know how often, if ever, cleruchs were hired for garrison duties or perhaps for controlling the collection and transport of royal grain or taxes. Assuming that cleruchs, both cavalry and infantry, served three months at the same wage of one drachma per day, 36,000 cleruchs – the number mentioned at Raphia without the 20,000 Egyptians of the phalanx – cost only 550 talents per year instead of 2,200 talents during a year-long military campaign. In addition, they decreased the need for mercenary soldiers in garrisons from 15,000–20,000 to perhaps 8,000–12,000 men.

During years of wars or of preparation for a war, military expenses could thus reach 10,200–13,400 silver talents if the fleet is included, and in peacetime the cost could have been half this amount (4,500–5,700 talents). The difference is due in part to the regular army settled in Egypt. I offer a summary of total military costs when I compare them with those of the Seleucids in section 3.1.4.4 and Table 3.5 below.

Finally, festivals such as the Ptolemaia also had to be budgeted for. Callixeinus estimated that the festival cost 2,239 talents 50 minas (Athenaeus 5.203b), about 500 talents per year since it was organized every four years, and probably less on average because it was not equally splendid every

95 For Teos, see SEG XXVI 1306, ll. 18–21 and ll. 29–31; Chaniotis (2005) 116; L. Robert and J. Robert (1976), esp. 206–7, 216. Bagnall (1976) mentions the known garrisons in each region in his study of the foreign possessions. For a more recent inscription containing the list of Ptolemaic soldiers in Coele-Syria, see Rey-Coquais (1978), esp. 321–3: the ethnic designations indicate soldiers from Thrace, Macedonia, mainland Greece, Asia Minor, Cyprus and Cyrene, all these regions being well known for providing mercenaries. For similar lists of soldiers, typically without patronyms, see Launey (1949) 67–81.

96 Winnicki (1978) counts five large garrisons and forty garrisons in the Thebaid and Middle Egypt in the second century BC. Their number and size in these regions were probably smaller in the third century, perhaps 2,000 soldiers. I estimate 9,000 soldiers in the Delta, that is one and half times the number of guards, cavalry and peltasts given for Raphia (see Table 3.7); Clarysse and Lanciers (1989) 127–32 discuss the evidence for the payment of a garrison in Techtho, in the Heracleopolite nome, re-dated after them to 211/10 BC (see P.Stras. II 103–8): they suggest a garrison of fifty-four men paid 9 obols, or of 108 men paid 4.5 obols per day rather than the 6 obols that are expected, because these were mainly police. Written a few months later, P.Stras. VII 622, a text from the same archive, reports a one-month payment of 930 drachmas for a Nile boat, which implies the plausible number of thirty-one men at one drachma per day.

time.[97] Thompson suggests that visitors, as part of a system of international gift-exchange, paid for part of the Ptolemaia by bringing crowns.[98] The expense could also be partially covered by booty from recent wars and contributions from the ruling elite, as in the parallel case of the Daphnae parade organized by Antiochus IV.[99]

3.1.4.4 Comparison with the Seleucid empire: prelude to the Fourth Syrian War

This estimate of the cost of the fleet and the land army, although speculative, does help to set the parameters and constraints governing the Ptolemies' military activities. It is especially relevant to compare the military resources and costs of the Ptolemies with those of their main opponent, the Seleucids, and to check them against military expenses for Early Modern states, for which better data are preserved. For a total population of about seven million, the Ptolemaic empire's revenues approximated 14,000–16,000 silver (Attic) talents per year.[100] In contrast, for a total population of roughly fifteen to twenty million subjects during most of the third century BC, the Seleucids' revenues reached 14,000–19,000 silver (Attic) talents per year.[101] Both empires had similar revenues, but they varied greatly in their overall population and size. Estimates of the number of troops in the Seleucid army are based on the description of the Battles of Raphia and Magnesia and on the Procession at Daphnae, as summarized in Table 3.4.[102]

In addition, both empires had similar military expenses, as is shown in Table 3.5.[103] These evaluations are based on the number of soldiers paid during wartime and peacetime, summarized in Table 3.6. The distribution

97 It is unclear whether this amount is given in Ptolemaic or in Attic currency.

98 Thompson (2000) 379–80.

99 Athenaeus 10.439 mentions war booty from Egypt, contributions by friends, and plunder from temples. On the Daphnae parade, see Polybius 30.25; Diodorus 31.16.2–17.

100 Four million in Egypt (Fischer-Bovet [2011] 137–8) and around three million in the external possessions (see note 75). For the revenues, see in Table 3.1 St. Jerome, *Daniel*, 12,000 silver talents, to which I add the revenues from the foreign possessions (section 3.1.4.1).

101 For the population, see Aperghis (2004) 56–8. Green (1990) 371 and Morris and Powell (2006) 446 even suggest 25–30 million subjects. For the revenues, see Table 3.2 and note 72.

102 Raphia (Polybius 5.79), Magnesia (Livy 37.37.9; 37.40; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 32), the Procession at Daphnae (Polybius 30.25); see Aperghis (2004) 190 note 3, 191–3, and his table 10.1. He allocates the troops to categories slightly different from those of Bar-Kochva (1976) 51, who uses the term "military settlers" for the troops Aperghis calls "regulars," i.e. cleruchs. Sion-Jenkis (2001) 20–2 also obtains slightly different numbers and discusses the various choices made by modern historians. See also note 93.

103 For the Ptolemies, see my calculations in the previous sections. For the Seleucids, see Aperghis (2004) Chapter 10, esp. 189–205. In my evaluation, I assume that mercenaries, cleruchs and natives were paid the same amount, as does Aperghis (2004) 201–4.

Table 3.4. *Seleucid army numbers in major campaigns, based on Aperghis (2004) 191*

	Raphia (217 BC)		Magnesia (190 BC)		Procession at Daphnae (166 BC)	
	Infantry	Cavalry	Infantry	Cavalry	Infantry	Cavalry
Regulars	30,000	6,000	28,000	8,000	25,000	6,500
Mercenaries	13,500		14,000	4,200	16,000	
Native levies	8,500		16,200			
Allies	10,000		2,000			
Total	62,000	6,000	60,200	12,200	41,000	6,500

Table 3.5. *Military expenses of the Ptolemies and the Seleucids, by annual amount in silver talents*

	Ptolemies		Seleucids	
	War	Peace	War	Peace
Fleet	4,000–6,700	2,500–3,700	1,000–2,000	5,000–600
Land army	6,200–6,700	2,000	7,000–8,000	6,000–7,000
Total	10,200–13,400	4,500–5,700	9,000–10,000	7,000–8,000
% of budget	78	34	57	45

Table 3.6. *Number of soldiers and crew members in the Ptolemaic and Seleucid armies at war and at peace*

	Ptolemies before and at Raphia		Seleucids	
	War	Peace	War	Peace
Fleet	70,000–80,000	45,000–50,000	25,000–30,000	10,000
Garrisons	15,000–20,000	8,000–12,000	20,000–30,000	20,000–30,000
Mercenaries	13,000	1,000	15,000	15,000
Regular	36,000	36,000 (3 months)= 9,000 full time	36,000	36,000
Egyptians or ethnic troops	25,000	5,000–6,000	8,000–16,000	–
Allies or subject levies	–	–	10,000–15,000	–
Total	160,000–175,000	63,000–78,000	115,000–130,000	80,000–90,000

of expenses is different. The Ptolemies devoted huge amounts to the fleet, about three times more than the Seleucids at war, while the Seleucids devoted huge amounts to paying the land army even in peacetime. The advantages and disadvantages of these strategies are analyzed below.

The results of these evaluations can be checked against the percentage of the state budget devoted to warfare in the Roman empire and Early Modern Europe. In a recent article, Callataÿ stresses the resemblances between Hellenistic states and modern Europe. Summarizing some of the data, he concludes that between the sixteenth century and the First World War, military expenses absorbed at least 33 percent of state revenues during peacetime and could easily reach 66 percent during war.[104] Situations of this sort often led states to run deficits, and they make clear the importance of booty for quick cash flow during and immediately after a war. Estimates of the cost of the Ptolemaic army (Table 3.5), like those proposed by Aperghis for the Seleucid army, resemble the figures obtained for Early Modern Europe.

Given the human and material resources available to both states, the Ptolemies were initially successful at mobilizing large armies and maintaining a fleet for an empire of their size. The tax rates show that within Egypt they were able to collect 3–4 talents of silver per 1,000 inhabitants, and 1½–2 talents in Coele-Syria and Asia Minor. The average in the Seleucid kingdom, by comparison, varied between one and two talents.[105] As long as the Seleucids maintained their large empire in the east, they had more human capital available, although they also had greater defensive needs. Even so, the Seleucids were able to mobilize large numbers of native levies and allies – including Indian elephants and their mahouts – on the battlefield at Raphia and Magnesia (Table 3.4). They thus compelled the Ptolemies to hire more soldiers, both Greek mercenaries and native troops, to defend their territory at Raphia (Table 3.6).

Absolute numbers for the Ptolemaic and Seleucid land armies, as seen in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, appear quite similar. This fact conceals two interrelated elements: the ratio of mobilized soldiers to the total population was higher for the Ptolemies, and the Seleucids were able to mobilize large armies even without recruiting in some provinces. The Seleucids in fact

[104] Callataÿ (2000), esp. 337–41, whose survey of the European states between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries shows that most of their expenses were military and that the administration and the royal court represent a much smaller percentage. Duncan-Jones (1994) 45 estimates military expenses at more than 70 percent of the budget for the Roman empire in the second and third centuries AD.

[105] Aperghis (2004) 248–51.

gathered only part of their military potential at Raphia, because some areas were under the control of a usurper.[106] The Ptolemies, by contrast, gathered the largest number of troops they would ever be able to hire.

The percentage of the population under Ptolemaic control connected to the army becomes even higher when one takes into consideration crew members, perhaps up to 78,400 men as calculated above on the basis of the number of ships in the time of Ptolemy II. The Seleucids, on the other hand, did not really invest in a fleet, except perhaps in the Persian Gulf (at most 5,000 men). Aperghis estimates that the Seleucid fleet could function with about 10,000 crew members and reached 30,000 only during Antiochus III's reconquest of the western part of his empire, at a time when Ptolemaic naval power was diminishing.[107] Antiochus III's investments for a fleet were nonetheless initially limited, since he was able to capture twenty decked warships in Ptolemais (in Phoenicia) during the Fourth Syrian War (Polybius 5.62.2–3, 217 BC) and because he could also use the ships of the Phoenician cities he conquered. The Ptolemies had invested large resources in maintaining a fleet in an attempt to be superior to those of Rhodes and of the Antigonids in the Aegean. Their supremacy at sea started to be challenged around the mid second century BC, when they were defeated by the Antigonids and by the Rhodians. Their failure at Andros in the 240s BC was also costly, whereas the Seleucids did not bear such a burden. In addition, the Antigonids could maintain their fleet at a lower cost, thanks to naval cities such as Pydna, Amphipolis, Cassandreia and others.[108] Even if my estimate of the number of Ptolemaic crew members is high, the Ptolemaic and Seleucid fleets were of very different sizes, the Ptolemaic fleet being three to six times larger, which suggests that the fleet was a burden on Ptolemaic finances and manpower.

About three years after the death of Ptolemy III, at the beginning of the Fourth Syrian War (219 BC), Antiochus III threatened to invade Coele-Syria with a land army of 68,000 men, including 10,000 allies. In contrast, the precise description of Ptolemy IV's land army in 219 BC suggests that Ptolemy had between 35,000 and 40,000 soldiers, many of them cleruchs he needed to gather first in Alexandria (Polybius 5.65, see Text 3.4 and Table 3.7).[109] By the time of the Battle of Raphia in 217 BC, he had to double the

106 Achaios controlled western Asia Minor, and Seleucid control of Media and Persia was weak at that time; see Aperghis (2004) 191.

107 Aperghis (2004) 197–9.

108 Hatzopoulos (2001) 27–8.

109 See Table 3.7: 25,000 men from the Greek world in the phalanx, 2,000 Cretans, 4,000 cleruchs from Thrace and Gaul, 3,000 in the *agēma*, 2,000 peltasts, 700 cavalry of the guard and probably around 1,000 mercenary cavalry (half of the cavalry under Echecrates) yields a total

Text 3.4. *Polybius 5.65 on the Battle of Raphia*

Text in italic: author's emphasis.

Polybius, *Histories* 5.65	Translation by Paton (1922–7) with modifications
εἶχον δὲ καὶ τὰς ἡγεμονίας ἕκαστοι τῶν προειρημένων ἀνδρῶν οἰκείας ταῖς ἰδίαις ἐμπειρίαις. [2] Εὐρύλοχος μὲν γὰρ ὁ Μάγνης ἡγεῖτο σχεδὸν ἀνδρῶν τρισχιλίων τοῦ καλουμένου παρὰ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν ἀγήματος· Σωκράτης δ᾽ ὁ Βοιώτιος πελταστὰς ὑφ᾽ αὑτὸν εἶχε δισχιλίους [3] ὁ δ᾽ Ἀχαιὸς Φοξίδας καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Θρασέου, σὺν δὲ τούτοις Ἀνδρόμαχος [ὁ] Ἀσπένδιος, συνεγύμναζον μὲν ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους Ἕλληνας, [4] ἡγοῦντο δὲ τῆς μὲν φάλαγγος Ἀνδρόμαχος καὶ Πτολεμαῖος, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων Φοξίδας, οὔσης τῆς μὲν φάλαγγος εἰς δισμυρίους καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων εἰς ὀκτακισχιλίους. [5] τοὺς δ᾽ ἱππεῖς τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὴν αὐλήν, ὄντας εἰς ἑπτακοσίους, Πολυκράτης παρεσκεύαζε καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Λιβύης, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐγχωρίους· καὶ τούτων αὐτὸς ἡγεῖτο πάντων, περὶ τρισχιλίους ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμόν. [6] τούς γε μὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων ἱππέων πλῆθος Ἐχεκράτης ὁ Θετταλὸς διαφερόντως ἀσκήσας, ὄντας εἰς δισχιλίους, μεγίστην ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κινδύνου παρέσχετο χρείαν. [7] οὐδενὸς δ᾽ ἧττον ἔσπευδε περὶ τοὺς ὑφ᾽ αὑτὸν ταττομένους Κνωπίας Ἀλλαριώτης, ἔχων τοὺς μὲν πάντας Κρῆτας εἰς τρισχιλίους, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων χιλίους Νεόκρητας, ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἐτετάχει Φίλωνα τὸν Κνώσσιον. [8] καθώπλισαν δὲ καὶ Λίβυας τρισχιλίους εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον, ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἦν Ἀμμώνιος ὁ Βαρκαῖος. [9] τὸ δὲ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων πλῆθος ἦν μὲν εἰς δισμυρίους φαλαγγίτας, ὑπετάττετο δὲ Σωσιβίῳ, [10] συνήχθη δὲ καὶ Θρᾳκῶν καὶ Γαλατῶν πλῆθος, ἐκ μὲν τῶν κατοίκων καὶ τῶν ἐπιγόνων εἰς τετρακισχιλίους, οἱ δὲ προσφάτως ἐπισυναχθέντες ἦσαν εἰς δισχιλίους, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Διονύσιος ὁ Θρᾷξ. [11] Ἡ μὲν οὖν Πτολεμαίῳ παρασκευαζομένη δύναμις τῷ τε πλήθει καὶ ταῖς διαφοραῖς τοσαύτη καὶ τοιαύτη τις ἦν.	All the men I have mentioned held commands suited to their particular accomplishments. [2] Eurylochus of Magnesia commanded a body of about three thousand men known as the Royal Guard (*agēma*), Socrates the Boeotian had under him two thousand peltasts, [3] Phoxidas the Achaean, Ptolemy the son of Thraseas, and Andromachus of Aspendus exercised together in one body the phalanx and the Greek mercenaries, [4] Andromachus and Ptolemy commanded the phalanx and Phoxidas the mercenaries; the phalanx amounted to twenty-five thousand men and the mercenaries to eight thousand. [5] Polycrates undertook the training of the cavalry of the guard, about seven hundred strong, and of *the cavalry from Libya and of those enlisted in the country*;[a] all of whom, numbering about three thousand, were under his command. [6] It was Echecrates the Thessalian who trained most admirably the cavalry from Greece and all the mercenary cavalry, who amounted to two thousand, and thus rendered most signal service in the battle itself. [7] No one paid more attention than Cnopias of Allaria to the men under him, composed of three thousand Cretans, one thousand being Neocretans whom he placed under the command of Philo of Cnossus. [8] They also armed in the Macedonian fashion three thousand Libyans under the command of Ammonius of Barce. [9] The Egyptians supplied twenty thousand men to the phalanx and were commanded by Sosibius. [10] A force of Thracians and Gauls was drawn together, about four thousand of them from among settlers in Egypt and their descendants, and two thousand lately raised elsewhere. These were commanded by Dionysius the Thracian. [11] Such were the numbers and nature of the army that Ptolemy was preparing.

[a] I have modified Paton's misleading translation: "Libyan and native Egyptian horse"; see Chapter 4, note 80.

Table 3.7. *Polybius 5.65*

	Infantry		Cavalry		Total
Recently hired Greek mercenaries	9,000	8,000: Greek mercenaries 1,000: Neo-Cretans[a]	2,000	2,000: cavalry from Greece and mercenary cavalry	11,000
Recently hired Thracian and Galatian mercenaries	2,000	2,000: Thracians and Galatians			2,000
Egyptians	20,000	20,000: Egyptian phalanx			20,000
Libyans and soldiers "enlisted in the country"	3,000	3,000: Libyans with Macedonian equipment	2,300	[2,300[b]]: Libyans and soldiers "enlisted in the country"	5,300
Cleruchs and Greek mercenaries already in service (coming from the Greek world)	32,000	3,000: *agēma* 2,000: peltasts[c] 25,000 Greek phalanx[d] 2,000: Cretans	700	700: cavalry of the guard[e]	32,700
Cleruchs (coming from Thrace and Gaul)	4,000	4,000: Thracians and Galatians "among settlers and their descendants"			4,000
Total	70,000	70,000	5,000	5,000	75,000

[a] For Walbank (1957–79) commentary to 4.3.1, the term "Neocretans" is unclear and probably refers to soldiers sent by Cnossus and thus recently hired. But the term may simply reflect an innovation in their armament, perhaps light-armed soldiers with small round *peltai*; see Launey (1949) 257, 284.

[b] This number can be deduced from Polybius 5.65.5, which mentions the 700 cavalrymen of the guard, making a total of 3,000 including the cavalry from Libya and those enlisted in the country.

[c] See Chapter 4, p. 139, note 123.

[d] See Fischer-Bovet (2011) 139–40, where I follow Rathbone (1990); Goudriaan (1988) 122; and Bar-Kochva (1976) 138–41, according to whom there were 25,000 Greek hoplites fighting in phalanx formation (total of the infantry: 70,000, see Polybius 5.79.2), *contra* Walbank (1957–79) vol. II, 590, who argues for only 5,000 Greek hoplites fighting in phalanx formation (total of the infantry: 50,000). Walbank accepted the interpretation of Mahaffy (1899); Tarn (1928) 730; G.T. Griffith (1935) 122; and Rostovtzeff (1941) 1397: for them the 20,000 Egyptians in the phalanx (5.65.9) must be included among the 25,000 hoplites fighting in phalanx formation mentioned in 5.65.4, and they accordingly deduce that there were only 5,000 Greeks in the phalanx.

e See Chapter 4, p. 149, note 151.

number of his troops by hiring 8,000 Greek infantry mercenaries, 1,000 Neo-Cretans, 2,000 extra Thracians and Galatians and 1,000–2,000 Greek cavalry. He also included 20,000 Egyptians and 3,000 Libyans in the phalanx.

Whereas the use of allied troops decreased the cost of the Seleucid military campaign – allies presumably paid the wages of their troops for some time at least – Ptolemy had none.[110] At the same time, Ptolemy's mercenaries were enormously expensive, because he had to hire them hastily to compensate for the small size of his army and his probably ill-trained cleruchs. The bargaining power of the mercenaries was very high at that point. The high demand for their services made them particularly expensive: they had been hired for the Social War in Greece, and the Second Punic War had just broken out in the Western Mediterranean.[111] Moreover, Ptolemy IV had been in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the Seleucids, who could plunder the territories they were attacking. Military costs driven by the Fourth Syrian War put Ptolemy IV in a difficult financial situation. This was a defensive war that ended up perpetuating the status quo. He had to pay his soldiers and mercenaries, as well as please the elite, especially the military elite, to prevent its members from joining the enemy. After a war, dissatisfaction on the part of the elite, the soldiers, or the population in general, whether Egyptian or Greek, could quickly turn into riots and revolts. The next three decades, described in the second part of this chapter, are full of revolts in the north and the south, the loss of most external possessions, and a major foreign attack (the Fifth Syrian War). At that point, after the Battle of Panion in 200 BC, control of Coele-Syria and its revenues fell into the hands of the Seleucids. The revenue of Coele-Syria, Syria and Asia Minor probably amounted to 2,400–4,000 talents.[112] This was a tremendous loss

of 37,700 men. The 2,300 cavalry from Libya and those enlisted in the country might have been hired for the battle as well as the other 1,000 cavalry under Echecrates said to be "from Greece."

110 For the financial advantages of using allied troops, see, for example, the treaty between the Rhodians and the city of Hierapytna in Crete (*c.* 200 BC, Syll.[3] 581 = Austin [2006] no. 113): Rhodes, the dominant partner, obtained terms according to which Hierapytna would pay the wages of the troops for the first thirty days. In addition, the Rhodians would keep any ships they captured, although the rest of the booty would be divided. Perhaps Ptolemy II could take advantage of his allies in the Island League, as is suggested without clear evidence by Rostovtzeff (1941) 333. Walbank (1993) 101 does not mention such benefits.

111 Grainger (2010) 205–6.

112 Assuming that the external possessions of the Ptolemies declined from 3–3.5 million to 1–1.5 million in the second century, their revenues would have decreased to 1,200–4,000 talents in comparison with the 3,600–7,000 calculated for the third century BC. Heinen (1984) 440–2 stresses the military and economic advantages of Coele-Syria, i.e. "Syria and Phoenicia" in the Ptolemaic documentation.

for the Ptolemies, for whom these provinces' taxes must have represented up to 20 percent of their total revenues.

The events of the Fourth Syrian War are among the causes of the Ptolemies' failure to maintain their foreign possessions a generation later. But Ptolemy IV's unfavorable position at the beginning of the war needs to be explained. Griffith has proposed that the need for mercenaries was caused by the disintegration of the Ptolemaic cleruchic system, in contrast to the Seleucid system.[113] Bar-Kochva has explained the difference in the composition of the Seleucid and the Ptolemaic armies as a consequence of the ill-functioning cleruchic system and the smaller pool from which the Ptolemies could recruit.[114] According to him, however, the use of light-armed native levies and allied contingents was a disadvantage vis-à-vis Ptolemaic heavy-armed infantrymen (both mercenaries and cleruchs) and ultimately accounted for the Seleucid defeat at Raphia. Both Griffith and Bar-Kochva assume that while the Ptolemaic cleruchic system functioned badly, the Seleucid cleruchic system maintained effective soldiers who were settled in military colonies called *katoikiai*. In fact, since their studies, the question of whether the *katoikiai* were actually military settlements has been debated at length. The military nature of these colonies has been shown to be doubtful, because of a lack of positive evidence attesting that the settlers were soldiers.[115] This led Aperghis to regard the Seleucid troops as constantly kept on duty in garrisons or in ongoing warfare, and therefore as well-trained, despite a negligible number of soldiers receiving *klēroi*.[116] Thus the savings achieved by the Seleucids as a result of settling a few soldiers does not significantly alter Aperghis' evaluation or my broad comparison with the Ptolemies. Soldiers continuously on duty represented a large share of Seleucid military expenses, while by contrast the Ptolemies provided a very large number of soldiers with a *klēros*.

113 G. T. Griffith (1935) 117, 170.

114 Bar-Kochva (1976) 53.

115 See Cohen (1991); Schuler (1998) 33–41; Sekunda (2007) 335. Bickerman (1938) 82 recognizes that the similarities between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic systems are conjectural and that there is almost no evidence of the military aspect of the Seleucid *katoikiai*.

116 Aperghis (2004) 194–7, 201 note 38, *contra* Bar-Kochva (1976) 59–62, who suggests that the Seleucids did not generally give *klēroi* to their troops (vs. the Ptolemaic army) and who calculates the cost of the land army accordingly. But he mentions a few examples of klēroi belonging to soldiers, notably OGIS I 229 for the garrison of Palaimagnesia (= Schuler [1998] 38 and D8) and Josephus, *AJ* for Jewish soldiers in Phrygia and Lydia. More recently, Capdetrey (2007) 158–66 concludes that most *katoikiai* had a military character and that the scant evidence suggests a combination of civilian and military settlers; see also Fischer-Bovet (2012). A question remains, if we accept Aperghis' new view: what is the difference between mercenaries and cleruchs? Aperghis suggests three possibilities: the pay, the type of soldiers (heavily armed regular troops vs. light mercenary infantrymen), or the provenance (cleruchs from inside the empire, mercenaries from outside).

The argument about the demographic advantages of the Seleucids is valid in part but can nonetheless be refined for reasons different from those proposed by Bar-Kochva. The Seleucids had substantial revenues even when they taxed less than the Ptolemies, and they had a large pool for recruiting soldiers: their army was made up of Greeks and soldiers from the eastern provinces, but probably also of Syrians, Mesopotamians and Persians armed in the Macedonian fashion.[117] Because their empire was so vast, however, Seleucid rulers were constantly sending troops to defend or maintain it, or at other times to expand it. War could also take the shape of dynastic conflicts: the War of the Brothers broke out immediately after the end of the Third Syrian War (241 BC) and facilitated the secession of regions such as Parthia and Bactria, and the expansion of the Attalid kingdom in Asia Minor.[118] This was at first a disadvantage, but it turned into an advantage twenty years later in the competition with the Ptolemies. Because Seleucid rulers (legitimate or not) were under constant pressure, their soldiers were experienced and well-trained. The Seleucids never decided to demobilize their troops or to settle large numbers of them in *katoikiai*. Their main rival Ptolemy III, by contrast, withdrew from direct involvement in international warfare.

3.1.4.5 General assessment of military activity under the first three Ptolemies

The survey of military events under the first three Ptolemies until the end of the Third Syrian War shows a continuous attempt on the part of Hellenistic rulers to expand the borders of their empires and to establish new areas of influence. The motivations behind Ptolemaic foreign policy have been debated at length, and the concept of "defensive imperialism" has often been implicitly or explicitly accepted.[119] This interpretation is based on

117 For Aperghis (2004) 195–6, the Seleucid had a "virtually inexhaustible reservoir of subject populations" from which to draw their regular forces; he believes that the troops described in the sources as "armed in the Macedonian fashion" may include Syrians, Mesopotamians and possibly Persians; see the *agēma* and the royal squadron at Magnesia with Medes, Syrians, Phrygians and Lydians (Livy 37.40.5–6, 11), *contra* Bar-Kochva (1976) 52, who defends the traditional view that the Seleucids did not want to arm people too close to the center of their empire. Launey (1949) 536 even proposed that that the Syrians and Mesopotamians were too effeminate to be included.

118 On the War of the Brothers, see note 68. On Parthia and Bactria, see Bernard (1994); Sherwin-White and Kuhrt (1993) 84–90, 107–11.

119 Will (1979) vol. I, 153–208, esp. 159–68. Hölbl (2001) 66–7 emphasizes the "considerations of security" of the Ptolemies but also acknowledges the aggressive politics of Ptolemy II in Pontus subsequently pursued by Ptolemy III.

decisions interpreted as lacking aggressiveness, notably by Ptolemy II during the Chremonidean War, but relies above all else on Polybius' assessment of the achievements and motivations of the first three Ptolemies (Polybius 5.34).[120] Polybius concludes that Egypt was never threatened under the first three Ptolemies, because they cared about "the affairs outside Egypt" (*ta exō pragmata*) (5.34.9). It is incontestable that Cyrenaica, Cyprus and Coele-Syria were indispensable to the protection of Egypt and were the Ptolemies' priorities. But their strategic advantage went beyond that. Cyprus and Coele-Syria had rich resources lacking in Egypt, notably wood to build a fleet, and had good warships available. Moreover, the Ptolemies could launch military expeditions from these regions. In my judgment, these aspects support the notion that they had an expansionist policy, while their military activities in the Aegean and Asia Minor, as well as in Thrace and the Black Sea, confirm it. Advocates of the defensive imperialist view, such as Will and Hölbl, interpret military actions beyond Cyprus and Coele-Syria as attempts to weaken rivals and assume that defensive imperialism implies occasional demonstrations of aggressiveness. But even Will acknowledges that Ptolemy III's raiding throughout the Seleucid empire seems to contradict his interpretation.[121] In fact, when taken in full, Polybius' analysis can be read as a description of an expansionist policy: he details all the Ptolemies' foreign possessions and presents them as masters of distant territories able to threaten the Syrian kings (5.34.5–8). The historian then ends his analysis with a sharp contrast between the first Ptolemies' extreme care for their foreign possessions and Ptolemy IV's negligence. Polybius connects their care with the lack of invasions and sharply contrasts it with the situation in which Ptolemy IV found himself. The dramatic dichotomy this creates can easily be explained by Polybius' hostile attitude toward Ptolemy IV throughout his *Histories*.[122] Indeed, Polybius is about to describe the hasty military measures Ptolemy IV had to take to prevent Antiochus III from seizing Coele-Syria and attempting an invasion of Egypt. As such a threatening situation had never happened before according to Polybius – who leaves aside the presence of Perdiccas' troops in Egypt – he explains it as the consequence of Ptolemy IV's careless attitude regarding the affairs of Egypt and his total disinterest in the administration of the possessions outside Egypt. But Polybius' insistence on the first Ptolemies' foreign possessions, in my opinion, suggest expansionist motivations on their part.

[120] Marquaille (2008) emphasizes Ptolemy II's military aggressiveness, while modern scholars perceives him as an unwarlike ruler.

[121] See above note 59. [122] G.T. Lefebvre (2009); Walbank (2002a), esp. 62–4.

An expansionist policy illuminates Ptolemy III's military campaign at the beginning of the Third Syrian War and eliminates any contradictions.

After the Third Syrian War, however, Ptolemy III stopped intervening directly with troops for two decades. As armies that were not fighting were expensive, it was a coherent policy to stop hiring and to settle as many soldiers as possible as cleruchs. Nothing indicates that Ptolemy instead consolidated or expanded his fleet. Two elements of foreign policy probably encouraged this policy. First, Ptolemy's external possessions formed a large Aegean coastal empire that seemed secure, since the king of Macedonia, Antigonus II, had just died in 239 BC, and the dynastic conflict mobilizing Seleucid troops prevented them from attempting a reconquest. Second, after the naval defeat of Andros and without supremacy on sea, it was (at least at that point) too difficult to expand. In addition, from a domestic Egyptian point of view, the five years of the Third Syrian War had put constraints on the Egyptian economy and exhausted state resources. We know little about the causes of the first revolt in Egypt in 245 BC, but socio-economic factors are generally put forward as an explanation. These internal troubles also reflect political instability, as they can scarcely have occurred without the support of dissatisfied ruling groups. The cost of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid armies in relation to state revenues in the third century (see section 3.1.4.4) shows that making war was no less of a financial burden for the Ptolemies than it was for their rivals. The Ptolemies had invested a great deal in a fleet because they needed it to expand their territories, whereas Seleucid expansion required no such investment. Had the Ptolemies been able to defeat their rivals at sea and thus consolidate their land empire and decrease their military costs (as the Romans did a few centuries later), the outcome could have been different. Such a success would have implied regular revenues from tribute and the end of military losses, especially ships.

Even if the Ptolemies were probably able to collect more taxes per inhabitant than the Seleucids were (see section 3.1.4.4), they were vulnerable after a war. Their naval defeats were costly, and Ptolemy III probably had to reinvest the plunder from his initial success in the long war. No Hellenistic state, even Egypt, was ever able to gain significant military and economic advantages over the others. After the Third Syrian War, Ptolemy III's aim was to keep the state stable. When he saw the expansionist policy of the new Seleucid king Antiochus III in Asia Minor (223 BC), however, he immediately sent a fleet but failed to accomplish what he wanted. The defensive war his successor Ptolemy IV had to face annihilated Ptolemy III's strategy for consolidating the empire.

3.2 Survey of military events, part II (221–31 BC): from Raphia to Cleopatra

3.2.1 Ptolemy IV and Ptolemy V: crisis leading to reform

The twenty peaceful years under Ptolemy III allowed time for the cleruchic system to be organized, but also for slowly creating a decentralized war machine.[123] The cleruchs became familiar with the new environment they were building, married Greek or indigenous women and passed their plots of land on to their sons instead of the state for redistribution. The structure of the army was superimposed on the previous administrative system and gradually superseded part of it. It is thought that the highest troop commander in each nome, the *stratēgos* at the top of the hierarchy, was the head of the nome.[124] By 229/8 BC, these men devoted most of their time to issues involving military settlers as well as civilians, and they have accordingly been called "nome-*stratēgoi*" by papyrologists, to distinguish them from purely military *stratēgoi*. Within Egyptian territory, a large share of the Ptolemaic army was now made up of cleruchs. These soldiers were no longer experienced and were probably less well trained than their Seleucid counterparts. As was explained above in the comparison between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid armies, fights against usurpers in the Seleucid empire had kept those troops well trained and given them experience; the Seleucids used far fewer cleruchs; and they recruited from a larger pool. The death of Ptolemy III at the turn of the year 222/1 BC and the accession to the throne of the young Ptolemy IV created ideal circumstances for another young king, the dynamic and ambitious Antiochus III, to attempt to conquer the rich province of Coele-Syria.

3.2.1.1 The Fourth Syrian War and the Battle of Raphia

Such was the situation in 221 BC. Antiochus had to withdraw to fight the usurper Molon but returned in 219 BC to conquer Seleucia in Pieria, Lebanon and Phoenicia, notably with the help of the Ptolemaic governor of Coele-Syria, Theodotus, who took his side. Antiochus' capture of forty warships stationed in Tyre and Ptolemais (Ake) (Polybius 5.62.2–3) must have weakened the Ptolemaic fleet; the following year, the naval battle

[123] G.T. Griffith (1935) 117–18 already emphasizes this absence of war; Rice (1983) 124; Bar-Kochva (1976) 141; see Chapter 6, section 6.4.

[124] See Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.

between the Ptolemaic and Seleucid fleets, which took place at the same time as the land battle near Berytus, was indecisive (Polybius 5.68–9). Between 219 and 217 BC, the regents of Ptolemy IV, Agathocles and Sosibius, tried to gain time to hire mercenaries and reorganize the army "in a way fitting the needs at hand."[125] As they expected to fight on a large, flat battlefield ideal for the phalanx, they trained a substantial number of heavy and semi-heavy infantrymen (see Chapter 4). Despite these preparations, Ptolemy might easily have lost with his small standing army and many ill-trained soldiers, had he not been able to gather in two years enough soldiers from outside and within Egypt to attain numerical superiority.[126] Even so, his left wing was defeated at the Battle of Raphia, and he lost 1,500 infantry, 700 cavalry and most of his elephants (Polybius 5.85.5, 86.7). Ptolemy nonetheless defeated the Seleucid phalanx, thanks to his larger number of infantry fighting in phalanx formation and the almost equal number of cavalry (see Table 3.3 and Table 3.4).[127] Yet Antiochus had not been able to gather his entire land army, as a result of unrest in the eastern provinces. Four thousand of his men were taken prisoner at Raphia, and he lost 10,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, but only three elephants, Indian elephants being better at fighting than African ones (Polybius 5.86.5). Finally, if Antiochus left quickly after the battle and gave Ptolemy an opportunity to take back Coele-Syria (except for Seleucia in Pieria), this was above all else to fight the usurper Achaios.[128]

The aftermath of the battle is reported in the decree of Raphia, in which the Egyptian priesthood celebrates Ptolemy IV's victory when he returned to Egypt a few months later.[129] The text is a clear example of propaganda that

125 See Polybius 5.64.2 in Text 4.1. Polybius 5.43–87 gives the whole narrative of the Fourth Syrian War; see also Grainger (2010) 190–218; Huss (2001) 386–404; Heinen (1984) 433–42. For an example of requisitioning, see Casson (1993a) and his analysis of P.Petr. II 20, col. IV.

126 Rostovtzeff (1941) 709 suggests that Ptolemy hired Egyptians to prevent them from revolting, as in 245 BC, but there is no evidence that the Ptolemies expected additional revolts.

127 Bar-Kochva (1976) 132–3, 135, 140–1: the Ptolemaic phalanx must have been twenty-four or even thirty-four lines deep, instead of the usual sixteen (Polybius 18.30.1). I follow Bar-Kochva 137–8, who explains Antiochus' pursuit of the defeated Ptolemaic left wing as a "fatal miscalculation" in an attempt to kill Ptolemy to end the battle, rather than Polybius, who claims that Antiochus acted out of inexperience, because he already had military victories over the usurper Molon.

128 Winnicki (1992a) 134. Achaios may have acted in agreement with Ptolemy; see Heinen (1984) 434–5 and Polybius 5.42.7–8.

129 Austin (2006) no. 276, November 15, 217 BC. For the interpretation of the decree by modern historians, see Heinen (1984) 438–9, who could not know the interpretation offered by Winnicki (2001a). On the Raphia decree, see also note 133.

insists on the victory and generous benevolence of the king toward the temples, the population throughout Egypt and his soldiers.[130] Unsurprisingly, it is vague about the betrayal of some troops when Ptolemy was trying to secure the territory taken back from Antiochus after two years of Seleucid occupation (ll. 24–5).[131] But such treachery on the part of Ptolemy's troops is easy to explain. This defensive war put Ptolemy IV's state in a difficult financial situation, because he needed to pay the soldiers and a large number of mercenaries he had hired for the conflict.[132] The king had probably been unable to collect revenues in this wealthy region for two years, and he could not plunder his own territory, whereas he needed to secure the loyalty of his troops and officers with rewards and organize a smooth demobilization of a large part of the army in order to stabilize the state budget. His donations, in particular the 300,000 pieces of gold given to his soldiers (l. 29), confirm that Ptolemy IV needed to promote loyalty with rewards. This was the equivalent of 1,000 talents of silver, about three months' salary for the whole land army Ptolemy had hired for the Fourth Syrian War.[133] Even without plundering, he had been able to collect some booty through the gifts he received from the cities of Coele-Syria, which were returning to his control (Polybius 5.86.8–11). These gifts – which can be interpreted as indemnities – and the subsequent rewards to his soldiers together illustrate how booty was immediately used as cash flow after a war to avoid riots by thousands of soldiers, a large proportion of whom had to be demobilized. If Rostovtzeff is right that for the war "the bulk of the expenditure was certainly met out of the regular revenue that Philopator derived from Egypt,"[134] he nevertheless

[130] For the *topos* of the return of the gods' statues by the Ptolemies, see Winnicki (1994), esp. 169–86.

[131] Winnicki (2001a) 135–40 sheds light on these obscure lines (ll. 23–6). The previous understanding was that Ptolemy sent his troops to recover Coele-Syria, but that they encountered problems and asked for reserve troops, who did not come. Now Winnicki has uncovered the treachery of the officers who, when sent to recover Coele-Syria, joined the enemy. To punish their treachery, Ptolemy sent another group of troops, who were allowed to plunder the cities taken by the officers who had betrayed him.

[132] Le Rider and Callataÿ (2006) 191–8 reject the commonly accepted thesis that the Ptolemies and later the Seleucids both lost their international power because of a lack of coins. They base their argument, for the Ptolemies, first on the huge booty of 40,000 silver talents reported by St. Jerome, *Daniel* 11.7, an amount probably exaggerated. Yet it is surprising that they insist on the important role of booty whereas they had previously denied it (170); second, on the donations to Rhodes after the earthquake of 227/6 BC (Polybius 5.88–9); and third, on the 300,000 gold coins distributed after Raphia. But this final donation was probably affordable thanks to the gifts received from cities in Coele-Syria rather than to contemporary tax revenues.

[133] Decree of Raphia, ll. 29 = Austin (2006) no. 276; Le Rider and Callataÿ (2006) 197; Winnicki (1992a) 440 and note 21. For a parallel, see OGIS I 266, § 6 and note 273, where Eumenes I is said to provide four months of salary in advance after the mutiny of his mercenaries.

[134] Rostovtzeff (1941) 710.

overlooks the fundamental role played by booty or its absence during and immediately after the war.

But the tense situation expected after a war – illustrated by the treachery of the first group of troops sent to retake Coele-Syria – conceals deeper difficulties that Ptolemy faced in maintaining the loyalty of his officers. Already at the beginning of the war, his governor of Coele-Syria, Theodotus, and other officers leading about 10 percent of the cavalry, joined Antiochus' side.[135] The promise made during the Battle of Raphia by Queen Arsinoe III to give 2 gold minas to each soldier (3 Maccabees 1.4) also exposes the difficulty of keeping troops loyal.[136] Consequently, the internal war that broke out in the Delta shortly after Raphia most probably started as a mutiny by officers and soldiers that encouraged further mob riots. Polybius, by contrast, reports that Ptolemy had to wage war against the Egyptians because he had armed them for the war with Antiochus (5.107, see Text 3.5). Polybius' account, however, is unsatisfying for several reasons. First, he does not mention the treachery to which the Raphia decree alludes. Second, he compresses the narrative of the thirteen years between Raphia and the death of Ptolemy IV and focuses on the king's personality and drinking habits. He declines to describe the internal war because, in his words, there was no "pitched battle, sea fight, siege or anything else worth recording" (5.107), but only "small events not worth serious attention" (14.12.4, see Text 3.5).[137] Third, he contradicts himself by mentioning the siege of Lycopolis, which actually took place during the revolt (22.17.1, see section 3.2.1.2 below). Above all, the time compression makes inconsistencies in Polybius' account difficult to resolve. "The war against the Egyptians" (τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους πόλεμον, 5.107) that occurred just after Raphia might refer instead to a revolt within the army that started in northern Egypt in 217 BC and is not reported elsewhere. Polybius fails to remind us of this event in 14.12 but simply mentions a war (πόλεμον) that broke out in the final years of Ptolemy IV's reign and that modern historians call the Great Revolt – the troubles that started in the Thebaid in 206 BC.[138]

While it appears that the Great Revolt involved mostly Egyptians and was later supported by the Nubian kings, one wonders why Polybius

135 Polybius 5.61.3–9 on the betrayal of Theodotos, and 5.70.10–11 on that of Keraisas, an officer, and Hippolochos with 400 cavalrymen. See also Winnicki (1992a) 140–1 for a list of betrayals by officers.

136 Winnicki (1992a) 440 and note 20.

137 Polybius' dislike of Ptolemy IV was driven by his aversion to a pattern of monarchy implying inappropriate luxury in the eyes of a conservative Greek aristocrat. See Heinen (1984) 435; also Lefebvre (2009).

138 In the documentation from Egypt, this "war" is called a "period of confusion" (ταραχή), e.g. SB XXIV 15972.

Text 3.5. *Polybius 5.107 and 14.12 on internal wars in Egypt*

Polybius on the internal revolts between 216 and 186 BC	
Polybius 5.107	Translation by Paton (1922–7)
Πτολεμαίῳ γε μὴν εὐθέως ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους πόλεμον. [2] ὁ γὰρ προειρημένος βασιλεὺς καθοπλίσας τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους ἐπὶ τὸν πρὸς Ἀντίοχον πόλεμον πρὸς μὲν τὸ παρὸν ἐνδεχομένως ἐβουλεύσατο, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἠστόχησε: [3] φρονηματισθέντες γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Ῥαφίαν προτερήματος, οὐκέτι τὸ προσταττόμενον οἷοί τ᾽ ἦσαν ὑπομένειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐζήτουν ἡγεμόνα καὶ πρόσωπον, ὡς ἱκανοὶ βοηθεῖν ὄντες αὑτοῖς. ὃ καὶ τέλος ἐποίησαν οὐ μετὰ πολὺν χρόνον.	As for Ptolemy, his war against the Egyptians followed immediately on these events. This king, by arming the Egyptians for his war against Antiochus, took a step which was of great service for the time, but which was a mistake as regards the future. The soldiers, highly proud of their victory at Raphia, were no longer disposed to obey orders, but were on the look out for a leader and figure-head, thinking themselves well able to maintain themselves as an independent power, an attempt in which they finally succeeded not long afterwards.
Polybius 14.12	Translation by Paton (1922–7)
Ἴσως δέ τινες ἐπαπορήσουσι πῶς ἡμεῖς τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις ἁπάσας κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν γράφοντες τὰς καταλλήλους περὶ μόνων τῶν κατ᾽ Αἴγυπτον ἐν καιρῷ τῷ νῦν ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου πεποιήμεθα τὴν ἐξήγησιν. [2] ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦτο πεποιήκαμεν διά τινας τοιαύτας αἰτίας. [3] Πτολεμαῖος ὁ βασιλεύς, περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος, ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ, μετὰ τὸ συντελεσθῆναι τὸν περὶ Κοίλην Συρίαν πόλεμον ἀποστὰς πάντων τῶν καλῶν ἐτράπη πρὸς βίον ἄσωτον καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον ἀρτίως διεληλύθαμεν. [4] ὀψὲ δέ ποτε βιασθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνέπεσεν εἰς τὸν νῦν δεδηλωμένον πόλεμον, ὃς χωρὶς τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους ὠμότητος καὶ παρανομίας οὔτε παράταξιν οὔτε ναυμαχίαν οὔτε πολιορκίαν οὔθ᾽ ἕτερον οὐδὲν ἔσχε μνήμης ἄξιον. [5] διόπερ ὑπέδραμεν οὕτω κἀμοὶ τῷ γράφοντι ῥᾳδίαν ἔσεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν εὐμαθεστέραν τὴν διήγησιν, εἰ μὴ κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπιψαύων μικρῶν [καὶ] οὐκ ἀξίων ἐπιστάσεως πραγμάτων ἀποδιδοίην τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ᾽ εἰσάπαξ οἷον εἰ σωματοειδῆ ποιήσας τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως προαίρεσιν ἀπαγγείλαιμι περὶ αὐτῆς.	Perhaps some of my readers will wonder why while elsewhere I dealt with the successive events of each year separately, in the case of Egypt alone I give on the present occasion a narrative of occurrences there extending over a considerable period. The reason of this I may state as follows. Ptolemy Philopator, of whom I am now talking, after the termination of the war for Coele-Syria abandoned entirely the path of virtue and took to a life of dissipation such as I have just described. Late in his reign he was forced by circumstances into the war I have mentioned, a war which, apart from the mutual savagery and lawlessness of the combatants, contained nothing worthy of note, no pitched battle, no sea-fight, no siege. It, therefore, struck me that my narrative would be easier both for me to write and for my readers to follow if I performed this part of my task not by merely alluding every year to small events not worth serious attention, but by giving once for all a life-like picture so to speak of this king's character.

specifies at 5.107 that it was against the Egyptians but fails to say this in 14.12. I suggest that at 5.107 Polybius calls the events of 217 BC "the war against the Egyptians" in order to offer an appealing, dramatic explanation of events: Ptolemy gave weapons to the Egyptians but at the same

time gave them the means to revolt. The reality was more complex than Polybius' summary.[139] The betrayals that occurred during the Fourth Syrian War support the hypothesis that the troubles directly after Raphia were the result of a military mob looking for more rewards and encouraged by the military officers and the elite who saw in them an opportunity to bargain with the king. Polybius describes the army at Raphia as composed of more Greek than Egyptian soldiers. Nor does he mention any Egyptian commander. Rather than an Egyptian revolt, the events of 217 BC plausibly resemble what some sociologists called praetorianism, "the rule of soldiers exercised not along customarily or legally recognized, constitutional channels, but through mutinies and *coup d'état*."[140] This type of rebellion was common in states whose military organization was based on professional soldiers, especially mercenaries, and when there was a divergence of opinion about who should rule. The revolts of the mercenaries faced by the Carthaginians after the First Punic War (241–238 BC) have a similar character (Polybius 1.65–88), with the Nubians and Libyans quickly joining the mercenaries.[141]

In sum, that many Egyptians were initially involved in the troubles of 217 BC is questionable. Most likely Polybius conflated the "wars" of 217 BC and 206 BC, insisting on the epithet "Egyptian" in the first case in order to offer a more dramatic explanation of events. It is of course plausible that rebellions led by military groups encouraged other population groups to foment a chain reaction of revolts. We are left with conjectures about

139 Heinen (1984) 438, drawing on Peremans (1975), suggests that "the link that Polybius claims to see between the battle of Raphia and the Egyptian autonomy movement is probably a very one-sided Greek view of affairs." Véïsse (2004) 5–7 reminds us that the "nationalistic" interpretation of the revolt is based on this passage, the meaning of which is obscure, and on pp. 126–8 that the anti-Ptolemaic tone of the prophetic literature has been questioned.

140 Andreski (1968) 104–7 (105 for the quotation). For an example of praetorianism in the ancient sources, see Polybius' description of the Alexandrian riot in 203 BC (15.25–33), discussed below in section 3.2.1.3.

141 Walbank (1957–79) vol. II, 439 on book 14.12 and Walbank (2002a) 64 suggests that even if Polybius' narrative of the Great Revolt of 206–186 BC in Egypt is lost, what fascinated him in both revolts must be similar. For the causes of the conflict in Carthage, see esp. Polybius 1.66–70: after the mercenaries began to rebel, they encouraged the population of the subject Libyan cities to join the revolt. Similar mechanisms may have operated in Egypt for the Great Revolt, since the terms Polybius uses to describe the two wars are similar (ἄσπενδον, "without a regular truce," in 1.65.6, and the war conducted παρανομίας, "lawlessly," in 14.12.4), although the rest of Polybius' narrative is lost. Another parallel between revolts in Carthage and riots in Egypt is found at Polybius 15.30.10, where the historian compares the role of children in Carthage and in the riot of 203 BC in Alexandria. Even if the Romans did not yet use a professional army, they too had to face the difficulty of a postwar period with allies revolting because of the large military units they were required to provide. But the Romans quickly repressed the Faliscan revolt (Polybius 1.65).

what happened: neither Polybius, whose introduction to Book 14 is all that has been preserved, nor any other document explicitly refers to troubles in the decade after Raphia.[142] In 210 BC Egypt was the only country at peace (Polybius 9.11a.2), which suggests that the troubles that started immediately after Raphia were at least temporarily resolved by then.

3.2.1.2 The Great Revolt (206–186 BC)

Socio-economic dissatisfaction on the part of the elite, the soldiers and the population, whether Egyptian or Greek, could still turn into revolts.[143] Shortly after 210 BC, in the final years of Ptolemy IV, rebellions broke out in both the Delta and the Thebaid. Given the high rate of taxation and the mechanisms of demobilization described above, similar to those described by Polybius in connection with the war of the mercenaries in Carthage, the revolts in Egypt can be more convincingly explained as reactions against any ruler, whatever his ethnicity, than as directed against a colonial foreign power.[144] The elite, officers and soldiers, independent of their ethnicity, had previously been satisfied with the rewards they received from the kings. A deterioration in their situation could have opened the way to collaboration and alliance with the lower strata of the population.[145] In addition, the local elite of Upper Egypt had traditionally tried to limit the control of the northern capital.[146] Consequently, in addition to the standard economic factors, politico-religious motives must have played some role in the Great Revolt, as Véïsse argued.[147]

In the Delta the best-known military episode of revolt is the siege of Lycopolis (197 BC) by Ptolemy V described in the Memphis decree (196 BC). Polybius mentions the harsh punishments reserved for the rebels on this occasion and once again compresses events to describe similar punishments

142 BGU VI 1215, a police report, mentions a war-engine (τὸ ὄργανον, l. 11), but its date and provenance are lost; see Véïsse (2007a) 7.

143 On the revolts in Egypt, see Véïsse (2004); McGing (1997); Pestman (1995); Dunand (1983); Clarysse (1979b); Peremans (1978); Préaux (1978) 389–98; also the lecture given by Clarysse (2004). The only ancient authors who describe the causes of the revolts are Polybius (5.107; see Text 3.5) and Strabo (17.1.53). For Strabo, a revolt broke out in the Thebaid one year after the Roman annexation of Egypt (29 BC) "because of the taxes" (διὰ τοὺς φόρους). The first hint of inflation in Egypt is usually dated to 210 BC; see for the third century, von Reden (2007); also Maresch (1996); Clarysse and Lanciers (1989) 117–18; Le Rider and Callataÿ (2006) 206.

144 *Contra* Anagnostou-Canas (1989), e.g. 189.

145 This reasoning is based on general theories of revolts and revolutions, arguing that "peasant revolts" could succeed in pre-modern states only when some members of the elite tried to gain more power and supported them; see Goldstone (1991), esp. 24–5; Turchin (2003) 118–49.

146 Vandorpe (1995) 204–7; McGing (1997) 299.

147 Véïsse (2004) 151–2, 245–8.

in the Saite nome perhaps as late as 185 BC (Polybius 22.17.1–6).[148] While the revolt in the Thebaid can be better reconstructed by means of papyrological and epigraphical evidence, the army's numbers and actions are poorly known except for a few allusions to troop movements and the victory of Ptolemy V's general, Comanus, over the second indigenous rebel pharaoh, Chaonnophris, south of Thebes.[149] During the Great Revolt the Ptolemies lost revenues, since they were unable to collect taxes in the south.[150] We have some evidence, however, regarding the transport of rations to soldiers during the revolt, which shows that southern Egypt was not completely controlled by Chaonnophris or his ally the Nubian king, although the Theban garrison was probably abandoned between 205 and 186 BC.[151] More than 11,000 artabas of grain (330,000–480,000 liters) were sent to the garrison in Assuan between May and August 187 BC, according to a papyrological archive.[152] The grain came from Diospolis Parva, Tentyra, Latopolis, from several villages in the Coptite, Pathyrite and Tentyrite nomes, and from Diospolis (or Apollonipolis) Magna. In total, several hundred soldiers were stationed in Assuan, and perhaps as many as 4,000. This significant number of troops in the south was a first step toward the military reorganization of the Thebaid after the revolt, in particular through the establishment of numerous larger military garrisons with professional soldiers. The Ptolemies were thus able to take control again and reorganize the area, and, as Heinen suggests, "the Ptolemaic dynasty was never seriously endangered by opposition from the native population and survived until 30 BC."[153] But the revolts were costly and the different parties in later dynastic conflicts exploited ongoing tensions. The Ptolemies were accordingly now more vulnerable to foreign attack.

148 OGIS I 90 = Austin (2006) no. 283 (Rosetta stone); Véïsse (2004) 7–11; McGing (1997) 284. For 185 BC as the date of the surrender of the rebels, see Walbank (2002b).

149 For the organization of the Egyptian rebel government, see Depauw (2006). For a survey of the military events, see Pestman (1995) 101–9; also Véïsse (2004) 11–26, esp. 13–14 on the decree of Philae II and 20 for the victory and the subsequent amnesty decree (P.Köln VII 313), 158–60. For the decree of Philae II, see Chapter 7, section 7.2.2, p. 266 and note 135; a papyrus containing a fragmentary literary narrative (P.Mich.inv. 6648, first century BC or AD) may refer to military operations during the Great Revolt and is summarized in Renner (1975).

150 No tax receipts on ostraca have been preserved from 205 to 186 BC, see Clarysse (2004).

151 Véïsse (2004) 18–20, 24–5, 84–95 on the role of the Nubian king during the revolt and the origin of Haronnophris and Chaonnophris; Vandorpe (1995) 233.

152 SB VI 9367 consists of twenty-seven papyri (187 BC, Thebes or Edfu); see also Reekmans and Van 't Dack (1952); see Véïsse (2004) 91–4 and note 35 and p. 156 on P.Mil. II 21, 22 and 24 (188 BC), P.Col. VIII 28 (187 BC), and CPR XXVIII 11 (P.Vindob. G. 56636). Clarysse (2004) estimates the number of soldiers at 4,000 if one assumes 40 liters per month.

153 Heinen (1984) 439.

3.2.1.3 *The role of soldiers in the Alexandrian mob riots*

The army was a means to suppress revolts, but its members could themselves also be the leaders of riots or coups. The role of officers and soldiers in the Alexandrian mob riot of 203 BC is emblematic of their increasing involvement in the internal dissent in Egypt from this time onward. Polybius offers a detailed account of this episode that suggests the diversity of the soldiers' provenance. The many riots that occurred in Alexandria between 203 BC and the end of the Ptolemaic dynasty have either received little scholarly attention or been explained by an Egyptianization of the Alexandrian population or simply by the character of native Egyptians. But a close reading of Polybius disqualifies these explanations and reveals that the crowd was representative of all sections of the populace in terms of ethnicity (Greeks, Egyptians, probably Jews and Syrians), gender and age (men, women and children) and socio-economic status, as Barry emphasizes in an illuminating article.[154] Polybius' account also reveals that both soldiers and civilians played a role, and that the "mob" did not act irrationally, as elitist interpretations both ancient and modern usually suggest. Barry shows that the crowd acted in a legitimate setting, the stadium, and did not try to kill the criminals (Agathocles and his followers) before the young king had been brought to them and had given his consent. The role of the mob was not revolutionary but conservative, in that it restored the Ptolemaic dynasty and showed loyalty and respect to the king.[155]

Times of dynastic succession were periods of vulnerability for the state, especially when the king was only a child. Polybius reports in detail the measures taken by the regents Sosibius and Agathocles on the death of Ptolemy IV to eliminate any potential rival to the king and to assure their own positions through murder and by removing influential members of the court from Egypt (15.25–33). Agathocles may have quickly eliminated Sosibius and then started reorganizing the troops to reinforce his power. He distributed two months' pay to appeal to the soldiers and sent the existing mercenary force to garrisons in the Egyptian countryside and to "foreign settlements" (*katoikiai*). He also dispatched one of his men, Scopas, to Greece to hire mercenaries to replace "the household troops and the guards of the court and of the rest of the city" (Polybius 15.25.17).[156] Given the role played by soldiers in the riot that led to his death in 203 BC, Agathocles was right to attempt to remove the troops from Alexandria and to replace

[154] Barry (1993) 417–22. [155] Barry (1993) 422–8.

[156] Translated by Paton (1922–7): τὴν θεραπείαν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν φυλακεῖα, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν.

them with mercenaries whose loyalty he had bought. But he did not have enough time to achieve his plan. Members of the military elite encouraged Tlepolemus, the military governor of Pelusium, to take advantage of the populace's growing dissatisfaction with Agathocles and his arrogant and murderous behavior, and to become the army's leader.

According to Polybius, Tlepolemus surrounded himself with commanders (*hēgemones*), taxiarchs (*taxiarchoi*) and officers (οἱ ἐπὶ τούτων ταττόμενοι, 15.25.31).[157] While Agathocles was trying to obtain the favour of the "Macedonians" – Polybius' term for the soldiers of the guard – more soldiers were coming from the garrisons in Upper Egypt (ἐκ τῶν ἄνω στρατοπέδων, 15.26.10) and were added to Tlepolemus' forces, notably because he controlled the supply of provisions for Alexandria.[158] Finally, one of Agathocles' bodyguards was falsely accused by his men and barely escaped death (15.27.4–28.9). According to Polybius, this incident led the Macedonians to act against Agathocles. Polybius gives important information about the organization of the garrison in Alexandria and the ethnicity of the soldiers. It was not only the Macedonians who assembled, but also other soldiers living in the tents next to them. Four hours later, "men of all nationalities (*genē*), both soldiers and civilians, had agreed to attack the government" (Polybius 15.29.4).[159] The soldiers or their ancestors certainly originated in the Eastern Mediterranean, but some may have been Egyptian. In any case, they were the initiators of the riots: they went to look for the king in the palace, brought him back to the stadium, and then killed Agathocles and his followers (15.32–3). Subsequently, the crowd committed acts of violence against his body and against members of his family. As a result, the young Ptolemy V had a new regent, Tlepolemus, who was not as good a minister as he was a military commander, according to Polybius (16.21–2).

The Alexandrian mob played a significant part in the dynastic disputes of the second and the first centuries BC, but none of these events is known in detail, and they will accordingly not be discussed here. From the description of the mob in 203 BC, we can extrapolate a similar social composition, consisting of all elements of the population, including soldiers.[160]

157 For these technical terms, see section 4.2.4.

158 We know that already under Ptolemy II there were Egyptians in the guard; see Chapter 4, section 4.2.5. The term Macedonian did not always refer to descendants of Macedonians, at least from the late third century onward; see Chapter 5, section 5.2.3.1.

159 Translated by Paton (1922–7): πάντα τὰ γένη συμπεφωνήκει καὶ τὰ στρατιωτικὰ καὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ πρὸς τὴν ἐπίθεσιν.

160 Barry (1993) 428–31. See also the description of the Alexandrian population by Polybius (34.14.1–8) under Ptolemy VIII, shortly after the king persecuted the Greeks in reprisal for his

3.2.1.4 The consequences of the Fifth Syrian War (202–195 BC) and of the Great Revolt

These tumultuous times in Alexandria and the ongoing revolt in the Thebaid created ideal conditions for Antiochus III to invade Coele-Syria. With the Fifth Syrian War (202–195 BC), the accumulation of military events reached a point the Ptolemaic state was unable to sustain.[161] By the end of the war Egypt had lost most of its external possessions except Cyprus and Cyrenaica and would not recover them until the end of the dynasty. More important for understanding the changes in the nature of the military organization are the decisions made about the army after the war and the Great Revolt.[162] A major innovation was the creation of the *epistratēgos*, established in Ptolemais, to supervise the *stratēgoi*, their troops and the nome officials of the Thebaid.[163] Comanus, the general who defeated the rebels in 186 BC, had been given this function in 187 BC. Ptolemy V began bestowing honorific titles on his officials and officers. The system mirrored the court hierarchy and is accordingly called "aulic titulature" by papyrologists.[164] Officials were tied to the ruler; their loyalty was reinforced, as was the legitimacy of the Ptolemaic court.

Following a pharaonic tradition, Ptolemy V became the first Ptolemy to publish amnesty decrees.[165] The content of his first amnesty decree is partially reproduced in the priestly Memphis decree, dated to 196 BC.[166] It shows that the Ptolemies had trouble finding rowers and therefore forced people into the navy (ll. 19–20). These oarsmen were apparently badly paid. No doubt Ptolemy had financial difficulties, as he was unable to collect taxes in Upper Egypt and was fighting on several fronts. In addition, the text of the decree leaves open to interpretation whether the amnestied soldiers were Greek or Egyptian, using the word "warrior" (*rmt.w ḳnḳn*) in the Demotic version and *machimoi* in Greek.[167] Once again, the term *machimos* does

previous exile: it was still composed of Egyptians, mercenaries and Greeks. For a list of the Alexandrian revolts, see Véïsse (2004), her Table 6.

161 On the Fifth Syrian War, see Grainger (2010) 245–71; Huss (2001) 489–93.

162 Huss (2001) 524–8.

163 The main study of the *epistratēgos* is still Thomas (1975). For an updated bibliography, see Huss (2001) 525; Véïsse (2004) 181–3. Later this office was combined with that of *stratēgos* of the Thebaid; see the numerous studies by Van 't Dack (1988a) 247–385.

164 Mooren (1975) and (1977); the titles are attested for the first time in 197–194/3 BC; see also Huss (2001) 524–5; Véïsse (2007b) 183.

165 Véïsse (2004) 171–7 with bibliography. Other amnesty decrees were passed in 163, 145/4 and 118 BC.

166 OGIS I 90 (Rosetta stone).

167 Véïsse (2004) 123, 126; Fischer-Bovet (2013).

not automatically refer to soldiers of Egyptian origin and, in my opinion, these soldiers could belong to any ethnic group. Other amnesty decrees were issued at the end of Theban revolt. In 186 BC, the decree of Philae II was favourable to the rebels and the Egyptian temples, and one month later a general amnesty was issued.[168] Finally, the Decree of Philae I, in 185 BC, redefines a few clauses concerning the temples. Ptolemy V reprieved the *machimoi* and others who were disloyal, and he granted an amnesty to police officers who plundered the royal treasuries. Other measures were more general and aimed at restoring the cultivation of land and limiting abuses by officials or fiscal privileges and exemptions.

Specific measures concerning the soldiers were taken after the revolt. First, in the Thebaid, Ptolemy V settled new garrisons at Krokodilopolis and Pathyris, thirty kilometers south of Thebes, while a garrison was re-established in Thebes.[169] It seems that the garrison at the Memnoneia, on the Theban west bank, was also set up during the reorganization of the region, according to a new dating of P.Erbach.[170] Second, Ptolemy partially avoided the dissatisfaction of soldiers at times of demobilization by granting them *klēroi*. At least 4,000 men received plots, probably in 187/6 BC. Indeed, land surveys from the late second-century Fayyum still designated these plots as the land of "those who took part in the expedition to the Thebaid from the 4,000 men," even if they were cultivated by a new generation of cleruchs.[171]

168 P.Köln VII 313 = P.Kroll = C.Ord.Ptol. 35. For other measures taken to reinforce the king's power after periods of trouble, see Schubert (1997) and P.Gen. II 86 (c), a tax-receipt concerning the *eikonōn eisphora* (εἰκόνων εἰσφορά), an extraordinary tax for erecting statues of the Ptolemies, and perhaps also of Egyptian gods, ordered either by Ptolemy V in 187 BC or by Ptolemy VI in 163 BC, after he returned to the throne. For Philae II, see note 149.

169 Véïsse (2004) 158–9; Winnicki (1978) 68–78. Vandorpe (1995) 233 explains that the location of the garrisons where the Nile Valley becomes narrow was strategically valuable in order to block enemies coming from the south. In Krokodilopolis, the garrison was a large military center (*hupaithron*, *hꜣpjtrs*) supervised by the *(epi)stratēgos* of the Thebaid, and the one in Pathyris was one of its subdivisions (ὀχύρωμα or *rsj.t*).

170 Winnicki (2001b) suggests that this Demotic letter was written in April 167 BC in Djeme (Memnoneia), which makes it the earliest document attesting this garrison and connects it to the post-revolt and postwar military reorganization. The letter was sent to soldiers garrisoned at *Sgntn*, which Winnicki identifies with one of the villages called Σκηνίτων κώμη, probably situated in the Eastern Delta or even outside Egypt. It is impossible to establish whether the soldiers were garrisoned there as a consequence of the Sixth Syrian War or to prevent raids from Arab tribes.

171 οἱ εἰς τὴν Θηβαίδα abbreviated for οἱ ἀναζεύξαντες εἰς τὴν Θηβαί[δα] ἀπὸ τῶν ʼΔ ἀνδρῶν. For Kerkeosiris, see P.Tebt. I 62, l. 43; 63, l. 43, and p. 547; P.Tebt. IV 1108, l. 6; 1109, l. 16; 1110, l. 47; 1114, l. 20; 1115, l. 1. For other places, see P.Tebt. I 79, ll. 69–85 and P.Tebt. III 998, ll. 3–4; Pestman (1995) 123, zz; Crawford (1971) 60. On the basis of P.Tebt. I 79, ll. 69–81 it is believed that each man received 50 arouras on average, representing about 550 km^2. Their

Such developments played a prominent role in integrating soldiers into the communities of the Egyptian *chōra*.

3.2.2 A new era: weaknesses and strengths under Ptolemy VI and Ptolemy VIII (180–116 BC)

On the death of Ptolemy V in 180 BC, Ptolemy VI, although only six years old, succeeded his father, with his mother Cleopatra I as regent.[172] She soon died, and two regents – incompetent, according to Polybius – drove the young Ptolemy VI into a war against his uncle Antiochus IV (Sixth Syrian War, 170/69–168 BC).[173] The goal was to take back Coele-Syria, but Antiochus quickly invaded a large part of Lower Egypt. Ptolemy VI, now married to his sister Cleopatra II and ruling jointly with her and their brother Ptolemy VIII, sent ambassadors to Antiochus (Polybius 28.18–22). Finally, Ptolemy VI went to his uncle's camp, and a decision was made that Antiochus would become his protector.[174] But his brother, who remained in Alexandria, had been proclaimed king by the Alexandrians, which led Antiochus to besiege the city. A civil war broke out in Egypt between the Alexandrian population, supporting Ptolemy VIII, and the rest of the country, which backed Ptolemy VI. The Alexandrian court asked for help from Rome, but the negotiations undertaken by T. Numisius failed.[175]

The events of 170/69 BC were certainly the worst military defeat of the Egyptian army, but little is known about them. The name of the supreme commander of the Egyptian army, Eirenaios (*Hrynys*), is known from the archive of Hor from Sebennytos, a Memphite priest who reported his interview with the commander about a premonitory dream announcing Antiochus' departure.[176] While Antiochus had elephants and a fleet, the Ptolemies seem to have just been able to sustain the siege of Alexandria. Only a few papyri report events related to the war, including a letter from

settlement was certainly not limited to the Fayyum, and the average plot size may actually have been smaller.

172 For the reigns of Ptolemy VI and VIII, see Huss (2001) 537–625. Unfortunately, rather than using the conventional number VIII, he gives the number VII to the king known in the rest of the scholarly literature as Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II; Hölbl (2001) 143–8; Nadig (2007).

173 The literary sources for the Sixth Syrian War are numerous (fragments from Polybius 28–31; Diodorus 30; Livy 44; St. Jerome, *Daniel* 11.24–30; Porphyrius, *FGrH* 260 F 49a–b) but focus on larger political events. See Grainger (2010) 291–308; Gruen (1984) 650–60; Ray (1976), esp. 125–30.

174 Gruen (1984) 653 note 199.

175 Livy 44.19.6–14; Gruen (1984) 690.

176 Ray (1976) 126 and note 6: *Hrynys*, called *stratēgos* in *O.Hor* 4 and "general of horse of Pharaoh and the Queen" in *O.Hor* 1, is perhaps the Eirenaios known from other texts.

a commander about the capture of an enemy camp and some 120 of Antiochus' men (l. 10, τῶν Ἀντιοχείων).[177] In 169 BC Antiochus had to leave Egypt because of domestic revolts, and Ptolemy VI joined his siblings in Alexandria. They were desperately trying to obtain the help of their allies, since they knew Antiochus would attack again. Their demand for 1,000 infantrymen and 200 cavalrymen from the Achaeans – who ultimately refused, preferring to send ambassadors to reconcile the two kingdoms (Polybius 29.23–5) – reveals the limited capacity of the Ptolemaic army in the early 160s. The main goal of the Ptolemies after the Great Revolt seems to have been to settle soldiers in new garrisons in Upper Egypt, leaving Egypt without a standing army ready to fight on an international scale. Indeed, when Antiochus attacked Egypt again in 168 BC, he was able to take over the Delta and the Fayyum without resistance, and some of his troops even reached the south of the country.[178] While he was marching against Alexandria for the second time he had to accept the ultimatum of the Roman delegation led by C. Popilius Laenas, who famously drew a circle around the Seleucid king and "bade him to give his answer to the note within the circle" (Polybius 29.27.5). Antiochus IV left Egypt and abandoned Cyprus, which he had briefly conquered. From this point on, the external politics of the Ptolemies were as much under Roman influence as those of the rest of the Eastern Mediterranean. Rome would play the role of arbiter during the upcoming dynastic conflicts.[179] But Ptolemy VI attempted to conquer Coele-Syria again between 150 and 145 BC through

177 P.Köln IV 186, a letter addressed to the top commander, certainly relates events occurring in the Sixth Syrian War. The editor suggests that "the men of Antiochus" were actually Egyptians fighting on Ptolemy VI's side against his brother Ptolemy VIII, on the basis of the onomastic and of the mention of the population of the Egyptian countryside (l. 16). Thus either some fights occurred between the two royal brothers during Antiochus IV's absence, or "the men of Antiochus" were really Antiochus' soldiers; see Véïsse (2004) 106–7. We will learn more about the military preparations before the invasion from an unpublished papyrus from Tebtunis in preparation by Galazzi and Clarysse.

178 For the consequences of Antiochus in the Fayyum, see P.Tebt. III 698, attesting a decree by King Antiochus to the cleruchs in the Krokodilopolite nome (a new name for the Arsinoite nome given by Antiochus) and P.Tebt. III 781 with Chapter 9, section 9.4 below. See also Lippert (2008) 168, for a Demotic lease from Oxyrhyncha (P.Tebt.Suppl. 640) mentioning a cavalryman of King Antiochus and dated to the year 144 of the Seleucid era (168 BC), to be published by Lippert. Another Demotic document dated to the year 144 or 145 of the Seleucid era will be published by Depauw (P.Stan.Green.dem. 016). In the south, see a graffito from Elephantine in Vittmann (1997) and Thiers (1995) doc. 6.

179 On relations between the Ptolemies and Rome, see Gruen (1984) 672–719; Lampela (1998). On the period from 273 BC to these events, see Heinen (1972). The unification of the two Hellenistic kingdoms might have prevented Rome from playing the role of an arbiter and might have made its involvement in the east more difficult; see also Ray (1976) 127.

his involvement in dynastic conflicts over the Seleucid throne.[180] He might have regained Coele-Syria with his army and fleet, had he not died in the aftermath of a battle against Alexander Balas.

Antiochus' invasions of 170/69–168 BC and the uncertainty about potential splits between the two royal brothers once again created the conditions for re-negotiating power relations and for a coup by the military elite. This interpretation of the so-called "revolt of Dionysios Petosarapis" is supported by Diodorus' description of events (31.15a.1–4): Petosarapis was one of the friends (*philoi*) of Ptolemy, an influential man at court and a courageous soldier, who tried "to win control of the state for himself."[181] Both his name and the events strongly suggest that he had supporters among the army and the Egyptians – the two groups were not exclusive – and that he came from a mixed family or was a (Hellenized) Egyptian.[182] Dionysios began his coup by falsely claiming that Ptolemy VI had made an attempt on his brother Ptolemy VIII's life. The people met at the stadium and were ready "to kill the elder brother and entrust the kingdom to the younger" (Diodorus 31.15a.2). After the two brothers appeared in the stadium in front of the crowd to show that they were acting in harmony, Dionysios gathered "those who were ripe for rebellion," which amounted to 4,000 soldiers (Diodorus 31.15a.3). But the king defeated them, and Dionysios retreated among the Egyptians, "where he tried to incite the masses to revolt" (Diodorus 31.15a.4). Papyrological evidence shows that the revolt expanded to the Heracleopolite nome in Middle Egypt.[183] Most of the army, however, remained loyal to the king, since Ptolemy VI marched against the rebels in Panopolis (Thebaid) "with a large force."[184] The rebellion in Panopolis may not be directly related to the revolt of Dionysios Petosarapis but may be connected with the outbreak of

[180] Huss (2001) 584–9; Hölbl (2001) 192–4.

[181] Watson's translation in Oldfather *et al.* (1989), as well as the following quotations. This *tarachē* is also mentioned in Ptolemaios the recluse's archive, during the time when his father Glaucias died; see UPZ I 14, ll. 8–9 and 7, ll. 12–14; McGing (1997) 289–95. Véïsse (2004), esp. 28–32 and 99–112 discusses McGing's chronology. The revolt occurred between the end of summer 168 BC, after Antiochus' departure, and December 164 BC, when the two brothers split. McGing and Véïsse favor 168 BC because of the younger ages of the kings and on the basis of P.Lond. VII 2188, which mentions a *tarachē*; also Huss (2001) 563–67.

[182] Véïsse (2004) 99–102 also gives as similar examples Dioscorides (see Chapter 8) and Plato the son of the *stratēgos* Plato (Gorre (2009) no. 24). The name of the leader was probably Petosorapis; see Clarysse (2009).

[183] P.Gen. III 128. McGing (1997) 293 suggests that the subsequent construction of a fortress in Heracleopolis in 156/5 BC is a result of these events. For the fortress, see the recent edition of the texts regarding its *phrourarchos* (P.Diosk.) by Cowey *et al.* (2003); and below Chapter 7, section 7.2.3.

[184] μετὰ πολλῆς δυνάμεως, Diodorus 31.17b, ll. 3; Véïsse (2004) 157; McGing (1997) 291.

other revolts at the same time in the Thebaid, their leaders taking advantage of the troubles in the north.

This passage of Diodorus, although incomplete, suggests that the so-called revolt of Dionysios Petosarapis started among the soldiers and spread through the Alexandrian population and then the Delta, as the revolts of 203 BC reported by Polybius also did. The usurper gathered 4,000 soldiers, but the king was able to find at least an equivalent number of loyal soldiers in the Delta. He nonetheless had trouble properly supporting his troops, which must have jeopardized their loyalty. Indeed, in 165/4 BC the *machimoi* stationed in Alexandria complained in a letter to the *dioikētēs* that they received insufficient wages from the royal bank, that they were unable to work their own farms and that they had to borrow money.[185] But these *machimoi*, probably a majority of them of Egyptian origin, remained in the king's service. Diodorus indicates neither the ethnic identity of the soldiers who revolted nor that of the crowd in Alexandria and its environs, in contrast to Polybius' description of the mob of 203 BC, which mentions all sections of the populace and soldiers of diverse origins. The passage from Polybius shows that one cannot divide the malcontents along the traditional ethnic lines of Greek soldiers, the Greek crowd in Alexandria, and Egyptian masses outside the capital. Instead, different ethnic groups were involved in the same riot, whether for exactly the same reasons or not. Both the crowd of 203 BC and that of the 160s BC, finally, were mainly reacting against crimes against a king and remained loyal to one member of the dynasty.[186]

McGing situates the revolt of Dionysios Petosarapis in an anti-Greek context, whereas Véïsse interprets the revolt as an attempt at a coup.[187] What is most remarkable is the role of the military elite and the soldiers in rallying the whole population, all ethnic groups included, a task facilitated by socio-economic difficulties. Véïsse offers evidence of the increased price of wheat in the 160s, and McGing mentions cultivation as a burden on the population and stresses official corruption.[188] Yet these fragmentary sources may indicate the cause of riots, their consequences or both. In fact, as a large part of the population in agrarian societies was almost constantly

185 For UPZ I 110, see Chapter 7, Text 7.1.

186 Barry (1993) 430 also stresses that in both cases there was no immediate violence, the people gathering in the stadium. Véïsse (2004) 103–4, 126 believes that the soldiers and the Alexandrian crowd included both Greeks and Egyptians, although she considers the soldiers largely Egyptians.

187 McGing (1997), esp. 293–5; Véïsse (2004), esp. 112, 151, 245.

188 Véïsse (2004) 147, on UPZ I 58 and UPZ I 59 (168 BC); McGing (1997) 293, on P.Amh. II 30 = W.Chr. 9, and 294–5 on UPZ I 110 (164 BC; see Chapter 7, Text 7.1) and UPZ I 113 (156 BC).

in an economically precarious state, one wonders why there were so few rebellions in the first century of Ptolemaic rule, but so many in subsequent centuries. The strength of the army in the third century BC in contrast to the later period partially answers the question and is apparent in two ways: in the military successes abroad and their positive socio-economic effects on the upper strata of Egyptian society, and in the ability to resolve conflicts with usurpers quickly. Both made the kings stronger. The elimination of usurpers was also made easier by the absence of child-kings and regents before Raphia.

Other attempts at coups similar to that of Dionysios Petosarapis punctuated Ptolemaic history in the second century BC. Some of these events were not recorded by our literary sources but are known in other ways. One was the attempt in the 150s of a certain *Tmpm* in *Tbny*, perhaps to be identified with a man named Demophon in Daphnae, and probably a member of the military elite.[189] But the army must have remained mostly loyal, since the king was able to maintain his throne. Nonetheless, the possibility of turning troops against the kings encouraged usurpers. Diodorus (33.20, 22) records another attempt, unsurprisingly a few years after the death of Ptolemy VI, in 141/0 BC. Galaistes was in the service of Ptolemy VI, but was rejected by his successor, Ptolemy VIII.[190] He gathered other exiles in Greece and came back to impose a son of Ptolemy VI as king. According to Galaistes, Ptolemy VI had entrusted his son to him. Once again, unpaid soldiers might quickly have joined the rebellion, had the *stratēgos* Hierax not paid them off with his own money.[191]

Unpaid, underused or demobilized soldiers in the Delta were a constant problem for the state. Numerous grants of land in the second century, especially in the Fayyum but also in the south, can be interpreted as attempts to solve these issues.[192] A land survey dated to 119/18 BC, P.Haun.inv. 407, attests a cleruchic grant in Edfu in 167/6 BC, around the time or just after the victory of the king at Panopolis. More importantly, the papyrus reveals the grant, in 135/4 BC, of 10-aroura plots to seventy-five infantrymen. Because at least some of these cleruchs were Egyptians, the editor of the papyrus interprets the grants as a way to gain the support of the native population.

189 Ray (1976) 129; *O.Hor* 7, l. 5.

190 On Galaistes in the papyrological sources, see the dossier of one of his officers, Exakon, in Van 't Dack (1988a) 118–20.

191 Véïsse (2004) 47–8, 104, 123.

192 For the Fayyum, see Chapter 7, section 7.1.4. For the south, see Christensen (2003) 12–15 and his Table 1; Chapter 6, section 6.1 below. For the involvement of these cleruchs in the financing of the temple-building at Edfu, see Chapter 9, esp. section 9.3.

But when the soldiers were unable to be present at the land survey of 119/18 BC, their plots were confiscated.

Many troubles driven by the dynastic conflict between Ptolemy VIII, his wife and niece Cleopatra III, and his sister Cleopatra II are attested in Egypt between 132/1 and 118 BC, although we have only indirect evidence for military events in this period.[193] Ptolemy VIII reacted militarily against Cleopatra II in 130 BC in order to take back Thebes, Edfu and Elephantine, as well as other places in the Thebaid such as Hermonthis.[194] After this, new garrisons were established in the Memnoneia and in Hermonthis near Thebes.[195] One year later, soldiers were sent to repress a rebellion in Panopolis, but we know only of the salary of eighty-four soldiers from the camp of Paos under the command of Inaros.[196] While the dynastic war between Ptolemy VIII and Cleopatra II is often difficult to disentangle from the civil war (or revolt) it triggered, Véïsse points out that when the inhabitants of a city such as Panopolis were not authorized to rebuild their houses, this suggests that they were not the victims of the dynastic conflict but had revolted.[197]

A "period of troubles" (*amixia*) contemporary with the revolt (*tarachē*) in the Thebaid broke out in the Fayyum around 130 BC. The rioting seems to have ended by 130/29 BC, since Ptolemy VIII settled new cleruchs (*machimoi*) in Kerkeosiris then.[198] But the situation in the Thebaid was not yet solved, as is clear from documents of the trial of Hermias, a soldier garrisoned at Kom Ombo at the time. By 127 BC Ptolemy VIII had been able to take back Alexandria from Cleopatra II, and he organized a new expedition to the South.[199] The three rulers were finally reconciled in 124 BC, but the non-payment of taxes in the Apollonopolite nome between 131 and 120 BC shows that troubles continued for a few years.[200] This

193 Véïsse (2004) 53–63. But the brief revolt of Harsiesis that was thought to have occurred during this period (see UPZ II 199 with McGing [1997] 295–6 and Véïsse [2004] 48–52) probably never happened; see Véïsse (2009).

194 The papyrological evidence gives us hints about the payment of "the troops that accompany the king"; see UPZ II 212–13, ll. 3–4 (130 BC). For the expedition of Paos, Ptolemy VIII's general, against the village of Hermonthis, see P.Dryton 36 (W.Chr. 10, 130 BC), a letter by the cavalryman Esthaldas to his father Dryton.

195 Vandorpe (1995) 233.

196 UPZ II 209.

197 See the amnesty decree of 118 BC (P.Tebt. I 5, ll. 147–53); Véïsse (2004) 57.

198 P.Tebt. I 72 (114/13 BC); P.Tebt. I 61(b) (118/17 BC). For the settlement of cleruchs, see Véïsse (2004) 58 and note 115. Crawford (1971) 69–71 counts thirty *machimoi* with 7 arouras and eight *machimoi hippeis* in 130/29 BC, and four *machimoi* in 129/8 BC.

199 P.Bad. IV 48 (127 BC), a letter by a soldier's wife from Alexandria about a dispute, indirectly attests this event.

200 Vandorpe (2003) 111.

might have taken the form of local fights, like that between Krokodilopolis and Hermonthis involving 20 cavalry and 500 infantry on one side, and 40 cavalry and an unknown number of infantry on the other.[201] Ultimately the amnesty decree of 118 BC (P.Tebt. I 5 = Sel.Pap. II 210) marked the reconciliation of the rulers. But it says little about soldiers except that some groups, largely of Egyptian origin, had their holding confirmed and that the policemen had penalties cancelled.[202] The special attention devoted to the *nauklēromachimoi*, whose role may be that of armed crew-members on police ships, shows the increasing importance of the army in police activities.[203]

The reigns of Ptolemy VI and Ptolemy VIII, which encompassed six decades of the second century BC, may look at first like a period of state weakness. Egypt from the 160s BC onward became gradually more dependent on Rome in terms of foreign policy, notably because the kings tried to gain support from Rome to solve their dynastic conflicts, a dependence that reached its acme in the first century BC. Events such as Antiochus' invasion, however, did not put an end to the dynasty. None of the coups succeeded, and the Ptolemies had enough resources to fight endlessly over their throne. Ptolemy VI was even able to send troops to Syria to support Alexander Balas against the Seleucid king Demetrius II in 147/6 BC.[204] The Ptolemies had adjusted the cost of the army to the new situation, and the long reigns of the two brothers allowed for durable policies. First, they used members of the Egyptian elite who had one foot in the temples and the other in the army, in order to take control of the south again. This included a strong temple-building program notably supported by the army (see Chapters 8 and 9). Second, their policy of settling soldiers expanded to a larger and more diverse group of the population, although plots were often smaller than in the third century BC (see Chapter 6). Third, the organization of the army gradually changed following Raphia, with significant modifications after Antiochus' invasion and Dionysios Petosarapis' attempted coup (see Chapter 4). The size of the fleet could not be maintained, because of the loss of the external territories that provided the wood needed for maintaining it. Yet reduction does not mean disappearance, since the Ptolemies were

201 W.Chr. 11 (123 BC); Véïsse (2004) 60–1 and 61–2, for indirect mentions of an *amixia* in the Thinite nome; PSI III 171; P.Dryton 36.

202 P.Tebt. I 5, ll. 44–9 (on soldiers) and ll. 188–91 (on policemen). On the ναυκληρομάχιμοι, see Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 89, esp. note 259, who suggest that these individuals owned *klēroi* but had their headquarters in Alexandria.

203 The only other attestation of the ναυκληρομάχιμοι is in a letter of the *dioikētēs* (UPZ I 110, ll. 22–3, 164 BC; Chapter 7, Text 7.1).

204 Hölbl (2001) 192–4.

able to mobilize between 60 and 110 ships when necessary. Ptolemy VI sent troops with “many ships” to Syria (1 Maccabees. 11.1). A century later, Cleopatra lost 110 ships in the burning of the docks during the Alexandrian War, but built a new fleet and provided Mark Antony with 200 warships.[205] After the Battle of Actium and his victory in Alexandria the following summer (30 BC), Octavian turned what remained of the Egyptian fleet into the Alexandrian fleet (*classis Alexandrina*).[206] Except for that battle, however, naval activity in the second and first centuries BC was limited to the Syro-Egyptian coast, Cyprus and Cyrene.

From an Egyptian point of view, ships remained essential to internal security. In addition to the patrol ships used to keep navigation on the Nile safe (ποταμοφυλακίδες), small warships (πλοῖα θαλάσσια) were regularly detached from the fleet at sea and placed under the command of the *dioikētēs* to increase security.[207] Parallel to the modifications in the land army after the Great Revolt and Antiochus IV’s invasion, some naval forces (ναυτικαὶ δυνάμεις) were stationed in the south, in Ptolemais, under the control of the *epistratēgos* of the Thebaid, to increase the mobility of loyal troops in case of revolt.[208]

3.2.3 The last century of Ptolemaic rule (116–30 BC)

The nature of warfare in the last century of Ptolemaic rule is broadly similar to that of the second century, with a slight decrease in the number of revolts and a slight increase in dynastic conflict and external warfare; the latter was mainly due to the alliance of the last queen, Cleopatra VII, with the Roman triumvir Mark Antony. The general policies that developed as a consequence of the Great Revolt continued, and the military elite was still involved in riots and dynastic conflicts. The most noticeable change was the presence from the 50s BC of Roman troops in Egypt to keep Ptolemy XII on the throne. As Capponi has recently made clear, however, the Ptolemaic army did not disappear, and some soldiers were included in the Roman army in Egypt after the Roman annexation in 30 BC.[209] A parallel can be drawn with the presence of Egyptians in the Ptolemaic army from the fourth century

205 Caesar, *Bellum Civile* 3.111.3–6; Plutarch, *Antonius* 56.1; Van ’t Dack and Hauben (1978), esp. 73–4, 77; Van ’t Dack (1977) 100–3; Lesquier (1911) 256–60.

206 Van ’t Dack (1983b) 26 and 29.

207 See, for example, the galley manned by men with round shields and lances apparently navigating toward a meeting of officers on the shore on the Palestrina Nile mosaic (section 17); Meyboom (1995) 40 and fig. 27; and the cover of this book.

208 Van ’t Dack and Hauben (1978) 61.

209 Capponi (2005) 22.

BC onward.[210] Once again, the sources are limited, especially for the first half of the period 116–31 BC, but the overall role of the army can still be reconstructed.

After the death of Ptolemy VIII in 116 BC his widow, Cleopatra III, tried to put her younger son on the throne, while she acted as co-ruler. The Alexandrians reacted against this, because in the royal tradition the eldest son succeeded his father. An endless conflict broke out between Cleopatra's two sons. The decades that followed were full of reversals, during which the brothers ruled alternately, Ptolemy IX Soter II between 116 and 107 BC and again between 88 and 80 BC, and Ptolemy X Alexander I between 107 and 88 BC.[211] As in the previous decades, external military intervention was limited. Cleopatra IV, repudiated by her husband Ptolemy IX, diverted part of the army stationed in Cyprus on her way to Syria to marry Antiochus IX, who was himself fighting against his own brother for the Seleucid throne, but we have no idea of the importance of these troops and their actions (Justin, *Epitome* 39.3.2). Then in 109/8 BC Ptolemy IX sent 6,000 soldiers to Antiochus IX for a campaign against Hyrcanus I the king of Judea (Josephus, *AJ* 13.278). The following year, when Ptolemy IX had to escape Egypt, he left with troops when he was pursued by Cleopatra III's men (Justin 39.4.1–2; Diodorus 34/35.39a), and he was quickly able to conquer Cyprus, where he ruled until 88 BC.

The final intervention of Ptolemaic troops outside Egypt was the so-called "War of the Scepters" in Syria (103–101 BC). This war was generated by both Ptolemaic and Seleucid dynastic struggles, although in the end only the Ptolemies fought one another (Josephus, *AJ* 13.324–64).[212] Ptolemy IX defeated the new Jewish king Iannaios, who was trying to expand his territory at the expense of Antiochus IX. According to Josephus, Ptolemy IX had 30,000 men, both infantry and cavalry, as well as the support of a few cities, notably Gaza, and took 10,000 prisoners from Iannaios' troops. Benefitting from this intervention, Ptolemy IX plundered Judea, hoping to reconquer Egypt thereafter. This forced his mother to attack first. She sent her younger son, Ptolemy X, with a fleet to Phoenicia while she traveled

210 See Chapter 5, section 5.1.

211 Pausanias 1.9.1–3; Justin, *Epitome* 39.3.2. Huss (2001) 626–70 offers a detailed summary of the reigns of the kings he calls Ptolemy VIII Soter II (rather than IX) and Ptolemy IX Alexander I (rather than X). See Barry (1993) 429–31 for the role of the Alexandrian mob in these events, as well as my conclusion to section 3.2.1.3; also Véïsse (2004) 104 and 108, Table 6. Cauville and Devauchelle (1984) 47–50 suggest that Ptolemy IX was in fact the son of Cleopatra II, but Hölbl (2001) 204–14 considers him Cleopatra III's son; also Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 18–24.

212 Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989), esp. 127–36 on the armies involved and the high officers; Van 't Dack (1981).

with the infantry in the direction of Ptolemais (Ake). With most of the Egyptian troops outside Egypt, the situation was ideal for Ptolemy IX to try to recover Egypt, but his younger brother stationed his army in Pelusium in the Delta, from where he could prevent Ptolemy IX from attacking.[213] In 102 BC Cleopatra's troops captured Ptolemais, forcing Ptolemy IX to return to Cyprus. While the Ptolemies might have reintegrated Judea into their possessions, Ananias, Cleopatra's Jewish general, dissuaded her from doing so in order to avoid the resentment of the Jewish people (Josephus, *AJ* 13.353–5). Most likely Cleopatra did not incorporate this region because she knew that Judea was a Roman ally.[214] Meanwhile Iannaios resumed his conquest of Palestine, as the Seleucid king was powerless to intervene.

Papyrological and epigraphical evidence sheds new light on the War of the Scepters. In May 103 BC 13 talents and 4,990 drachmas of copper were to be paid to "those stationed in the garrison of Krokodilopolis by the secretary Antipatros."[215] This represents only about 100 artabas of wheat at 1,000 drachmas per artaba in that period and is equivalent to food for one month at one artaba per month per soldier for a unit of one hundred soldiers stationed at Krokodilopolis in the Pathyrite nome.[216] We do not know whether these soldiers went to Syria or what proportion of the troops stationed there they represented. But some soldiers from the Pathyrite did take part in the war, and they left a dossier of papyri sent from Mendes and Pelusium in the Delta and from Ptolemais in Syria to an unknown destination and then brought it back to Pathyris.[217] The letters, in both Greek and Demotic, report some fragmentary events in the lives of two groups of soldiers and were addressed to a company commanded by the *hēgemones* Pates and Pachrates.[218] As often, it is difficult to understand the context in which the letters were sent, and the fragmentary state of the dossier does not allow reconstruction of the military operations in which the soldiers were involved. But the letters do inform us about some larger historical events, such as the presence in Damascus of the king (i.e. Ptolemy

213 A Demotic stele from the Serapeum in Memphis clearly states in the dating formula that Cleopatra III and Ptolemy X were at Pelusium on February 20, 102 BC; see Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 83–4.

214 Hölbl (2001) 209.

215 τοῖς ἐν Κρο(κοδείλων) πόλ(ει) φερομένοις φρου(ροῦσι) δι' Αντιπάτρ(ου) γρ(αμματέως), P.Bad. II 9, l. 6 (103 BC).

216 Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 117.

217 These officers belonged to a socio-military association of *philobasilistai*; see Chapter 7, section 7.3.1; Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 37–81. For a new fragment belonging to the fourth papyrus of the dossier (p. 62), see SB XXIV 16069 in A. Martin and Nachtergael (1998) 108–13.

218 Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 37–83.

X), who left one company of men in town (C.Jud.Syr.Eg. 3, l. 19). At times we can reconstruct movements of troops, for example that one of the two units of soldiers went to the general Phommous, perhaps the otherwise well-known *epistratēgos* and priest (*PP* I/VIII 202). The troops were ready to return south in September 102 BC (C.Jud.Syr.Eg. 6), and the soldiers were waiting for a monthly shipment of grain, no doubt part of their wages (C.Jud.Syr.Eg. 7, ll. 2–3).[219]

The epigraphical evidence related to the War of the Scepters also concerns priest-soldiers examined in Chapters 8 and 9. Apollonios-Pachou/Pashaï II, a military officer and priest from Edfu, died during the war.[220] Petimouthes, "great commander" of the army (*mr-mšʿ wr*, vocalized as *mer-mesha wer*) and prophet of Amun-Ra and other gods in Diospolis Kato (Tell el-Balamun), also participated in it.[221] He probably obtained his high functions from Cleopatra III for his exploits in the war and was later involved in financing temple-building.

A decade later, around 91/0 BC, rebels attacked Pathyris and some landholdings around Latopolis, and soon Thebes joined the revolt. Ptolemy X also lost Cyrenaica and its revenues when it was conquered by Ptolemy Apion, another son of Ptolemy VIII, and bequeathed to the Romans. A military revolt supported by the Alexandrians broke out, perhaps because the elite was dissatisfied at this loss or nominally because of Ptolemy X's friendship with the Jews. The news of troubles in the capital was an incentive for revolt elsewhere.[222] Ptolemy IX took advantage of the situation to return to Egypt and organized the military operations needed to regain control of the Thebaid. Meanwhile, after a naval defeat, Ptolemy X was still trying to control Cyprus. He borrowed money from the Romans to pay his soldiers and even bequeathed Egypt to the Roman Republic in case he died (Cicero, *De lege agraria* I.1; II.41–2). As Ptolemy X died only after Ptolemy IX had taken back the Egyptian throne in 88 BC, the will did not go into effect, although it weakened the legitimacy of the dynasty.[223] The next generations of kings

[219] For Phommous, see Chapter 8, section 8.2.2, note 23, as well as Appendix, Table A.1, **24**; and see Chapter 9, section 9.3, note 58.

[220] See Chapter 8, section 8.6.2 and note 103, as well as Appendix, Table A.1, **18**.

[221] See the biographical text written in hieroglyphs on his statue, which can be dated thanks to Petimouthes' involvement in this war see Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 84–8; see Chapter 8, section 8.6.2 and note 12, with Appendix, Table A.1, **51**; see Chapter 9, section 9.3 under Thebes, and note 57.

[222] McGing (1997) 299.

[223] For the transition between Ptolemy IX and X and Ptolemy X's will, see Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 136–61.

and queens needed to obtain recognition of their titles from the Roman Senate to legitimize their power vis-à-vis the elite and the population, an obvious obstacle to the establishment of a strong central state.

If the precise military events that led to the death of Ptolemy X are unknown, sources concerning the repression of internal revolts are more abundant.[224] From the correspondence of the *stratēgos* of the Thebaid, Plato, with the population of Pathyris, who remained loyal to the Ptolemaic dynasty, we learn that the general Hierax was about to subdue the Thebaid "with a very large force" (μετὰ δυνάμεων μυρίων), probably larger than the one of the *stratēgos* Plato, although the number may have been exaggerated to encourage the local troops.[225] The king's delegation of military operations to powerful military officers, a tendency that developed from the reign of Ptolemy V early in the second century, increased in the first century, reinforcing the power of the military elite.[226]

This revolt was harshly suppressed.[227] Even if Thebes was to some extent destroyed, however, Pausanias (1.9.3) certainly exaggerated the episode. Government officials were involved in new construction. The most telling example is that of Callimachus, *stratēgos* under Cleopatra VII, responsible for the finances of the Peri-Theban nome, *gymnasiarchos* and *hipparchos*, who was honored in a bilingual decree by the priests for his benefactions and temple construction.[228] Other changes mark this period. First, the loyal garrison town of Pathyris, which had been destroyed by the rebels, was abandoned; the documentation from the town stops in 88 BC.[229] Second, Hermonthis now became the capital of the nome, which received the name Hermonthite.[230] As a whole, administrative documentation from the Thebaid became rarer, but tax receipts on ostraca and funerary documents have been preserved.[231]

224 McGing (1997) 296–9 discusses Pausanias 1.9.3, P.Berl.Dem. 13608 and the dossier of the *stratēgos* Plato (SB III 6300 = Sel.Pap. II 417; P.Bour. 10–12, P.Baden 16); also Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 146–9.

225 P.Bour. 12, ll. 14–15; Véïsse (2004) 157. For Plato, see Coulon (2001). Dryton's son Esthaldas similarly announced the coming of the troops of Paos μετὰ δυναμέων ἱκανῶν; see P.Dryton 36, ll. 8–12; Collart (1922) 279.

226 It is unclear whether these military officers supported Ptolemy IX from the beginning, shifted their loyalty from one brother to the other, or simply defended the monarchy; see Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 149.

227 Vandorpe (1995) 233–5.

228 I.Prose 46. For an interpretation of Callimachus' role as benefactor and member of the army, see Chapter 9, section 9.3.

229 For the bilingual archives of soldiers from this town, see Chapter 7, section 7.2.3.2.

230 On the administrative reorganization, see Devauchelle and Grenier (1982).

231 Clarysse (1984) 25. For funerary material, see e.g. Coenen (1998).

At the death of Ptolemy IX in 80 BC, his daughter Berenice III became the sole ruler. But Ptolemy XI, the son of Ptolemy X, was recalled from Rome (where he was a client of Sulla) to be co-regent, thanks to Sulla's intervention (Appian, *Bella Civilia* 1.102). This was the first Roman active involvement in Egyptian politics since Popilius Leanas came to Egypt. Yet the reign of Ptolemy XI with his stepmother was short and dramatic, as he murdered her almost immediately. In response, the Alexandrian populace killed him and chose his cousin Ptolemy XII as king of Egypt; Ptolemy XII's brother became king of Cyprus in order to hinder Rome's ability to activate Ptolemy X's will.[232] The first part of Ptolemy XII's reign, until his banishment by the Alexandrians, who supported his daughter and his sister-wife Cleopatra VI Tryphaena, was mainly devoted to obtaining recognition of his royal title by the Roman Senate. He bribed influential Romans and reinforced his relationship with the Egyptian priestly elite. The army was not involved in many events, except for the soldiers and the military elite in Alexandria, who took part in the riots. Ptolemy XII's involvement in military affairs translated into financially supporting Pompey's 8,000 cavalrymen to fight in Judea (Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 33.136), rather than sending his own troops. The Ptolemaic army seems to have been reduced to a limited number of men garrisoned within Egypt, since Ptolemy preferred to provide money rather than troops and then had to ask Pompey's help to put down a revolt; the request was refused. The revolt has often been explained by tax increases that would have allowed the king to bribe the Romans, whereas the state of military organization and the role of the military elite have been overlooked. Heavy taxation has usually been inferred from limited regional evidence from the Heracleopolite nome about inhabitants of villages abandoning their land (*anachōrēsis*).[233] But the king may have been able to afford a politics of bribery by saving money on administrative costs, and by lowering military expenses by reducing the number of garrisoned soldiers. Indeed, Ptolemy's demand to Pompey suggests the lack of a large body of mobilizable soldiers and of support from the military elite in the capital. The economic situation of the population may well have deteriorated due to tax increases, but above all the elite in Alexandria was dissatisfied with Ptolemy XII and had enough military support to oppose him.

[232] Huss (2001) 671–702, on Ptolemy XI (instead of XII); Hölbl (2001) 222–30; Van 't Dack (1983b) 19–20. On relations between Egypt and Rome, see note 179.

[233] See for example Hölbl (2001) 224. Maehler (1983a) 7 discusses both farmers abandoning their land because they were overtaxed (see BGU VIII 1815, 61/0 BC, and BGU VIII 1843, 50/49 BC) and the resettlement phase of Dime in the Fayyum due to increasing prosperity at some point between 74 and 30 BC. Regional variations are difficult to identify owing to the fragmentary state of the papyrological sources.

In 59 BC the consul Julius Caesar finally recognized Ptolemy XII as king of Egypt, after Ptolemy gave him and Pompey 6,000 talents (e.g. Suetonius, *Julius Caesar* 54.3). Like many of his predecessors, Ptolemy XII issued an amnesty decree to reassert power.[234] He notably re-stated that cleruchic land could be hereditarily transmitted, as had already been accepted in Ptolemy VIII's decrees. Everything might have worked well for the king, had not Cyprus been in the process of becoming a Roman province at the same moment.[235] Influential members of the elite criticized Ptolemy's failure to prevent this loss. Supported by the mob, they expelled him and put his daughter Berenice IV on the throne along with her mother, Cleopatra VI Tryphaena.

After having tried for almost three years to obtain Roman military support to regain his position, Ptolemy XII crossed the Egyptian border in 55 BC escorted by Gabinius, the proconsul of Syria, and his troops, with Mark Antony as commander of the cavalry (Plutarch, *Antonius* 3.4–7). Gabinius, who led his legions outside his province without official authorization, took the garrison of Pelusium and defeated Archelaos, the queen's husband. For the first time in Egyptian history, not only did a Roman army enter the country, but Roman troops and Gallic and Germanic cavalrymen, known as the Gabiniani, remained there to protect Ptolemy. They rapidly married local women and became involved in the "defense" of Egypt against Caesar.[236]

In the final year of his life Ptolemy XII made his elder daughter Cleopatra VII co-regent.[237] Shortly after his death, in 51 BC, she expelled her twelve-year-old brother, whom she should have married according to tradition and probably according to Ptolemy XII's will. But the difficult economic situation engendered by a bad flood turned the population and influential men in the court against her.[238] She had to leave the capital and then Egypt. When Caesar arrived in Egypt after Pompey's murder by Ptolemy XIII's men, Cleopatra's troops and those of her brother and the eunuch Pothinus were opposing one another around Pelusium. We know almost nothing about the composition and number of Caesar's troops. Some Gabiniani probably fought on Ptolemy's side, while 500 Gallic and Germanic cavalry had been sent to Pompey's son in 49 BC with fifty warships (Caesar, *Bellum Civile* 3.4.4, 3.40; Dio Cassius 42.12; Appian, *Bella Civilia* 2.49). Caesar

[234] C.Ord.Ptol. 71 = Text 6.3 in Chapter 6, section 6.4.1.
[235] Hölbl (2001) 226.
[236] For intermarriage, see Caesar, *Bellum Civile* 3.110.2.
[237] The bibliography on Cleopatra VII is enormous. See, for example, Huss (2001) 703–57, with Ptolemy XII (instead of XIII) and Cleopatra VIII (instead of VII); Hölbl (2001) 231–56; Chauveau (1997), (2004).
[238] For the difficult economic situation, see note 233.

decided to solve the conflict between the siblings, doubtless hoping to use Egyptian resources to strengthen his power in Rome. He chose to support Cleopatra but may have misjudged the strength of her position.

Soon Caesar was trapped in Alexandria with only two small legions and 800 cavalry (Caesar, *Bellum Civile* 3.106), whereas Pothinus attacked the city in the name of Ptolemy XIII with 22,000 men under the command of Achillas (*Bellum Civile* 3.110.1–2). Caesar described these events as the Alexandrian War (48/7 BC), which he won thanks to reinforcement from Asia Minor and Judea. Since Ptolemy XIII died in the encounter, Caesar settled the dynastic conflict by marrying Cleopatra to her younger brother Ptolemy XIV, following his own interests but also their father's will, and establishing the pair as queen and king of Egypt. The final piece of evidence about the overall composition of the army in Egypt is found in *Bellum Civile* 3.110 and *Bellum Alexandrinum* 2.1.[239] In the first passage Caesar divides the army fighting on the side of Ptolemy XIII and led by Achillas – 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry – into three groups: the Gabiniani, the mercenaries from Cilicia and Syria, whom he calls "thieves," and the condemned and exiled people (*capitis damnati exulesque*) and slaves.[240] It is noticeable that the two cohorts of Gabiniani seem to have quickly played a central role in the Ptolemaic army. It is unclear if the mercenaries who joined them, according to Caesar, were recent additions or already belonged to the army. Yet the mobilization of slaves suggests that Ptolemy did not consider his army strong enough to oppose Caesar's two legions. The author of *Bellum Alexandrinum* 2.1 explains that Ptolemy and the Alexandrians had also levied men in Egypt and on its frontier, which suggests that there were still professional soldiers and officers stationed in garrisons.[241] But there is no clear evidence that the cleruchs were active in this period.[242]

Finally, a watershed in the history of the Ptolemaic army occurred when Caesar left three additional legions in Egypt in 47 BC. By then the troops in garrison in the Delta were probably predominantly Roman, with soldiers

239 Van 't Dack (1983b) 20–3.

240 On these three groups, see Van 't Dack (1983a) 77–81,Van 't Dack (1983b) 23–4; Capponi (2005) 17.

241 Van 't Dack (1983a) 82–4 suggests connecting these men with the handful of officers of Greek and Egyptian origins attested in documentary evidence, especially in Middle and Upper Egypt, between 55 and 30 BC.

242 Van 't Dack (1983a) 85 and note 50. But the officers and the units of the *katoikoi hippeis* are still attested in the first century; see Van 't Dack (1977) 89. The final attestation of a πρὸς τῆι συντάξει, a high official in the military administration responsible for the *katoikoi*, is dated to 48/7 BC; see Ioannidou (2006) 37, commentary to l. 16.

recruited primarily from Italy or the Greek-speaking provinces.[243] Their movement into the rest of the country, like their integration with existing troops, must have been gradual. The extent to which changes attested in the documentary evidence were representative of the entire army is difficult to estimate, but groups of soldiers with Roman names or even with Roman, Greek and Egyptian names appear here and there, along with dedications by soldiers with Latin ranks translated into Greek.[244] Roman military terminology in Greek translation also gradually comes to be used, until it is completely standardized under Augustus.[245] Military developments between 55 BC and 30 BC can be sketched as follows: the Roman legions became the main source of military power other than a few "Ptolemaic" soldiers in garrisons, while the cleruchic army was no longer active militarily. This is not to say that men born in Egypt played no role in the army, but they were reduced to a small number or were increasingly integrated into the Roman system.[246] The existence of Ptolemaic hipparchies used as auxiliaries to the Roman army as late as AD 12 convincingly shows that "some Ptolemaic forces survived the Roman conquest."[247]

The final military event indirectly involving the Ptolemaic dynasty is the naval Battle of Actium between Octavian and Mark Antony in 31 BC. The Egyptian contribution was financial as usual but also naval, the central power having been unable to organize and sustain a functioning land army for decades.[248] According to Plutarch (*Antonius* 56.1–6), Cleopatra gave Mark Antony 20,000 talents in addition to her 200 ships. For the battle, Mark Antony burned the Egyptian fleet except the best sixty warships that transported 20,000 infantry and 2,000 archers (*Antonius* 64.2). These are the ships with which Cleopatra broke the Roman blockade to sail back to Egypt (*Antonius* 66).[249] After their defeat, Antony and Cleopatra lost most of their allies but organized the defense of Egypt. One year later, Octavian and his armies took Pelusium and fought outside Alexandria until

243 Van 't Dack (1983b) 24 discusses the provenance of Caesar's troops.

244 Capponi (2005) 15–17 summarizes the evidence; see Van 't Dack (1983b) 25–8, with particular attention to O.Edfou 371 and I.Philae I 63.

245 The Greek word for the Latin *cohors* ("maniple"), *speira* (σπεῖρα), appears already in Heracleopolitan papyri from the mid first century BC; see BGU VIII 1763, l. 10; BGU VIII 1806, l. 4.

246 For example Diphilos, a Greek officer at the head of the *speira* in BGU VIII 1806, may have led a Roman unit; see Van 't Dack (1983a) 83 and (1983b) 25.

247 Capponi (2005) 22. I suggest that Egyptian troops similarly remained in the army after Alexander's conquest; see Chapter 5, section 5.1.

248 Thompson (1994) 322–3; Van 't Dack (1983a) 86.

249 Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 73–4, 89; the 22,000 soldiers on board must be counted as Mark Antony's Roman legions, not Ptolemaic troops.

Antony's troops switched sides (*Antonius* 76). Antony and Cleopatra both committed suicide, and Egypt became an official Roman province. The number of soldiers in the Roman army in Egypt remained lower than that in the Ptolemaic army in the third and second centuries BC and was about one-quarter of the size of the land army gathered at Raphia. There were three legions of about 5,000 men, and then only two legions left under Tiberius in AD 23, along with auxiliary units.[250]

3.2.4 Contrast between the third century and the second and first centuries BC

This survey of military events illuminates how the army functioned differently in the third century BC (Period A) and the second and first centuries (Periods B and C). Two elements emerge. First, the army was now involved mainly in fights against rebels (Period B) or against the troops of pretenders to the throne (Period C, see Figure I.2). Literary sources suggest a substantial reduction in the number of soldiers and, from the time of Ptolemy XII onward, an absence of military functions for certain groups of cleruchs. But the army continued to exist until the very end of the Ptolemaic dynasty, and some cleruchs, particularly the *machimoi*, were active in military contexts until at least the late 60s BC.[251] The Ptolemies' reshaping of their military structures in Period B enabled them to repress revolts and to maintain the core of their state, but they were no longer able to oppose external enemies such as the Seleucids. One can wonder, however, what might have happened had the Seleucids and Ptolemies been willing to join the kings of Pontus in their fight against Rome, instead of becoming trapped in dynastic conflicts that led them to bequeath their territories to the Romans.

The second change involves the increasing pressure of the military elite on the king. The military defeats of the early second century and the subsequent loss of most external possessions must have reduced the economic and political opportunities available to the uppermost elite in the third century BC, and may have encouraged members of this elite to support or organize revolts.[252] Discontent, combined with the inability of the country's rulers to secure the succession, encouraged prominent men and women in the court to benefit from ill-legitimized rulers, by attempting to replace them with successors of their own choice. Every time the Ptolemies lost one of

250 Strabo 17.1.12, 17.1.30, 17.1.41; Alston (1995) 23–8.

251 See Chapter 6, section 6.4.4.

252 See p. 92 and note 145.

their remaining possessions – Cyrenaica under Ptolemy X, Cyprus under Ptolemy XII – trouble occurred and the ruler was rendered destitute (at least temporarily in the second case). Yet the Ptolemies were able to rely on the Egyptian military and priestly elite to control Upper Egypt again after the Great Revolt in the second century BC (see Part III). In the first century BC, dynastic conflicts entangled with Roman politics almost entirely dictated the role of what remained of the army. Roman power had become essential for legitimizing and maintaining one Ptolemy rather than another vis-à-vis the elite at court and in Alexandria.

Chapter 4 examines the organization of the army and how it developed over time, and it attempts to connect organizational changes to modifications in the army's function in Periods B and C.

4 Military organization and hierarchy

The organization of the army can be analyzed along two lines: the nature of the agreement between the ruler and his soldiers (conscription, mercenary service, grants of land and alliances with other armies) and force types (heavy and light infantry and cavalry, elite troops, special troops and the fleet).[1] In the Antigonid army, for example, the two classifications broadly overlapped.[2] The situation was probably similar in Egypt at first, with Macedonians and Greeks in the heavy infantry and cavalry, and mercenaries from Crete, Thrace, Thessaly or Galatia serving in the light infantry and the cavalry. But by the time of Raphia in 217 BC the organization was no longer so clear-cut. Chapter 4 examines first the system of remuneration for army service, then the different types of forces in the Ptolemaic army and finally the military hierarchy. A model of the organization of the army is proposed in Figure 4.1 (see section 4.2) and assumes that the same hierarchy applied to professional and cleruchic troops.[3] This chapter also examines a series of reforms in the organization of the cavalry and the infantry that occurred primarily between *c.* 220 and *c.* 160 BC (Period B), and it illuminates the connection between these modifications and the profound reshaping of the state during this period of crisis described in Chapter 3.

In their discussion of the forms of state appropriation that they call the "war machine" Deleuze and Guattari sketch how armies could be organized according to different "formulas":[4] mercenary or territorial soldiers, professional army or conscript army, a special body or a "nationally" recruited force. These formulas could of course be combined and change over time. In the context of the ongoing international warfare between the Successors and the harsh competition to secure as many of Alexander's well-trained soldiers as possible, Ptolemy I's decisions were deeply influenced by the need to match and if possible surpass the military resources of his opponents. He had to select and organize different groups of soldiers and remunerate them

1 For the fleet, see Chapter 3.
2 Hatzopoulos (2001) 29.
3 Military ranks found in the *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* are the same for both types of troops; see also Sekunda (2001) 18. Lesquier (1911) 97–8 relies on the description of Raphia (Polybius 5.65.3), where the phalanx and mercenary troops were trained together.
4 Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 417–19.

Table 4.1. *Macedonian and Egyptian points of view on types of soldiers*

Provenance	Macedonian point of view	Egyptian point of view
(a) Soldiers from Macedonia	"national" recruits from a conscript army	mercenaries
(b) Soldiers from the Greek world and the former Persian empire	mercenaries	mercenaries
(c) Egyptian soldiers from the armies of the former Persian empire and the last native Egyptian rulers	professional soldiers from a territorial army	"national" professional soldiers from a territorial army

to ensure that they remained loyal to him and did not join his opponents. Some of these men were from Macedonia (a), some from the Greek world and the former Persian empire (b), and others were Egyptian soldiers from the armies of the former Persian empire or the last native Egyptian rulers, the Nectanebos (c) (see Table 4.1). From a Macedonian point of view, in other words, these were either "national" recruits from a conscript army (a), mercenaries from the Greek world or the former Persian empire (b), or professional soldiers from a territorial army (c). From an Egyptian point of view, different terminology is appropriate, because the Ptolemaic army was initially composed mostly of mercenaries (a and b), who formed a sort of "society of warriors who arrived from without,"[5] having been recruited outside the core of the Egyptian state.[6] These groups were joined, as I argue in Chapter 5, by what was left of a "national" professional army in Egypt (c) after the two Persian occupations.

The organization of the army did not remain static over three centuries but adjusted to new situations. Important differences can be sketched between Period A (ending *c.* 220 BC) and Period C (from *c.* 160 BC until the coming of Roman soldiers). The intervening Period B, a time of intense military activity within Egypt and Coele-Syria, triggered reorganization and reform. Four tendencies can be identified in the organization and composition of the army in Period A: (1) the extensive use of a group of warriors from outside the country; (2) the creation of a privileged status for soldiers, due to their socio-economic bargaining power driven by the competition between

[5] Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 419.

[6] I take the core of the Ptolemaic state to correspond broadly to the territory of the Egyptian state today.

the successors of Alexander; (3) well-trained soldiers on the international battlefield, fighting in a phalanx and using the long Macedonian pike called the *sarissa*; (4) the development of an expensive fleet with engines of war.

The situation was strikingly different after the period of crisis (Period B). In the second and first centuries BC (Period C) soldiers came primarily from inside the country: they were Greeks born in Egypt, Egyptians and Greco-Egyptians. In the new garrisons in the south these professional soldiers were infantrymen called *misthophoroi* (μισθοφόροι), a term normally used in third-century papyri only in combination with other military terms (see below). The second-century *misthophoroi* were recruited within Egypt and had not experienced the international battlefield. They were not expected to have done so and were no longer trained like their predecessors, and their bargaining power was consequently lower. The privileges to soldiers granted land diminished as well, as is apparent from the size of the plots they were given.[7] But access to this status was extended to a larger pool, since some soldiers and policemen were given a status similar to that of the Greek cavalry settlers through land grants, suggesting that police control became a priority for the Ptolemies.

4.1 Remuneration in wages and in land: mercenaries (*misthophoroi*), cleruchs and *misthophoroi klērouchoi*

The Ptolemies used two types of remuneration: professional or mercenary soldiers received cash (*opsōnion* or *misthos*) and food, whereas cleruchs were granted plots of land (*klēroi*).[8] The standing army – the troops maintained in peacetime and also used in war as the army's core – was made up of professional soldiers stationed in garrisons and cleruchic troops serving in turn, presumably for only part of the year, in garrisons.[9] All cleruchic troops were mobilized simultaneously only in case of war. In addition, the existence of a mixed group, the *misthophoroi klērouchoi*, shows that the

[7] See Chapter 6, section 6.2.1.

[8] Lesquier (1911) 25, 66 and tables, divided the Ptolemaic army into (a) regular troops (cleruchs), (b) mercenaries and (c) indigenous troops, but this categorization is often misleading and is not followed here. G. T. Griffith (1935) 111 uses the term "Macedonians" where Lesquier uses "regular troops," while recognizing that the boundaries between Macedonians and mercenaries are unclear.

[9] We do not know how much of their time the cleruchs have devoted to garrison duties or military training. Sekunda (2001) 17 divides the army into two components, the cleruchic or territorial army and the standing army (guards at the court and mercenaries in garrisons), although guards at the court had *klēroi*.

system was flexible. This section sketches out the basic distinctions between these three categories, while Chapters 5–7 explore how Egyptian soldiers were incorporated into the professional and cleruchic troops.

The most common term for "mercenary," *misthophoros* (literally "one who draws regular pay"), does not imply that the individual in question is a foreigner. In the fourth and third centuries BC, however, *misthophoroi* generally came from the Greek-speaking world and were often called *xenoi* (ξένοι, "foreign soldiers"), *stratiōtai* (στρατιῶται, "soldiers"), *xenologēthentes* (ξενολογηθέντες, "enlisted mercenaries"), *misthodotoumenoi* (μισθοδοτούμενοι, "furnished with regular pay") and perhaps also *taktomisthoi* (τακτόμισθοι, "with a fixed wage").[10] Many served in the external possessions. The term *misthophoros* is never used alone in the third-century papyri but qualifies either the mercenary-cavalry (*misthophoroi hippeis*) or a special group of mercenaries, the mercenary-cleruchs (*misthophoroi klērouchoi*).[11] Moreover, both groups are attested only in the Fayyum. In contrast, Polybius uses the terms *xenoi* and *misthophoroi* together to designate the mercenaries present in Egypt in 222 BC (5.36.3).[12] In the final decades of the third century fewer soldiers immigrated into Egypt, with the exception of those hired during the Fourth Syrian War in 219 BC.[13] At that time many cavalry and infantry mercenaries garrisoned in Egypt were the descendants of previous generations of mercenaries and cleruchs and had been born in the country. This suggests a difference between them and the mercenaries stationed outside Egypt or hired for a war.[14] After the period of crisis the Ptolemies hired Egyptians and Greco-Egyptians to regain control of the Thebaid. These were professional troops in garrisons who received a wage and were thus called *misthophoroi* in Greek.[15] A new expression was created in Egyptian to translate the concept *rmt iw=f šp hbs*, "man receiving pay."[16] The levels of pay varied according to rank and were on average higher in the third century BC.[17] In addition, in wartime soldiers hoped for opportunities for plunder and were often promised premiums that could be up to thirty

[10] Scheuble (2009) 213; Sekunda (2007) 343; Kramer (1991) 176–7.

[11] *PP* II/VIII 2533–66.

[12] Polybius uses these terms as synonyms; see Foulon (1995) 212–13.

[13] See Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 *contra* Van 't Dack (1977) 90, who explains this as a result of a supposedly low birthrate in Greece at that time.

[14] See also Scheuble (2009) 222.

[15] Scheuble (2009) 214–16, with references to the texts. Van 't Dack (1977) 92 calls them "permanent militia." Thompson and Vandorpe suggest using the term *misthophoroi* rather than translating "mercenaries," because the latter wrongly suggests that the individuals in question come from abroad.

[16] For the equivalence of μισθοφόρος and *rmt iw=f šp hbs*, see Vleeming (1985).

[17] See Chapter 3, p. 73 and note 93 for bibliography on wages. For the second century, see Chapter 7, section 7.2.3.1.

times higher for officers than for ordinary soldiers.[18] In the third century the average pay of infantry soldiers was probably one silver drachma per day (the figure assumed in the calculation of the cost of the land army in Chapter 3). Documents concerning the transfer of soldiers' wages in grain and/or cash do not often indicate the number of garrisoned soldiers, so that the wage per soldier can seldom be calculated exactly.[19]

In contrast, other soldiers were granted land in exchange for military service. Ptolemy I had probably already remunerated soldiers this way, but the cleruchic system developed under Ptolemy II and III, although cleruchs also received a ration while on duty.[20] Tax lists dating to these two reigns show that in the Fayyum two-thirds of the cavalry were cleruchs, while one-third were *misthophoroi hippeis*.[21] About one quarter of third-century cleruchs were of Macedonian origin, while the rest came from mainland Greece, Asia Minor, Cyrenaica and the Balkans.[22] The papyrological sources for the third century predominantly report large plots given to officers and cavalrymen, most commonly measuring 100 arouras. Eighty-aroura plots start to be granted around 221 BC, and 70-aroura plots between 223 and *c.* 170 BC.[23] Since soldiers had to declare what rank or pay category (*epiphora*) they held in contracts, these cavalry settlers appear in legal texts and official documents as 70-aroura men (*hebdomēkontarouroi*), 80-aroura men (*ogdoēkontarouroi*) or 100-aroura men (*hekatontarouroi*), or simply as cleruchs.[24] The titles of 60-, 50-, and 40-aroura men are exceptional and probably refer to an early stage of the cleruchy under Ptolemy I, before the standardization of categories.[25] The size of their plots placed the cavalry not only within the upper class of the cleruchs – a group later called *katoikia* – but

18 See Chapter 3, note 18.

19 See Chapter 3, note 95; Salmenkivi (2002) 70–9, on twelve copper talents to be paid "to those . . . on the ship" in P.Berl.Salmen 1 and the copy of the written order paid in kind at 128 artabas of wheat for two months in BGU XVIII.1 2748 (86 BC, Heracleopolite). For Salmenkivi, there were plausibly twenty-two soldiers, each receiving two and two-thirds artabas per month. P.Berl.Samen 2, dated to the same year, concerns payments to *machimoi*. See also the new edition of P.Grenf. II 23 = W.Chr. 159 (108 BC, Latopolite) by Vinson (1998) with perhaps thirty-four men at 2 artabas per month apiece.

20 See Chapter 7, p. 260 and note 103 about *pentarouroi*.

21 P.Count 1 (Arsinoite, 254–31 BC) records 3,472 100-aroura cleruchs and 1,426 *misthophoroi hippeis*.

22 Fischer-Bovet (2011) 142; see also Bagnall (1984) 10–12, based on Uebel (1968) and Essler (2008) 56–7.

23 Kramer (1991) 79.

24 *PP* IV 8570–8864. The division of the *PP* locates most cavalrymen in volume IV, devoted to land tenure, although they served at times in the standing army; the cavalrymen in service are in *PP* II. For the *epiphorai*, see below, p. 56 and note 55.

25 Peremans and Van 't Dack (1950–81) introduction to *PP* IV, p. XIX; introduction to P.Cair.Zen. I 59001 (Pitos, Memphite, 274/3 BC).

also in the upper strata of society. The term *katoikia* and the denomination *katoikoi hippeis*, however, are typical of the second-century evidence, a time when this group gradually came to include more men, although they were not necessarily granted as many arouras as one might expect on the basis of the third-century evidence.[26] Finally, in Period C cavalry called *machimoi hippeis* received 20 arouras and were of Egyptian or Greco-Egyptian origin.[27]

There is little evidence for infantry cleruchs in the third century BC. Either most of them were settled in the Delta, where papyri were not preserved, or land grants were given to fewer men than is usually thought.[28] Their allotments were smaller than those of the cavalry, usually 30 or 25 arouras. Land grants to infantry cleruchs are attested six times less often in the sources than those to cavalry cleruchs.[29] Yet the village called Ibion *tōn Eikosipentarourōn*, "Ibion of the 25-aroura men," near Kerkeosiris in the Fayyum, suggests a substantial number of this type of settler there.[30] Finally, 5-aroura men (*pentarouroi*) existed from the reign of Ptolemy III onward. They received plots whose size was similar to that of soldiers settled on land in the New Kingdom and the Third Intermediate period.[31] This term is often combined with *machimos*, and the bearers of the title usually have Egyptian names. The *machimoi* could alternatively receive 7 (*heptarouroi*) or 10 arouras (*dekarouroi*).[32]

In the second century BC a similar change can be observed in the professional and cleruchic troops. Egyptian and Greco-Egyptian soldiers became prominent among the active troops in the Thebaid, and Egyptians were better integrated into the cleruchic army through the new tendency toward recruiting locally. Egyptian cleruchs, usually *machimoi*, represent a far larger proportion of the infantry in Period C, and the discrepancy between the size

26 *PP* II/VIII 2586–2720: there are only two attestations of *katoikoi hippeis* in the third century BC; see Chapter 6, p. 217, note 94.

27 *PP* II/VIII 2721–34, although one was a 30-aroura man (*PP* II/VIII 2725).

28 See Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 153 for their low frequency in the Fayyum.

29 Compare the 30- and 20-aroura men in *PP* IV 8876–8922 with the 100-, 80- and 70-aroura men in *PP* IV 8570–8864.

30 See Chapter 6, p. 208 and note 56.

31 SB III 6285 (229/8 BC, Heracleopolite); SB I 4369 (b) (third century BC) records *machimoi* with 5, 7, and 10 arouras. For pre-Ptolemaic land grants, see Chapter 6, note 6; Lesquier (1911) 47–8 was misled in taking Herodotus 2.168 to suggest that the size of the plots decreased from Amasis' time.

32 For infantry *machimoi*, see *PP* II/VIII 2979–3044. For 7- and 5-aroura men, see *PP* IV 8943–9056. *Dekarouroi machimoi* are attested only in P.Tebt. I 5, l. 44 (118 BC) and P.Tebt. I 81, col. VII (late second century BC) and in P.Haun.inv. 407 (119/18 BC, Apollonopolite), where the soldiers are called *andres*; other *dekarouroi* are often policemen (*phylakitai*).

of their plots and those of the other cleruchs decreases.[33] Their organization was probably similar to that of the rest of the army and is therefore not discussed separately here. The only specificity in the terminology is the title of their officers, the *laarchai*, who commanded cavalry and infantry units of *machimoi* grouped into *laarchiai*.[34] These officers are first attested under Ptolemy V and were perhaps previously called *hēgemones*. Once again, this change can be connected to the gradual large-scale reorganization of the army in Period B.

The final category of the remuneration system, the mercenary-cleruchs (*misthophoroi klērouchoi*), is more difficult to define. *Misthophoroi klērouchoi* and *taktomisthoi klērouchoi* first appear under Ptolemy III and are attested for the last time in 173 BC.[35] In addition, cavalry *misthophoroi* (*misthophoroi hippeis*) and perhaps infantry *misthophoroi* (*misthophoroi pezoi*) are found with plots of land in three other cases dated to the third century BC.[36] Scheuble sees a difference between *misthophoroi* allotted *klēroi*, on the one hand, and *misthophoroi klērouchoi* and *taktomisthoi klērouchoi*, on the other, all of them attested only in the Fayyum.[37] But in both cases the Ptolemies applied the same principle of granting land to consolidate the loyalty of their soldiers and probably to lower their regular pay. In my opinion, the difference simply reflects a lack of coherence in the terminology, especially in the third century. Several hypotheses have been offered to explain the nature of the *misthophoroi klērouchoi* and *taktomisthoi klērouchoi*. For Lesquier, these were mercenaries included in the cleruchic system, in particular to remove them from the garrisons when they seemed disloyal.[38] Griffith criticizes Lesquier's theory because there would then be no difference between these men and cleruchs and insists instead that *misthophoroi klērouchoi* and *taktomisthoi klērouchoi* remained active soldiers in the standing army.[39] Launey considers them mercenaries who exchanged their wages for a plot of land but is unable to explain how they are different from cleruchs.[40]

33 Van 't Dack (1977) 94–5. For the *machimoi*, see Chapter 5, section 5.1. For Egyptian cleruchs, see Chapter 6, section 6.2.3 and Chapter 7, section 7.1.4.

34 *PP* II/VIII 2044–50; see Chapter 5, section 5.1.

35 These two titles have been found to date in ten texts; see Scheuble (2009) 219 note 40. But only two of the texts attest *misthophoroi klērouchoi*, P.Petr. III 112 (f) ll. 19–20 and (g) ll. 16–25 (221–220 BC) and P.Tebt. III. 2 853, ll. 16–17 (*c.* 173 BC). Scheuble (2009) 221 convincingly argues that the *taktomisthoi* were a subgroup of the *misthophoroi*.

36 P.Petr. III 117 (b) (245/4 BC), W.Chr. 335 = P.Lille I 14 = P.Sorb. III 89, ll. 3–4 (238 BC), and P.Petr. II 31, ll. 4–6 (third century BC), the last concerning *klēroi* measured for "the *misthophoroi* [*hippeis* and *pezo*]*i*, for the Macedonians, and the others."

37 Scheuble (2009) 219–20.

38 Lesquier (1911) 18, 47.

39 G. T. Griffith (1935) 116, 135–9.

40 Launey (1949) 47.

Van 't Dack, finally, followed by Scheuble, suggests that the Ptolemies began to hire soldiers from the cleruchic army to serve permanently in garrisons.[41] Although this seems plausible, it remains possible that some *misthophoroi klērouchoi* were mercenaries who received a plot of land as a special reward, for example when they were promoted to officer status. One of the four *misthophoroi klērouchoi*, Ergodates, was a cavalry officer (*epilarchēs*), and two others were perhaps infantry officers, depending on the interpretation of an abbreviation in an account of military taxes (P.Petr. III 112).[42] Moreover, the *misthophoros hippeus* Theodoros – though not called *misthophoros klērouchos* – was allotted a *klēros* and was also an *epilarchēs*.[43] His *klēros* was taken back by the state at his death. Nothing is known about the size of their plots, but it has been conjectured that mercenary-cleruchs in the cavalry received 80 arouras on the basis of a different reading of the same abbreviation in P.Petr. III 112.[44]

The terms *misthophoroi klērouchoi* and *taktomisthoi klērouchoi* disappear in the 170s BC. Soon afterward the new type of *misthophoroi* mentioned above is found in the Hermopolite nome and in the Thebaid. As Scheuble suggests, the creation of the latter category might explain the disappearance of the former.[45] The principle of rewarding *misthophoroi* with *klēroi* seems to have been applied to the troops garrisoned in Akoris in the Hermopolite, although the term *misthophoros klērouchos* was never used there.[46]

4.2 Military organization and reforms

The organization of the Ptolemaic army, like that of other Hellenistic armies, resembled the Macedonian army but developed its own peculiarities over time. This section examines the force types and reforms in the infantry and the cavalry, assuming the same changes for cleruchs and professional soldiers. The results are schematized in a model of the organization of the army in Figure 4.1 below.

41 Van 't Dack (1977) 92; Scheuble (2009) 220.

42 *PP* II 2260 = P.Petr. III 112 (g) ll. 16–18 (221/0 BC). For the abbreviation, perhaps to be read *p(entakosiarchos)* or *p(entekontarchos)* rather than *ogdoēkontarouros*, see Dio[. . .] son of Nikias *PP* II 2306 = 2342 (g) l. 20 and perhaps Apollodoros *PP* II 2305 = 2334, P.Petr. III 112 (f) l. 20.

43 W.Chr. 335 = P.Lille I 14 = P.Sorb. III 89, ll. 3–4 (238 BC).

44 Uebel (1968) no. 1021, p. 248 note 2 and no. 661 follows the commentary to P.Petr. III 112 (g) l. 20.

45 Scheuble (2009) 220.

46 See Chapter 5, section 5.2.3.1, p. 190, note 122.




Figure 4.1 Model of the organization of the Ptolemaic army




Figure 4.2 Cavalry units

4.2.1 Cavalry units and equipment

The cavalry played a fundamental role in Alexander's army, where it represented an exceptional 16 percent of the land force; in Hellenistic armies it usually amounted to 10 percent of the land force and remained essential, even if by the final quarter of the third century the phalanx had become the decisive force type on the battlefield.[47] The Ptolemaic cavalry was organized similarly to that of other Hellenistic armies. Hipparchies (singular *hipparchia*) included 400–500 men and were commanded by *hipparchoi* (also called *hipparchai*). A *hipparchia* was divided into two squadrons, called *ilai*, of 200–250 men headed by *ilarchoi* (also called *ilarchai*); each *ilē* was divided into two *lochoi*, as illustrated in Figure 4.2.[48] The *lochoi* had in fact been

[47] Sekunda (2007) 346; Hatzopoulos (2001) 33–4.

[48] *PP* II/VIII 2184–2287; Sekunda (2007) 331, 333, 343 and (2001) 18–19. Hatzopoulos (2001) counts *c.* 250 men by *ilē* in the Antigonid army, with each *ilē* divided into two *tetrarchiai* and each *tetrarchia* divided into two half-*tetrarchiai*, which are themselves divided into two groups of *c.* 15 men. Marrinan (1998) 216–58 lists the sources for the various units and offers hypotheses about the overall hierarchy, although these remain highly conjectural, for example *ilai* of 100, 128 or 200 men. Lesquier (1911) 87–92 is no longer up to date.

created by Alexander during his reforms in 331 BC.[49] The lower-ranking officers attested in the papyri are the *epilarchai*, *ilarchai*, *epilochagoi*, *lochagoi* and finally *dekanikoi*, who perhaps led up to fifteen cavalrymen, the smallest unit in the Antigonid cavalry.[50] Whether *epilarchai* and *epilochagoi* were superior or inferior to *ilarchai* and *lochagoi*, respectively, is debated. The meaning of *epi-* ("above") and the superiority of the *epistratēgos* to the *stratēgos* suggest by analogy that the *epilarchai* and the *epilochagoi* were superior officers.[51] This would make *epilarchai* equivalent to *hipparchoi*, and *epilochagoi* equivalent to *ilarchai*, which was certainly not the case. I suggest instead that the *epilarchēs* was senior to his colleague the *ilarchēs*, with each in charge of one of the *ilai* that made up a *hipparchia*. So too, the *epilochagos* was superior in age and experience to the *lochagos*, with each leading one of the *lochoi* of the *ilē*.[52] Finally, a general of Ptolemy IX, Philostephanus, recommends organizing the cavalry on the battlefield in *oulamoi*, formations ten wide and five deep.[53]

It seems that there was initially no system of naming or numbering the hipparchies to distinguish them. Cavalrymen indicated the highest officer to whom they were attached – called the eponymous officer by papyrologists – and sometimes added their location. Under Ptolemy II, for example, one cavalryman provided his official identity in a legal document as "Strattippos, Macedonian of the cavalrymen under the command of Antigonus in the Heracleopolite."[54] Strattippos followed the rule according to which "all soldiers had to declare their place of origin, to what units they belong, and what ranks they hold (ἐπιφοραί)."[55] The hipparchies were then organized in numbered and ethnic units around 235 BC and by 233/2 BC, respectively – a period of peace under Ptolemy III (see Figure 4.1).[56] A roll of abstracts dated to 232/1 BC records for the first time a cavalryman of the hipparchy of "the Persians and of [. . .]" (CPR XVIII 15, ll. 298–9) and another of

49 Sekunda (2010) 453, based on Diodorus 17.56.2–4, Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.16.11 and Curtius 5.2.6, *contra* Hatzopoulos (2001) 39.

50 Hatzopoulos (2001) 38.

51 Van 't Dack (1988b) 53–4.

52 Pairs of senior and junior officers also occurred in the second-century infantry among the *hēgemones* and sons of the *hēgemones*; see Vandorpe (forthcoming).

53 Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 23.1; Sekunda (2007) 347.

54 PSI VIII 976, ll. 1–2 (249/8 BC, Heracleopolite). Stratippos *PP* II/VIII 2944 = IV 9525 is also found as a cleruch cultivating a vineyard (P.Cair.Zen. II 59236 = Bagnall and Derow [2004] no. 92) and is the father of Neoptolemos, Macedonian, of the cleruchs of Philadelphia.

55 See BGU XIV 2367, translated in Bagnall and Derow (2004) no. 125 (late third century BC) and P.Hamb. II 167 (third century BC), which summarize how parties in a contract must describe themselves, a rule papyrologists call the "nomenclature rule" (*Nomenklaturregel*). The rule was no longer followed strictly after the mid second century BC; see Uebel (1968) 11–13; Kramer (1991) 63; Fischer-Bovet (in press b).

56 See Kramer (1991) 79–80; Uebel (1968) 379.

"the Thessalians and the other Greeks" (CPR XVIII 10, l. 197).[57] The latter still existed in 174/3 BC, although this is the final mention of an ethnic hipparchy (P.Freib. III 34, l. 607). The hipparchies of the Thracians, Mysians, Persians, Thessalians, and Thessalians and other Greeks are recorded in a handful of papyri dated to 222–217 BC.[58] In addition, the hipparchy of the Macedonians is attested in an unpublished petition dated to *c.* 184 BC (P.Vindob. G 40160).[59] In total, there were five ethnic hipparchies, since the two different denominations used for the hipparchies of the Persians and the Thessalians presumably referred in each case to a single hipparchy. From these double denominations and from the discrepancy between the ethnics of individual cavalrymen and those of their hipparchies, we can infer that there was in fact no rigid ethnic organization.[60] It is likely, however, that the core of each ethnic hipparchy initially contained a majority of cavalrymen with the same ethnic designation or who wore equipment associated with it. The Thessalians, for example, had a long reputation as excellent cavalry, often as heavy cavalry, as did the Thracians.[61]

The hipparchies given a number around 235 BC were composed of 100-aroura men.[62] These cavalrymen also used individual ethnic designations to identify themselves, but there was no correlation between their ethnics and their hipparchy.[63] In 221 BC 80-aroura men first appear as members of the numbered hipparchies. This is one of many hints of a reform of the army at the beginning of the Fourth Syrian War, the beginning of Period B. There were only five numbered hipparchies at that time, but the number went up to at least eight in the second century BC, no doubt in connection with a gradual reorganization of the cavalry throughout Period B.[64] A tenth

57 CPR XVIII by Kramer (1991), esp. 79–80. Maresch (1996) 77–81 supported the date of 206 BC, but Kramer had already rejected this in BL 11, p. 73.

58 *PP* II/VIII 2735–46, see P.Petr. III 112 and commentary, pp. 287–8; P.Enteux. 14 and 15; P.Tebt. I 137.

59 I thank Bärbel Kramer for information about the date.

60 Chaireas son of Chaireas (*PP* II 2745) from Perga[mon] in Asia Minor or Perga[ios] in Cilicia belonged to the hipparchy of the Thracians (P.Petr. III 112 [f] II, ll. 13–14 and Launey [1949] 1201, 1212, 1223); Diphilos, Thracian, belonged to the hipparchy of the Thessalians and the other Greeks (CPR XVIII 10, l. 197), as did Ptolemarchos, Macedonian (*PP* II/VIII 2743) and, more accurately, Hipponicus, Arcadian (*PP* II/VIII 2738); a cavalryman from Heracleia (*PP* II/VIII 2735) belonged to the hipparchy of the Thessalians, although if this is Heracleia Trachinia, it was close to Thessalia; Ptolemaios, Macedonian (CPR XVIII 15, ll. 298–9), belonged to the hipparchy of the Persians and other Greeks, not to that of the Macedonians.

61 On Thessalian cavalrymen, see Launey (1949) 221–3; Sekunda (1984) 18–19 with figure reconstruction pl. C.2 on Alexander's sarcophagus. On Thracian cavalrymen, see Launey (1949) 374–7, 380, 386–8, 394–6.

62 Uebel (1968) 397.

63 See *PP* II/VIII 2747–2868.

64 Kramer (1991) 79. There was no ninth hipparchy in the third century BC; see the correction by Clarysse (1975) 74–5 of SB V 7631 (227 BC).

hipparchy is attested, although only in 73 BC.[65] Even if this attestation is late, it is plausible that the cavalrymen of the five ethnic hipparchies were integrated into the numbered hipparchies during Period B.[66]

In 217 BC at Raphia there were 5,000 cavalrymen, the total number one expects for the five ethnic and five numbered hipparchies attested at the time. Van 't Dack nonetheless suggests that there was more than one hipparchy with the same name, for example several "fifth hipparchies," because of the existence of a unit called the *epitagma*, which encompassed eight hipparchies according to the ancient treatises on warfare.[67] Van 't Dack's hypothesis is unlikely, however, because the term *epitagma* is found only in the titulature of three *hipparchai* "leading the men" (*hipparchēs ep' andrōn*), active officers in Pathyris and Philae under Ptolemy VI and VIII. The creation at this time of a unit called an *epitagma* perhaps encompassing a few hipparchies of *misthophoroi* cavalrymen in Upper Egypt coincides with the reorganization of the army after the Great Revolt (Period B).

Cavalrymen obtained their horses from the state, most often probably by buying them with the state's help. This thesis finds support in bequests of their service horses by cleruchs or professional soldiers exclusively to their sons who served in the army; in the fact that the Ptolemies generally provided the military equipment (see below on infantry); and in the existence of royal stables and veterinarians, as in the Seleucid kingdom.[68] The equipment of the Ptolemaic cavalry can be reconstructed on the basis of terms mentioned in papyri combined with Hellenistic representations of cavalrymen (rarely from Egypt) and information gleaned from Xenophon's *On Horsemanship*. Vandorpe provides a useful survey of the equipment for riding and caring for a horse and of the cavalrymen's weapons based on the Zenon archive (third century BC) and lists of goods from the Pathyrite archive of the second-century cavalry officer Dryton.[69] Dryton followed Xenophon's advice by owning two flexible bits or bridles (*chalinoi*), which

65 P.Oxy. XLIX 3482, ll. 3–4, 29–31: Μακεδόνες τῶν ἐκ τῆς δεκάτης ἱππαρχίας κα(τοίκων) ἱπ(πέων); no ninth hipparchy is yet attested.

66 See p. 133 and note 85.

67 See I.Philae 13 and UPZ II 185; P.Dryton (index, under *epitagma*); and Van 't Dack (1988b) 52–3 and (1993) 166 with note 11. A. Bernand and E. Bernand (1969) 143 translate *epitagma* as a unit with soldiers on reserve; see also *kata to epitagma*, with no connection to a hipparchy, in BGU VI 1493 (200–1 BC, Elephantine).

68 For bequests, see Vandorpe (2002a) 34, 38; Clarysse (1991a) 35, 37–9. For royal stables (*hippotrophia*), see P.Petr. III 62 (b) (third century BC), P.Hib. I 162 = P.Yale I 49 (227 BC), and Lesquier (1911) 102–3. For the tax for supporting veterinarians (*hippiatrikon*), see P.Hib. I 45 (257 BC); Préaux (1979) 401. On the Seleucids and the Antigonids, see Hatzopoulos (2001) 42–3.

69 Vandorpe (1997) with figs. 1–10, Vandorpe (2002a); further bibliography in Parca (2010).



Figure 4.3 Ptolemy IV on the Raphia stele

could be used in combination with the leading rein (*agōgeus*) and the reins (*himantes*). The leather or bronze cavesson or nose band (*peristomis* or *peristomion*) kept the horse's mouth closed and was often used when it was in the stable, although a muzzle (*sphairōma*) might also be used. While cavalrymen might ride bareback, they also used a saddle (*ephippion*) with a sweat cloth (*hydrōrion*) underneath, all attached around the horse's belly with a girth (*zōstērion hippikon*). On campaign, third-century Ptolemaic cavalrymen wore a breastplate (*thōrax*) and a cuirass-belt (*zōnē thōrakitis*) and fought with a small curved saber (*machaira sperantikē*), as recommended by Xenophon, instead of with a double-edged sword (*xiphos*) (Xenophon, *De equitandi ratione* 12.11ff.).[70] The other offensive weapons were two wooden spears, the shorter Persian variety being preferred over the Greek type by Xenophon.

The relief on the trilingual stele of the Raphia Decree represents the emblematic figure of Ptolemy IV as a Macedonian cavalryman with a spear (see Figure 4.3).[71] Earlier non-royal representations of cavalry of the guard have also been preserved, generally in a funerary context, for example the funeral stele of a Macedonian officer from the late fourth century BC in

[70] Vandorpe (1997) 988–9 and figs. 7–8.
[71] Hölbl (2001) 163, fig. 6.1; Thompson (1988) pl. vi.



Figure 4.4 Funerary stele of a Macedonian cavalry officer, Alexandria, fourth century BC

Alexandria (necropolis of Shiabty) with chiton, cuirass, cloak and a long Macedonian spear, but no helmet (see Figure 4.4).[72] Asclepiodotus and other writers of *Tactics* refer to such cavalrymen as "spear-bearing" (*doratophoroi*) or "lance-bearing" (*xystophoroi*).[73] They normally wore helmets, while the

[72] See Rostovtzeff (1941) 128–9 (pl. XVII), 150–1 (pl. XIX.1). For figure reconstructions of a companion cavalryman on Alexander's sarcophagus, see Sekunda (1984) pl. A.2. For a Macedonian cavalryman from an Alexandrian family on the mural painting of a grave (no. 1) at Mustafa Pasha near Alexandria, early third century, see Rostovtzeff (1941) 408 (pl. XLIX.1). For a heavy cavalryman with Boeotian helmet, cuirasses and Persian saddle cloths, see Sekunda (1984) 22.

[73] Sekunda (2007) 345.

propagandist representation of Ptolemy IV shows him with the Egyptian double crown. Other essential elements of the equipment were boots and a saffron cloak, probably with purple borders, like those of Alexander's companions. That boots were closely associated with soldiers in Alexandria is clear from Theocritus' *Idyll* 15, where two women on their way to the festival of Adonis in Alexandria describe with some irritation the crowd as "all army boots and uniforms."[74]

There was great diversity of types of cavalry in the Hellenistic period, and sources to reconstruct the equipment used in the Ptolemaic army are scarce. In the first book of his *On the Erythraean Sea*, Agatharcides reports that Ptolemy II equipped 100 cavalrymen hired in the Aegean with Kushite-style quilted armor.[75] Around the same time some Hellenistic cavalrymen began to use shields, although this is not attested in Egypt.[76] In addition to heavy cavalry, the Successors of Alexander employed light cavalry, often Thracians, presumably unarmored horsemen used as scouts.[77] Because light cavalry could also carry spears, the difference between spear-bearing and lance-bearing cavalrymen was not always clear-cut.

To sum up, the cavalrymen of the numbered hipparchies were granted plots of 100 or 80 arouras, perhaps depending on their equipment or experience, and are assumed to have formed the heavy cavalry, with armor, spears and sabers. By contrast, the cavalrymen of the ethnic hipparchies were given 70 arouras.[78] Lesquier, who did not know about the Macedonian hipparchy, believed that these hipparchies, equipped with spears but no armor, formed the light cavalry, because their names refer to populations that provided light cavalry for Philip and Alexander.[79] But there is no reason to assume that all cavalry belonging to the ethnic hipparchies were light cavalry. In addition, part of the mercenary-cavalry was probably light cavalry. In practice, there were numerous cavalry types ranging from light to heavy equipment. The rationale behind the distribution of cavalrymen in either the numbered or the ethnic hipparchies and their remuneration either in land or in wages cannot be reconstructed in detail. The discrepancy between ethnic hipparchies and individual ethnic designations suggests that a combination of criteria left unmentioned in the papyri were used.

74 Delia (1996) 41. 75 Burstein (2008b) 138.

76 Sekunda (2007) 345; Vandorpe (1997) 989.

77 Sekunda (2007) 345; Launey (1949) 394–8.

78 All the cavalrymen of the ethnic hipparchies in *PP* II/VIII 2735–2746a are 70-aroura men except *PP* II/VIII 2743, for whom the information is lacking; Uebel (1968) 71 note 6 is dubious that Demetrios, a cavalryman from a numbered hipparchy, could be a 70-aroura man (*PP* II/VIII 2770 = *PP* IV 8841, 179 and 176 or 165 BC); but at least one 70-aroura man is attested in Period C, when there were no longer ethnic hipparchies (*PP* IV 8834, 113 BC).

79 Lesquier (1911) 88–9.

The only information about the different groups of cavalry in training and on the battlefield comes once again from Polybius' description of Raphia. There were 5,000 cavalry in total: Polycrates, one of the *condottieri* newly hired for the Fourth Syrian War, trained and commanded the 700 cavalry of the guard (Text 3.4, Polybius 5.65.5, ἱππεῖς περὶ τὴν αὐλήν) and 2,300 cavalry from Libya and from the country (οἱ ἀπὸ Λιβύης ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐγχώριοι). The latter were mobilized for the battle and probably consisted of Cyreneans and other Libyans, as well as cavalry cleruchs and/or *misthophoroi hippeis* from the country (οἱ ἐγχώριοι).[80] The Greek term *enchōrioi*, "natives, local people," is usually taken to refer to Egyptians.[81] But there is no evidence for Egyptian cavalry until the *machimoi hippeis* of the second half of the second century BC, whereas there were plenty of Greek cavalrymen in the Fayyum under Ptolemy II and III. Most probably Polybius meant cavalrymen enlisted "in the country," namely Greeks born in Egypt, whom he probably did not regard highly. Polycrates' cavalry stood on the far left side of the battlefield, with elephants and the Cretan troops presumably in front of them (Polybius 5.82.3–4, 7).[82] They faced 4,000 Seleucid cavalrymen also protected by elephants and Cretans. It is usually assumed that the cavalry of the guard had *klēroi* and were heavy cavalry (see section 4.2.5); the other 2,300 cavalrymen probably combined heavy and light cavalry. Finally, the last 2,000 cavalrymen were a combination of troops hired in Greece for the battle and mercenary cavalry (*misthophoroi hippeis*, Polybius 5.65.6) of the sort mentioned in the third-century tax lists of the Fayyum: professional cavalry living in Egypt. They were on the far right side of the battlefield under the command of the Thessalian Echecrates, and they played a crucial role in the victory by charging the flank and rear of the 2,000 cavalry of the left wing of the Seleucid army (Polybius 5.85.3).

4.2.2 Cavalry reforms (c. 220–c. 160 BC)

The exact time of the reform of the cavalry has been debated and was fixed by Daniel after 170 BC in connection with Antiochus' IV invasion.[83] This coincides with Sekunda's hypothesis that a reform occurred after 165 BC.

[80] Thompson (2007) 309. See also the earlier translation in Hultsch and Shuckburgh (1889). *Enchōrios* in an Attalid inscription from Tyriaion, SEG XLVII 1745 = Austin (2006) no. 236 (after 188 BC) refers perhaps to the Hellenized local ruling class that lived with the Greek settlers; see the analysis by Schuler (1999) 127–9.

[81] See Chapter 3, Text 3.4, a note for the translation by Paton.

[82] See Bar-Kochva (1976) 134–7 and fig. 8 for the disposition of the troops.

[83] Daniel (1977), esp. 78–9, suggests this *terminus post quem* of 170 BC to explain why the holders of 70 arouras could belong to a numbered hipparchy in SB XIV 12101 and P.Amh. II 55. Marrinan (1998) 218 erroneously imagines the existence of "numbered ethnic hipparchies."

Although Sekunda focuses on the infantry reform (see section 4.2.3), he also emphasizes the disappearance of the cavalry officers called *dekanikoi* from our sources after 165 BC.[84] Armoni, by contrast, suggests a gradual reform between the end of the third century BC and the 180s BC on the basis of the new dating of a document involving a 70-aroura man of the fifth hipparchy and the uncertain dating of other papyri.[85] In my opinion, the intense military activity in Egypt during Period B and the loss of external possessions discussed in Chapter 3 support the hypothesis of gradual readjustment to the new situation.

Armoni and Daniel suggest that the Ptolemies found it politically more appropriate to eliminate the ethnic hipparchies, which stressed the non-Egyptian origin of the cavalrymen, when the number of Egyptians in the army was growing. But it is unlikely that this would have alienated Egyptians. Second-century evidence indicates that Egyptian or Greco-Egyptian soldiers would have accepted the designations *Makedōn* or *Persēs*, since they had lost direct ethnic connotations (see Chapter 5). Similarly, cavalrymen in the numbered hipparchies still used ethnic designation to identify themselves. I propose instead a demographic and military explanation for the gradual reform. Over time, the designations for the ethnic hipparchies lost their ethnic meaning and perhaps also the reference to specific types of equipment. It was thus more efficient to reunify the entire cavalry in one system. As suggested above, the creation of the 80-aroura men in 221 BC was probably the first step in the reorganization, followed by the creation of new numbered hipparchies.[86] Finally, the cavalry did not disappear with the annexation of Egypt, and it seems instead that three Ptolemaic hipparchies were integrated into the *auxilia* of the Roman imperial army under Augustus.[87]

4.2.3 Infantry units and equipment

The infantry of the Hellenistic states initially followed the organizational structure of the Macedonian army of Alexander, with some variation

[84] Sekunda (2001) 18–20 sees the latest attestation in P.Tebt. III 811, ll. 13–14 (Krokodilopolis, 165 BC) and *PP* II 2273.

[85] Armoni (2001), esp. 238, identifies Protarchos son of Jason, a *hebdomēkontarouros* of the hipparchy of the Mysians (P.Petr. III 112 (e) col. II, ll. 3–5, 221/0 BC), with the Protarchos in SB XXII 15213 (dated by her to 203/2 BC), now a *hebdomēkontarouros* of the fifth hipparchy. For another *hebdomēkontarouros* in a numbered hipparchy, although the case is contested by Uebel, see above note 78.

[86] See below section 4.2.4 and Text 4.1 for the reorganization mentioned by Polybius (5.64.1–3) at the beginning of the Fourth Syrian War.

[87] Capponi (2005) 22.




Figure 4.5 Infantry units in the third century BC

appearing over time in the different kingdoms.[88] As in the cavalry, there were cleruchs and mercenaries organized according to the same regimental structures. The Macedonian tactical unit was the phalanx, whose usual depth was sixteen lines, although at Raphia the Ptolemaic phalanx may have been deployed in twenty-four lines.[89] The term "phalangite," however, is never used in documentary sources from Egypt. Instead, the generic term *pezoi* ("infantrymen"), *stratiōtēs* ("soldier") or *idiōtēs* ("private") is employed. Similarly, the term "phalanx" is not used of an organizational unit of the Ptolemaic army.[90] The *chiliarchoi* were the commanders of the largest regiments of infantry, theoretically with 1,024 soldiers divided into two units led by commanders of 500 men, the *pentakosiarchoi*, as schematized in Figure 4.5.[91] The chiliarchies were divided into four regiments called *syntagmata*, each composed of about 250 men and led by a

[88] Sekunda (2007) 336–9. On the Seleucid infantry, see Bar-Kochva (1976) 54–67. On the Antigonid infantry, see Hatzopoulos (2001) 55–83.

[89] Polybius 18.30.1; Sekunda (2007) 336; Bar-Kochva (1976) 66, 135.

[90] There is only one papyrological attestation of a secretary of the phalanx used as the equivalent of the generic term *hēgemonia*; see P.Bad. IV 47 (127 BC) with Sekunda (2001) 51 and Van 't Dack (1988b) 55.

[91] *PP* II/VIII 2290–2320; Sekunda (2001) 20; Van 't Dack (1988b) 56; Lesquier (1911) 92–7.

syntagmatarchēs.[92] At that time each *syntagma* was divided into two *taxeis* led by officers called *taxiarchai/taxiarchoi.* A system of numbering the chiliarchies was used, but only the seventh chiliarchy is attested so far in the papyrological documentation.[93]

The Ptolemies provided their soldiers' equipment, as Polybius and other authors make clear.[94] A basic distinction is drawn between heavy and light infantry, but there was probably more variety in the combination of equipment than we can reconstruct from written sources. Archaeological material belonging to Hellenistic infantrymen and the representations of them in funerary art shed light on weaponry and equipment, although art tends to provide a standardized version.[95] There were three types of infantry:[96] the heavy infantry, also called hoplites or Macedonian hoplites; the peltasts; and the light infantry, including the *thyreophoroi* with their oval shield (*thyreos*) and other specialist units such as missile troops. The first two categories represented different elements of the phalanx; the third was not included in the phalanx and was usually made up of mercenary troops, which is to say that these were professional soldiers paid in money and serving in garrisons.

The heavy infantry, fighting in the phalanx with Macedonian equipment, carried the *sarissa*, a pike sixteen cubits (more than seven meters) long, later shortened to fourteen, according to Polybius (18.29.2).[97] The phalangite probably had a curved sword (*machaira*) as a secondary weapon, in the same way as the classical hoplite had a short slashing-sword, but close combat with sword and spear occurred only occasionally.[98] Heavy infantrymen wore conical helmets called Phrygian helmets (see Figure 4.6), sometimes with cheek guards but with no protection for the nose, providing better visibility than the Corinthian-style helmet of the classical hoplite.[99] The helmets of officer or senior soldiers bore plumes, as on the Palestrina Nile mosaic

92 In the Tacticians, the commander of the *syntagma* is called συνταγματάρχης; see Van 't Dack (1988b) 57–9. But the rare papyrological attestations are abbreviations whose restitution is debated; see Clarysse (1991a) 97–8 and *PP* II, p. XXII, and the restitution by Uebel (1968) 225 note 2 with 378.

93 P.Petr. III 112 (h) ll. 1–2 (221/0 BC) and Uebel (1968) no. 1023 = *PP* II 3536; P.Tebt. I 137 (218/17 BC).

94 Polybius 5.63.11 on providing arms to soldiers before Raphia; Aristeas Judaeus 13 on Ptolemy I arming some of the Jews he brought back to Egypt; Athenaeus 5.203a on the many other panoplies left in chests during the Great Procession.

95 Rostovtzeff (1941) 474, comment on pl. LVII.2.

96 Sekunda (2007) 336–44.

97 Sekunda (2007) 329.

98 For Xenophon, the *machaira* is equivalent to the *kopis*; see Heckel and Jones (2006) 16–17; Hunt (2007) 115; Sabin (2007) 428.

99 Heckel and Jones (2006) 16–17 (with plate) and pl. C.1.



Figure 4.6 Bronze Phrygian helmet without cheek guard from the Molossian settlement at Vitsa Ioanninon, fourth century BC (inv. no. 6419)

(see Figure 4.7).[100] Another distinction between officers and soldiers was the Macedonian mantle (*chlamys*) in a variety of colors that could differentiate officers' ranks: officers with red and yellow *chlamydes* are represented on the same mosaic (see Figure 4.7 and the book jacket).[101] Over the tunic (*chiton*) the infantryman fighting in phalanx formation wore a cuirass, either the muscle cuirass called a bronze thorax (25–30 pounds), an iron cuirass (30 pounds), or a *linothorax*, made of linen or leather and thus lighter (11–14 pounds).[102] On the Alexander mosaic from Pompei, for example, the Macedonian king wears a *linothorax*.[103] Both the metal cuirass and the

[100] For a discussion of the date of the mosaic (*c.* 100 BC) and its contribution to the description of Hellenistic military equipment, see Meyboom (1995) esp. 16–19, 34–7. For helmets, see also Sekunda (1984) 38–9 with figure reconstructions from the Alexander sarcophagus, pls. D.3 and G.1.

[101] An officer wearing a greenish *chlamys* is found on an Alexandrian stele; see Meyboom (1995) 36, fig. 22 and fig. 52, references on p. 269.

[102] The type of material used for the *linothorax* is still debated; see Heckel and Jones (2006) 15, 60–1 with pl. C. See now Aldrete *et al.* (2013).

[103] For the Alexander mosaic, see plate in e.g. Heckel and Jones (2006) 36.



Figure 4.7 Palestrina Nile Mosaic, *c.* 100 BC, Praeneste in central Italy

muscle cuirass are still found in the first century BC on the Palestrina Nile mosaic (see Figure 4.7), but in that case the muscle cuirass, which is white, seems to be made of linen or leather.[104] Heavy infantry protected their legs more carefully than classical hoplites did with their greaves (*knēmides*) and wore boots (*embades*) rather than sandals (*krepides*).[105] Finally, heavy infantrymen carried a shield whose size is debated. Some modern historians believe that all Macedonian infantrymen fighting in phalanx formation used the *peltē*, a small, round bronze shield about 65 cm in diameter according to Asclepiodotus (*Tactics* 5.1).[106] Others suggest two types of shields were in use, because there is archaeological evidence from Macedonia for both the *peltē* and a larger shield measuring around 74 cm in diameter.[107] In that case, the larger shield belonged to the heavy infantry, whereas the smaller one was used by the peltasts who made up other parts of the phalanx, and perhaps also by infantrymen armed in an intermediate style.[108] Shields could bear specific devices, as can be seen on the Palestrina Nile mosaic (see Figure 4.7), and their color often gave the regiment its name.[109]

In addition to the heavy infantrymen traditionally called "hoplites," peltasts (*peltastai*, also called *peltophoroi*) formed another part of the

[104] See the soldier with the raised arm in Meyboom (1995) 36 and fig. 22 and p. 268 with references.

[105] Heckel and Jones (2006) 16; Meyboom (1995) 36, 269, and fig. 22 on sandals and boots. For *embades*, see the officer with a drinking horn in Figure 4.7.

[106] Hatzopoulos (2001) 82–4, at least in the Antigonid army.

[107] Sekunda (2007) 337–9.

[108] For this intermediate group, see Foulon (1995) 214 and below, p. 142 with note 124.

[109] Examples of devices include a scorpion, a star (typical on round shield), and a group of four S on three shields on the Palestrina Nile mosaic; see Meyboom (1995) 36 notes 163, 164, and fig. 22. Rectangular shields were rare in Hellenistic armies.

phalanx. Their equipment originated in Thrace, and in the early fourth century they wore a hat (rather than a helmet) and carried a sword, javelins and the *peltē*, at that time a wicker shield, round or crescent-shaped.[110] Peltasts were traditionally considered light infantry.[111] In the classical period they were indeed light foot soldiers, but in the Hellenistic period they belonged to the heavy infantry.[112] At that time, peltasts carried a bronze *peltē*, a helmet (*kōnos*), a cuirass in metal, linen or leather, the *sarissa* and a sword. But their shield was smaller and lighter than the one hoplites carried, their *sarissa* was shorter, and they did not always wear body armor.[113] Because of the variety of their equipment, it seems more accurate to follow Asclepiodotus' description of the peltasts as halfway between hoplites and missile troops (*Tactics* 1.2). Ptolemy had 2,000 peltasts at Raphia (Polybius 5.65.2), and in the other Hellenistic armies they also formed a few chiliarchies, up to 5,000 men.[114] Ptolemy V offered 6,000 peltast panoplies to the Achaean League in 189 BC (Polybius 22.9.3). Although modern historians debate whether the peltasts had exactly the same equipment as the Macedonian infantry fighting in phalanx formation, for Foulon the Hellenistic kings used them as elite troops constantly in service, so that they were better trained and more experienced, whereas the infantry fighting in phalanx formation were mobilized only on a temporary basis.[115]

Hellenistic armies also used special units that did not fight in the phalanx, sometimes called light infantrymen (*euzōnoi*) by ancient authors, or given more specific designations according to their equipment or origin, these elements being to some extent connected, especially in the third century (see Chapter 5). Three such groups are well represented in the Ptolemaic army and fought at Raphia (Polybius 5.65.7, 10; see Text 3.4): the Cretans, Thracians and Galatians. Cretans were hired as archers by all the Hellenistic states and often fought against their fellow-citizens in a rival army, as at Raphia (Polybius 5.79.10, 82.10).[116] Thracians were more numerous in the third-century Ptolemaic army than in other Hellenistic armies.[117] Some served as cavalrymen and received plots of land as cleruchs, and one of the ethnic hipparchies was even called that of the Thracians. Others formed

[110] Lee (2007) 116–17. [111] Lesquier (1911) 15.

[112] Foulon (1996), esp. 24 and 30–1. For hoplites in phalanx formation and peltasts fighting together at Cynoscephalae (Polybius 18.24.8–9), see Hatzopoulos (2001) 70–3.

[113] Sekunda (2007) 339 and fig. 11.6, *contra* Foulon (1996) 24.

[114] Polybius 2.65.2 (Doson); 4.37.7 and 4.67.2 (Philip V); 10.42.2 (Euboea).

[115] Foulon (1996) 24–6, 30–1, with scholarship cited in notes 48–50.

[116] Sekunda (2007) 243–344; Launey (1949) 248–86, esp. 280–6 on their equipment as depicted in funerary steles. For Raphia, see Bar-Kochva (1976) 132, 134 and fig. 8.

[117] Launey (1949) 366–98.

special units of light infantry, for example the Galatians at Raphia, who totaled 4,000 men mobilized from the *katoikoi* and the *epigonoi* (i.e. the settlers and their descendants) and 2,000 recently hired, according to Polybius (5.65.10). The characteristic features of their equipment were the *thyreos*-shield and the *romphaia*, a long lance or missile (Livy 31.39.11), as seen on the second-century tombstone of Salmas son of Moles of Adada in Sidon (see Figure 4.8), in this case, however, with a medium-length spear.[118] Galatians carried tall oval shields named after them, but also called *thyreoi*; Galatian or Celtic shields, however, were perhaps slightly larger than *thyreoi*, and *thyreoi* may have imitated them.[119] It is still debated whether the only archaeological remnant of a shield from the period found in Egypt is Galatian or Roman (see Figure 4.9).[120] In addition, these troops were normally armed with the Galatian sword that had multi-lobate pommels of the type represented on the tombstone of Dioscourides of Balboura from Sidon (see Figure 4.10).[121]

While it has been assumed that light infantrymen such as the Cretans, Thracians and Galatians were mercenaries, and that heavy infantry serving in the phalanx were cleruchs, the system was more complex than this.[122] Polybius states clearly that the 4,000 Thracians and Galatians were cleruchs, although he uses the word *katoikoi* instead of the technical term *klērouchoi* found in papyri of the third century BC. The 2,000 additional Thracian and Galatian soldiers were certainly not yet cleruchs at the time of the battle but may well have received a *klēros* later. In addition, while Lesquier took the peltasts to be either mercenaries or cleruchs, the consensus now is that they were cleruchs, since they composed regiments of the phalanx.[123] Finally, the soldiers called mercenaries (*misthophoroi*) by Polybius fought at Raphia in a phalanx formation with the cleruchs; Polybius explains that three commanders were jointly in charge of training (*syngymnazō*) the 25,000 hoplites fighting in phalanx formation and 8,000 mercenaries (Polybius 5.65.3). During the battle, the 20,000 Egyptians fighting

118 Launey (1949) 397–8. According to Sekunda (2001) 68–71, 77, 137–49, Salmas belonged to the Ptolemaic rather than the Seleucid army, and his medium-length spear is typical of the period after the reform of the infantry.

119 Sekunda (2007) 341; Barbantani (2001) 188–223, esp. 194–6 on their shield. But Launey (1949) 533–4 and note 2 thinks that the *thyreoi* were already widely used before the Galatian invasion. For another example of a *thyreos*, see the stele of Dionysios the Bithynian in Sekunda (2001) 65–7 fig. 7, called “Celtic shield” in Rostovtzeff (1941) 288, plate XXXVII.1.

120 See below, note 149.

121 Sekunda (2001) 77–9, figs. 15 and 16.

122 For example Lesquier (1911) 17–18, who also suggested that 4,000 of the Thracians and Galatians were probably mercenary-cleruchs. There is no basis for this interpretation.

123 Lesquier (1911) 14–15; Sekunda (2007) 339; Bar-Kochva (1976) 132 note 11.



Figure 4.8 Tombstone of Salmas from Sidon, second century BC

in phalanx formation were positioned between these two groups. Consequently, mercenaries either were equipped and fought in some cases as heavy infantry (fighting in phalanx formation) or more often had an intermediate function and equipment somewhere between heavy and light




Figure 4.9 Thureos shield found in Egypt in Kasr el Harit, Fayyum, probably late second century BC



Figure 4.10 Tombstone of Dioscourides from Sidon, second century BC

infantry and are accordingly called "semi-heavy infantry" by modern historians such as Foulon and Bar-Kochva.[124] The fact that young Macedonian, Boeotian and Athenian soldiers (*neaniskoi*) were trained to use both javelins and heavy-infantry equipment may support the polyvalent functions of some soldiers, especially professionals.[125] While Bar-Kochva considers the 8,000 Ptolemaic mercenaries at Raphia heavy infantry, and the Thracians and Galatians semi-heavy troops, Foulon regards the mercenaries too as semi-heavy infantry. If the category "semi-heavy" is artificial, it nonetheless makes clear that the dichotomy between heavy and light infantry was not clear-cut, as Asclepiodotus already recognized in regard to peltasts (see above). Foulon demonstrates the multiple functions of mercenaries serving as intermediate troops in many Hellenistic battles (including Raphia), sometimes fighting with the heavy infantry as lighter troops, sometimes with the light infantry as heavier troops. The variety of functions of some troops may have been a partial trigger for the reforms in the army, especially during Period B, from Raphia to the 160s BC.[126]

4.2.4 Infantry reforms: from Raphia (217 BC) to the 160s BC

Reforms were not limited to the cavalry but also involved the infantry. Polybius' description of military preparations for the Fourth Syrian War in 219–218 BC indicates that the two ministers of Ptolemy IV, Agathocles and Sosibius, reorganized the army. In addition to this evidence of an initial reform at the beginning of Period B, the differences in terminology for officers and sub-units of infantry regiments between Period A and Period C points to another series of changes. The following section examines first the evidence for the Fourth Syrian War and the battle of Raphia, and then the changes within the infantry regiments. It argues that there was a series of reforms rather than one single reform in the 160s BC.

When Polybius describes both the old troops and those newly recruited for the Fourth Syrian War, he says that Ptolemy's regents reorganized the soldiers "in a way fitting the needs at hand" (Polybius 5.64.2), by "classes"

124 Foulon (1995) 214–17, for whom they are different from the peltasts; Bar-Kochva (1976) 128–41 on Raphia, e.g. 132 with note 11.

125 Sekunda (2007) 341.

126 Foulon (1995) 214 describes the equipment of mercenaries as consisting of a conical helmet, high laced-up boots without greaves, a small round or oval shield similar to the *peltē*, a spear 3–4 meters long and a long sword, whereas hoplites fighting in phalanx formation had greaves and the *sarissa* (*c.* 6 meters long). See also Foulon (1996) 18–120.

Text 4.1. *Polybius 5.64.1–3 on the organization of mercenaries*

Polybius 5.64.1–3	Translation by Fischer-Bovet and Clarysse
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κατὰ γένη καὶ καθ᾽ ἡλικίαν διελόντες ἀνέδοσαν ἑκάστοις τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους καθοπλισμούς, ὀλιγωρήσαντες τῶν πρότερον αὐτοῖς ὑπαρχόντων. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέταξαν οἰκείως πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν χρείαν, λύσαντες τὰ συστήματα καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῶν πρότερον ὀψωνιασμῶν καταγραφάς: ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις ἐγύμναζον, συνήθεις ἑκάστους ποιοῦντες οὐ μόνον τοῖς παραγγέλμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς οἰκείαις τῶν καθοπλισμῶν κινήσεσιν.	First of all they [Sosibius' and Agathocles] divided them according to classes and ages, and provided each with suitable weaponry, taking no account of what they had before. Next they organized them in a way fitting the needs at hand, breaking up the regiments and abolishing the previous paymasters' lists: having effected this, they drilled them, habituating them not only to the words of command, but also to the proper manipulation of their weapons.

or "categories" (*genē*) and by age (see Text 4.1).[127] This suggests that before Raphia the most plausible criterion for grouping soldiers in regiments and paying them was their origin or ethnic group. The organization of the hipparchies examined above on the basis of papyrological evidence shows that ethnicity was used as an organizational criterion from at least the 230s, although not in a rigid way, and this remains true in the decades after Raphia. In the infantry, weaponry and the origins of soldiers also seem to have been at least somewhat connected. In his description of the various types of troops (Polybius 5.65, see Text 3.4), Polybius in some cases continues to refer to the soldiers' origins but also shows that soldiers of different origins trained together. It remains unclear how the reorganization by classes and age was implemented, but the papyrological documentation does offer one hint of changes. Most of the highest commanders in the army, the so-called eponymous officers, seem to have ended their careers in the years before Raphia, while new *condottieri* were hired to train the army.[128]

Our understanding of another series of changes in the organization of the army during Period B is based primarily on changes in the terminology used for officers and units and on archaeological evidence for alterations in equipment. All the evidence is difficult to interpret. Sekunda situates a one-time infantry reform in both the Ptolemaic and the Seleucid armies in the 160s, although the best evidence has to do with to the Ptolemies.[129] In his early studies Sekunda argues that these changes should be understood

[127] For the meaning of *genē* and the reform of the army before the Battle of Raphia, see Fischer-Bovet and Clarysse (2012); the term is usually translated "nationalities" or "ethnicity."

[128] Fischer-Bovet and Clarysse (2012), and section 4.3.2, below.

[129] Sekunda (1994), (2001).

Table 4.2. *Sub-units of the chiliarchy*

Chiliarchy and its subdivisions	III cent. BC (Period A)	II/I cent. BC (Periods B and C)
Chiliarchy	1,024 men led by a *chiliarchos*	1,000 men led by a *chiliarchos*, or chiliarchy is no longer in use (?)
	2 units of 512 men led by a *pentakosiarchos*	–
4 *syntagmata*	*syntagma* of 256 men led by a *syntagmatarchēs* or a *hēgemōn*	*syntagma* or *sēmeion* (or *sēmeia*) of 250 men led by a *hēgemōn*; lower officers are the herald of the army (*kēryx or stratokēryx*) and the standard bearer (*sēmeiophoros*); Demotic *stn*
8 *taxeis*	*taxis* of 128 men led by a *taxiarchēs/taxiarchos*	–
8 *hekatontarchiai* and 4 rear units of 50 men	–	*hekatontarchia* of 100 men led by a *hekatontarchēs*, and 50-man rear unit led by an *ouragos*
16 units of 50 men, that is 2 per *hekatontarchia*	–	50-man unit led by a *pentekontarchēs*

as a Romanization of the military organization and equipment, but he now maintains that "the extent and significance of these changes is difficult to assess."[130] The survey of the evidence that follows aims to show that the modifications in question were mostly Ptolemaic innovations, although there may have been some borrowing of Roman elements. All of this probably reflects a gradual adaptation to the new character of internal military intervention in the Egyptian field during Period B, which involved smaller battlefields and fewer siege battles.

As noted above, in the third century BC the *syntagma* was divided into two *taxeis* of 128 men led by officers called *taxiarchai/taxiarchoi*. In the second and first centuries, however, these terms disappear from the documentary sources and are replaced by *hekatontarchiai* of 100 men led by *hekatontarchai* (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.11).[131] Literary evidence combined with an analysis of two first-century inscriptions from Hermopolis

[130] Sekunda (2007) 354.

[131] Van 't Dack (1988b) 58–9 and note 42 suggests that the change occurred in the late third or early second century. If *hekatontarchia* is accepted for the abbreviation in P.Tebt. III 815, fr. 2, ll. 65–6, the first attestation is from 223/2 BC, see below note 172, but the title *hekatontarchēs* appears only in the second century BC.




Figure 4.11 Infantry units in the second and first centuries BC

Magna allowed Zucker to reconstruct the organizational structure of the *syntagma* in Periods B and C.[132] The internal divisions of the *syntagma* have been interpreted somewhat differently by Winnicki, Van 't Dack, Sekunda and most recently Vandorpe.[133] Drawing on their work, I present my own understanding here. The *syntagma* led by a *hēgemōn* was also called a *sēmeion* or *sēmeia* in Period C, and probably also a *tagma*.[134] Each *sēmeion* was divided into two units of 100 men called *hekatontarchiai* and led by an *hekatontarchēs*, and one rear unit of 50 men led by an *ouragos*.[135] Each *hekatontarchia* was in turn divided into two units of 50 infantrymen, each led by a *pentekontarchēs*. The *hekatontarchiai* had numbers that ran up to at least eight, suggesting that the size of a regiment of infantry remained similar to

[132] Zucker (1938) 29–33 on I.Herm.Magn. 5 and 6 (= SB I 4206 and SB V 8066).

[133] Winnicki (1978) 12–17; Van 't Dack (1988b) 47–64; Marrinan (1998) 183–93; Sekunda (2001) 21–35; Vandorpe (forthcoming). The same authors discuss an earlier inscription from Hermopolis Magna, I.Herm.Magn. 4 (SB I 599), dated to the late second century BC by E. Bernand (1999), but to *c.* 144 BC by Sekunda (2001); see previously Lesquier (1911) 95–6.

[134] For *tagma* as the equivalent of *syntagma/sēmeion* or one of its sub-units, see Vandorpe (forthcoming). For Van 't Dack (1988b) 59, *tagma* also refers to the *syntagma* found in the papyri or to the *taxis* of the third century; see also Kramer (1991) 74.

[135] For the new attestation of an Egyptian *ouragos* from Pathyris, see Martin and Nachtergael (1998) 110–11.

that of a chiliarchy.[136] On the basis of the first attestations of the *sēmeia* and the *hekatontarchai* and *pentekontarchai*, Sekunda proposes a *terminus post quem* of 163/2 BC for the reform of the infantry.

Sekunda also stresses the absence of the chiliarchy and the *pentakosiarchoi* from the Hermopolis Magna inscription.[137] In the papyrological sources, the chiliarchy is attested only three times, twice in the third century and once after 140 BC although abbreviated.[138] Similarly *chiliarchos* is attested only in the third century and then three times in the first century BC. These first-century soldiers were all members of the royal guard as saber-bearers (*machairophoroi*) or spear-bearers (*lonchophoroi*) who claimed to belong to the *chiliarchoi*. It is thus difficult to tell whether there were still commanders called *chiliarchoi* in the infantry during Periods B and C, but it is possible that by now the *syntagma/sēmeia* had become the largest infantry unit, replacing the chiliarchy. Sekunda notes other changes in terminology that he dates to the 160s BC, including the change from *idiōtēs* to *stratiōtēs*, which he links to the Latin *gregarius* or *gregalis* for "private soldier."[139] But he also acknowledges that the two Greek terms may have been interchangeable. As for the subaltern officers, Sekunda connects the Ptolemaic *kēryx* to the Latin *tessarius*, the *ouragos* or "file-closer" to the *optio*, and the *sēmeiophoros* ("standard-bearer") to the *signifer* in the Roman *manipulus*, because of their similar functions and because of the date of their earliest attestations in Ptolemaic documents.[140] But he also points to the likelihood that standards were used in Macedonian units before the 160s because one standard is represented on a bronze strip from Pergamon.[141] A final terminological argument involves the *exō taxeōn*, "non-combatants" or "camp-followers," a term Sekunda suggests was perhaps created in the 160s as the equivalent of the Latin *principales* ("those outside the ranks").[142]

136 For eight *hekatontarchiai, s*ee Vandorpe (forthcoming), following Van 't Dack (1988b) 59 and P.Tebt. III 742, ll. 18–22, Μẹλ . . . ẹά̣γρ̣ο̣ụ (. . .) τῶν Πολυκράτου τῆς η (ἑκατονταρχίας?) τοῦ Μακεδονικοῦ = Uebel (1968) 257, no. 1076 = *PP* II 3491/VIII 3495. Sekunda (2001) 30, by contrast, argues for a maximum of six *sēmeia* by infantry regiment on the basis of the alternative reading of UPZ I 18, l. 5 as ἕκτης σημείας instead of ἐκ τῆς σημείας (BL 8, 500), and on 35–6 suggests 128–256 soldiers in a *sēmeion*. As one would expect the article <τῆς> before ἕκτης σημείας (BL 9, 362), I do not consider this text a safe attestation of the existence of a regiment of six *sēmeia*. On 51 Sekunda proposes that the *sēmeia* is equivalent to the Roman maniple because Polybius uses *sēmeia* for translating it and that six *sēmeia*/maniples formed a *syntaxis*.

137 Sekunda (2001) 27–8.

138 For the third century, see note 532 and the abbreviated form in SB XXII 15559 (after 140 BC).

139 Sekunda (2001) 30–3, esp. 30.

140 Sekunda (2001) 36–8.

141 Sekunda (2007) 337, fig. 11.4.

142 *PP* II/VIII 2105–2111b and 4276–77; only *PP* II/VIII 2105 is earlier than the second century BC.

At least one attestation of the word, however, is plausibly dated to the third century, and Sekunda's equivalence between the *exō taxeōn* and the Latin *principales* remains conjectural, since the precise functions and the types of *exō taxeōn* remain a matter of debate.[143]

Sekunda also connects the new system of *hekatontarchai* and *pentekontarchai* forming a *sēmeia* to the Roman maniple (*manipulus*). But if the *hekatontarchai* resembled centurions, there was nothing like the *pentekontarchai* in the Roman army, suggesting that the changes were not due to direct borrowing from the Roman system as an indissoluble entity. Sekunda even suggests that the Ptolemies themselves created the position of commanders of fifty men, thus refining the Roman system, and that they may have influenced the organization of the Jewish army of Judas Maccabeus.[144] Indeed, borrowing was not usually limited to one-way exchange. The Romans improved the equipment of their cavalrymen, for example, by borrowing the Greek cuirass, solid lance and shield (Polybius 6.25.3–11). The Greek terms Polybius uses to translate *manipulus* in his description of the Roman army are *speira* and *sēmeion*, literally "standard" (Polybius 6.24.8). *Sēmeion* is common in the second-century papyri, while *speiron* appears only after the arrival of the first Roman troops in Egypt.[145] The Egyptian term *stn*, on the other hand, was employed throughout these years for a unit of about 250 men.[146]

Sekunda also uses iconographic and archaeological evidence – steles from Alexandria and from Itanos in Crete, a tombstone from Sidon that might be Ptolemaic or Seleucid, fresco fragments from Alexandria and a shield from the Fayyum – to support the thesis of the Romanization of the army (see Figures 4.8–4.10).[147] Yet these sources do not shed light on the exact moment of a one-time reform, since they cannot be dated precisely. Only a few features demonstrate Roman influence on items of equipment, such as the mail cuirass and boots on one of the seventeen painted slabs from Sidon, that of Salmas son of Moles .[148] It remains uncertain whether the shield from

143 Sekunda (2001) 42 associates the *principales* with the *ektaktoi* of the Tacticians and thus with *hoi exō taxeōn*; see also p. 41 note 74, *contra* Van 't Dack (1969), esp. 157–60, who thinks that some of the *exō taxeōn* were select veterans still in active duty. Sekunda (2001) 44–6 redates the only attestation of a *hēgemōn exō taxeōn* in the third century (*PP* II/VIII 2105) to after the so-called reform of 160 BC, but for Scheuble (2005) 32–5 the sources still support their existence in the third century; see also Cowey *et al.* (2003) 127–9. For the *exō taxeōn* in the Antigonid army, see Hatzopoulos (2001) 76–8.

144 See Sekunda (2001) 33 and 1 Maccabees 3.55.

145 See Chapter 3, section 3.2.3, esp. note 245.

146 Van 't Dack (1969).

147 Sekunda (2001) 65–83. On 57–61 Sekunda makes several conjectures about authors of the reform, most likely in his opinion Callicles son of Callicles of Alexandria.

148 Sekunda (2001) 70–1.

the Fayyum, the only one found in Egypt, is Roman rather than a Galatian shield of a type already in use in Hellenistic armies.[149] The absence of two essential weapons used by Roman soldiers, the Spanish sword and the *pila*, from the representation of Ptolemaic soldiers is a problem.[150] The current state of the evidence, therefore, does not allow us to speak with any certainty of a Romanization of the Ptolemaic army in the second century BC.

In conclusion, there were at least two reforms during Period B, one before Raphia and another during the 160s; some modifications probably occurred gradually in between, as was also true for the cavalry. Change was driven by adjustment to specific situations through the selection of elements that seemed efficient, as in 219 BC when the army was reorganized "in a way fitting the needs at hand" (Polybius 5.65.2, see Text 4.1). The development of smaller infantry regiments (see Table 4.2), moreover, suggests that adjustments or innovations were initiated by military activities that shifted from the Mediterranean scene and naval battles there to Coele-Syria and Egypt in Period B. The extent to which warfare on a smaller scale, including guerilla warfare during revolts, had a dynamic effect on army organization and military equipment still requires investigation.

4.2.5 Elite troops: cavalry of the guard, royal guard and **agēma**

The elite troops of the Ptolemaic army can be roughly divided into three groups, as in Figure 4.12: (1) the cavalry of the guard (*PP* II/VIII 4415–18), (2) the royal guard composed of different types of foot soldiers (*PP* II/VIII 4284–4384), and (3) the *agēma*, sometimes translated "royal guard" (*PP* II/VIII 4394–4414). The organization and equipment of these groups can be only partially reconstructed on the basis of Polybius' brief allusions, combined with what is known of other Hellenistic armies and from military titles attested in papyri and inscriptions. Whereas elite troops have traditionally been thought of as Macedonian, the discussion that follows brings out their ethnic diversity.

(1) The cavalry of the guard consisted of at least 700 cavalrymen, the number given by Polybius as present at the Battle of Raphia (Polybius 5.65.5). At Raphia, their commander was Polycrates of Samos (*PP* II/VIII 2172 = VI 15065), who trained them together with cavalry from Libya and cavalry enlisted in the country, making a total of 3,000 troops (Polybius 5.82.4), as noted earlier. There is no clear evidence that these men were

149 Kimming (1940) pl. 23. For Beston (2002) 388, the shield appears more Galatian than Roman, *contra* Sekunda (2001) 80–3. For a Roman origin, see now Baray (2014).

150 Van Wees (1997).




Figure 4.12 Elite troops

cleruchs, but it is usually assumed that they had *klēroi*, not only because they belonged to the heavy cavalry but because the soldiers of the *agēma* were probably granted land (see below).[151] The official name of these cavalry units is unclear. Polybius calls them the cavalrymen "at the court"

[151] For Lesquier (1911) 25, they were regular troops, i.e. cleruchs. Lewis (1986) 24 also believes that the members of the royal guard received *klēroi*; and see Sekunda (2012).

(*peri tēn aulēn*), sometimes translated “cavalry of the guard” (Polybius 5.65.5), but he also uses this expression for the Antigonid elite cavalry (4.67.6); in his account of the Alexandrian riot of 203 BC he refers broadly to “the household (*therapeia*) and the guard at the court (*peri tēn aulēn phylakeia*)” (Polybius 15.25a.17) without specifying “cavalry.”[152] Beyond this, the only evidence for the official name the Ptolemies used for the cavalry of the guard is epigraphical: the “cavalrymen in Alexandria” in two fragments from 154 BC concerning a squadron commander, Callicles son of Callicles, and perhaps the longer version of the title, “the cavalrymen of the household in Alexandria,” in an inscription honouring the *stratēgos* Ptolemaios son of Achilleus from the first century BC.[153]

Sekunda reconstructed the dress and heavy cavalry equipment of the guard on the basis of representations on the Alexander sarcophagus, two steles and a wall painting.[154] They wore a saffron-yellow cloak (*chlamys*) with a purple border, a white tunic (*chiton*), brown boots, a composite cuirass and probably a Boeotian helmet, and later a muscle cuirass perhaps made of bronze and a so-called Thracian helmet.[155] Their offensive and defensive weapons were a long spear, a sword slung on a baldric and a round shield.

(2) The royal guard on foot was constituted of different elite troops. Polybius’ description of the riot of 203 BC offers hints about its components. The highest-ranking individuals were *sōmatophylakes* or “bodyguards,” who were also in charge of the upper-level military administration, perhaps like the seven or eight chiefs of the army of Alexander the Great.[156] Other soldiers of the royal guard include those referred to in the papyri as “at the court” (*peri tēn aulēn*), like the cavalry “at the court” in Polybius (5.65.5), and members of the *therapeia* (the household), or they bear a title that indicates their proximity to the king (*meta tou basileōs*).[157] Their number is unknown, but the 3,000 soldiers of the *agēma* perhaps provide a comparison (see below). Soldiers of the household and of the guard at the court were

152 Sekunda (2012).

153 For Callicles, ἰλάρ[χης τῶν ἐν Ἀλεχανδρείαι τεταγμένων] ἱππέων, see SB VIII 10113 = *PP* II/VIII 4304 = VI 14652 = Mooren (1975) no. 0279. For Ptolemaios, οἱ ἐν Ἀλεχανδρείαι ἱππεῖς τῆς θεραπείας, see SB V 7787 = I.Fayoum I 13 (42 BC, Krokodilopolis) = *PP* I 319 = *PP* II/VIII 2940 = 4374 = III 5349b = Mooren (1975) no. 086.

154 Sekunda (2012) with bibliography. See also references above, note 72.

155 For a Thracian helmet, see Figure 4.7, second soldier from the right.

156 Polybius 15.27.6, 15.32.6; *PP* II/VIII 4284–4334; Mooren (1975) nos. 0279–0280; Sekunda (2012); Foulon (1996) 20–1.

157 *PP* II/VIII 4367–8, 4371–84 with mention of the first *sēmeion* of the *therapeia* and p. 229 note 1; Lesquier (1911) 21–4; Launey (1949), index under “garde (royale)”; Fraser (1972) vol. I, 88–9, 333.

professional military men according to Polybius, who calls them mercenaries (*xenoi*) (Polybius 15.25a.17). The *machairophoroi* and the *lonchophoroi*, who formed several units of the guard, were also professional soldiers.[158] But one saber-bearer was involved in the transfer of a *klēros* in the first century BC, so some may also have been granted land, especially in the late Ptolemaic period.[159]

It is usually assumed that the men called "Macedonians" by Polybius during the riot of 203 BC belonged to the guard, which was thus mostly ethnically Macedonian.[160] But the term "Macedonian" is often ambiguous, especially in ancient authors; Greeks of diverse origins, Egyptians and men bearing Semitic names also belonged to the guard. Two groups are particularly ethnically diverse: the *machairophoroi* (saber-bearers) and "the picked troops among the *machimoi* at the court." In addition to the *machairophoroi* in Alexandria, where a group protected the royal couple (*peri tous basileis*, BGU IV 1190, ll. 3–4), some were stationed in Memphis, while others must have spent part of their time in the *chōra*, since they were members of socio-religious associations in the Fayyum and the Heracleopolite called *synodoi*, including the First Friends and the *chiliarchoi*.[161] The *machairophoroi* found in the lists of members of these associations have been considered Greek because they had Greek names, and those represented on a second-century BC mural from the Fayyum have been taken to be non-Egyptians (see Figure 4.13).[162] But it is the details of their clothing or hairstyle in the painting that give this impression, and onomastics in the second century BC do not allow for safe claims about the ethnic background of these men. One inscription from Memphis and another from Hermopolis make it clear that some *machairophoroi* bore Semitic names.[163] Demands for *asylia* by a *chiliarchos* of the *machairophoroi* and a *chiliarchos* of the *lonchophoroi*, a Corinthian and a man from Antioch, respectively, show that officers probably often

[158] Mooren (1975) nos. 0281–0288; Aubert (1987) 129 notes 11 and 12, and 130 note 14; Meyer (1900) 95–7. They were registered on the active army list (P.Ryl. IV 585, unknown provenance, early second century BC) and were paid in kind and money (P.Fay. 302, Philoteris, second century BC and P.Fay. 101, Euhemeria, *c.* 18 BC).

[159] *PP* II/VIII 4355 et BGU VIII 1770 (64/3 BC, Heracleopolite) and Fischer-Bovet (in press a).

[160] Walbank (1957–79) 448; Sekunda (2012).

[161] Arsinoite nome: P.Amh. II 62 (Soknopaiou Nesos, second century BC); see also SB I 624 and SB IV 7270 and papyri from the Fayyum (SB III 6236 = I.Fayoum II 114, Theadelphia, 70 BC) Heracleopolite nome: BGU IV 1190 (first century BC) and BGU VIII 1770 (64/3 BC); see Chapter 7, section 7.3.2 about *synodoi.*

[162] On the mural of the funerary shrine of Kom Madi, southeast of Narmouthis, see Bresciani (2003); Bagnall and Rathbone (2004) 146 with fig. 5.4.3.

[163] The Idumeans of Memphis, see OGIS II 737 = SB V 8929 = I.Prose 25 (112 BC); I.Herm.Magn. 5, ll. 239–56 (80/79 BC) = SB I 4206, ll. 2–3.




Figure 4.13 *Machairophoroi* from Kom Madi, second century BC

had Greek ancestors. But these demands involve Egyptian temples and suggest that these Greeks were connected with Egyptian families in the first century BC.[164] Already in the third century, in fact, some bodyguards of Ptolemy II came from Egyptian military families and were thus probably hired as *machairophoroi*.[165] Finally, "the picked troops among the *machimoi* at the court" led by two *laarchai* and *hēgemones* under Ptolemy V were elite troops, confirming that soldiers from Egyptian families belonged to the royal guard.[166] It may be these same units, at that point called "the picked troops among the *machimoi* in garrison in Alexandria," with other *machimoi* stationed in the capital, who complained to the *dioikētēs* in a petition in 164 BC.[167]

(3) The *agēma* formed a third group of elite troops; it consisted of 3,000 infantrymen at Raphia, according to Polybius (5.65.2), and was thus divided into three chiliarchies.[168] Ancient authors call these troops, found in all the Hellenistic armies, "the *agēma* of the *hypaspists*," literally "the column of those below the *aspis*-shield," a round shield that at that time resembled the *peltē*. When Polybius discusses the Ptolemaic *agēma*, he refers to it simply as "the *agēma*," as in the papyri, or as "the hypaspists." At Raphia these men fought next to the peltasts (Polybius 5.82.4), and Hatzopoulos suggests

164 Fischer-Bovet (in press a).

165 See the Mendes stela in Chapter 5, section 5.1, note 7.

166 *PP* II/VIII 4367–8 (= *PP* II/VIII 2048 and 2050) attests two *laarchai and hēgemones* τῶν περὶ τὴν Αὔλην ἐπιλέκτων μαχίμων. Lesquier (1911) 22–3 supposes that guards of Egyptian origin first appeared under Ptolemy IV in connection with the battle of Raphia, because he does not know that Egyptian guards existed under Ptolemy II.

167 UPZ I 110, ll. 20ff, see Text 7.1; Fischer-Bovet (2013).

168 A chiliarch of the *agēma* is now attested; see Clarysse (2012); P.Pintaudi 34, ll. 17–18 (after 235 BC, Arsinoite?).

that in the Antigonid army the *agēma* regrouped the elite regiments of the peltasts.[169] In Hellenistic armies the foot soldiers of the *agēma* were organized according to the same hierarchical system as the infantry and wore the same equipment as the heavy infantry, but they were highly trained troops permanently on active duty.[170]

Less often, ancient authors use the term "*agēma* of cavalry" to refer to picked horsemen, and it was long believed that only the Seleucids had an *agēma* of cavalry.[171] It has recently been established, however, that there were also cavalrymen of the *agēma* in the Ptolemaic army and that they were allotted *klēroi* already in the third century BC.[172] The standard view is that soldiers of the *agēma* received *klēroi*, but this can be observed in the papyrological documentation only for infantry officers and cavalrymen. The first case is that of a *syntagmatarchēs* of the *agēma* who is identified as a cleruch in a will dated to 236/5 BC; the second is a certain Philon, who identifies himself as *pentakosiarchos* of the *agēma* and cleruch in a petition to the king.[173] Then in the second century Nikon, an Argive *dekanikos* (cavalry officer) of the *agēma* of the men of Demetrius, had a judicial case handled by the judges of the *katoikia*.[174]

4.2.6 Elephants

Hellenistic armies also included elephants, although they never played a significant role in achieving a victory when both armies used them.[175] Ptolemy I already had elephants in his army, some of them perhaps seized

[169] Hatzopoulos (2001) 66–7, 72–3, with Livy 42.51.5.

[170] Foulon (1996) 21; Marrinan (1998) 178; and already Lesquier (1911) 25.

[171] Arrian, *Anabasis* 4.24.1 and Appian, *Syrian Wars* 32; Plutarch, *Eumenes* 7; Foulon (1996) 21.

[172] Falivene (2007) 213–14. This confirms the restitution of a reference to a *hipparchia* in Τροχινίδης Βοιώτιος τοῦ ἀγήματος καὶ τῆς δ [ἱππαρχίας] (P.Tebt. III 815, fr. 2, ll. 65–6, *c.* 223/2 BC) proposed by the first editors, as well as by Uebel (1968) 135 note 3, and 125 note 1. Trochinides (*PP* II/VIII 4413 = 2828add = *PP* IV 8744) probably had a *klēros*, since he belonged to the *agēma* and to the fourth *hipparchia*. His case also makes it likely that Meleagros (*PP* II/VII 3491/3495 = 4412) of the men of Polycrates was a *hekatontarouros* in P.Tebt. III 742, l. 18 (Tebtunis, 157 BC), whereas Van 't Dack (1988b) 59 suggested that the abbreviation ρ stood for *hekatontarchia*.

[173] P.Petr.[2] I 18, l. 18 (236/5 BC, Theogonis); P.Enteux. 45, l. 1 (222 BC, Magdola). In addition, Sekunda (2001) 31 and Marrinan (1998) 198 base their analysis on the first edition of P.Tebt. III 742, ll. 18–22, i.e. SB I 4318, l. 2, τῶν Πολυκράτου τῆς η (ἑκατονταρχίας) ἀγή(ματος) Μακεδονικῶν to show that the system of the *hekatontarchiai* applied to the *agēma*. But the reading in the original online is unclear.

[174] P.Thrace 1, ll. 4–6, where the translation "Nikon, Argive, of the men of Demetrius of the Decurion *agēma*" is somewhat confusing.

[175] Sabin (2007) 419–21, 429.

from Perdiccas in 321 BC (Diodorus 18.33–4), and forty-three of them taken from Demetrius at Gaza in 312 BC (19.82–4).[176] Pachyderms were present in half of the major battles of the period, positioned in a line and surrounded by special units of forty or fifty light infantrymen as flank guards, although sometimes the kings lacked enough troops for this, as at Raphia on the Ptolemaic right wing and the Seleucid left (Polybius 5.82.7–13).[177] In this battle, as in others, the larger Indian elephants frightened the African forest elephants used by the Ptolemies (5.84.3–7), although a few who were equipped with towers fought bravely (5.84.2). Charles has convincingly argued that the latter were not African elephants exceptionally armed with towers, but that the Ptolemies had a small number of Indian elephants.[178] It is in fact conceivable that some of the Indian elephants Ptolemy III captured during his raid through the Seleucid empire survived two decades.[179] In addition, some were bred in captivity, and the mahouts probably taught their skills to their sons.[180]

According to Appian (*Praef.* 10) and Porphyrius (*FGrH* 260 F 42), Ptolemy II had 300 or 400 elephants, while the author of 3 Maccabees (5.2) even claims that Ptolemy IV had 500. But these numbers are exaggerated. The twenty-four elephant-drawn quadrigas at the Great Procession organized by Ptolemy II or the seventy-three elephants present at Raphia (Polybius 5.79.2, 82.7) provide a more plausible estimate.[181] Even so, capturing between seventy and a hundred war elephants, transporting them on special ships (*elephantēgoi*) and feeding them was costly for the state.[182] Ptolemy II was the first to organize hunting expeditions for African elephants, because he lacked access to Indian elephants; these expeditions were conducted by leading members of the army, some of them eponymous officers (see below), while Greek-speaking Egyptians were among the soldiers.[183] Ptolemy II's elephants came from southern Sudan, where he founded Ptolemais of the Hunts in 270/69 BC, and later from the Red Sea area, where he founded other settlements (Philotera, Arsinoe and Berenice Troglodytica).[184] Ptolemy III had to go further south along the Somalian coast, and the last hunts were organized toward the end of Ptolemy IV's rule. The end of the practice has been connected with the disruption caused by

176 Burstein (2008b) 140.
177 Bar-Kochva (1976) 82–3.
178 Charles (2007).
179 Adulis' inscription = OGIS I 54 = Austin (2006) no. 268.
180 Casson (1993b) 253.
181 Callixeinus, *FGrH* 627 F 2.32; Rice (1983) 92–3.
182 Préaux (1979) 34–7. On *elephantēgoi*, see Casson (1993b) 253.
183 W.Chr. 452 = P.Petr. II 40 (a) (224 BC), with Casson (1993b) 252, 257.
184 Pithom stele with Mueller (2006) 151–3; Casson (1993b) 254–5; Burstein (2008b) 142–3; Burstein (1996) 800–1; Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 201 and notes 262–3, where "IIe s." is a mistake for "IIIe s."; Winnicki (1978) 48–50.

the Great Revolt and with overhunting for ivory.[185] Indeed, the capture of war elephants and the acquisition of tusks, whose trade partly covered the considerable expense of the hunts, were indissociable. The disappearance of large-scale warfare and battlefields like those of the third century also helps to explain the abandonment of organized hunts after Ptolemy IV during Period B, a time of adaptation of the military organization to a new context.

4.3 Military hierarchy

The military hierarchy of the Ptolemaic army remains a matter of debate, because the same title often has multiple meanings. Put another way, a single title could be used at more than one level of the military hierarchy. I propose below a reconstruction of the high command of the army, which includes primarily *hēgemones*, *stratēgoi* and eponymous officers, with references to previous surveys or views (see Figure 4.1).

4.3.1 **Hēgemones** *(officers) and* **hipparchai** *(cavalry officers)*

The most generic term, *hēgemōn*, "officer" or "commander," was used at a number of different levels:[186] the lowest was probably that of "commander of a *syntagma*" as it appears after the reorganization of the infantry regiments discussed above. *Hēgemōn* is also the equivalent of the cavalry officer called a *hipparchos*. Indeed, when soldiers were attached to a hipparchy but not yet to an officer, they belonged to "those not yet under the command of a *hipparchos*" or "those not yet under the command of a *hēgemōn*."[187] Under Ptolemy V, two brothers are *laarchai* and *hēgemones* leading the picked troops of *machimoi* at the court (see Chapter 5), while the Aetolian Sosandros is *laarchēs* and *hipparchos* at an unknown date.[188] It is sometimes specified that the *hēgemōn* is *ep' andrōn*, an active officer "leading men" in

[185] Burstein (2008b) 146 and (1996) 801–5; Hemmerdinger (1970), for a new edition of P.Petr. III 114 = SB XII 10771 (Arsinoite, 223/2 BC).

[186] For example, a high-ranking *hēgemōn* (*prokathēgemōn*) is attested for the first time in the papyri in P.Haun.inv. 407, l. 75, thanks to a new reading by Vandorpe and Thompson.

[187] For τῶν οὔπω ὑπὸ ἱππάρχην or τῶν οὔπω ὑφ' ἡγεμόνα, see Kramer (1991) 63, 77–8; Clarysse (1991a) 47–8; also *PP* II introduction, p. XXV and BGU VI 1258a, l. 10 "*hēgemōn* and *hipparchēs*."

[188] See Chapter 5, esp. note 27. For Sosandros (*PP* II/VIII 2046 = 2237 = E97), see SB I 626; E. Bernand (1971).

contrast with *hēgemones exō taxeōn*, "staff-sergeants."[189] Finally, a *hēgemōn* could also be a "commander of the garrison," like the *hēgemones* in the external possessions, and thus equivalent to a *phrourarchos*.[190]

The title of cavalry officer (*hipparchos* or *hipparchēs ep' andrōn*) could also be used at several levels of the military hierarchy: for example, the *hipparchai* who also received civil competences in one nome of the Thebaid or in one district of the Arsinoite as *epistatai* ("those on the staff of the *stratēgia*") were *hipparchai* of a higher rank and thus held higher aulic titles than the *hipparchēs* Dryton in Pathyris.[191]

4.3.2 Stratēgoi *(generals)*

Traditionally, the highest command in a Greek army belonged to one or more *stratēgoi*, "generals," or to the king. The common view is that in Hellenistic armies, the *stratēgos* commanded four chiliarchies, or 4,000 infantrymen according to Macedonian practice.[192] It is more difficult to define the position of the military *stratēgoi* in the Ptolemaic army, as they too appear at more than one level and no source specifies how many men they have under their command. In addition, papyrological documentation is more abundant regarding another type of *stratēgos*, who directed the administrative and judicial affairs of a nome, and whom papyrologists refer to as a "territorial *stratēgos*" ("governor of the nome" or "nome-*stratēgos*").[193] This second type appears in the documentation from 229/8 BC onward, and the name of the nome often follows *stratēgos*.[194] Finally, there were *stratēgoi* in the external possessions; they acted as governors together with the *oikonomoi* and were in charge of the troops, in which capacity they were supported by garrison commanders appointed by the king.[195] These *stratēgoi* belonged to the upper elite close to the king and were military men with administrative and military competence over a region outside Egypt, for example the members of the family of Aetos, who were governors of

189 Lesquier (1911) 84–7; Van 't Dack (1983a) 84, and Van 't Dack (1969) 159; A. Bernand and E. Bernand (1969) 142. For the *exō taxeōn*, see note 143.

190 Lesquier (1911) 83 note 4. On *phrourarchoi* in the external possessions and in Upper Egypt, see now Scheuble (2010b).

191 Mooren (1977) 122; cf. most of the men in Mooren (1975) nos. 0140–0157. Dryton's demotic title for *hipparchos* is *ṯs ḥtr*; see Winnicki (1978) 74.

192 Foulon (1996) 20 and note 15; Hatzopoulos (2001) 77.

193 See previously the list by Henne (1935), updated in *PP* I/VIII 207–355 as civilian administrators with comments in *PP* II, pp. XI–XII.

194 P.Col.Zen. II 120 = P.Col. IV 120 = C.Ord.Ptol. 28 with Bengtson (1952) 32–5.

195 Bagnall (1976), esp. 243–6. On Lycia, see Wörrle (1977), (1978), (1979).

Cilicia in the third century.[196] Some also occupied the elevated position of eponymous priests in Alexandria at some point in the career, whereas *stratēgoi* of a single nome rarely did so.[197]

The type of *stratēgos* in question and his level within the hierarchy can be determined in one of two ways: either the term *stratēgos* is followed by a military title such as *hēgemōn* or the name of an eponymous officer (e.g. *PP* I/VIII 278 and *PP* I/VIII 287), or the aulic titles associated with the function and the context in which the *stratēgos* is found are significant.[198] Thanks to Mooren's studies, it is now accepted that aulic titles are correlated with the function and not the person.[199] The *stratēgoi* of Cyprus, for example, always held the highest aulic title "relative" (*syngenēs*) of the king, which makes it clear that *stratēgoi* in the external possessions had a more important position than they did in the country.[200] At the other end of the spectrum, *stratēgoi* of a single nome in Egypt occupied a much lower position in the social hierarchy, while *stratēgoi* of several nomes or of the Arsinoite had higher aulic titles.[201] I do not discuss the administrative and judicial functions of such *stratēgoi* here.[202] Territorial *stratēgoi* of a single nome might have had military competence in some area in the second and first centuries BC, but the evidence is scarce (see on Agathis below).[203] But many came from military families, such as Aetos, *stratēgos* of the Arsinoite in 203/2 BC, or had been military officers, such as the *stratēgos* of the Arsinoite Ptolemaios who was honored by his "fellow-soldiers" of the cavalry of the guard in Alexandria (*sustratiōtai*) as late as 43/2 BC.[204] The promotion of cavalry officers to nome-*stratēgos* status seems to have been common.[205]

[196] On Aetos' family, see Sosin (1997); Rowlandson (2007a) 37–8.

[197] Rowlandson (2007a) 34–5; Clarysse and van der Veken (1983); Mooren (1977) 91. For governors of external possessions as eponymous priests, see, for example, Aetos (*PP* III/IX 4988) in the third century, Philon son of Castor, *stratēgos* in Cyrenaica, *PP* III/IX 5305 = Mooren (1975) no. 0359, and Helenos son of Apollonios, *stratēgos* of Cyprus, *PP* III/IX 5112 = Mooren (1975) no. 0356, both in the second century.

[198] For the first possibility, see Peremans and Van 't Dack (1950–81) vol. II, pp. XI–XII.

[199] Mooren (1975); (1977), esp. 61–73.

[200] Mooren (1977) 70.

[201] Mooren (1977) 65–6.

[202] For the traditional view of the evolution of the *stratēgos*' functions from military to administrative and his involvement in the administration of *klēroi*, see Bengtson (1952) esp. 24–8, 32–5; Bagnall (1969), esp. 77–8; Bagnall and Derow (2004) 286.

[203] Bengtson (1952) 71–3.

[204] On Ptolemaios, see I.Fayoum I 13 (46 BC, Krokodilopolis), *PP* I 319 = *PP* II/VIII 2940 = 4374 = III 5349b, see Chapter 8 and Table A.1 in the Appendix, no. 59. For Ptolemaios, as well as the earlier case of Dorion (*PP* I 248), see Fischer-Bovet (in press a). For similar examples of dedications to a *stratēgos* or an *epistratēgos* by members of the royal guard in the second century, see Mooren (1975) nos. 066 and 044 and Mooren (1977) 93.

[205] Van 't Dack (1983a) 84, in regard to Callimachus *hipparchos* and then *stratēgos* (Mooren [1975] no. 0143 = *PP* I/VIII 381 = *PP* II/VIII 2216). See also Chapter 9, section 9.3.

Only military *stratēgoi* are directly relevant to understanding the military hierarchy. Among the best known is Comanus, who defeated the rebel king in 186 BC. Comanus had a military function as a military *stratēgos* or as the first *epistratēgos* of the *chōra*, an official with both administrative and military competences.[206] In fact, *epistratēgoi* of the *chōra*, *stratēgoi* of several nomes in Lower and Middle Egypt, and *stratēgoi* of the Thebaid all had both administrative and military functions, as is confirmed by their higher aulic titles.[207] We nonetheless do not know how many men were under their command. Only when a man is, for example, *stratēgos* and *hipparchēs*, like Agathis in the Arsinoite nome in 199 BC, can we infer that he was in charge of at least 500 cavalry and likely to have been higher in rank than other cavalry and/or infantry officers.[208]

4.3.3 The eponymous officers

At the top of the military hierarchy were the so-called eponymous officers, referred to thus by papyrologists because soldiers and cleruchs designated their military unit with the expression "of the men of X."[209] Because there were several eponymous officers at one time in the same area and they had both cavalry and infantry under their command, Oates and Bagnall have challenged this interpretation.[210] They suggest that eponymous officers were not commanders of tactical units, but administrative officials subordinate to the *stratēgoi* and charged with the surveillance and mobilization of cleruchs. But several points still support the thesis that eponymous officers were the chief military commanders. First, some were eponymous priests or fathers of eponymous priestesses and thus belonged to the highest aristocracy in Alexandria.[211] Second, cleruchs of the same village could be attached to different eponymous officers, which would be problematic if the latter were in charge of the cleruchic system. And finally, eponymous officers had military functions such as *hipparchoi* or organized elephant hunts.[212] They

206 Mooren (1977) 74–82.

207 Mooren (1977) 86–8, 90–6 for three specific cases (Mooren [1975] nos. 063, 065 and 066) and 130.

208 On Agathis (*PP* I/VIII 207 = II/VIII 2184), see Sosin and Oates (1997). See also Callimachus, note 204 above.

209 Peremans and Van 't Dack (1950–81) introduction to *PP* II, p. XXIX and *PP* II/VIII 1825–2035; see also Van 't Dack (1985).

210 Oates *et al.* (1967) introduction to P.Yale I 27 (276 BC, Hibeh); Bagnall (1969) 79–81. For a survey of the opposing view, see Kramer (1991) 74–8; still apparent in Pfeiffer (2010) 250 note 39.

211 This is also accepted by Bagnall (1969) 80–1; Kramer (1991) 75.

212 Fischer-Bovet and Clarysse (2012).

exercised command over *hipparchoi* and *chiliarchoi*, as well as over lower-ranking cavalry and infantry officers. They themselves at times held these positions, which again supports the thesis that such military titles could be used at several levels; some of these eponymous commanders seem to have been *hēgemones*, *laarchai* or commanders of garrisons, and in the second century BC at least three were also *stratēgoi* of the Thebaid.[213]

At the beginning of this chapter, mention was made of the different "formulas" used to organize an army and how they might change over time. A survey of the evidence points to reforms at the beginning and end of Period B and hints at adjustment throughout that period. Unlike in traditional surveys of the organization of the Ptolemaic army, no section has been devoted here to the so-called native troops, because in my view Egyptian soldiers were incorporated into the different force types as both professional soldiers and cleruchs. The actual composition of the troops is examined in the following chapter.

[213] Peremans and Van 't Dack (1950–81) introduction to *PP* II, pp. XXIII–XXV. For the *stratēgoi*, see Boethos (*PP* II/VIII 1869 = Mooren [1975] no. 053), Lochos (*PP* II/VIII 1940 = Mooren [1975] no. 055) and Hippalos (*PP* II/VIII 1919 = Mooren [1975] no. 043). See also Bagnall, *BASP* 6 (1969) 80–1 for the first two; both Lochos and Hippalos head a *hēgemonia*.

5 Military recruitment and ethnic composition

This chapter complements the preceding treatment of the organizational structure of the Ptolemaic army by examining the composition of the troops. When Alexander conquered Egypt, the Egyptian army had been composed of groups of various foreign origins – notably Libyans and Nubians – for centuries, and since the seventh century BC it had included men from Asia Minor and the Aegean who settled in Egypt. Alexander left a small number of his soldiers in Egypt, while the first Ptolemies offered thousands of men an opportunity to migrate to Egypt to serve in their standing armies, both as mercenaries and as cleruchs. The scale of immigration was larger than ever before, and the army included a considerable number of non-Egyptians, although their percentage of the total population has been overstated. The presence of large numbers of Greeks seems to have furthered the common modern view that Egyptians played almost no role in the Ptolemaic army until the Battle of Raphia.

In the first section of the chapter I evaluate the presence of Egyptian troops throughout this period. Some fought already in the fourth and third centuries BC, while others served in the fleet or were employed as guards, although their military role has been disputed. The number of Egyptians in the army is unknown, but they probably represented a small percentage of the forces. Even so, it is essential to note that the Ptolemies did not attempt to exclude Egyptians from their army. After the period of reorganization of the army (Period B), Egyptian and Greco-Egyptian soldiers gradually came to play a central role in the army.

The second section of this chapter is devoted to Macedonians, Greeks and soldiers of other origins. The first Ptolemies had to secure as many of Alexander's soldiers as possible. Many were Macedonians or Greeks garrisoned in the Mediterranean, where the army was above all else a tool of Ptolemaic foreign policy, but many others went to Egypt.[1] The reasons for their decision to join the Ptolemaic army and settle in Egypt are examined, as are their numbers and origins. After this, the complicated and evolving

[1] Polybius 5.34 stresses that the focus of attention of the first three Ptolemies was the Mediterranean rather than Egypt; see Winnicki (1985) 48 and already Lesquier (1911) 47.

relationship between the actual meaning of terms such as "Macedonian" and "Persian" used by soldiers, and the administration and the ethnic origins they suggest, is considered. In some cases, these "ethnic designations" or "ethnics," as papyrologists refer to them, may have continued to allude to the origin of the soldiers' ancestors, but in other cases they did not.[2] Recent scholarship on these ethnic designations (or "pseudo-ethnics") has made it clear that over time they came to designate above all else the status of their bearers. This chapter suggests that some ethnic designations individually ascribed served an organizational purpose within the army, but that most continued to point to the origin of one of the soldiers' ancestors, even if in some cases the ascriptions were inaccurate.

These developments point to a new situation from the 150s BC onward, after a period of change in the army's composition in the 220s–160s BC, concomitant with the reform of the army organization described in Chapter 4. Local recruiting characterized the change, and an increasing number of Greco-Egyptian and Egyptian soldiers joined the army as both professional soldiers and cleruchs, notably as *machimoi*, although the latter were not exclusively Egyptian.

5.1 Egyptians in the Ptolemaic army and police

Literary sources make clear that Egyptians were recruited into the army during the first century of Ptolemaic rule. First, as noted in Chapters 2 and 3, Egyptian soldiers fought in Ptolemy's army at the Battle of Gaza in 312 BC (Diodorus 19.80–5; Plutarch, *Demetrius* 5; Justin, *Epitome* 15.1). They were also in the fleet sent by Ptolemy II to Greece during the Chremonidean War in 266 BC (see Pausanias 3.6.5) and formed a phalanx of 20,000 men at the Battle of Raphia in 217 BC (see Polybius 5.65; Diodorus 19.80–4).[3] It is remarkable that Egyptians are mentioned in each of the only three passages that describe Ptolemaic troops, even though Greek authors are generally uninterested in the role they played. Modern scholars nonetheless routinely downplay the role of Egyptians on the basis of the small number

[2] These terms might be confusing, because they refer to an official identity that may differ both from an individual's origin and his ethnicity, in which case papyrologists talk about "pseudo-ethnics." I use them, however, because they are part of the standard papyrological terminology.

[3] Van 't Dack and Hauben (1978) 87–9 emphasize the fundamental function the Ptolemies gave Egyptians in their fleet.

of references to them and to their actual participation in fighting.[4] It is also often held that Egyptians were included in the army for the first time at Raphia.[5]

Egyptian and Greek inscriptions and papyri also support the notion that Egyptian soldiers were used by the Ptolemies in the third century.[6] According to the hieroglyphic Mendes stele, Ptolemy II chose some of his bodyguards from among the sons of the Egyptian elite.[7] Egyptians were also involved in elephant hunts (see Chapter 4). From 261 BC the *machimoi* provide the best evidence for the recruitment of Egyptian soldiers in the third century BC.[8] But the conventional translation of the term as "Egyptian warrior" can be misleading. Not all Egyptian soldiers were *machimoi*, for they also belonged to other categories of soldiers, such as the infantry on board warships. Even Greek authors never use the technical term *machimoi* to designate Egyptian soldiers of the Ptolemaic period. Nor were all *machimoi* Egyptian:[9] two soldiers with Greek names and Greek patronymics are found in a report on cultivation listing *machimoi pentarouroi* ("with 5 arouras") from the third century,[10] and a *hēgemōn* leading *machimoi* in the Heracleopolite has the Semitic name Bithelminis.[11] Even if in the third century we have only a letter to Zenon which states explicitly that the *machimos* Paris was Egyptian, onomastic evidence generally suggests an Egyptian

4 For example, Winnicki (1985) 49 and (1989a) 230 concludes from the same sources that the Egyptians belonged to a second category of soldiers, either as auxiliaries or mobilized in unfavorable circumstances until Raphia; Van 't Dack (1977) 82 thinks that the Ptolemies could not enroll the local population to fight against external invaders; and Rostovtzeff (1941) 708 asserts that the native militia were only auxiliary troops.

5 This general view is based on Polybius 5.65.9 (Text 3.4), 5.107.1–2 (Text 3.5). For my interpretation of these passages, see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1.1.

6 Fischer-Bovet (2013), with a table of all attestations of *machimoi*; *PP* II/VIII 4725–4802 and Preisigke and Kiessling (1925) vol. III, 215.

7 I.Cairo 22181, ll. 14–15; see Sethe (1904) nos. 13, 28–54; Winnicki (1985) 49 note 41 and (1989a) 228 note 48: *m mś.w mnf. tj. w n Bꜣk.t* (*Bꜣk.t* = Egypt) *tpjw.sn m msw (m) tꜣ mrj*; the latest translation by Klotz (2009) 302 "from among children of the elite of Egypt, their leaders being 'sons of Egypt' " makes it clear that the bodyguards were Egyptian; see previously Meulenaere and MacKay (1976) 175; Roeder (1998), esp. 182; Marrinan (1998) 305. In contrast, Derchain (1986), followed by Thiers (2007) 191 note 574, translates the passage "from among the children of the army of Egypt, the first children of the king to be born in Egypt." Derchain thinks that the bodyguards are sons of Ptolemy I's soldiers who have become "genuine Egyptians." Since we have no evidence for such an early assimilation and the audience of this inscription is the Egyptian priesthood, I accept the traditional translation, confirmed by Klotz.

8 P.Hib. I 41. 9 Goudriaan (1988) 121–5.

10 P.Petr. III 100 (b2), ll. 9–29. Lesquier (1911) 298 includes them in the *machimoi*, while Uebel (1968) only records the *machimoi pentarouroi* with Egyptian names, nos. 811–18, perhaps influenced by the traditional view that Greeks cannot be *machimoi*.

11 P.Hib. I 44 = P.Yale I 33 (253 BC).

origin for such men.[12] Sokeus son of Nechauis and Inaros, for example, were *machimoi* in the Arsinoite around 250 BC, while Tothoes was a *pentarouros* in the Heracleopolite.[13] The distinction between Greek, Egyptian and other *machimoi* made in two first-century documents suggests that the term *machimos* continued to be connected to the type of land allotment, and perhaps equipment, and did not automatically have an ethnic connotation.[14] The *machimoi*'s functions within the army were also ambiguous in the third century, since they were often guards sent with officials and paid one or two obols a day, rather than soldiers.[15] Yet the functions of guards and soldiers could be quite similar. In some cases, at least, *machimoi* were soldiers, for example those sent up under the officer (*hēgemōn*) Bithelminis in 253 BC, or the picked troops of *machimoi* at the court under the command of Thearos and his brother, the sons of Horos, who were *laarchai* and *hēgemones* at the turn of the century.[16] Similarly, grants of land suggest that *machimoi* were soldiers, as in the case of the *pentarouros* Tothoes in 229/8 BC – the first precisely dated example of a land grant – and other 7- or 10-aroura *machimoi*.[17] In addition, the name of the village Ibion *tōn Pentarourōn* in the Arsinoite nome, whose first and only attestation dates to 231 BC, suggests that a significant number of *machimoi* were granted land there under Ptolemy III.[18] There is thus no compelling evidence to support Oates' view that before Raphia the *machimoi* were "Egyptians conscripted for labor of a rather menial sort" and were not hired for tasks involving coercive power.[19] According to Oates, the *machimoi* belonged to the civilian side of society, because they were connected to the *basilikos grammateus*. But

12 On Paris, see P.Cair.Zen. 59590 + P.Mich. I 82.

13 Sokeus: P.Ryl. IV 563 = SB V 7646. Inaros: P.Cair.Zen. IV 59627. Tothoes: SB III 6285, although Goudriaan (1988) 124 is not certain that he was Egyptian.

14 P.Tebt. I 120 and 139, two accounts mentioning payments to Ἕλληνες μαχίμοι, Αἰγύπτιοι μαχίμοι καὶ ἄλλοι μαχίμοι, as well as Fischer-Bovet (2013). For Crawford (1971) 83, "the distinction is between *katoikos* and *machimos* rather than between Greek and Egyptian."

15 For guard duties, see for example P.Hib. I 41 and PSI IV 353; Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 173 notes 285–6; P.Count 18, l. 18 (third century BC) and 15, l.9 (third or second century BC). Launey (1949) 776–7 stresses that the native soldiers were less paid; Kiessling (1928).

16 OGIS II 731 = SB V 8925 (205–193 BC): dedication by the *laarchai* and *hēgemones* of the elite troops of *machimoi* at the court (τῶν περὶ αὐ(λ)ὴν ἐπιλέκτων μαχίμων); new edition in E. Bernand (1971).

17 SB III 6285; P.Petr. III 100 (b2), ll. 9–29 and SB I 4369 (b), third century BC.

18 CPR XVIII 3 and 5 (231 BC) with Kramer (1991) 103–6.

19 Quotation from Oates (1994) 592, on the basis of P.Cair.Zen. IV 59590 + P.Mich. I 82 and already Oates *et al.* (1967), in his introduction to P.Yale I 33, relying in particular on PSI IV 353 (Philadelphia, 254 BC) and P.Tebt. III 703 (Tebtunis, 210 BC). Oates argues that the Egyptian Paris tries to avoid being enrolled in the *machimoi* because this implies forced labor with low prestige. His reasoning was conditioned by his understanding of the passages in Polybius

in fact the *machimoi* and officials such as the *basilikos grammateus* appear in the same context, because the latter hired the former as guards. To sum up, in third-century papyri *machimoi* are armed men hired as guards or soldiers, although their specific equipment is unknown.

It is worth mentioning that Egyptians were also integrated into the Ptolemaic police.[20] This is confirmed by a tax list from the Fayyum dated to the mid third century that records *inter alia* a large group of individuals with the occupational label *gl-šr* (policeman), all of whom have Egyptian names.[21] The equivalence between the functions of the *gl-šr* and the *phylakitēs* (the Greek word for policeman) is attested in a bilingual surety bond dated to the second half of the third century BC, in which a *gl-šr* is called *phylakitēs* on the back of the document.[22] Names of senior police officers in the third century, however, indicate that they were often Greek.[23] For Winnicki, policemen *(gl-šr.w* and *kalasiries)* and *machimoi* mentioned in the papyri from the Ptolemaic period all had the same status.[24] We know that a *phylakitēs* might earn slightly higher wages than agricultural workers and belonged to a privileged fiscal category, although his exemption from the salt tax was simply deducted from his salary and was not a true exemption, as it was for a small number of other categories of the population.[25]

Egyptians still served as guards and soldiers in the second and first centuries BC,[26] but their organization into military units seems to have become more structured. At least from the time of Ptolemy V onward, there were picked troops of *machimoi* at the court under two *laarchai* and *hēgemones*, the sons of Horos mentioned above.[27] A *laarchia* grouped infantry *machimoi* and cavalry *machimoi* together, as can be seen from the *machimoi* who

(5.65.9, see Text 3.4, and 5.107.1–2, see Text 3.5), according to which Ptolemy IV armed Egyptians for the first time at Raphia.

20 Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 165–77. For recent studies of the police, see Hennig (2002), (2003); Bauschatz (2007) and Bauschatz (2013).

21 P.Count 4 (= P.LilleDem. III 101, 254–231 BC, Arsinoite, Krokodilopolis [?]); Goudriaan (1988) 124.

22 P.LilleDem.inv. 3619 (227/6 BC); see Winnicki (1986) 22 and (1992b) 65.

23 Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 172.

24 Winnicki (1986) 20–1, (1992b) compares P.Lille 112 (in Demotic) concerning groups of 58 and 25 *gl-šr.w* to the *machimoi* of P.Yale I 33. For the papyri of the Ptolemaic period, see Winnicki (1986) 19–26 and (1977) 263–8.

25 See the introduction to P.Count 4 and P.Count 12, commentary on ll. 146–52. Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 54, 99, and esp. 171–2, describe the *phylakitai* as "among the better-off of Egyptian society," owning land and livestock. For the wages, see Chapter 3, p. 73 and note 93 and Chapter 7 note 66.

26 For guard duties, see P.Tebt. I 121, ll. 34, 43, 83 μάχιμοι οἰκονόμου; P.Tebt. I 116, l. 57 μάχιμοι βα(σιλικοῦ) γρ(αμματέως); P.Tebt. I 112, l. 81 μάχιμος τοπογραμματέως.

27 Only seven *laarchai* are attested; see *PP* II/VIII 2044–50 and E. Bernand (1971).

belonged to the *laarchia* of Chomenis and who were accordingly assigned different types of *klēroi* in the late second century in Kerkeosiris. By that point the *machimoi* were still primarily but not exclusively of Egyptian origin, as can be seen from their names and patronymics.[28] Egyptians joining the army tended to choose Greek names (see Chapter 7), but Egyptian names point to soldiers of Egyptian origin.

As in the third century, the Ptolemies continued to dispatch Egyptian troops to the Mediterranean. Ptolemy VI sent soldiers, all with Egyptian names, to Gortyn to aid in a war against Cnossos.[29] The fragmentary state of the inscription prevents us from knowing whether these men were *machimoi*, but it at least attests the presence of soldiers of Egyptian or mixed origin in the Mediterranean and leaves open the possibility that some *machimoi* serving abroad were Egyptian. Indeed, at the moment the question of the ethnicity of *machimoi* stationed in the Mediterranean in the second century BC remains open. On the basis of two dedications dated to Ptolemy VI, one by an Alexandrian, *grammateus* of the *stratiōtai* and *machimoi* in Crete, Thera and Arsinoe in the Peloponnesus (OGIS I 102), another by two members of a religious association in Thera devoted to Thracian Dionysus and involving *machimoi* (SB V 8209), scholars either believe that the *machimoi* were of Greek origin, forming a single group with the *stratiōtai*, or assume that they must be Egyptians.[30] Since Egyptian soldiers were sent outside Egypt, it is likely that at least some *machimoi* were Egyptian.

In the second century, after the period of crisis caused by the Great Revolt, the Ptolemies hired mostly local recruits and began to organize the army more systematically. The Egyptian and Greco-Egyptian troops stationed in garrisons in the Thebaid received a wage. They were thus called *misthophoroi* in Greek and "men receiving pay" in Demotic, and they were not *machimoi* allotted land.[31] Within the army the *machimoi* were distinguished from these "men receiving pay," on the one hand, and from the *katoikoi*, a more privileged group of cleruchs, on the other.

The increasing number of Egyptians in the army suggests that the status and wages they obtained, along with the grant of *klēroi*, appealed to them. Whereas scholars generally insist on the low economic status of Egyptian soldiers, a reassessment of the sources makes clear their enviable social

[28] See the list of names in Crawford (1971) Table IV.

[29] I.Cret. IV 195; Fraser (1972) vol. II, 169 note 346; Bagnall (1973) 124–7.

[30] OGIS I 102 probably dates to Ptolemy VI's reign. *Contra* the usual interpretation, G. T. Griffith (1935) supposes that the *machimoi* were Egyptians, as does Launey (1949) 957–8 in regard to those of SB V 8290. For UPZ I 110, see Chapter 7, section 7.1.4.

[31] For the equivalence of μισθοφόρος and *rmt iw=f šp hbs*, see Vleeming (1985).

position vis-à-vis unskilled laborers and farmers.[32] Cases of desertion and rebellion by *machimoi* have been taken as evidence of their unfavorable social position, but dissatisfaction occurred during periods of trouble such as the revolts following Raphia and the disturbances after Antiochus' invasion.[33] If the Rosetta stone indicates that impressment into the fleet occurred in this period of crisis, it was otherwise to be avoided (l. 17), and in any case it did not involve only "the native population" (*laos*) but "all the others" as well (l. 12). Instead, kings felt it necessary to please the different groups of *machimoi* (picked troops, 7-aroura and 10-aroura men) by confirming their holdings and protecting them from accusations in the amnesty decree of 118 BC.[34] The *machimoi* belonged to the lower categories of cleruchs, but not to the lower socio-economic categories of the population as a whole.

In sum, the combination of literary sources and papyrological evidence shows that Egyptian soldiers were used continuously, although there is no evidence for the continuity of a "category" of *machimoi* from the pre-Ptolemaic period.[35] The development of the *laarchiai* suggests a turning point in the organization of the Ptolemaic army in the second century BC, when soldiers of Egyptian or mixed origin became predominant. The establishment of garrisons of local recruits in the Thebaid was part of the same wave of reorganization. And *machimoi* were still mobilized in 63 BC, at a time when nothing is known about the actual military functions of the other group of cleruchs, the *katoikoi*.[36]

5.2 Macedonian, Greek and other soldiers

5.2.1 Recruitment

In the century following Alexander's conquest of Egypt, soldiers from outside Egypt composed the bulk of the Ptolemaic army. The reasons why people emigrated to Egypt can only be partly reconstructed, whereas the motivations for hiring soldiers are obvious from the narrative of

32 See Chapter 7, section 7.1.4; Fischer-Bovet (2013).

33 P.Tebt. III 703 (*c.* 210 BC) and OGIS I 90 (Rosetta decree) (196 BC), ll. 19–20; UPZ I 110 (164 BC) = Text 7.1, discussed in Chapter 7.

34 P.Tebt. I 5, ll. 44–8.

35 A better-documented parallel for the integration of existing troops in a new system is the integration of Ptolemaic soldiers into the Roman imperial army in the late first century BC, see Capponi (2005) 17–23 and Chapter 3, section 3.2.4 and note 247.

36 BGU VIII 1749–50 (64/3 BC, Herakleopolite); Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 194.

military events laid out in Chapter 3. Several strategies were used to hire soldiers, although recruitment never developed into a well-organized process.

We can safely assume that people hoped for economic opportunity and grants of land when they joined the army and/or when they settled in Egypt and its foreign possessions. Sometimes they were escaping economic or political crises at home.[37] Herodotus presents Egypt as a prosperous country, and, as the conclusion to Chapter 2 suggested, mercenaries employed by the Egyptian kings in the fourth century probably presented Egypt to their families as a wealthy country, now becoming accessible thanks to Alexander's conquest. But emigration was costly psychologically as well as financially, and no evidence has been discovered of subsidies intended to help civilians provided either by cities, within or without the Ptolemaic possessions, or by the Ptolemies themselves.[38] Only soldiers serving the Ptolemies faced no costs for traveling and settling. They knew they could obtain land, as immigrants working in the highest levels of the administration also did. In terms of bargaining power, soldiers were in a strong position vis-à-vis the rulers, since the latter were in a harsh competition for resources and territory in the decades following Alexander's conquest. Each ruler needed both to hire well-trained soldiers and to prevent his rivals from hiring them. In some cases the Ptolemies garrisoned prisoners-of-war as soldiers or settled them in Egypt.[39] In other cases the soldiers of rival kings joined the Ptolemaic army, but the reverse also occurred, for example when some officers and soldiers abandoned the Ptolemaic side before Raphia, as noted in Chapter 3.[40] Consequently, rulers were ready to offer the best deals they could in order to obtain loyal soldiers and immigrants. Advantages included large plots of land and/or wages, premiums, and to some extent a privileged status expressed fiscally. Because they spoke Greek, and some could even write in the language now being used in the administration, immigrants also had valuable skills during the early decades, although these skills quickly expanded to other portions of the populations. The first Ptolemies were quite successful at attracting soldiers, notably by making settlements in Egypt more appealing to foreigners through administrative and fiscal incentives, providing the immigrants with a somewhat privileged

[37] For example, Cyreneans fled to Egypt for political reasons under Ptolemy I; see Mueller (2006) 178.

[38] Mueller (2006) 175.

[39] For example, Ptolemy I after the Battle of Gaza; see Chapter 3, section 3.1.1, p. 53 and note 16.

[40] See also G. T. Griffith (1935) 261–2.

status compared with the Egyptian masses.[41] If fiscal and economic advantages were originally based on ethnic origin (*contra* Goudriaan), this had changed already by the end of the reign of Ptolemy III.[42]

We are ill-informed about the details of the agreements made between soldiers and their employers, but the Ptolemies at least provided their troops' equipment.[43] It is assumed that there was a sort of contract in which wage, length of service during the year, further premiums and a grant of land were agreed upon.[44] The clearest example is found outside Egypt in the mid third century and includes reciprocal oaths taken by the Attalid king Eumenes and his mercenaries: the officers and soldiers swore they would fight for Eumenes and his interests.[45] Yet these oaths occurred after a mutiny, so one can only assume that such oaths were common in the Hellenistic armies. In Egypt an oath of allegiance to the king was taken by the troops on the accession to the throne (Polybius 15.25a.11), and new cleruchs took oaths when they received their *klēroi*.[46] Only sparse evidence sheds light on other individual agreements. Four soldiers serving on a ship in 160 BC, for example, took a royal oath delivered to the *stratēgos* Kudias, swearing that they would bring back part of what they seized as hunters or fishermen.[47]

For the rulers, opportunities for recruitment were not limited to prisoners-of-war and soldiers changing sides.[48] Soldiers were recruited into Hellenistic armies, first of all by means of treaties of alliance (*symmachia*).[49] There is no clear evidence of this for the Ptolemaic army, except perhaps the connection between the Ptolemies and the ex-high priest of Jerusalem. Onias fled to Egypt in the late 160s BC after the revolt of the Maccabees accompanied by Jewish troops, but the case is similar to that of the *condottieri*.[50] Indeed, as a second means of recruiting soldiers, kings hired *condottieri* who

41 "To make their rule work and to make new settlement work, the Ptolemies encouraged administrative discrimination based upon Greek language and education. Immigrants profited"; see Mueller (2006) 174–80, esp. 177. See also Véïsse (2007a) 20 on the privileges attached to the status of *Hellēnes* and access to this category. But the privileges must be understood more as symbolic than as conferring a significant economic advantage.

42 See the tax lists published in P.Count. For the tax-*Hellēnes*, see esp. Thompson (2001) 307, 310–11, although this was apparently still a very small group.

43 See Chapter 4 note 94.

44 G. T. Griffith (1935) 261.

45 OGIS I 266 = Austin (2006) no. 230 (263–241 BC); Launey (1949) 1014.

46 For cleruchs, see P.Cair.Zen. II 59254 = SB III 6992 (Arsinoite, 252 BC), PSI V 513 (Philadelphia, 251 BC); Legras (1999) 196–9.

47 P.Hamb. I 57 = SB III 6261 (Heracleopolis); Kramer (2001) 329; Launey (1949) 948 note 2; Préaux (1936) 197–200.

48 On recruitment, see G. T. Griffith (1935) 254–63; Launey (1949) 30–6; and the re-evaluation of previous studies by Couvenhes (2008).

49 Sekunda (2007) 344; G. T. Griffith (1935) 257–9.

50 For a survey of these events, see Barclay (1996) 35–9. On Onias, see O'Neil (2006) 18.

brought their troops with them, like some of the officers hired to lead the army at Raphia.[51] Rulers also sent recruiting officers (*xenologoi*) throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. Polybius reports two such incidents involving the Ptolemaic state: before the Battle of Raphia the ministers Sosibius and Agathocles sent *xenologoi* outside Egypt (Polybius 5.63.8–9), and at the beginning of Ptolemy V's rule Agathocles alone sent the Aetolian Scopas, who had recently joined the Ptolemaic army, to Greece (Polybius 13.1a.2, 15.25a.16–18). Agathocles clearly expected to obtain the loyalty of these new soldiers by paying them himself.[52] Although sending recruiting officers was not a systematic method of hiring soldiers, it implies that these men had connections with the right people in the regions to which they were sent. The Aetolian Scopas went to Aetolia, among other places, to recruit soldiers. He hired a total of 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, and the Aetolian government responded by limiting the number of men allowed to join the Ptolemaic army.[53] Previous scholars such as Griffith and Launey suggested that there were fixed rallying points where mercenaries gathered in search of an employer, saving recruiting officers the trouble of moving from city to city.[54] This is not confirmed by ancient sources but may be correct. However, the idea that Cap Taenarum in the Peloponnesus was the most important such spot and a "market of mercenaries" between 333 and 302/3 BC is inaccurate. Couvenhes has recently shown that even if soldiers were enrolled at Taenarum during this period, it is still misleading to call the place a "market."[55] Instead, Taenarum was a rallying place for troops who had previously been hired elsewhere, and enrollment there depended on historical circumstance. There is in any case no direct evidence that Ptolemy the satrap sent recruiting officers to Taenarum. A clearer picture of where the Ptolemaic *xenologoi* were sent, and of where the Friends (*Philoi*) of the kings had connections, can be extracted from the provenance of soldiers discussed below.[56]

5.2.2 Numbers and origin

The question of recruitment has already made it clear that the largest number of soldiers enrolled by the Ptolemies in the first century after Alexander's conquest came from Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet it is possible

[51] On *condottieri*, see Launey (1949) 32–4.
[52] See also Scheuble (2010b) 35–6.
[53] Livy 31.43.5–7; G. T. Griffith (1935) 258.
[54] G. T. Griffith (1935) 259–60; Launey (1949) 105.
[55] Couvenhes (2008), esp. 281–4.
[56] The connections of the king's *Philoi* to their place of origin played a fundamental role for the Ptolemies; see Rowlandson (2007a) 35–40, esp. 37.

to be more specific regarding their origin and numbers. Four independent methods can be used to evaluate the number of Greeks who settled in Egypt in the first century of Ptolemaic rule. These have been presented in detail in another study and take into account *inter alia* the percentage of Macedonian cleruchs in Egypt in comparison with other settlers, the number of cleruchs in the mid-third-century Arsinoite nome and the number of soldiers available before the new hiring necessary for the Battle of Raphia.[57] There were probably about 200,000 Greeks in Egypt (including Macedonians, Greeks from the Aegean and Asia Minor and Cyreneans), about 5 percent of a total population of around four million, and not 10 percent as usually assumed.[58] Slightly more than half of the male immigrants may have been soldiers in Period A (*c.* 40,000 soldiers out of *c.* 63,500 Greek adult males) before the new enrollment for the Battle of Raphia.[59] In addition, these methods suggest that the flow of immigration was irregular and that large-scale immigration had come to an end by the mid third century.[60]

The origin (or *Heimatsvermerk*) of the soldiers hired by the Ptolemies, along with changes over time in the pattern of immigration and integration, has fascinated Hellenistic historians.[61] To map the provenance of immigrants and soldiers, they have tried to apply statistical methods to the origin of names and, where available, to the geographic labels attached to people in legal and administrative documents.[62] But historians eventually realized that onomastic material and even geographic labels could not always be used at face value. Two recent studies of Ptolemaic Egypt, one by Goudriaan and the other by McCoskey, use anthropological and social scientific approaches to tackle what is now commonly called ethnicity or ethnic identity and focus on how Greek versus Egyptian identity was constructed.[63] None of this work, however, produces a clearer picture of the

[57] Fischer-Bovet (2011).

[58] On the total population of Egypt in the Ptolemaic period, see Rathbone (1990) 123, for whom it increased from less than 3 million to almost 4 million in the third century BC and then decreased below 3 million again in the second century BC. Scheidel (2001) 220–3 assumes numbers slightly below the 5–7 million he calculated for the second century AD. Manning (2003) 47–9 and note 129 suggests 3.5–4.5 million inhabitants.

[59] Fischer-Bovet (2011) 151.

[60] Fischer-Bovet (2011) 152.

[61] For a study of the *Heimatsvermerk*, see Bickerman (1927), who was criticized because the geographical labels in the administrative documents should be understood in relation to the Ptolemaic administration and not to the political entities outside Egypt to which they refer.

[62] See Launey (1949), who at times misuses the onomastic material, especially for the second century BC, and who bases his analysis on racial prejudice. For a survey of the history of the scholarship on ethnicity in Ptolemaic Egypt, see Goudriaan (1988) 1–7.

[63] Goudriaan (1988) draws on the theoretical work of Barth (1969) to argue that ethnicity is a socially constructed categorization. He analyzes the uses of the terms Greek and Egyptian but has been criticized for not taking chronological change into consideration. Clarysse and

situation: Goudriaan restates the general opinion that the Ptolemies had no policies based on races or ethnic groups – the two expressions have been employed variously by scholars over time – whereas McCoskey stresses that identity was used in Ptolemaic Egypt as "both a colonial institution and individual practice."[64] Markers of origin were not a Ptolemaic innovation, however, but are already attested in Late period Egypt, in fifth-century Aramaic papyri and in a Demotic papyrus from the fourth century. This was thus either a Persian or an Egyptian practice.[65]

The difficulty with using geographic labels to reconstruct the origin of immigrants involves the nature of the sources. The data include at least three types of documents: legal documents in which parties had to indicate their place of origin (*patris* in Greek), that is their "legal ethnic designations," to use Vandorpe's terminology;[66] public documents such as honorific inscriptions or dedications, in which the individuals honored or making the dedication indicated their ethnics; and tax lists, in which a smaller number of geographic labels (*ethnē* in Greek) served, along with occupational labels, as fiscal categories, mainly *Hellēn* (Greek), *Persēs* and Arab. In their studies of these tax lists, Clarysse and Thompson suggest that origin probably played some role in early Ptolemaic times in establishing administrative categories, with ethnic designations serving fiscal purposes.[67] During Period B, however, origin increasingly lost its relevance as a criterion in the ascription of an official identity. This is clear in the tax lists in regard to *Hellēn* and *Persēs*, and in Period C in the legal documents in regard to *Persēs* and *Makedōn*. For this reason, some papyrologists speak of "fictitious designations" or "pseudo-ethnics" from the second century onward. At the same time, the variety of legal ethnic designations decreased, because fewer people immigrated, those who did came from a limited number of areas, and the descendants of immigrants no longer felt the need to use geographical labels.[68]

Thompson (2006) have now corrected some important misconception in his interpretation; see below, p. 184 and note 90. McCoskey (2002) proposes reintroducing the concept of race, which she defines as a product of social construction, to allow historians "to call more persistent attention to the role of power." But use of the concept is confusing, given that most authors currently discussing Ptolemaic Egypt, for example Goudriaan, use "ethnicity" in the same way. I prefer to avoid the concept of race, since biologically there is only one human race; see e.g. Isaac (2004) 30.

64 McCoskey (2002) 34.

65 La'da (1994a) 185–1.

66 Vandorpe (2008) 87; see the *Nomenklaturregel* in BGU XIV 1763 and Chapter 4 note 55.

67 Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 124–5.

68 Mueller (2006) 168; Thompson (2001) 304; La'da (1996) 87–91 (unpublished dissertation).




Figure 5.1 Identity and ethnicity in the third century BC




Figure 5.2 Identity and ethnicity in the second and third centuries BC

A model of the connections between origin, occupation, ethnic identity and official identity, and their development over time is proposed in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 above. By ethnic identities, I mean socially constructed identities whose components are language, religion, tradition and

social status.[69] The model suggests that in the earlier period origin had a strong influence on occupation and on the ascription of an official identity (see bold arrows in Figure 5.2). By the second century, Greek immigration had ceased for a few decades, and the new situation affected the dynamics of defining identities (see Figure 5.2). In this period official identity, the one recorded in legal and administrative documents, was defined instead according to occupation and to some extent ethnic identity and origin.

Depending on context, ethnic designations can indicate either the origin of individuals (where they or their ancestors were from) or a legal or fiscal status (official identity) sometimes based on the origin of ancestors or occupation. For example, *Hellēnes* (Greeks) in tax lists might be of Greek origin, or non-Greeks (e.g. Egyptians or speakers of a Semitic language) whose occupation placed them in this fiscal category, or even non-Greek women who had married a *Hellēn*. In the administrative and fiscal domains, individuals had only one official identity at a time, according to one of these criteria (origin or occupation), although a person might use several ethnics successively over time, as will be seen below.

In daily life, on the other hand, people were free to construct their ethnic or cultural identity by choosing elements from one culture or another, or by playing with two or more according to context and circumstance.[70] In some cases the origin of the mother, if different from the father's, might affect a child's occupation and ethnic identity and facilitate a multiplicity of ethnic identities. When our sources are not merely isolated bits of information, for example when archives are preserved, it is possible to reconstruct the official identity of an individual over time, his/her origin or that of his/her family, and the ethnic group(s) to which he/she connected himself/herself depending on context. This type of evidence is too scarce for statistical analysis. It is nonetheless possible to map the provenance of immigrants on the basis of ethnic designations in the third-century documents, since at that time these designations were more likely to indicate a real origin, and even if they already represented a legal/fiscal category, their use probably informs us about the origin of the immigrants.[71]

In his seminal 1911 work, Lesquier devoted an entire chapter to the origin of soldiers.[72] Four decades later Launey dedicated the first volume of his

69 A more general model is discussed in Fischer-Bovet (in press b).

70 I follow here an instrumental or circumstantial approach to ethnicity rather than a primordial view. For the two approaches, see Fenton (2003) 9–10, 73–90.

71 I use the word "origin" rather than "nationality" because of the connotations of the latter.

72 Lesquier (1911) 105–35 relies primarily on P.Petr. III and P.Tebt., which had recently been published.

Table 5.1. *Top-ten provenance among immigrants into Ptolemaic Egypt based on Mueller (2006: 170 note 85)*

Cyrenaica	Thrace	Jews	Crete	Attica	Thessaly	Caria	Arabia	Pamphylia	Ionia
201	199	102	80	63	58	53	49	40	37

Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques to the same question, with the aim of demonstrating the degeneration of the Hellenic race contaminated by Semitic populations – an approach colored by racist prejudice and now completely outdated.[73] Lesquier relied on a very limited sample of soldiers known at that time, while Launey was excessively dependent on onomastic criteria, which are not applicable after the third century BC and often misleading when used without sufficient context. Three decades ago Bagnall, using Uebel's list of cleruchs up to 145 BC, examined the provenance of such individuals based on ethnic designations.[74] On the basis of La'da's recent collection of people given ethnics, Mueller reports over 170 different ethnic designations from cities and regions outside Egypt in the mid third century BC, when the sources provide the greatest variety and frequency of geographical labels describing immigrants and their descendants.[75] As noted above, a majority of settlers were soldiers in the service of the Ptolemies or came to join the army. Mapping the provenance of individuals with foreign-city ethnics, Mueller confirmed that their distribution was not limited to the Ptolemaic possessions, as Bagnall had already noticed when examining the provenance of cleruchs.[76] Mueller's map shows that these people came mainly from the Greek-speaking areas of the Eastern Mediterranean, and that only a few were from the Black Sea or the Italian Peninsula.[77] The conclusion was modified slightly when Mueller took into consideration the most heavily represented regional ethnics, such as Thessalians, as well as non-Greeks (e.g. Thracians and Jews) who came from regions to which Greek culture had spread.[78] The top-ten provenances Mueller identifies over the three centuries are shown in Table 5.1 above, excluding ethnics that

[73] Launey (1949) vol. I. [74] Bagnall (1984).

[75] Mueller (2006) 166–74, with her maps 6 and 7 based on foreign city ethnics in La'da (2002); see also Mueller (2005) 73–92.

[76] Bagnall (1984) 24.

[77] For immigrants from the Black Sea, see now Avram (2007), with a list of fifty-eight soldiers and cleruchs.

[78] Thracians and Jews are sometimes included in the tax lists as *Hellēnes*; see Clarysse and Thompson (2006) 145–6, 321–2.

Table 5.2. *Origins of cleruchs, based on Bagnall (1984) and Uebel (1968)*

Provenance	Until 242	242–204	205–145	III cent. BC subtotal	Total
Macedonian	17	60	30	77	107
Cyrenaica	29	49	7	78	85
(Includes *Cyreneans*)	(24)	(43)	(6)	(67)	(73)
(Includes *Libyans*)	(1)	(3)	(0)	(4)	(4)
Balkan peoples	21	39	17	60	77
(Includes *Thracians*)	(20)	(33)	(16)	(53)	(69)
North and central Greece	14	35	8	49	57
(Includes *Thessalians*)	(2)	(10)	(1)	(12)	(13)
(Includes *Athenians*)	(4)	(5)	(3)	(9)	(12)
Asia Minor/Propontis	15	23	10	38	48
(Includes *Mysians*)	(5)	(3)	(1)	(8)	(9)
Peloponnesus	9	15	1	24	25
Greek Islands	1	13	5	14	19
(Includes *Cretans*)	(0)	(5)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Levant	0	3	11	3	14
(Includes *Jews*)	(0)	(2)	(10)	(2)	(12)
Greeks of the north Aegean	1	9	0	10	10
Occident	2	5	2	7	9
Total	109	251	91	360	451

La'da regarded as fictitious namely *Hellēnes* (for tax-*Hellēnes*), *Makedones* and *Persai.*

The provenance of cleruchs until 145 BC, summarized in Table 5.2, confirms but also refines the data. It shows that Macedonians and Cyreneans were the best-represented among cleruchs in the third century, each group making up about 20 percent of the pool.[79] During this period the ethnic "Macedonian" still indicated the origin of the settler, which is no longer the case in the next century (see below). Not all Macedonians were cleruchs, of course, since some were soldiers in garrisons, while a smaller number formed the top of the military hierarchy and belonged to the Friends (*Philoi*)

[79] On these two groups in the Hellenistic armies, see Launey (1949) 287–365 and 590–6. Onomastic analysis of about twenty names from dedication by soldiers in Hermopolis, probably belonging to a *koinon* and dated to *c.* 125 BC (I.Herm.Magn. 4 = SB I 599), has led Fraser (2007) to surmise that these soldiers were descendants of military settlers who came from the regions that often provided soldiers to the Ptolemies in the third century, in particular Cyrenaica, Thessaly and Crete.

of the king.[80] Billows estimated that about 25,000 Macedonians emigrated between 334 and 319 BC, plausibly one-third of them to Egypt and two-thirds to Asia, while more might have left the country during the 270s, a troubled period there.[81]

Most details offered by Polybius about the origin of Ptolemaic soldiers coincide with the data from documentary sources. In 222 BC the Spartan king Cleomenes characterized the Ptolemaic army with some disdain as constituted of Syrian and Carian soldiers (*stratiōtai*), and he was himself able to provide 3,000 Peloponnesian and 1,000 Cretan mercenaries (*xenoi kai misthophoroi*, Polybius 36.3–5). Syrian and Carian soldiers are to be understood as meaning men from the coastal cities of the Levant and from Asia Minor. As for cleruchs, Polybius states explicitly that 4,000 Thracian and Gallic settlers (*katoikoi*) fought at Raphia, while the mercenaries came from the Greek world (Polybius 5.65.3–4 and 10; see Text 3.4). We find many Thracian cleruchs in Table 5.2 but no Gauls, yet the latter are attested with military functions in other sources. As for the Libyan cavalry and infantry at Raphia, which may refer to the Cyreneans of the documentary sources, Polybius remains vague about whether they were cleruchs (Polybius 5.65.4 and 8). More generally, the origins of the military leaders at Raphia perfectly reflect the information preserved by documentary sources.

Another group not mentioned by Polybius but well represented among the immigrants also deserves attention. In the *Letter of Aristeas* (13), the author claims that Ptolemy I brought 100,000 Jewish captives back to Egypt and settled 30,000 of them in garrisons.[82] These numbers are exaggerations, and this is a literary text that must be interpreted cautiously. But there is documentary evidence for Jewish military settlers in Egypt already in the third century, mostly in the Fayyum.[83] On the other hand, the assumption that they were organized in Jewish units before the ex-high priest Onias IV and his troops settled in Egypt in the late 160s cannot be substantiated.[84]

80 O'Neil (2006) 16–17. As O'Neil indicates, however, his study is based on a heteroclite corpus of men with aulic titles collected by Mooren (1975). Many of them were nome-*stratēgoi* (see Chapter 4), while others held high positions in the government or were military men. His results are thus at times misleading; see Rowlandson (2007a) 35–6.

81 Billows (1995) 157–9, 196, 208–10. For the ratio Asia: Egypt (2:1), see Scheidel (2004) 24–5.

82 See Chapter 3 note 21.

83 Tcherikover and Fuks (1957), vol. I, 145, 147–78; Kasher (1978); Barclay (1996) 20–4. For Jews as third-century tax-*Hellēnes* in Trikomia and in a second-century *politeuma*, see Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 147–8, 270, 321–2; Mueller (2006) 136–7. On the *politeuma*, see Chapter 7, section 7.3.2.

84 Tcherikover and Fuks (1957), vol. I, 147–8. This view has been criticized by Kasher (1978). On Onias, see above, note 50.

The most frequent ethnics among third-century cleruchs, marked in italics in Table 5.2, are also those commonly found among soldiers in the documentary sources. Their use over three centuries is examined in Section 5.2.3.

5.2.3 Ethnic and pseudo-ethnic designations in the army

An important distinction must be made between ethnics ascribed to individuals and those ascribed to groups. In the army, ethnic designations that were applied to units did not reflect the origin of all members of the unit, as in the case of the cavalrymen of the five ethnic hipparchies (Persians, Macedonians, Mysians, Thessalians and Thracians) discussed earlier.[85] After the reforms of Period B, no military units were named using such geographical markers, but individual ethnics were still employed by soldiers in official or public documents.


In general, individual ethnics gradually disappear and decline in variety throughout the second and first centuries.[86] A typical example is the ethnic "Athenian," which shows that both the number of Athenians and the number of Athenian soldiers fell from the second century onward (see Figure 5.3 below). In fact, city ethnics as well as regional ethnics, such as "Aetolian" or "Boeotian," mostly retained their geographic meaning. This is especially true when individuals, frequently soldiers, used an ethnic to indicate their connection with the Greek world in inscriptions for public display.[87] In most cases, however, these men were probably born in Egypt and were advertising the origin of one of their ancestors.

Some regional ethnics seem to have been used differently. Two ethnics in particular, *Persēs* and *Makedōn*, have been identified as clear pseudo-ethnics, the first probably already in the third century, the second at some point early in the second century, when the army was reorganized (Period B). The following subsection examines the meaning of *tēs epigonēs* and *Persēs* in connection with the army and surveys recent scholarship regarding the significance of the pseudo-ethnics *Persēs* and *Persēs tēs epigonēs* in Upper Egypt in the second century. In the final subsection I evaluate the use and meaning of other ethnics frequently borne by soldiers.

85 See Chapter 4, section 4.2.1, p. 127 and note 60; this was already noted by Lesquier (1911), esp. 122–3.

86 For the reasons for this change, see above, p. 171 and note 68.

87 See for example some of the *phrourarchoi* in Scheuble (2010b) 46–50, some members of the royal guard in Fischer-Bovet (in press a) Table, and the *hipparchos* and *laarchēs* Sosandros (*PP* II/VIII 204b=2237=E97), SB I 626; E. Bernand (1971).







Figure 5.3 Ethnic designations, Group 1

5.2.3.1 Persai, Persai tēs epigonēs, Epigonoi *and* Makedones

The frequent use of the ethnics *Makedōn* and *Persēs* in the second century suggests that they were pseudo-ethnics with some organizational meaning within the army. Perhaps they should even be considered entirely different from other ethnics from the 150s BC onward. Figure 5.4 (below, p. 181)







Figure 5.3 (*cont.*)

also sheds some light on the discrepancy between the use of these two ethnics in the third century: *Makedōn* was an origin-marker identifying a large pool of soldiers from Macedonia, whereas *Persēs* was apparently not an origin-marker and was less strongly linked to the army. Oates and Pestman present opposed views about *Persēs* and *Persēs tēs epigonēs*, but







Figure 5.3 (*cont.*)

recent work using Demotic sources, tax lists and archives from Pathyris has shed new light on the issue.[88] Drawing on these studies, this section highlights how the meaning of these designations evolved over time from

[88] Pestman (1963) and Boswinkel and Pestman (1982), esp. 56–63, against Oates (1963), for whom the expression should be read *Persēs, tēs epigonēs* with a comma, since the second






Figure 5.4 Ethnic designations, Group 2

an origin-marker (although not meaning "Persian") to an occupational and status-marker related to members of the army. The development of these

designation would mean "civilian"; Bresciani (1973). Vandersleyen (1988) supports Oates' view. See previously Lesquier (1911) 52–65; Launey (1949) 563–80. For more recent work, La'da (1997); Clarysse and Thompson (2006); Vandorpe (2008).







Figure 5.4 (*cont.*)

terms illuminates the differences between the third century and the second and first centuries BC in terms of the organization of the army and the relation between the army and Egyptian society.

To begin with, the meaning of the expression *tēs epigonēs* (literally "of the descent") that follows many ethnics attested in contracts, wills and






Figure 5.4 (*cont.*)

petitions is now better understood thanks to La'da's study.[89] *Tēs epigonēs* always follows ethnics or pseudo-ethnics and is equivalent to the Demotic *ms n Kmy*, "born in Egypt," itself plausibly an abbreviation of a longer

[89] La'da (2002).

expression found in a later Demotic papyrus, *ms n Kmy ẖn nꜣ ẖrt.w nꜣ srtyts*, "born in Egypt among the children of the *stratiōtai*."[90] In a series of third-century land leases from Tholthis in the Oxyrhynchite nome, the *tēs epigonēs* were the lessees, sometimes along with Egyptians, of cleruchic holdings.[91] According to Bingen, they actually acted as creditors and were non-Egyptian civilians. But their interaction with cleruchs confirms their close relationship with the military sphere. In addition, *tēs epigonēs* was equated around the same time with the *epigonoi* ("descendants") who were connected somehow to the military sphere, probably to the infantry, because some had *klēroi* of 25 arouras.[92] The thesis that *tēs epigonēs* had a specific meaning in a military context is also supported by the absence of women with this designation after their ethnic.[93] La'da accordingly suggests that "the bearers of these expressions, as offspring of foreign soldiers, were either active soldiers themselves or potential recruits or reservists for the army," which is to say that the term designated their status and/or occupation.[94] When one brother in a family was Argive, for example, but the other was Argive *tēs epigonēs*, this did not imply that the first was born outside Egypt and the second in Egypt – most likely they were both born in Egypt – but probably indicated that the Argive *tēs epigonēs* had not yet been incorporated into the army.[95] Clarysse and Thompson also accept La'da's conclusion, but in their view many of the cleruchs' sons, the *epigonoi*, could remain civilians, since

[90] P.Ryl.Dem. 21, ll. 6–7 (112/11 BC) and Bresciani (1973) 125; Clarysse (1987) 29, no. 76; La'da (1997) 563–4: no occupational or status titles are found with *ms n Kmy*, with a few exceptions (see his note 1). Goudriaan (1988) had previously argued against this equivalence and that of *Persēs tēs epigonēs* with *Wynn ms n Kmy*, and thought that *Wynn ms n Kmy* means "Greek born in Egypt," that *Mdy ms n Kmy* signifies "Mede born in Egypt," and that a *Wynn* is a "Greek." Clarysse and Thompson (2006) have now shown that a *Wynn* refers to a tax-*Hellēn* (not automatically an ethnic Greek) in the third century BC, and that some of these individuals were Jews and Egyptians. In addition, *Persai tēs epigonēs* attested as *Wynn ms n Kmy* in the second century are generally of Egyptian origin.

[91] Bingen (1978c) = Bingen (2007a) chapter 15.

[92] La'da (1997) 568–9. P.Count 47 (230/29 BC) records three "*tēs epigonēs*" among the *epigonoi*; see commentary *ad loc.*: (1) l. 9, Kephalon son of Theodoros, Macedonian *tēs epigonēs*, see SB V 7631, ll. 5–6, 29 = Uebel (1968) no. 933 = *PP* X E1796; (2) l. 92, Serambos son of Phrynichos, Boeotian *tēs epigonēs*, see Uebel (1968) no. 1394 = *PP* X E333; (3) l. 142, Theon son of Apollonios, Persian *tēs epigonēs*, for whom the equivalence is less certain, see BGU VI 1266 = Uebel (1968) no. 1398 = *PP* X E2139. Scholl (1987) demonstrated that all these men have Greek names, some have a *klēros* of 25 arouras, some lease their plots out (see UPZ I 14, l. 70 and SB V 7631 mentioned above), and others are stationed in a military section and are thus receiving an emolument in cash. In P.Count 47, p. 464, Clarysse suggests on the basis of their 25 arouras that these were infantrymen as opposed to *katoikoi.*

[93] *Persinē* is attested for women, but is never followed by *tēs epigonēs*; see La'da (2002) E2243–94.

[94] La'da (1997) 569.

[95] See BGU XIV 2372 (263 BC) and CPR XVIII 21 (231 BC), with La'da (1997) 566–7, for whom *tēs epigonēs* is not used to distinguish people born in Egypt from those with the same ethnic born elsewhere.

Table 5.3. *The meaning of* Hellēn, Persēs *and* Persēs tēs epigonēs

Greek	Demotic	III to mid II cent. BC	Mid II to early I cent. BC
Hellēn	*Wynn*	tax-*Hellēnes* = privileged fiscal category[a] = *c.* 10–20% of the Fayyum population	*Wynn* is still used, (e.g. Dionysios son of Kephalas, P.Dion.7, l. 6) perhaps a military and/or a fiscal status[b]
Persēs	*Mdy*	tax-*Persai* = privileged fiscal category = *c.* 0.3% of the Fayyum population;[c] second category of Greeks; Greek names; found in the army context	from 150 BC, Greek and Egyptian names; found in the army context
Persēs tēs epigonēs	*Wynn ms n Kmy*	*Wynn ms n Kmy* (literal meaning "Greek born in Egypt") is attested four times, three times in the Fayyum[d]	*tēs epigonēs* is only used with *Persēs* (except in 3 documents); *Wynn ms n Kmy* is found only in Upper Egypt – literal meaning is inaccurate; another Demotic equivalence in Dionysios' archive is "son of *misthophoros*"[e]
Epitelēs	*Mdy ms n Kmy*	liable for tax; Egyptian name (*PP* X E2309–2311)	unattested

[a] Clarysse (1994) 76 discusses P.Count 2, ll. 501–5, in which four men of Elephantine (*rmt Yb*) and three men of Philae (*rmt Pylq*), who generally have Egyptian names, belong to the tax-*Hellēnes*. This suggests that already in the final quarter of the third century BC the *Hellēnes* were not a "pure" ethnic group but a tax category. Perhaps these Egyptians entered such a category because they were members of military units in the south.

[b] P.Dion. 7, l. 6.

[c] See Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 158.

[d] For the oldest attestation (244 BC), see Bresciani (1973) 125 note 16.

[e] P.Dion. 1 (l. 3), 4 (l. 4 and l. 6), 6 (l. 6 *šr mstwphrs*).

not all sons could inherit a *klēros*.[96] The *epigonoi* could represent a substantial portion of the tax-*Hellēnes* (a civilian category; see Table 5.3 above), who themselves represented up to 16 percent of the civilian population in the third-century Arsinoite tax lists. In these documents both men and women in this category have Greek names. In the second century, by contrast, most of the women bear Egyptian names, suggesting that the *epigonoi* of that time are (Hellenized) Egyptians who represent "a typical example of acculturation."[97] In conclusion, during Period A and most of Period B the designation *tēs epigonēs* referred to soldiers' sons. Those who joined the army, presumably as cleruchs, kept their ethnic without *tēs epigonēs*

[96] Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 154. For the *tēs epigonēs*, see also Clarysse (1991a) 48–9.

[97] P.Count 50, commentary to l. 51; Clarysse and Thompson (2006) 318–49.

and never reverted to it.[98] From the 150s BC, however, *tēs epigonēs* was no longer used with diverse ethnics but only with *Persai*, and in three cases with *Makedones*; moreover, some soldiers used the designations *Persai* and *Persai tēs epigonēs* interchangeably.[99] Before interpreting the development in the use of these terms and how it reflects reforms of the army, it is necessary to consider who the *Persai* were.

Hammond suggested that the *Persai* were the 1,000 Persian Apple-bearers who formed one of Alexander's sets of palace guards (see Athenaeus 12.514b, 539e) and were brought to Egypt when his funerary *cortège* was diverted there by Ptolemy in 321 BC.[100] As for the *Persēs tēs epigonēs*, Hammond simply supposed that they were subsequent generations of Apple-bearers.[101] Indeed, previous scholarship regarded them as initially of Persian, Median or Iranian origin.[102] Even in the third century, however, *Persai* only rarely have Persian names, and there is no evidence at all to support the inference that the *Persai* came from the 1,000 Apple-bearers.[103] La'da also suggests that Persian soldiers were incorporated into the armies of Alexander and his successors, explaining the close relationship between this ethnic and the military.[104] On average about half of the Persians have military titles (see Table 5.4 and Figure 5.4, p. 181), but the proportion may have been higher in the early third century. For La'da, this group was privileged because of its links with the military and had become fictitious by the early 220s, when *Persai* was used as a tax category in tax lists. Yet Clarysse and Thompson conjecture that these tax-Persians were civilians descended from the Greeks settled in Egypt before Alexander's conquest and might have been granted a special status by the Persian rulers in exchange for their services (see Table 5.3 above).[105] Then, under the early Ptolemies, they were integrated into

[98] See also Vandorpe (2008), esp. 90, 98.

[99] Macedonians *tēs epigonēs* are attested in P.Ryl. II 252 (141/0 BC, Hermopolis, Μακεδὼν τῆς [ἐπιγονῆς]), P.Tebt. I 104 and P.Tebt. I 105 (92 and 103 BC, Kerkeosiris); see Oates (1963) 72; La'da (2002).

[100] Hammond (1996). [101] Hammond (1996) 109.

[102] Lesquier (1911) 89, 118, 152–3; Mélèze Modrzejewski (1983) 261; Goudriaan (1988) 18–20. Quack (2006) suggests that the *Persai tēs epigonēs/Mdy ms n Kmy* were descendants of Persians and that some of them may have been the authors of texts written in the name of Zoroaster or Ostanes but displaying Egyptian influence.

[103] They usually had Greek names (see La'da [2002] E1965–2062, E2295–2301) – although Greek names could be held by Persians – except in the third- and second-century tax lists, where they mostly have Egyptian names. See Clarysse and Thompson (2006) 157–8.

[104] La'da (1994b), esp. 187–1.

[105] Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 159; already suggested by Samuel (1970) 448 note 12. Clarysse (1994) 76 proposes that "as collaborators with the enemy they received an inferior status vis-à-vis the other Greeks."

Table 5.4. *Percentage of soldiers among men bearing the same ethnic designation*

	Ethnic designations (without *tēs epigonēs*)	% (decreasing order)	Absolute number in *PP* online III–I cent. BC	Absolute number in *PP* online III–I cent. BC, excluding doc. without date	Absolute number of soldiers, III–I cent. BC, excluding doc. without date	Use of ethnics increased in II cent. BC
1	*Galatai*	85	15	13	11	×
2	*Libyes*	80	6	5	4	×
3	***Thraikes***	68	140	131	89	
4	***Thessaloi***	62	57	45	28	×
5	***Makedones***	61	362	353	215	×
6	*Kyrenaioi*	52	133	109	57	
7	*Krētes*	50	57	36	18	
8	***Persai***	49	111	110	54	×
9	***Mysoi***	44	16	16	7	×
10	*Athēnaioi*	31	58	51	16	
11	*Ioudaioi*	13	72	70	9	
12	*Arabes*	13	40	39	5	

a privileged fiscal group, the tax-Persians or *Mdy.w* in Demotic who, like tax-*Hellēnes* or Arabs, were exempt from the obol tax.[106] In conclusion, it remains unclear if men with the ethnic *Persai* found outside the tax lists are tax-Persians.[107] In my opinion, the Persians in the army before the 150s BC were the descendants of Persian soldiers and/or of Greeks who served during the Persian occupation of Egypt. In both cases the terms seems to refer to a population group already in Egypt at the time of Alexander's conquest.

The situation in the second century BC, after Period B, seems different (see Table 5.3 above), although the sources come almost entirely from two garrison towns where archives of soldier families were preserved, Akoris in Middle Egypt and Pathyris in the Thebaid.[108] For the time being we can observe three important changes from the period before the 150s BC. First, as noted earlier, the designation *tēs epigonēs* was used almost exclusively with *Persēs*.[109] Second, the same individual could use

[106] See the equivalence between the number of *Persai* in P.Count 3, l. 36 and l. 164 and in P.Count 2, ll. 508–9, with commentary *ad loc.* For the exemption of the obol tax, see P.Count 23, ll. 5–6 and 30–3.

[107] Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 158.

[108] See the evidence collected by Oates (1963) from 148 BC on.

[109] See p. 186 and note 99.

different ethnic designations over time, especially *Persēs*, *Persēs tēs epigonēs* and *Makedōn*. Third, all bearers of the ethnic *Wynn ms n Kmy (*a translation of *Persēs tēs epigonēs* meaning literally "Greek born in Egypt") had Egyptian names with Egyptian patronymics, whereas previously they all had Greek names with Greek patronymics.[110] Consequently, these terms were used differently in connection with the new troops of *misthophoroi* garrisoned in Upper Egypt toward the end of Period B.

Vandorpe proposes a compelling explanation for the individuals called both *Persēs* and *Persēs tēs epigonēs* in Greek and Demotic notarial contracts from Pathyris, showing that they all belonged to the new sort of mercenaries called *misthophoroi* in Greek and "men receiving pay" in Demotic.[111] As noted above, these men were recruited in Egypt after the Great Revolt and were stationed in the new garrison towns of Pathyris and nearby Krokodilopolis after Antiochus IV's invasion. The terms used for them emphasize that they received a wage rather than a plot of land. According to Vandorpe, in both Pathyris and Krokodilopolis these soldiers were enrolled in the category of the Persians, and their sons were *Persai tēs epigonēs* until they were recruited. In addition, a *Persēs* became a *Persēs tēs epigonēs* again when not on active service. He might alternate between these two statuses, depending on whether he was actively employed or not, maintaining his financially privileged position.[112] It is thus no longer necessary to assume that in some cases *Persēs* is an abbreviation of *Persēs tēs epigonēs*, as Pestman suggested.[113] By being enrolled in the army as professional soldiers, these men, often of Nubian origin, acquired financial privileges and moved up in the local socio-economic strata.[114]

Comparison with the garrison town of Akoris in the late second century BC confirms that the situation was similar in Middle Egypt, although mercenary soldiers (*misthophoroi*) of Egyptian origin were even more integrated

110 La'da (1994b) 186.

111 Vandorpe (2008). For the equivalence of μισθοφόρος and *rmt iw=f šp hbs*, see Vleeming (1985).

112 Vandorpe (2008) explains that between 161 and 116 BC Ptolemy VI and Ptolemy VIII needed to employ most of their soldiers stationed in Pathyris. Only 18 percent were not enrolled or were not-yet-recruited sons of *Persai* (i.e. *Persēs tēs epigonēs*). From Ptolemy VIII's death to the destruction of Pathyris in 88 BC, they were 59 percent of non-active soldiers or not-yet-recruited sons of *Persai* (i.e. *Persēs tēs epigonēs*) in Pathyris.

113 Boswinkel and Pestman (1982) 48, 52.

114 But they Hellenized only superficially: they used Greek in contracts but mostly kept their traditions and were unable to write Greek themselves. See Vandorpe (2008). For Nubian soldiers who were herdsmen when not on military duty, see Horos son of Nechouthes and Peteharsemtheus son of Panebkhounis in Vandorpe and Waebens (2009) 127–41, 163–89. For Nubians as herdsmen in legal documents from Edfu, see Manning (2003) 80–1.

into the Ptolemaic power structures there than in Pathyris.[115] Dionysios-Pasas, son of the *Persēs* Kephalas, bore the designation *Persēs tēs epigonēs* and, as also happened in Pathyris, became a *Persēs* when he was recruited, probably around 110 BC.[116] He was then again a *Persēs tēs epigonēs* (in Demotic "son of a *misthophoros*"). Yet in contrast to the soldiers in Pathyris, he was promoted to *Makedōn* around 105 BC.[117] The most economical explanation of this succession of ethnic designations, obviously fictitious in these cases, is a change of military status.[118] Dionysios was not the only *misthophoros* in the archive who changed from *Persēs* to *Makedōn*, but these other *misthophoroi* became cleruchs and are not attested as *Persēs tēs epigonēs*.[119] As a *Makedōn*, however, Dionysios may have received financial advantages: indeed, he also appears a few months earlier in a Demotic text as a *Wynn*, a term used for tax-*Hellēnes*, although mostly in the third century.[120] We thus do not know the real origin of Dionysios son of Kephalas, but his brother bore the ethnic designation "Libyan" and was a cavalry-*misthophoros* of the *hēgemonia*. Boswinkel and Pestman suggest that the family had Libyan ancestors, but there is no reason to follow them in believing that Dionysios ever used the ethnic *Libys* in legal documents.[121]

From Dionysios' archive, five suggestions can be made about the remuneration and organization of the troops and the use of pseudo-ethnics in the army in Akoris in the late second century. First, at least two *misthophoroi* of

[115] For the close relations between the Ptolemaic army and the local elite there, see Chapter 7, section 7.2.3.2.

[116] Boswinkel and Pestman (1982) 54–5, 61–3. But I interpret the change of pseudo-ethnic according to Vandorpe (2008) and do not consider *Persēs tēs epigonēs* a legal fiction at that time; see note 117.

[117] On this fictitious ethnic in Akoris, see also Launey (1949) 325–6. Vandorpe (2008) Appendix 2 demonstrates that persons using the designations *Persēs tēs epigonēs* and *Makedōn* in the same document (P.Ryl. IV 588 and P.Dion. 30), which has been interpreted as evidence for the gradual shift of the meaning of *Persēs tēs epigonēs* toward a legal term to designate a debtor liable to exceptional execution and thus in a disadvantageous position, must be understood "Macedonians, but at the time of the agreement, Persians of the epigone." Consequently, there is a clear gap between the use of the designation *Persēs tēs epigonēs* by soldiers in the second century and its later meaning *contra* Oates (1963) 119–20, Boswinkel and Pestman (1982) 60–1 and Chauveau (1997) 212, who assume that the legal meaning of the Roman period can be traced back to the late second century BC.

[118] As Oates (1963) 118–19 note 9 suggested. For the designations used by Dionysios, see *PP* X E519. For Vandorpe (2008) the advance to *Makedōn* is due to Dionysios' higher degree of Hellenization than that of the soldiers in Pathyris, since he knows Greek and has a double name. In my opinion, we cannot be certain of the extent to which the military administration took such criteria into consideration at that time.

[119] Boswinkel and Pestman (1982) 46–7. There is no clear evidence that Apollonios was a *misthophoros* first, but Dionysios son of Apollonios belonged to the *hēgemonia*. For the latter, see also below and note 122.

[120] P.Dion. 7, l. 6.

[121] Boswinkel and Pestman (1982) 63.

the *hēgemonia* became cleruchs (*klērouchoi*, not *katoikoi*) in the nearby village of Cleopatra: Dionysios son of Ptolemaios, who was a *Makedōn* already before he received his *klēros* and who kept this designation, and Dionysios son of Apollonios, who was still a *Persēs* when he became a cleruch and who only later used the pseudo-ethnic *Makedōn*.[122] Soldiers with the pseudo-ethnics *Persēs* and *Makedōn* are indeed found distributed indiscriminately among *misthophoroi*, cleruchs and *katoikoi hippeis*.[123] Second, both the infantryman Dionysios and his brother the cavalryman Paesis were under the command of an eponymous officer, Demetrius, who ranked above the *hēgemōn*.[124] As already noted, eponymous officers could command soldiers bearing different ethnic designations, in this case the pseudo-ethnics *Libys* and *Makedōn*.[125] Third, the *hēgemonia* in Akoris grouped together cavalry *misthophoroi* and infantrymen.[126] It is thus unclear whether Dionysios remained an infantryman like his father or became a cavalryman when he received the pseudo-ethnic *Makedōn* in 106 BC.[127] Fourth, it is also unclear if the ethnic *Libys*, borne in this archive by only one *misthophoros hippeus* and one *katoikos hippeus*, developed into a pseudo-ethnic to indicate a subunit and/or a type of equipment (likely cavalry equipment) different from the *Makedones*.[128] There are so few attestations of *Libys* (see below) that it is doubtful that it became a fictitious ethnic indicating a military status

[122] For Boswinkel and Pestman (1982) 54–5, the two Dionysii were no longer active soldiers once they became cleruchs. In my opinion, they may have continued to be active in the *hēgemonia*, since they still used their titles as officers. It thus seems that at least some officers resemble the *misthophoroi klērouchoi* discussed in Chapter 4 (section 4.1), although the exact term is never used. This was suggested by G. T. Griffith (1935) 137–9, although the evidence he offers for Kephalos (= Kephalas) and his family (P.Rein. I 7, 17, 13, 31 = P.Dion. 9, 10, 26 and 29) does not imply that they received *klēroi* but only that they owned land.

[123] Boswinkel and Pestman (1982) 44–7. *Persai* also received *klēroi* in the Fayyum, but there is no evidence that *Persai tēs epigonēs* were ever granted *klēroi* in Egypt; they are only cultivators of cleruchic land. See the Excel file available online at fischer-bovet.info with the distribution of ethnic designations within forces and ranks.

[124] Boswinkel and Pestman (1982) 37, however, believe that Demetrius was a "commander of the recruits" and thus inferior in rank to the *hēgemōn*.

[125] See Chapter 4. For example, the Macedonian Didymachos and the Persian Petron of P.Tebt. I 30 (115 BC) are in the fifth hipparchy of the 100-aroura men.

[126] Since Achilleus, for example, is *misthophoros hippeus* of the *hēgemonia* and Hipponikos is a *hekatontarchos*, hence an infantry officer, of the *hēgemonia*; see Boswinkel and Pestman (1982) 38–41.

[127] See also Boswinkel and Pestman (1982) 34, "Dionysios was at some point an infantryman." In *PP* II/VIII 2544 = 2553a Dionysios is recorded as a cavalryman. In Egypt *Makedones* could be either cavalrymen or infantrymen; see the Excel file available online at fischer-bovet.info with the distribution of ethnic designations within forces and ranks.

[128] Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 231 note 430 concludes that the ethnic designations *Makedōn* and *Libys* have a military significance.

throughout Egypt. Finally, it is worth noting that the two sons of the *Persēs* Kephalas joined the army like their father but obtained higher statuses.

This subsection illustrates significant changes in Period C in the way in which the military administration used the ethnic designations *Persēs* and *Persēs tēs epigonēs* to indicate if a professional soldier was currently in active service. It is unclear why this designation was chosen, except that it was often used for Greco-Egyptian and Egyptian soldiers recruited locally. As Vandorpe stresses, however, these designations do not seem to have worked in the same way for cleruchs, who did not revert to the status *Persēs tēs epigonēs*, and in this case it still functioned as in the previous century.

5.2.3.2 Other regional ethnics

The aim of this final section is to examine whether the twelve geographical markers most frequently borne by individual soldiers or cleruchs took on a new meaning in the army in the second half of the second century, as *Persēs* and *Makedōn* did. Using the online *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* (as of 2007), the percentage of soldiers or cleruchs was calculated for each ethnic designation (see Table 5.4 above). These ethnics were selected because they were already the most common among cleruchs, except for the Gauls (*Galatai*) and the Arabs. The nine ethnics with the highest percentage of men within the army refer to geographic areas from which troops fighting at Raphia came, or after whom the five ethnic hipparchies (in bold print) were named in the late third and early second centuries BC. Twelve graphs represent the evolution of these ethnic designations over time with the number of soldiers who bore them (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4 on pp. 178–83).[129]

These ethnics can be divided into two groups according to their use over time. The first group follows the expected pattern of decline in use, while the second one does not (see Table 5.4, marked by a cross). In Group 1, the ethnics *Thraikes*, *Kyrenaioi*, *Krētes*, *Athēnaioi*, *Arabes* and *Ioudaioi* decline, like most geographical designations in the second century BC, and this is a real decline, since the sources are more abundant for this period (see Figure 5.3).[130] These ethnics actually indicate the origin of one of these men's ancestors, rather than the place where the bearers were born, and

[129] The discrepancies between the number of cleruchs as reported in Table 5.2 above (based on Uebel) and the graphs with men with military titles (including cleruchs) based on the *PP* comes from the fact that Uebel included many cleruchs who are not clearly attested as such (introducing into his list all the fathers of individuals bearing the designation *tēs epigonēs*) or whose ethnics are not regarded as secure by the *PP*.

[130] In the first century, attestations fall for all ethnics because the administration slowly stopped using any type of ethnic designations and because of the overall scarcity of sources.

they disappeared over time when such designations were no longer deemed meaningful from an administrative and legal point of view, and from a personal point of view as well. The bearers of these ethnics can be divided into two subgroups. One was never closely connected to the army, as was apparent already from the provenance of cleruchs in Table 5.2 (above): *Arabes*, *Ioudaioi* and *Athēnaioi*.[131] The other subgroup, including *Thraikes*, *Kyrenaioi* and *Krētes*, was more closely connected to the army, as the proximity of the two curves in the graphs attests (see Figure 5.3).[132] In fact, a sub-unit of Cretans commanded by Aristocrates of Gortyn, and another of Cyreneans commanded by Andronicos are attested in a dedication of the *koinon* of soldiers in Hermopolis from the late second century BC.[133] In addition, the proximity of the curves suggests that designations indicating origin remained slightly more frequent in the military administration. For example, in a petition to the *archisōmatophylax* and *grammateus* of the *suntaxis* from the second century BC, Deidameia still mentions that her father Hermias was a Thracian and that her sons by different husbands are an Argive and a Cardian under the command of two different eponymous officers.[134] The ethnic designations referred to the origin of the boy's father or some other ancestor, for it is doubtful that Argives or Cardians formed specific units. These ethnics were attached to individuals and did not indicate a particular military status, but military officials expected this information in official and judicial documents. In other words, these ethnics officialized the connection with the military milieu. Indeed, while Deidameia did not name Hermias' eponymous officer, perhaps because her father was already dead, the use of his ethnic probably emphasized his past connection with the army.

Unlike the graphs of the first group, those of the second group, which includes bearers of the ethnics *Makedones*, *Persai*, *Thessaloi*, *Galatai*, *Libyes* and *Mysoi*, display a rising curve in the second century with a large percentage of soldiers (see Figure 5.4 and Table 5.4, marked with a cross). For *Makedones* and *Persai*, this increase and the large number of attestations

131 For *Arabes*, see Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 159–61. For Arabs as soldiers, see Launey (1949) 560–2. On the Arabs' relation with Egypt in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, see Abd El Ghany (1989). For *Ioudaioi*, see section 5.2.2; for the term as a real ethnic, see La'da (1997) 564–6. For *Athēnaioi*, see Launey (1949) 145–51.

132 For *Thraikes* and *Krētes*, see Chapter 4, section 4.2.3. For the *politeuma* of the Cretans, see Chapter 7, section 7.3.2. For *Kyrenaioi*, see Launey (1949) 590–7.

133 I.Herm.Magn. 4, ll. 56–8, Balacros son of Dionysios belonged to the Cretans, but his name is not typically Cretan (it might be Macedonian, according to Launey [1949] 271, 327, 1071); ll. 58–9, the patronym of Apollophanes son of Jason is common in Cyrene.

134 Ioannidou (2006).

confirm that these designations became pseudo-ethnics.[135] By contrast, no other ethnic applied to individuals seems to have changed so drastically in meaning. An individual identified as a Thessalian probably had ancestors from Thessaly, as the region provided cleruchs in the third century.[136] Indeed, the increasing number of Thessalians between the early third and the second centuries BC, from seven to ten, is too insignificant in absolute numbers for the ethnic to be considered fictitious, like *Makedones* and *Persai*. Finally, the limited amount of data concerning *Galatai*, *Libyes* and *Mysoi* makes it impossible to interpret these ethnics as used on a large organizational scale within the army. No evidence suggests that *Galatēs* was ever used as a pseudo-ethnic, yet eleven of thirteen *Galatai* were in the army and, together with the Mysians and the Arabs, they form the only group for whom no officer is attested.[137] Two of the six *Libyes* were cavalrymen in the Hermopolite nome, one as a *misthophoros hippeus* and the other one as a *katoikos hippeus*, but it is difficult to make further generalizations (see above on Paesis). Similarly, at least some Mysians belonged to the cavalry; it is worth noting that in the late second century Theotimos, a Persian *tēs epigonēs* from the Fayyum, became a Mysian of the fourth hipparchy.[138] This may suggest that *Persēs tēs epigonēs* was a stepping-stone to obtaining a *klēros*. We cannot tell if Theotimos was a *misthophoros* at some point in his career, like Paesis in Akoris, but he ultimately joined the fourth hipparchy as a 100-aroura man (and thus a *katoikos hippeus*). He was ascribed the ethnic Mysian either because he actually had Mysian ancestors or, less likely, because he joined a sub-unit of pseudo-Mysians.[139]

In conclusion, the use of ethnics in the army can only be partially reconstructed. While collective ethnics such as those of the ethnic hipparchies do not correspond to the origin of the soldiers, in most cases individual ethnics reflected the origin of the individual's ancestors. Ethnics were required in legal documents and were also used in the military and cleruchic

135 For example, Lesquier (1911) 122 table did not include the ethnic "Macedonian" in his list of "suspicious" ethnics.

136 By contrast, for Lesquier (1911) 123 the four main suspicious ethnics were Cretans, Mysians, Persians and Thracians, and perhaps Thessalians and Galatians in the second century. For him, their survival in the second century BC and probable new meaning within the army echoed the third-century ethnic hipparchies and populations known for their military skills (Cretan archers, Galatian infantry).

137 See already Launey (1949) 516. For Galatians, see Chapter 4, section 4.2.3.

138 P.Fay. 11 and 12 (115 BC and 103 BC); *PP* II/VIII 2793 = E1885.

139 This is a preliminary hypothesis, since all the other *Mysoi* belong to the regular troops and the *PP* could not determine if they belonged to the cavalry or to the infantry. For the distribution of ethnic designations within forces and ranks, see the Excel file available online at fischer-bovet.info.

administration, but less systematically from the second century BC onward. For this reason, the use of most ethnics declines in documentary sources. But they also become less common because more and more men of Egyptian origin entered the army. Because in some official contexts these men still needed to indicate an ethnic, the fictitious *Persēs* and *Makedōn* were used, and these terms accordingly show an unexpected and unique increase in appearances in our sources from about 150 BC. *Persēs*, first of all, was often used because it was tied to the military status of *misthophoroi* in certain garrisons of Egypt, such as Pathyris, and because it still bore the connotation "locally hired soldier." The soldiers in Pathyris nonetheless retained their Egyptian names. Second, *Makedōn* was ascribed to *misthophoroi* such as Dionysios-Plenis son of Kephalas in Akoris. *Makedones* most often had Greek names or double names (Greek and Egyptian). Both pseudo-ethnics, *Persēs* and *Makedōn*, obtained through military service, may have brought privileges outside the army. The descendants of cleruchs who held the ethnics *Persēs* or *Makedōn*, meanwhile, continue to do so, since this probably did not seem confusing to officials and soldiers. As for the other ethnics frequently borne by individual soldiers, nothing points unambiguously to a fictitious meaning except one important element: these men were almost never born in the city or region referred to by their ethnic, but merely had more or less loosely connected ancestors from there. From the mid second century onward, many of the soldiers who bore the pseudo-ethnics *Persēs* and *Makedōn* may actually have been Greco-Egyptian or Egyptian.

Except for *Persēs* and *Makedōn*, no clear organizational structure emerges from consideration of the use of ethnics in the army. The same ethnics – *Athēnaios*, *Krēs*, *Thraix*, even *Persēs* and *Makedōn* – were borne variously by *misthophoroi* and cleruchs, and also by cavalrymen and infantrymen, and officers and private soldiers.[140] Again, with the exception of *Persēs* and *Makedōn*, no clear pattern emerges from the use of ethnics over time other than a gradual decline. Hypotheses can be offered about sub-units that grouped men with the same ethnic, but the fragmentary nature of the sources means that they cannot be tested. A unit of Cretans and one of Cyreneans are found in late second-century Hermopolis. Since only one soldier is recorded in each (with no individual ethnic), the unit was probably small. Yet it is impossible to be sure if all the soldiers actually came from Crete or Cyrenaica, although the Cretan commander clearly did.[141] The other units (or better, sub-units) in the inscription from Hermopolis are identified

[140] See the Excel file available online at fischer-bovet.info with the distribution of ethnic designations within forces and ranks.

[141] See above, note 133.

only by the names of their officers, or in one case as the unit of the Thebaid, meaning that there is no systematic way to separate soldiers by ethnicity. Sub-units of Libyan cavalrymen in Akoris, or of Mysian cavalrymen within the numbered hipparchies, are conjectural and rely on the fact that a few individuals bear these ethnics. At the moment, it is accordingly impossible to examine this lower tier of military organization in detail.

The aim of Part I of this book was to explain the shape of Ptolemaic military institutions and how they evolved over time. Chapter 3 attempted to shed light on the challenges faced by the Ptolemies and how they used their army in the context of intensive Hellenistic state formation. Different types of warfare were predominant in different times and were schematized into Periods A (323–*c.* 220 BC), B (*c.* 220–*c.* 160 BC), and C (*c.* 160–30 BC). The cost of the army, as well as mobilization and demobilization, were examined in relation to the international situation, which in turn made possible an explanation of the organization and ethnic composition of the army and of a series of changes that crystallized around the period of crisis in the state (Period B). Costly forces such as the fleet were now no longer maintained on the previous scale, and exotic troops, for example elephants, disappeared. The system of cavalry units was harmonized through the incorporation of ethnic hipparchies into numbered hipparchies, and the internal infantry units were reorganized (Chapter 4). Most important, a new type of mercenaries (*misthophoroi* or "men receiving pay") of Egyptian or Greco-Egyptian origin were garrisoned in Upper Egypt in a bid to regain control of the area. Egyptians were continuously employed in various parts of the Ptolemaic army and became predominant in Periods B and C, notably as a type of cleruch called *machimoi* (Chapter 5). Immigrants from the Eastern Mediterranean initially formed the largest group of soldiers, whose provenance can be reconstructed through ethnic designations recorded in official documents. Macedonians, Cyreneans, Thracians, Cretans, Thessalians and men from a variety of Greek cities made up the bulk of the army. At least two ethnics, "Macedonian" and "Persian," came to indicate a military status independent of the real origin of the bearer and became current in the Egyptian and Greco-Egyptian military milieu. Parts II and III of the book explore in more depth how the army became a tool of integration in Egypt through local recruitment and analyze the development of the soldiers' settlements and garrisons. Part II in particular pinpoints the different socio-economic statuses entangled with distinctions between soldier and officer, cavalryman and infantryman, and cleruch and professional.

PART II

Economic status and social networks of soldiers and officers

Part II of this book explores how the nature of soldiers' settlements and the evolution of their organization throughout Egypt, on the one hand, and local recruitment, on the other, converted the army into an engine driving the integration of different ethnic groups and of soldiers into the rest of society. This development is specific to Ptolemaic Egypt, in contrast to the contemporary Seleucid kingdom. Chapters 6 and 7 question the view that the ethnic origin of the immigrants made collaboration between soldiers and the subject population in Egypt difficult.[1] They aim to show instead that the cleruchic system allowed for a gradual interaction between population groups, because political and judicial structures were less constraining in the *chōra* than in the poleis. From the second century BC onward, this resulted in the substantial integration of some groups of the Egyptian population into the military milieu. The army became a vehicle for the distribution of land to a larger pool of people, bringing them opportunities for upward mobility. At the same time, an increase in local recruitment modified the composition of the professional army. The military developed into a community builder that integrated different ethnic groups, bringing some degree of stability to the Ptolemaic state.

Chapter 6 explains why the Ptolemies implemented the cleruchic system and how the fundamental changes that occurred between Period A and Period C can be connected with the framework proposed in Chapter 3. Changes can be identified in three main areas: diversification of the location of military settlements; decrease and leveling of the size of soldiers' plots; and expansion of the system to a larger pool of locally recruited individuals. The final section examines the degree of private ownership attached to cleruchic allotments and suggests that the closer this came to private ownership, the more cleruchic institutions tended toward demilitarization.

This evaluation of the cleruchic system sets the stage for an investigation of the cleruchs' socio-economic status and their interactions with the general

[1] For example Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 176.

population in the first section of Chapter 7. A critical survey of interactions of cleruchs and soldiers within communities and of the nature of their relations with the local population reveals how, for many cleruchs and soldiers, the absence of polis institutions led to the hybridization of the military milieu, allowing soldiers to play an intermediary role between the state and local communities.[2] The final section explores how socio-military associations generated group solidarity between soldiers of different origins and social backgrounds through the unifying figure of the king.

[2] For a general survey of the concept of hybridity, see Burke (2009); in Romanization studies, see e.g. Webster (2001).

6 Settling soldiers

The main purposes of granting land to soldiers were the following. The practice strengthened loyalty to the ruler, especially when the soldiers were originally from outside the country, and was a cheaper way to keep them available for mobilization, since the state provided them with a means to make a living and paid them in coin and food only when they were mobilized. In addition, the system allowed the ruler to spread his military apparatus throughout his territory and to avoid a dangerous concentration of soldiers in the capital, while also increasing his revenues by maximizing the amount of land cultivated. But settling soldiers on land also had two substantial drawbacks: the troops were decentralized, which made it difficult to mobilize them quickly in case of an attack and, as they became more involved in cultivation or estate management, they also became less well trained than a professional army would have been.

When Ptolemy I granted his soldiers land, he developed this system to a scale never reached before. He was not innovating, however, because similar strategies had been used by Athens in the previous century, and because land grants to soldiers had been common in Egypt.[1] Herodotus and Diodorus mention the plots of land given to the so-called *machimoi*, supposedly 12 arouras, and the practice may go back to the Sixth Dynasty (2345–2181 BC).[2] Hieratic papyri from the New Kingdom and the Third Intermediate period confirm the tradition of rewarding soldiers with land. The Wilbour Papyrus reports plots of land, many of them of 5 arouras, in the Fayyum and Middle Egypt, as well as in the south, with a higher concentration in certain areas. In total, soldiers represented 12 percent of the landholders in the country, and some sections of the land were certainly military settlements.[3] In addition, a high percentage of women owned land, especially in places where military men were well represented. This suggests

[1] Lesquier (1911) 44–52; Préaux (1979) 465–6. Van 't Dack (1977) 82 also mentions the role of Hecataeus of Abdera in the choice of such a system.

[2] Herodotus 2.168; Diodorus 1.73; Crawford (1971) 53–4; see Chapter 2, section 2.3.

[3] Spalinger (2005) 264–5, 275; Katary (1999), esp. 69–70, 75, 79–80. Manning (2003) 195–6 explains that soldiers were a dominant class of landholders and shows that the concept of private property had existed since the Old Kingdom.

that they were the widows, daughters or wives of active soldiers. Other texts from the New Kingdom, such as the coronation inscription of Horemheb (*c.* 1332–1305 BC), also attest to significant landholding by soldiers and veterans, often connected with priests.[4] Horemheb awarded military men priestly offices, especially at the end of their career. This close relationship between soldiers and priests in Egypt still existed under the Ptolemies (see Part III). Similarly, Papyrus Reinhardt (tenth century BC), a land register like P.Wilbour, records soldiers with plots of land within a temple domain in the tenth Upper Egyptian nome.[5] The soldiers owned smaller plots than most Ptolemaic cleruchs, although similar in size to those held by the Ptolemaic *machimoi*.[6]

In Classical Greece, the system of settling citizens on land by granting them plots of land (*klēroi*) in exchange for military service was developed in fifth-century Athens.[7] Later Plutarch interpreted this as a way to create "fear and security."[8] Philip and Alexander also granted land to soldiers, but the evidence is limited to officers.[9] If the Athenian example influenced the Ptolemies, it did so indirectly. The only straightforward borrowing for their system of granting land is its terminology and the key term is *klēros*. The Ptolemies employed the terms "cleruch" (κληροῦχος), "cleruchy" (κληρουχία) and "those who have been granted a *klēros*" (κεκληρουχημένοι) rather than other words used elsewhere in the Hellenistic period and connected with the concepts "settler, colonist" and "settlement, colony" (*katoikos*, *katoikia*, *katoikountes*), which have no technical military meaning.[10] In addition, the Ptolemaic system was initially to consist of a temporary grant of land attached to military service, implying that the cleruchs' sons too would become soldiers.

4 Horemheb supplied the temples with priests "from the pick of the home troops" and granted land and herds to these soldiers; see the translation of the hieroglyphs in Murnane and Meltzer (1995) no. 106, 233; Katary (1999) 79 "this may explain the administrative role of temples in the Wilbour Papyrus where so many military men are enumerated in company with smallholders of priestly office."

5 Vleeming (1993) 71–5, 78–9, for similar texts of the same period. Manning (2003) 35, 71 relates this practice to the strategy used by the Ptolemies; see also Katary (1999) 80 note 49.

6 Vleeming (1993) 72: plots of 2, 2½, 3, 4, 5 and 9 arouras. Five arouras are the most common in P.Wilbour; see Katary (1999) 75: 752 cases, i.e. 59 percent.

7 But Gauthier (1973) questions the extent of the use of the cleruchic system by Athens, as there is as much evidence for private ownership outside of Attica by the Athenian aristocracy as by Athenian cleruchs.

8 Plutarch, *Pericles* 11: φόβον δὲ καὶ φρουράν; Crawford (1971) 54.

9 Syll.[3] 332, ll. 9–10, where Philip gives land to Cassandra; Plutarch, *Alexander* 15; Crawford (1971) 54.

10 Lesquier (1911) 44. These latter terms, still debated, are discussed in section 6.2.3 and in Chapter 7, section 7.4 for the Seleucid system.

Settling soldiers on land could take many forms. The system established by the Ptolemies differed from those of Alexander and the Seleucids.[11] They distributed soldiers throughout the countryside (although far from uniformly), within existing villages, towns and cities, and sometimes in new foundations, but they founded only one Greek polis in Egypt, Ptolemais. The soldiers were settled gradually, in some villages only a few cleruchs per decade, while grants to larger groups occurred after both external and civil wars.[12] In the third century BC the Ptolemies expanded the cultivable area of the country through reclamation work around Lake Moeris, a region initially called "The Lake" (*Limē*) and later named the Arsinoite nome after Queen Arsinoe II.

Ptolemy I had to face the problem of a surplus of soldiers at the end of each war, as well as prisoners of war, who were often soldiers as well. The first hint of movements of people by Ptolemy I is given by Diodorus (19.85.4) in his mention of the settlement of 8,000 prisoners of war in all Egyptian nomes after the Battle of Gaza in 312 BC, although we do not know whether these men received *klēroi* and became cleruchs or whether they were professional soldiers in garrisons.[13] In 306 BC in Cyprus, Ptolemy's soldiers remained loyal to him, rather than joining the victorious Demetrius, because their families and baggage (*aposkeuai*) were in Egypt (Diodorus 20.47.4), although we cannot be sure that they were cleruchs.[14] Ptolemy I might have initially granted land to veterans, but in general the cleruchic system targeted soldiers still of fighting age, as is clear from the presence of young cleruchs.[15] Because we lack direct evidence for Ptolemy I's reign, the general view is that the settlement of soldiers became systematic only under Ptolemy II in connection with the reclamation of the Fayyum region and the first preserved decrees administrating the cleruchic system. As Crawford points out, however, the progress of the reclamation work under Ptolemy II suggests that the settlement of soldiers began with the founder of the dynasty.[16]

11 Crawford (1971) 53–4.

12 Documents from the Zenon archive show the numerous grants of land, especially to officers and cavalrymen, after the Third Syrian War and the subsequent royal visit to the Fayyum; see Clarysse (1980). The new cleruchs took oaths of allegiance when they received their *klēroi*; see Chapter 5, p. 168 and note 46. For progressive settlement of cleruchs in Kerkeosiris, see Crawford (1971) 58–75 and Tables I and II, p. 147; Keenan and Shelton (1976) 15. See already Lesquier (1911) 162–6, for a combination of progressive and exceptional grants.

13 See Chapter 3, section 3.1.1 note 16 for the textual problem.

14 Crawford (1971) 55 note 9.

15 Lesquier (1911) 46.

16 Crawford (1971) 55. Lesquier (1911) 46 and P.Fay., introduction, p. 9, had previously thought that the development of the Fayyum started under Ptolemy II; a survey of the different decrees concerning the cleruchs is given in section 6.4.

6.1 Chronology, geography and settlement size

Immigrants did not spread out equally in Egypt but formed pockets, mainly in Alexandria and the Delta, in the Fayyum, and in several areas in the Nile Valley. On the basis of toponyms in the three districts (*merides*) of the Fayyum, Clarysse proposed a chronology of its settlement by immigrants from abroad and Egyptians.[17] Arabon kome, Syron kome and *Thrakon* reflect settlement by foreign ethnic groups, and some settlers in the area belonged to the Ptolemaic army and police.[18] The Heraclides *meris* (including the nome-capital) was home to more than 50 percent of the Fayyum cleruchs, settled in 71 percent of the villages, whereas the Polemon *meris* in the south was home to only around 20 percent of the cleruchs, in 48 percent of the villages.[19] On the other hand, 45 percent of the professional cavalry soldiers (*misthophoroi hippeis*) were garrisoned in the Polemon *meris* to guard the southern entrance of the nome, compared with only 30 percent in the Heraclides *meris*.[20] A temporary army camp (*stratopedon*) was established during the Great Revolt in Theogonis (see Map 2), to the southeast of Kerkeosiris in the Polemon *meris*, and a guard-post was located on the Moeris canal in the Heraclides *meris*.[21] The latter may have existed already in the third century BC. Finally, the Themistos *meris* in the northwest, with about 30 percent of the cleruchs, settled in 63 percent of the villages, many of them named after the dynasty or the Alexandrian demes, had the largest number of Greek toponyms.[22] The names of the villages of Theadelphia and Philoteris can be dated to the reign of Ptolemy II, and Dionysias perhaps even later, suggesting that the area was settled slightly later than the other *merides*.

[17] Clarysse (2007), esp. 75, 78–9; Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 149–50; see also Mueller (2006) 149–51. For internal migration, Braunert (1964).

[18] Mueller (2006) 136.

[19] The percentages given in this section come from Clarysse (2007).

[20] Many names in the Polemon *meris* reflect town names from the Nile Valley and thus suggest internal migration; see Clarysse (2007); Braunert (1964), notably 83–5, 91. P.LilleDem. I 32 (Ghoran, 264/3 or 226/5 BC) reports the transfer of a few hundred people, perhaps workers, perhaps war prisoners, to "the south." Sottas (1921) suggests that this can refer either to the south of the Fayyum or to the Nile Valley.

[21] Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 98 note 29 and 150 note 136. See P.Köln V 221, l. 44 (190 BC) for a *stratopedon* in Theogonis, and P.Tebt. I 92, ll. 6–7 with P.Tebt. IV 1102, ll. 4–5 (after 113 BC and 116/15 BC, Kerkeosiris) for the guard-post on the Moeris canal.

[22] These figures (50 percent in the Heraclides, 20 percent in the Polemon and 30 percent in the Themistos) can be contrasted with the percentage of cleruchs per *meris* found in Uebel (1968), when fewer texts were included in the results: 43 percent of cleruchs in the Heraclides, 7 percent in the Polemon and 50 percent in the Themistos. See Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 150 and note 140.

Table 6.1. *Nomes with cleruchs attested until the mid second century BC in Uebel's list. Numbers based on Uebel (1968), and arouras calculated by Christensen (2002) 189–90 note 353*

Nome	Number of cases	Total size of arouras	Total size of km^2
Saite	3	12 or more	–
Bubastite	1	?	?
Memphite	24	1,225	3.1
Arsinoite	1065	33,907	93.44
Aphroditopolite nome	2?	?	?
Heracleopolite	181	3,926[a]	10.8
Oxyrhynchite	175	476	1.3
Hermopolite	8	270	0.75
Thebaid (region)	19	?	?

[a] Christensen (2002) 190 updated Uebel's figure for the Heracleopolite (3,926 arouras = 10.8 km^2) to 8,976 arouras (see Table 6.2) on the basis of BGU XIV, Appendix V 228–55, exclusive of vineyards, orchard land and temple land.

It is impossible to expand this type of analysis to all of Egypt, because the documentation is uneven, as is apparent from Uebel's list of cleruchs settled until 145 BC in Table 6.1, although we can refine the estimates of the size of the cleruchic settlements in several nomes (see below, Table 6.2). Cleruchs are well attested in the Arsinoite nome, and to some extent in the Memphite, Heracleopolite, Oxyrhynchite and Hermopolite nomes, but seem to have been less numerous in the rest of Middle Egypt and in Upper Egypt until the end of Period B (see Map 2).[23] This uneven distribution is not only due to the nature of the sources, but reflects the fact that the Thebaid was more densely populated and its best land already privately owned when the Ptolemies arrived, unlike the Fayyum.[24] In addition, the term "cleruch" did not spread to Middle and Upper Egypt, where terms for military ranks were more commonly used, biasing the collection of data.[25] Already under Ptolemy II or Ptolemy III, however, Greek infantry and cavalry soldiers paid

[23] Uebel (1968) 379–83. For the *katoikoi hippeis* of the Hermopolite nome and their dedication of a temple to Ptolemy III, see Chapter 9, section 9.3, p. 340 and note 40. Launey (1949) 46 also refers to the Pathyrite nome, but if this is the case, it is only attested in the second century BC; see Uebel (1968) 27.

[24] Uebel (1968) 26. For population density and ownership, see Monson (2007a).

[25] This discrepancy is manifest between the titles used in the Arsinoite nome and in the Oxyrhynchite nome; see Uebel (1968) 26.

Table 6.2. *Estimate of the amount of cleruchic land in the Arsinoite, Heracleopolite and Oxyrhynchite nomes*

Figures in italics are not based on papyrological evidence.

Nome	Cleruchic land in arouras and km²	Total size of cultivable land	% of cleruchic land in the nome	% of cleruchic land out of cleruchic land in Egypt
Higher estimate				
Arsinoite	163,350 ar. = 450 km²	544,500 ar. = 1,500 km²	30	31
Heracleopolite	*64,033 ar. = 176 km²*	*213,444 ar. = 588* km²	*30*	12
Oxyrhynchite	*60,766 ar. = 167 km²*	202,544 ar. = 558 km²	*30*	11
Total	*288,149 ar. = 793 km²*	960,498 ar. = 2,646 km²	–	54
Lower estimate				
Arsinoite	136,125 ar. = 375 km²	544,500 ar. = 1,500 km²	25	38
Heracleopolite	*42,689 ar. = 118 km²*	*213,444 ar. = 588* km²	*20*	12
Oxyrhynchite	*40,411 ar. = 111 km²*	202,544 ar. = 558 km²	*20*	11
Total	219,225 ar. = 604 km²	960,498 ar. = 2,646 km²	–	61

taxes on a large number of sheep and goats they owned in the Thebaid.[26] The possession of livestock suggests that they may have been cleruchs, but nothing in the tax list indicates that they were granted *klēroi* there.

The cleruchic system evolved during the second century, and there were still cleruchs until the first century BC. Uebel ends his investigation with the death of Ptolemy VI (145 BC), because in his view the inclusion of groups other than the initial immigrants and their descendants in the cleruchic system altered its nature.[27] My approach, by contrast, aims to identify changes in military institutions and investigate their causes. In Period C, grants of cleruchic land persisted in the villages of the Fayyum, with most of our sources coming from the village of Kerkeosiris. In the Nile Valley, starting from the north, the Heracleopolite and the Oxyrhynchite nomes still had communities of cleruchs in the first century BC, the Heracleopolite being the best documented for this later period.[28] In the Hermopolite nome, there were still *katoikoi hippeis* in the second and first centuries, some perhaps the descendants of those who settled in the nome capital in the third century.[29] They may have been attached to the *hēgemonia* or *syntagma* of professional

26 See the forthcoming edition of a Demotic tax list (P.Ashm.Dem. 81) similar to P.Count 2 by Clarysse.

27 Uebel (1968) 5. 28 See sections 6.3 and 6.4.3, and Chapter 7, section 7.2.3.

29 Only two documents mention cleruchs, SB V 7632 (159 BC) and BGU III 1002 (55 BC); see Winnicki (1978) 16–17.

soldiers stationed in the garrison of Hermopolis in the late second and first centuries.[30] Also in the Hermopolite nome, but 50 kilometers north of Hermopolis, in Tenis-Akoris and Cleopatra, cleruchs, *katoikoi hippeis* among them, were well represented among the military groups in the late second century BC.[31] If it initially seems surprising that the Hermopolite nome was so heavily militarized, its location at the northern border of the Thebaid may be the explanation, as Winnicki proposed.[32]

Further south in the valley, there were 25-aroura men in the Lycopolite nome in the second century BC, and cavalry settlers in the Panopolite nome in the first century BC.[33] In Thebes only a few *katoikoi* are attested from the second century BC onward and illustrate the military reorganization of the area that resulted from the period of crisis.[34] *Machimoi*, probably settled in the second century, were found there in the first century BC. From Thebes 408 *machimoi* were transferred to the Heracleopolite in 63 BC.[35] South of Thebes there was a garrison in Hermonthis, with *katoikoi hippeis* from at least 130 BC.[36] Finally, Edfu had a garrison already under Ptolemy II, if not earlier, since one of his royal decrees stated that soldiers should reside there.[37] They were not to receive any *stathmos* in the nearby town of Arsinoe unless necessary, that is, they were not to be settled by state administrators in private houses and should not settle there on their own initiative.[38] There is no positive evidence that any of them were cleruchs, but there were cleruchs in the nome at least from the late third century, when one petitioned the king (SB VI 9302). The second-century land survey of the Edfu nome (P.Haun.inv. 407) also records a few large cleruchic plots (of 140 and 98 arouras, and two of 40 arouras), the first before the Great Revolt, and a few more under Ptolemy VI and Ptolemy VIII. The latter king also settled seventy-five *andres*, many of them probably Egyptian, with 10 arouras of cleruchic land apiece.[39] Ptolemy VIII relied on this group during the dynastic conflict. When the *andres* failed to appear, however,

30 See I.Herm.Magn. 4 = SB I 599 (late second century BC). This inscription is also discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.2.4 and in Chapter 7, section 7.2.3 and note 155.

31 See Chapter 5, section 5.2.3.1 and Chapter 7, section 7.2.3.2.

32 Winnicki (1978) 25.

33 SB X 10224 (Lycopolite, second century BC). For the Panopolite, see the will of a *katoikos hippeus* discussed in note 175.

34 Clarysse (1995) 2–3 and Table 2, with the fourteen *katoikoi hippeis* attested in Thebes from 161/0 BC onward, with only one case in the first century BC and only one *katoikos* with an Egyptian name, Amenrosis son of Paieus; Winnicki (1978) 60–1.

35 BGU VIII 1749–50 (64/3 BC, Heracleopolite); Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 194.

36 P.Bad. II 2 (Hermonthis, 130 BC) and Winnicki (1978) 67.

37 See Chapter 7, section 7.1.2, p. 243 and note 25.

38 For the *stathmos*, see section 6.4.1 and Chapter 7, section 7.1.2.

39 Christensen (2003) 12–14 and (2002) 167–72. For the dedication of about one aroura from each plot to the temple of Edfu, see Chapter 9, section 9.3 note 51.

at the land survey of 119/18 BC, their plots were confiscated.[40] They were probably transferred to a new place, but whether they were given land there is unknown.

Judgment as to whether cleruchs were settled elsewhere is contingent on our ability to understand the terms used and on the provenance of the sources. The variation in the terminology in different areas, involving either the number of arouras or military rank as a means of identification in official papyri, make it difficult to trace the settlement of cleruchs throughout Egypt. But data that were unavailable to Uebel make it possible to propose new estimates of the amount of cleruchic land in the Arsinoite, Heracleopolite and Oxyrhynchite nomes, summarized in Table 6.2 (above, p. 204). The *katoikoi* of the Heracleopolite nome may have represented 12 percent of those in Egypt, according to a new interpretation of the amount of taxes *katoikoi* owed the state in the first century.[41] Christensen calculates that the *katoikoi*'s holdings in land surveys from that century amounted to 8,976 arouras.[42] Yet this figure can hardly represent all the cleruchic land in the nome, since it amounts to only 4 percent of the cultivable arouras.[43] For the Oxyrhynchite nome, we must rely mainly on documents from the first four centuries of Roman rule, which record the amount of land located on *klēroi* presumably named after the cleruchs of the Ptolemaic period.[44] Such "old" or "fossil" *klēroi* also existed in the Heracleopolite nome.[45] Falivene has recently demonstrated that these *klēroi* kept the names of the earliest settlers and were divided into smaller plots in the first century BC.[46] An educated guess can be made for the Oxyrhynchite nome on the basis of the 258 *klēroi* reported in Benaissa's survey of the Oxyrhynchite settlements.[47]

40 Christensen (2003) 14.

41 BGU VIII 1760 (50/1 BC) and Monson (2012) 180–1: the *katoikoi* of the Heracleopolite owed 35,680 artabas out of 300,000 to be paid by the *katoikoi*. For an earlier interpretation, see Ricketts (1992), esp. 276 and note 5.

42 Christensen (2002) 190 updated Uebel's number of arouras (3,926 arouras = 10.8 km^2) on the basis of BGU XIV, Appendix V 228–55, exclusive of vineyards, orchard land and temple land.

43 I calculated 213,000 cultivable arouras for the entire nome on the basis of its size roughly estimated at 305,000 arouras or 840 km^2 (70 km × 12 km) on the basis of the map of the Heracleopolite nome in Falivene (1998). I assumed that the percentage of cultivable land was similar to the 70 percent I calculated for the Oxyrhynchite nome, that is 202,544 arouras (see note 48 below) out of approximately 283,000 arouras (based on the map in the Barrington Atlas).

44 Rowlandson (2007b) 209.

45 Zucker (1964). Most had Greek names, but Zucker 106 also notes a few Egyptian names.

46 Falivene (1998) 273–88, and esp. Falivene (2007); Berti (2007) 107. For descriptions attached to the land rather than referring to current settlers in the Fayyum, see Crawford (1971) 60–1.

47 Benaissa (2012); previously one could count 210 *klēroi* reported by Pruneti (1975) in her list of names of *klēroi*. Uebel (1968) recorded 175 cleruchs in that nome until 145 BC, but the size of *klēroi* is almost never preserved; see p. 214 and note 87 below.

If these fossil *klēroi* averaged 100 arouras, there were at least 25,800 arouras of cleruchic land out of a total of 202,544 arouras in that nome, about 13 percent of the cultivable land.[48]

This figure is close to the total of cleruchic land in the Arsinoite recorded in Uebel's list: 33,907 arouras (see Table 6.1, above). But Uebel's figure must be a significant underestimation, since it is hardly plausible that his list of *klēroi* is exhaustive. Cleruchic land would account for only about 6 percent of the area under cultivation in the Fayyum (1,500 km^2), whereas land surveys record 40 percent cleruchic land in third-century Tanis and 34 percent in second-century Kerkeosiris.[49] Six percent is surprisingly low for the Fayyum, since the Ptolemies undertook intensive reclamation work to settle immigrants, mostly soldiers, there. Indeed, the amount of cultivable land went from *c.* 400 km^2 in the second millennium BC to *c.* 1,500 km^2 in the third century BC.[50] More reliable than Uebel's list for large-scale evaluations is a tax list from the Arsinoite nome from the period 254–231 BC (P.Count 1) that gathers data from the entire nome and reports 3,472 adult males belonging to an unnamed group, probably cavalry cleruchs. Thompson explains that these men were not all granted 100 arouras, but that only heads of households were, perhaps 1,000 or 2,000 men.[51] Even if only 1,000 cleruchs received 100-aroura *klēroi*, cleruchic land in the Arsinoite may have amounted to 294 km^2, 20 percent of what was cultivable.[52] The cavalry cleruchs of the Arsinoite may have constituted about one-third of those settled in Egypt, as they totalled 3,000 according to Polybius' description of the cavalry at Raphia.[53] This number probably remained stable as Greek immigration stopped after Raphia but increased slightly in the second half of the second BC with the inclusion of new soldiers and policemen in the *katoikia* (see below).[54]

48 For the total cultivable area, see SB XIV 12208 (*c.* AD 350) and Monson (2012) 102 note 126.

49 Monson (2012) 91–2.

50 The Fayyum was first intensively developed during the Twelfth dynasty and then under the Ptolemies: Manning (2003) 38–9. For estimates of the amount of cultivable land, see Butzer (1976). For 1,500 km^2 (= 544,267 arouras), see Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 90 note 2, 95.

51 Thompson (2007), esp. 309, with household sizes of 3.3–6.2 adults on average; Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 152–3.

52 See also Monson (2012) 89; Thompson (2007) 309–10.

53 Polybius 5.65.5, see Text 3.4 and Table 3.7: 700 cavalry of the guard and 2,300 Libyan and cavalry "enlisted in the country"; Thompson (2007) 309–10 counts 1,000 cavalry cleruchs and 400 cavalry mercenaries for the Arsinoite, so more than half of the 2,300 cavalry in Polybius 5.65.5; the proportion is similar to that in Monson (2012) 180–1, who calculates on the basis of P.Tebt. I 99 that the *katoikoi* of the Arsinoite paid 23 percent or 27 percent of the fiscal burden owed by the *katoikoi*.

54 Fischer-Bovet (2011) 143–5.

Another problem Clarysse and Thompson raise about the figures for cleruchic land in the Arsinoite is the limited evidence for infantry cleruchs in the tax lists and in the documentation as a whole before Raphia.[55] They suggest that cavalry settlers were the norm because the early Ptolemies tried to secure their loyalty before that of infantrymen. Their skills no doubt made their bargaining power with the king greater than that of infantrymen. The *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* records only thirty-six 30-aroura men (*PP* IV 8876–8908) and sixteen 25-aroura men, who must be infantry cleruchs, versus 222 100-aroura men and sixty-three 80- and 70-aroura men altogether. This is a surprisingly low proportion of infantry (15 percent), since Hellenistic armies usually had ten times more infantry than cavalry. Thirty-aroura men were granted land throughout the third and second centuries BC, but the denomination “25-aroura men” seems to have been used only in Period A. The village Ibion of the 25-aroura men (Ibion *tōn Eikosipentarourōn*), which appears in documents at the very beginning of Period B (P.Tebt. I 137, 218/17 BC), could misleadingly suggest that this size of allotment was common and continued to be granted.[56] In fact, the name was certainly given to the village after the settlement of a group of infantrymen who fought at Raphia and subsequently received 25 arouras; the name of the settlement remained the same, but this size of allotment seems no longer to have been used, along with other military reforms in the period.[57] In other words, during Period A it seems to have been mainly cavalrymen and cavalry and infantry officers who received allotments in the Fayyum and probably in the other nomes of Middle Egypt. Riding horses allowed them to reach their garrisons easily. By contrast, either it was mostly infantrymen who were settled in the Delta, or not as many infantrymen as is usually thought received plots in Period A.

In what follows, I propose a model for evaluating the relative numbers and extent of cleruchic land in the Arsinoite, Heracleopolite and Oxyrhynchite nomes, taking into consideration the data described in this section. In the Arsinoite nome – the best-documented case – cleruchic land in the hands of cavalry settlers (294 km^2) amounted to at least 20 percent of the cultivable land, to which one must add land held by infantry cleruchs. Monson suggests that the latter could not hold more than 32,040 arouras

55 Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 153.

56 This may be the new name given to Ibion *tōn Pentarourōn* after Raphia; see Kramer (1991) 103–6.

57 The only attestation of 25-aroura men after Raphia is SB X 10224 (Lycopolite, second century BC); on the names of early military settlements that remained in use in the Heracleopolite nome, see Falivene (2007) 213–14.

(88 km^2), a maximum reached if one assumes that they were as numerous as cavalry cleruchs and received an average of 30 arouras.[58] A total of 382 km^2 of cleruchic land represents 25 percent of the cultivable land. As the Arsinoite villages mentioned above had higher percentages of cleruchic land, an average of 25–30 percent of cleruchic land in the Arsinoite is plausible, as Monson has already suggested. The percentage of cleruchic land in the two other nomes under consideration was probably similar or slightly less. In the higher estimate summarized in Table 6.2 above, I assume 30 percent cleruchic land. Hence the Heracleopolite and the Oxyrhynchite nomes might have included 176 km^2 and 167 km^2 of cleruchic land, respectively. As noted above, the Heracleopolite *katoikoi* paid 12 percent of the taxes owed by all *katoikoi* in Egypt. This allows us to calculate that 31 percent of the cleruchic land held by *katoikoi* was in the Arsinoite nome and 11 percent in the Oxyrhynchite. These three nomes contained a total of 793 km^2 of cleruchic land and accounted for a little more than half the cleruchic land in Egypt (54 percent). If this is approximately correct, 7 percent of the 20,000 km^2 of cultivable land in Egypt was cleruchic land.

This model suggests that the papyrological sources available for evaluating cleruchic land in the Heracleopolite nome yield a huge underestimation. The 8,976 arouras (24.7 km^2) Christensen calculated on the basis of land surveys are one-seventh of the figure suggested by the model. On the other hand, the names of *klēroi* in Roman material from the Oxyrhynchite nome support a figure of at least 25,800 arouras (71.1 km^2) of cleruchic land, slightly less than half of the higher estimate suggested in Table 6.2. This is unsurprising, since one would not expect the names of all *klēroi* to be preserved, especially given that repeated attestations are rare. For this reason, I also regard as possible a lower estimate summarized in Table 6.2, in which only 20 percent of the Heracleopolite and Oxyrhynchite land was cleruchic, and 25 percent of the Arsinoite land. The portion of the total cleruchic land in Egypt in the Heracleopolite amount remains 12 percent, as calculated by Monson on the basis of taxes paid by the *katoikoi*. With the lower estimate, the percentage of cleruchic land in the Oxyrhynchite nome stays at 11 percent; the percentage in the Arsinoite nome, however, might be as high as 38 percent. On this estimate, the three nomes had a total of 604 km^2 of cleruchic land and accounted for slightly less than two-thirds of cleruchic land in Egypt (61 percent). In that case, 5 percent of the 20,000 km^2 of cultivable land in Egypt was cleruchic land.

58 Monson (2012) 89.

One hopes that these figures will someday be refined by the discovery of texts that offer information about other nomes. At the moment, other data from the Nile Valley remain unconclusive. On the one hand, a second-century BC land survey from the Edfu nome records 657 arouras (1.81 km^2) of cleruchic land out of *c.* 57,000 arouras.[59] This suggests only 1.2 percent cleruchic land in that nome, which may be too low an estimate. On the other hand, Roman land registers from the village of Naboo in the Apollonopolite Heptakomias nome of Middle Egypt record 2,980 arouras of cleruchic land out of 4,915 arouras in the entire village, about 60 percent (P.Giss I 60, AD 118), and 237 arouras out of 668 arouras in one basin within the village, one-third of that area (WChr. 324, AD 113–20). This is somewhat misleading, however, because in the Roman period the term "cleruchic land" was used as equivalent to "private land," as Monson has argued.[60] Only a portion of the so-called cleruchic land was accordingly in the hands of cleruchs in the Ptolemaic period. In any case, it is impossible that the percentage of cleruchic land in that nome was higher than in the Fayyum. Finally, the carbonized papyri from the Mendesian nome in the Delta, dated to the Roman period, bring to light no fossil *klēroi* but only make occasional mention of old possessions (*ousiai*) of the *phylakitēs*.[61]

6.2 Organization of the cleruchic system

6.2.1 Administrators of the cleruchic system

The cleruchic system required its own administrators, and although the evidence reveals their titles, it is vague on their functions. For this reason it has been suggested that the eponymous officers were officials in charge of cleruchic settlements, but the old view that they were high officers in charge of active soldiers was restated in Chapter 4. The tasks of the administrators of the cleruchic system remained rather similar during the three centuries: assigning land to new cleruchs, checking their property and the quality of their land for taxation purposes, controlling the exchange or division of *klēroi*, confiscating them when necessary, and handling disputes involving cleruchs or concerning *klēroi* or *stathmoi*.[62] But from the administrative documents of Kerkeosiris we can at least infer modifications

59 P.Haun.inv. 407, l. 244 and Christensen (2002) 115, 190.

60 Monson (2012) 101, and on land classification in Naboo, 99–102.

61 Blouin (2007) 165.

62 For the steps in the attribution of a *klēros* and the administrative channels, notably involving the *taktomisthos*, see PSI V 513 (Philadelphia, 251 BC) and Aly (1997) 3–4. For oaths taken by cleruchs, see Chapter 5, p. 168, note 46.

in the management of the expanding cleruchic system in the final decades of the second century. This brief survey sketches the broad lines of the system and introduces the most common titles preserved in the papyrological sources.

While a series of *grammateis* and *hypēretai* were secretaries and servants in the administration of the army on active duty, a multitude of officials ran the cleruchic system.[63] A group of *epistatai* was in charge of the cavalry settlers. At the end of the second century, in Period C, they may have been called *epistatai* of the hipparchy, and they transmitted the declaration of property of the cavalrymen to the *stratēgos* for tax purposes.[64] The *prostatai* of the *katoikoi hippeis* and their colleagues, the *symprostatai*, took care of assigning isolated plots of land to other cleruchs and may have been chosen by the cleruchs themselves.[65]

Above the *prostatai* were the officials responsible for all the cleruchs within an area. In the third century the *grammateis* of the cleruchs, probably one per region, managed the administration of the plots, while in the second century the system developed further, with *grammateis* specialized according to the type of cleruchs, one for the *katoikoi hippeis* and perhaps two for the *machimoi*.[66] If this is correct, it unsurprisingly suggests a larger number of *machimoi* than of *katoikoi hippeis*. The *grammateis* checked the individuals who were becoming cleruchs, assigned land, controlled the quality of the *klēros* and handled disputes. From the time of Ptolemy V on, in Period B, they were subordinate to a new high official, the *pros tē syntaxē* or *epi syntaxeōs*.[67] The latter managed plot allotments and transfers and sequestrations of plots at the death of cleruchs, and they were responsible for paying soldiers in cash and kind.[68] They connected the military administration to that of the nome,

[63] *PP* II/VIII 2400–2532; Ioannidou (2006); Lesquier (1911) 99–102 for the administration of the army on active duty and 192–201 for the administration of the cleruchic system.

[64] See the ἐπιστάτης τῆς Πολεμάρχọυ̣ [ἱπ]παρχίας in P.Thrace 1, ll. 30–1. In this petition to an *archisōmatophylax* by a woman concerning her two sons who belonged to the army, the *epistatēs* of the hipparchy of Polemarchos probably had to handle complaints regarding taxes. Several kinds of *epistatai* are attested in the army.

[65] For the multiple meanings of *prostatēs*, see Ioannidou (2006) commentary to l. 20.

[66] *PP* II/VIII 2464–88; UPZ I 110, ll. 145 with commentary; P.Tebt. I 60–3; Lesquier (1911) 194.

[67] Ioannidou (2006) 37, commentary to l. 16 and note 17 (P.Tebt. III 793, col. 3, ll. 20–2, 183 BC), *contra* Lesquier (1911) 196 note 2 who considers P.Lille I 4, ll. 24–5 = W.Chr. 336 (217 BC, Ptolemais Hormou) the first attestation. Indeed, Geraci (1981) 268 note 7, 270–1 shows that in P.Lille I 4 the ὁ ἐπὶ συντάξεως is in charge of an infantryman and is thus not the same official as the one in charge of the *katoikoi hippeis*.

[68] For the nome as the area of competence of the πρὸς τῇ συντάξει or ἐπὶ συντάξεως, see Geraci (1981) 275. For σύνταξις in this title meaning "contribution" because this official was involved in collecting the *stephanos* tax, see Wilcken (1979) 296–7, *contra* Grenfell *et al.* (1902–38), who translate "superintendent of the arrangement of *catoeci*" and "of the assignment of land to the

notifying the royal scribe about transfers.[69] The *pros tē syntaxē* disappears from our very limited documentation in the final decades of Ptolemaic rule (48/7 BC), when Caesar arrived with his legions.[70] This suggests that the cleruchic system was no longer providing troops when needed and was no longer integrating new cleruchs or transferring them. The registration of katoikic land continued until the second century AD, but in the Roman period its status was probably similar to that of private land.[71]

6.2.2 Rationale behind the evolution of plot size

Cavalry settlers were usually allotted 100 arouras, and from the 220s BC on some received 80 or 70 arouras, whereas infantrymen were granted 30 or more rarely 25 arouras.[72] Other sizes were rare, except smaller plots of 5 to 20 arouras that were granted to *machimoi*, most often of Egyptian origin.[73] In view of the large size of the plots given to immigrant soldiers, and given the location of many of them in the Fayyum, it is likely that cleruchs received plots that needed to be at least partially reclaimed, rather than confiscated land.[74] Even if the royal administration undertook the costly initial work, this recently reclaimed land was not of the same quality as land in the Nile Valley and needed more maintenance work.[75] Yet cleruchs used part of their plots for grazing sheep, horses or cattle.[76]

From Period B onward, the size of cleruchic plots diversified and the average size decreased. This happened in three ways but can be observed in

catoeci"; see P.Tebt. I 30, l. 6 and P.Rein. I 7, l. 12 and commentary *ad loc.* For Duttenhöfer and Scholl (2002), commentary to P.Lips. II 124, l. 72, *syntaxis* can also designate, in addition to "assignment," a group of individuals who receive military wages or an allotment, hence "pay-category" or "type of land allotment" ("Besoldungsgruppe, Gehaltsstufe, Lehensgruppe"); see P.Tebt. I 60, ll. 17–28 (Kerkeosiris, 118 BC).

69 On the collaboration of the royal scribe with the cleruchic administration, see Armoni (2012) 186–204.

70 Ioannidou (2006) 37, commentary to l. 16, see Chapter 3, section 3.2.3 note 242.

71 P.Köln V 527; Monson (2012) 121–2.

72 For the earliest attestation of an 80-aroura man, see P.Genova III 103 (after 229/8 BC), and for a 70-aroura man, see P.Enteux. 11 (221 BC).

73 See Chapter 4, section 4.1.

74 In the Fayyum the *klēroi* were made up out of royal land; see Crawford (1971) 55 and P.Rev. 36, ll. 13–14. Private property in general was protected against soldiers' abuses in royal *prostagmata* such as C.Ord.Ptol. 9 under Ptolemy II and the amnesty decree of 118 BC, P.Tebt. I 5, ll. 99–101.

75 For the relatively poor quality of the plots, see Lesquier (1911) 206; Préaux (1979) 469–70; Rostovtzeff (1922) 137–9; Crawford (1971) 58 for the second century BC, whereas examples of fertile land grants exist in the third century BC. For the problem of salinization in the Fayyum and Delta vs. the Nile Valley, see Monson (2012) 51–4. Préaux (1979) 463 thought that cleruchs could be settled on *dōreai*, but Uebel (1968) 25 showed that this was highly unlikely.

76 See, for example, the many sheep owned by soldiers in P.Count 1 and 2.

detail only in the village of Kerkeosiris. First, cleruchs who inherited one 100- or 800-aroura *klēroi* could lose the non-cultivated parts or the areas left fallow.[77] Second, many new recruits were *machimoi* of Egyptian origin, who received small plots.[78] Third, from Period C onward, new cleruchs allotted land in Kerkeosiris who were not *machimoi* received smaller *klēroi* than their title indicated.[79] Cleruchs hired as 100-aroura men were allotted only 50 arouras, and 80-aroura men got only 40 arouras, unless their plots were split over several villages, which we cannot know in most cases.[80] Yet such standardization, at 50 and 40 arouras, suggests that this had become the norm. This would not be at odds with the fact that infantrymen and policemen who entered the *katoikia* did not automatically receive complimentary plots of land, and thus did not hold 100 or 80 arouras (see section 6.2.3, below).[81] These inconsistencies between title and real size may have encouraged the administration to use the generic term *katoikos hippeus* or *katoikos* for cavalry settlers, since terminology based on the exact number of arouras was gradually losing its connection with actual plot size.[82]

These developments have been explained as a "devaluation of the *klēros*" or "devaluation of the cleruchic institutions."[83] According to Préaux, from the second century onward not enough people wanted to cultivate cleruchic land. These cleruchs would have done a favor to the king, who was in a weak position and was hoping to maintain or expand cultivated land to maximize tax collections.[84] In Préaux's view, the king had to accept the loss of some of his rights on cleruchic land to have enough men cultivating his territory. But if one follows Préaux's reasoning, that the cleruchs were helping the king by taking more land, the implication is that the best deal for a cleruch would

77 Van 't Dack (1977) 85. 78 See Chapter 5, section 5.1 and Fischer-Bovet (in press a).

79 Peremans and Van 't Dack (1950–81) *PP* IV, p. XX and note 1 mention a *triakontarouroi* (*PP* II 3536) who pays the *chōmatikon* on only 25 arouras. For them, this discrepancy can be explained by the lack of people available for cultivating or by confiscations by the king.

80 Keenan and Shelton (1976) introduction, 10; Crawford (1971) Table III, 148–54. For an example of a *klēros* split between Kerkeosiris and another village, see the division of the 24 arouras of the *ephodos* Acousilaos, P.Tebt. I 64(a), l. 78 (116/15 BC) and Crawford (1971) 68. For 45 arouras as common in the 160s, see the 45-aroura cleruchs at Moeris, p. 349.

81 For the standardization, see already Lesquier (1911).

82 For the term *katoikos*, see section 6.2.3.

83 By "devaluation of the cleruchy" I understand the lowering, on average, of the socio-economic status of cleruchs. Van 't Dack (1977) 85 uses "devaluation of the *klēros*" to mean that over generations, the cleruchs could lose portions of the land that were not cultivated or left fallow, and thus that the size of their *klēros* could diminish. But on p. 84 he seems to use the idea of a "devaluation of the cleruchic institutions" as if cleruchs were no longer well-trained soldiers but devoted their time to agricultural and economic activities, and he suggests that this was caused by the development of inheritance rules concerning *klēroi*, thus following Heinen (1973), esp. 107; see section 6.4.4.

84 Préaux (1979) 470.

have been to obtain the smallest plot of land possible. This was obviously not the case, since the *machimoi* – not the cavalry settlers – were still allotted the smallest plots, as in the third century. For Van 't Dack, on the other hand, the grant of large plots, often transmitted hereditarily, in the third century BC led to saturation in the second century, unless the king converted more royal land into cleruchic land.[85] A decree about the decision to give "desert" land (*chersos*) to cleruchs from 140/39 BC in Kerkeosiris, although in practice the cleruchs were often illegally given "sown" land (*sporimos*), supports Van 't Dack's hypothesis, which can be called the "saturation theory."[86]

Alternatively, one can analyze the situation according to the rule of supply and demand, assuming that owning land was valuable, as in any agrarian society. The larger number of small plots granted by the state suggests high demand for cleruchic land. Since the king was in a strong bargaining position, he could find cleruchs in the internal pool of recruits who would accept smaller plots more easily than they would have in the past. If this is correct, we should find that in the third century plots of 60 or more arouras were commonly granted to cleruchs throughout Egypt – and not only in the Fayyum, where a large amount of land was reclaimed – and that in the second and first centuries BC, only smaller plots were given out. The uneven provenance of the sources and their representativeness are problematic. But when we know the size of plots granted in the Nile Valley in the third century, they are indeed large, confirming the hypothesis.[87] Moreover, in the second century, as noted above, the size of allotments was on average smaller for cavalrymen in the *katoikia* than it was for cavalry cleruchs in the third century; the average size of cleruchic plots – including *klēroi* granted to *machimoi* – was even smaller. First-century land surveys from the Heracleopolite nome confirm this pattern. *Klēroi* with the names

85 Van 't Dack (1977) 83.

86 For the decree of the *dioikētēs*, see P.Tebt. I 72, ll. 159–63 (Kerkeosiris, 113 BC) with Crawford (1971) 58 and notes 2–5. For illegal grants, see P.Tebt. I 79, ll. 42–67 (Arsinoite, 148 BC).

87 The table below with the plot sizes that are preserved is based on Uebel (1968). In the Memphite nome, twelve plots are above 60 arouras out of eighteen whose size is known; in the Heracleopolite, seventeen plots out of twenty-five are, and in the Hermopolite the four plots whose size is known are above 60 arouras. Only the Oxyrhynchite nome shows a different pattern.

Nome	Number of cases	100 or more	80	70/60	40	30 or less
Memphite	24	7	0	5	4	2
Heracleopolite	181	14	0	3	0	8
Oxyrhynchite	175	0	0	3	0	10
Hermopolite	8	3	1	0	0	0

of previous owners (fossil *klēroi*) were in most cases split into smaller plots by that time.[88] Many cleruchs were *katoikoi hippeis* newly promoted to the *katoikia* from the police, while others were 7-aroura men and lower ranking policemen with cleruchic land.[89] While they were almost all of Egyptian origin by that time (see Chapter 7, section 7.1.4), the 7-aroura men and lower-ranking policemen, called "Egyptian cleruchs" by Falivene, were granted smaller plots. To sum up, in the Heracleopolite nome the Ptolemies seem to have split old *klēroi* between the new *katoikoi* and cleruchs, which supports the "saturation theory," whereas in Kerkeosiris the state expanded the amount of cleruchic land. In both cases, soldiers and policemen received smaller plots than in the past, in accord with the "high demand theory." Both processes thus seem to have been at work and might explain the rationale behind the size of *klēroi*.

Cleruchs with large *klēroi* may have had trouble finding enough laborers to work their plots and do the maintenance work. But they probably put animals to pasture on some of their land. Granting smaller plots, by contrast, was perhaps a better solution for the state if the goal was to maximize the amount of land cultivated and taxed. Whereas cleruchs with large plots did not cultivate the land themselves and thus did not increase the agricultural labor force, the smaller plots given to the *machimoi* encouraged them to cultivate their land completely in order to have enough income. This worked well, provided they did not have to leave their land too frequently or during harvest time or the like. But complaints by *machimoi* in garrison in Alexandria in the 160s BC (UPZ I 110) and later from the official records preserved in Kerkeosiris attest such problems in the period of crisis.[90]

Increasing numbers of *machimoi*, who were cleruchs with 5 to 7 arouras, or even with 20 or 30 arouras for cavalry *machimoi*, and decreasing numbers of cleruchs with more than 70 arouras, can be seen in Period B and especially Period C in the lists of the *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* II and IV; the trends are particularly visible in the land surveys from Kerkeosiris for Period C.[91] This expansion of the cleruchic system to new groups can be explained by the need to rely on soldiers recruited locally. The discrepancies between the size of *klēroi* diminished to some extent, leveling the economic capacities of different groups of cleruchs, as summarized in Table 6.3 below.[92]

88 Falivene (2007), based on BGU XIV 2441–50, esp. Table 8, with two 100- and 105-aroura *klēroi* that are not yet fossil.

89 Falivene (2007), esp. 211 and Table 7.

90 See Chapter 7, section 7.1.4.

91 For a list of *machimoi*, see Fischer-Bovet (2013) Table. For Kerkeosiris, see Crawford (1971) Table IV, 156–9.

92 The economic capacities of cleruchs and soldiers are discussed in Chapter 7, section 7.1.

Table 6.3. *Size of cleruchic land allotments*
Changes in Periods B and C are in bold.

Period A		Periods B and C	
Titles	Size of the plot in arouras	Titles	Size of the plot in arouras
Hekatontarouroi, *ogdoēkontarouroi*, *heptarouroi*	100, 80 or 70 (cavalry)	***katoikoi hippeis***	100 or 80, or slightly less
–	–	**new recruits directly hired as *katoikoi hippeis***	**70 to 40**
Triakontarouroi	30 (infantry)	*triakontarouroi or become* ***katoikoi hippeis*** **(cavalry)**	**[30 or more?]**
Eikosipentarouroi	25 (infantry)	–	–
–	–	***katoikoi hippeis*** **transferred from the police**	**40 to 10**
–	–	***machimoi hippeis***	**30 to 20**
Machimoi	10, 7 or 5	*machimoi*	10, 7 or 5
Policemen (*ephodoi*, *phylakitai* . . .)	–	**policemen (*ephodoi*, *phylakitai* . . .)**	**24 to 10**

The cleruchic system initially reinforced some socio-economic inequalities between immigrants and indigenous people, but by the mid second century it had become a unifying force between certain strata of these two groups. At the higher level of the cleruchic system, policemen and guards of Egyptian origin entered the *katoikia*, the group formed by the descendants of the first immigrants, and benefited from the same privileges. At the lower level, many more Egyptians were granted land as *machimoi*. As holders of cleruchic land, they enjoyed privileges discussed below and in Chapter 7.

6.2.3 Expansion of the cleruchic system: integration and leveling

Access for a larger portion of the population to the cleruchic system from the second century BC onward led to internal reorganization, with an alteration in terminology. Indeed, during Period B, under Ptolemy IV and V, policemen, who were strictly speaking not part of the army, received plots of cleruchic land (*gē klērouchikē*), and more men were hired as *machimoi*




Figure 6.1 Model of change within the cleruchic system

and were also allotted cleruchic land.[93] At the same time, the term *katoikos*, until then used only rarely for cavalry settlers (*katoikoi hippeis*), appears to mark a distinction between these new members and the earlier cleruchs.[94] *Katoikos hippeus*, most often abbreviated to *katoikos*, became a technical term for cleruchs of the highest status who had the largest plots, and who were cavalrymen and generally of Greek origin.[95] In other words, as illustrated in Figure 6.1 below, the *katoikoi* were a subgroup of cleruchs, all of whom had allotments of cleruchic land.[96] But the category "*katoikia*," as it appears in the papyri, was not hermetic. In Period C, from the mid second century, many infantrymen and policemen entered the *katoikia* from the

93 For one of the earliest attestations of policemen with a *klēros* (34 arouras) under Ptolemy IV, see Crawford (1971) Table III, 148 (P.Tebt. I 62, ll. 34–5). For *machimoi*, see Chapter 5, section 5.1.

94 There are only two attestations of *katoikoi hippeis* in the third century BC, *PP* II/VIII 02658 = Uebel (1968) no. 4, see P.Mich. I 9 (257 BC, Bubastos) and Uebel (1968) no. 1453, see SB VIII 9735 (246–222 BC, Hermopolite nome).

95 Van 't Dack (1977) 84; Uebel (1968) 5, 26–7; earlier views in Lesquier (1911) 48–52. For the equivalence between *katoikoi* and *katoikoi hippeis*, see *PP* II 2586–2720, where the same persons appear indifferently joining the *katoikoi hippeis*, the *katoikia*, or the *katoikoi*, at least in Kerkeosiris (e.g. *PP* II/VIII 2589, 2608, 2617, 2618, 2621, 2625, 2627, 2682, 2684, 2686, 2702). We know of only one case of a *katoikos* of the infantry, κάτοικος [τῶν πε]ζῶν, *PP* II 2978 in P.Fay. 11, l. 3 = M.Chr. 14, after 116 BC, Theadelphia. But the reading on the original is uncertain, perhaps [τῶν Περ]σῶν.

96 Grenfell *et al.* (1902–38) P.Tebt. I, pp. 545–6.

lower status of cleruchs.[97] Yet the word "cleruch" was still used generically, for example in decrees concerning all holders of *klēroi*.[98]

As the number of *machimoi* allotted land grew, a new term was coined for their unit under Ptolemy V: *laarchia*.[99] In Kerkeosiris, the *laarchia* was composed of cavalry-*machimoi* with 20- or 30-aroura plots (*triakontarouroi* or *eikosiarouroi*) and of infantry-*machimoi* with 7- or 5-aroura plots (*heptarouroi* or *pentarouroi*).[100] These men were mostly of Egyptian origin.[101] New cleruchs could also be directly "enrolled among the *katoikoi hippeis*," as the papyri put it, and sometimes took the names of the officials who settled them, as for example the *Kritoneioi*.[102] The inclusion of policemen in the cleruchic system – but not immediately in the group of *katoikoi hippeis* or *katoikia* – began under Ptolemy IV: first a desert horseman (*chersephippos*) was granted 30 arouras in Kerkeosiris, and then under Ptolemy V a desert guard (*erēmophylax*) was granted 10 arouras in the same village.[103] That these developments were not limited to this village can be assumed, since they make sense within the larger political and economic context of Period B. The changes reflect the government's need to secure the loyalty of new groups "from inside," when hiring "from outside" was inappropriate for some functions and had become very limited. A second extension of the cleruchic system to officials who did not belong to the army or the police may have occurred at the end of the second century. But the hypothesis regarding this later extension relies on only two papyri, which report that

97 For one of the earliest clear attestations, see P.Tebt. I 32 (after 145 BC) with note 109 below.

98 E.g. P.Tebt. I 124, l. 37 = C.Ord.Ptol. 54, l. 15 (*c.* 118 BC) mentions "those who up to the present have been registered in place of others in the cleruchy," τοὺς μέχρι τοῦ ṿῦṿ μετεπιγεγρ(αμμένους). τῆι κλη(ρουχίαι).

99 See Chapter 5, section 5.1; Van 't Dack (1977) 87; Lesquier (1911) 184–6; Préaux (1979) 467. For the *laarchia* in Kerkeosiris, see Crawford (1971).

100 Crawford (1971) Table IV, 155–9; Van 't Dack (1977) 87 and note 1. In some cases the cavalry *machimoi* and infantry *machimoi* of Chomenis in Kerkeosiris appear simply as *eikosiarouroi* or *heptarouroi* and are included as such in *PP* IV and not among the soldiers; see *PP* II, intro, p. XX. All but one of the *machimoi* of the cavalry recorded in *PP* II were found in Kerkeosiris between 119 and 112 BC. The last attestation is dated to 51 BC in Tebtunis, PSI X 1098: Ariston son of Purros, *PP* II 2722 = *PP* IV 9143 is a cavalry cleruch of Chomenis (τῶ(ν) Χομή(νιος) κλη(ρούχων) ἱππέων), not a cavalry *machimoi*, and the reference is probably to a different Chomenis; see Crawford (1971) 71.

101 See Chapter 5, section 5.1.

102 E.g. P.Tebt. I 79, l. 51 (*c.* 148 BC) or P.Tebt. I 62, l. 117 (119 BC): προσληφθέντες or προσειλημμένοι εἰς τοὺς κατοίκους ἱππεῖς. The preposition *dia* is used to indicate the name of the officials, but not for eponymous officers. Cf. Crawford (1971) 22, 60, 68: Κριτωνείοι or οἱ διὰ Κρίτωνος κάτοικοι ἱππεῖς; Lesquier (1911) 188–9.

103 For the descendant of this desert horseman in the late second century, see the desert horseman Pantauchos son of Pantauchos (*PP* II 4828 = *PP* IV 8896) in P.Tebt. I 62, l. 34, Kerkeosiris, 119/18 BC and P.Tebt. I 63, ll. 36–7, Kerkeosiris, 116/15 BC; Crawford (1971) 59–60, 148; Lesquier (1911) 177.

Menches, the *kōmogrammateus* in Kerkeosiris, received 20 arouras of royal land that was converted into cleruchic land.[104]

Internal reorganization occurred in connection with the expansion of the system in two ways. First, transfers could take place within the army, from the infantry to the cavalry, from a cleruch with 30 arouras in most cases to a new status of *katoikos* (see Figure 6.1, above). One example refers explicitly to an infantryman, Dionysios, who had a 30-aroura plot and was "transferred into the *katoikia*."[105] In most cases the documents do not specify the individual's previous status but only indicate that he was one of those transferred to the *katoikia*. But Dionysios' case suggests that the descendants of the immigrant infantrymen settled in the third century became cavalrymen when they entered the *katoikia* in the second century BC.[106] Consequently, in the second century most infantrymen belonged to the *machimoi* and all cavalrymen belonged to the *katoikia*. It remains possible, however, that some descendants of the 30-aroura men remained infantrymen even though they entered the *katoikia*.

Second, from the mid second century onward, transfers also occurred from the new cleruchic status granted to some policemen to that of *katoikos*. The cases studied by Crawford, however, show that these individuals did not necessarily receive more arouras when they obtained the title *hekatontarouros*.[107] These were high-ranking policemen called *ephodoi* who had 24 arouras and *erēmophylakes* who had 10 arouras, at least in

104 Keenan and Shelton (1976) introduction, 5 and Verhoogt (1998) 111, 121–2 note 62 accept the standard view regarding the grant of cleruchic land to a few civil servants, but Verhoogt stresses that in P.Tebt. I 65 and P.Tebt. IV 1115 the total of cleruchic land following the mention of Menches is not filled in. Crawford (1971) 72 follows Grenfell *et al.* (1902–38) P.Tebt. I app., 551, for whom the *kōmogrammateus* Menches is the only attested case of this new development (P.Tebt. I 75, ll. 50–1 [112 BC], being granted 20 arouras of uncultivated land (ὑπόλογον) to be counted as cleruchic land (ὥστ' εἶναι κλη(ρουχικῆς)) in P.Tebt. I 65, ll. 18–23 (112 BC) and P.Tebt. IV 1115, ll. 185–7 (111/0 BC). In addition, Menches helped some cleruchs to pay their *artabieia* tax (see P.Tebt. I 75, ll. 3–14) (112 BC) and rented part of a *klēros* belonging to Ptolemaios (see P.Tebt. I 107 and Crawford [1971] 79). The physician of the *dioikētēs* Apollonios was granted a *klēros* on Apollonios' *dōrea*, but this is a borderline case; see P.Cair.Zen. II 59225 = SB III 6819 (unknown provenance, 253 BC) with Aly (1997) 14 and Uebel (1968) no. 269 and note 3.

105 P.Tebt. I 62, l. 48 (Kerkeosiris, 119/18 BC): μεταβεβηκὼς εἰς τὴν κατοικίαν (or εἰς τοὺς κατοίκους ἱππεῖς); Van 't Dack (1993) 163; Van 't Dack (1977) 85–7, esp. note 1 about Dionysios *PP* II 2632 = *PP* III 6611 = *PP* IV 8883; Crawford (1971) 60; Uebel (1968) 173 note 4 and 195 note 1.

106 Van 't Dack (1977) 86; Crawford (1971) 60; Lesquier (1911) 189–90. There is only one attestation of a *katoikos* of the infantry, see note 95.

107 Crawford (1971) list III, 148–54, pp. 62–9; Grenfell *et al.* (1902–38) P.Tebt. I, p. 548; Lesquier (1911) 179; the policemen had the rights to have the title of *hekatontarouroi* even if their *klēroi* were smaller, see Van 't Dack (1977) 86 referring to Crawford (1971) list III, pp. 148–54 and pp. 62, 63 note 8.

Kerkeosiris.[108] Their promotion may well have been related to the fact that they actually had horses, like the *chersephippos* mentioned above. The promotion of Asclepiades son of Ptolemaios supports the thesis that *ephodoi* might be cavalrymen and that they were not automatically granted more land when they entered the *katoikia*. First, Asclepiades, who bears the ethnic "Macedonian," joined the fifth hipparchy of the 100-aroura men and was thus a cavalryman.[109] At the same time he was relieved of his function as *ephodos*. Second, the official correspondence specifies that Asclepiades' transfer to the *katoikia* occurred on the condition that he held 24 arouras near Kerkeosiris. The thoroughness of the document in regard to the number of arouras and their location suggests that Asclepiades did not receive more land when he was promoted. In other cases, however, promotions of *ephodoi* to the *katoikia* could lead to additional grants of land, although such individuals would never have 100 arouras in total.[110] The promotion of these *ephodoi* illustrates how men of Egyptian origin could move up the social ladder by the mid second century and probably earlier by virtue of their position in the police or the army. Their Greek names can be interpreted as a mark of social status rather than ethnicity.[111] In the case of Asclepiades, the designation "Macedonian" functioned as a pseudo-ethnic, as was argued in Chapter 5, but the mention of his integration into the *politeuma* of the Cretans suggests that he had Cretan roots.[112]

The transfers indicate that *katoikos* was a privileged status that went beyond the grant of a *klēros*, as discussed in the following sections. Decrees copied in papyri of the second half of the second century record rights granted to *katoikoi*, such as the exemption from duties (*leitourgiai*) not imposed on *katoikoi* and the remission of taxes such as harvest taxes (*epigraphai*) and tax levies (*eisphorai*).[113] The decrees suggest that it was

108 Crawford (1971) 64–5 with and Table III, 150–4; Van 't Dack (1977) 86 suggests that *phylakitai* with 10 arouras also entered the *katoikia* but in Kerkeosiris they only received cleruchic allotments and did not transfer to the *kakoikia*. For the *ephodoi*'s functions, see Clarysse and Thompson (2006) 174–5.

109 P.Tebt. I 32, ll. 4 and 18–20 = W.Chr. 448 (after 145 BC); Crawford (1971) 65. For Asclepiades as a "Macedonian" member of the *politeuma* of the Cretans, see Chapter 7, section 7.3.2, p. 294 and note 269.

110 Thirty arouras for Acousilaos and ten for another Asclepiades; see Crawford (1971) 68–9 with references to the texts.

111 See Clarysse and Thompson (2006) regarding the tax lists. In Kerkeosiris, the *ephodos* Apollonios son of Ptolemaios also bore the Egyptian name Haryotes, and his son was also known as Petesouchos; see Crawford (1971) 64.

112 On Asclepiades' inclusion in a *politeuma*, see 7.3.2.

113 P.Tebt. I 124 = C.Ord.Ptol. 54 (118 BC) = Text 6.2; see discussion below.

not only men who belonged to the various groups of cleruchs who could enter the *katoikia*, but private landowners as well.

6.3 Taxing cleruchs

The Ptolemies created the cleruchic system in part to collect revenue from the cleruchs' plots. At the same time, the cleruchs were fiscally privileged, at least in terms of land taxes, usually taken to be the *artabieia* tax at a fixed rate of one artaba per aroura. By contrast, other categories of land such as royal land were subject to the harvest tax, usually called the *epigraphē* or royal rent, which varied between 4 and 8 artabas per aroura according to the quality of the land and the harvest.[114] In addition, cleruchs paid many other taxes specific to their occupation, which are mentioned in both Greek and Demotic documents.[115] In his survey of the Ptolemaic administration, Bagnall summarizes the standard view: "it is possible that the situation varied regionally on the basis of historical experience. There were few if any blanket exemptions from taxes, and cleruchs paid taxes just as did private owners, perhaps even bearing some unique to them. Their tax rates, however, were significantly lower than the rents paid by cultivators of royal land."[116] Préaux and many scholars after her tend to insist on a deterioration in the situation of the cleruchs and surmise that the taxes on cleruchic land increased over time. For Préaux, taxes on cleruchic land in the second century represented more than one-fourth of the income from such land, a rate she takes to be even higher than that on royal land, although she offers no references to support this judgment.[117] The land surveys from Kerkeosiris published by Keenan and Shelton, by contrast, raise questions about this pessimistic view and show that cleruchs paid a low fixed tax on land.[118]

The following survey of the sources emphasizes three aspects of the cleruchs' favorable fiscal position: (1) cleruchs benefited from reductions in

114 Vandorpe (2000) 196; Monson (2007b) 261 and Monson (2012) 177–3, 176–84.

115 E.g. the ἰατρικόν, ἱππιατρικόν, κοινωνικά, στέφανοι; see von Reden (2007) 92–4; Préaux (1979) 132–3, 400–3, and notes *ad loc.*; Grenfell *et al.* (1902–38) Appendix, p. 555. For the *iatrikon*, paid in wheat, and the *phylakitikon* in a Demotic papyrus from the same cartonnage as P.Count 2 and 3, see the new edition of P.LilleDem. 110 by Wackenier in a forthcoming volume of the *Papyrus Démotiques de la Sorbonne*. Lesquier (1911) 212–23 is no longer up to date; see Shelton (1976) 114 note 10. For the dyke tax, pasture tax and many different guard taxes, see Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 73 and note 203; P.Thrace 1, ll. 22–3 and 32 for the horse tax (ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἵππου) and the *leitourgic* tax (λειτουργικόν, a tax paid to avoid the corvée) and Ioannidou (2006) 39.

116 Bagnall and Derow (2004) 287 = Bagnall (1976) 5–6.

117 Préaux (1979) 473.

118 Keenan and Shelton (1976) Introduction, 11–12, on Kerkeosiris between 118 and 112 BC.

some taxes collected in cash; (2) at least from the second century BC onward, they paid a low fixed rate on cleruchic land, although they occasionally had to pay harvest taxes (*epigraphai*) and contributions (*eisphorai*); (3) cleruchs of the same categories developed into cohesive fiscal groups that tried to negotiate fixed annual amounts and to ensure that the state did not overtax them or ask them for more than their status required.

The oldest evidence that soldiers were fiscally privileged comes from the Revenue Laws, in which cleruchs are granted a reduction in the vineyard-*apomoira* tax, which had been devoted to the cult of Arsinoe since 263 BC and was collected in wine or cash.[119] "The cleruchs who are soldiers (*strateuomenoi*) and planted their [own] plots" paid only one-tenth of their revenues, while other cultivators paid one-sixth.[120] Tax lists from the third-century Fayyum confirm that soldiers and other occupational groups particularly useful to the state were fiscally privileged in terms of taxes paid in cash, although soldiers were not exempt from the salt tax (or poll tax) but only from the somewhat symbolic obol tax.[121] They were perhaps exempted from other taxes when the obol tax was finally subsumed into the salt tax.[122] These privileges were not limited to soldiers of Greek origin but extended to men involved in military and paramilitary activities in general, such as groups of Nubian or Egyptian origin connected to the army.[123] In the third century, soldiers were registered separately from the civilian population in the tax lists, and the *logeutai* collected their taxes, including the salt tax (or *per capita* tax), directly, without intervention by tax-farmers (*tēlonai*).[124] For these reasons, cleruchs formed a privileged fiscal category in the third century, even if they probably did not yet benefit from a low fixed tax on land.[125]

119 P.Rev. § 24, ll. 5–10, 259 BC; see Bingen (1952), with commentary in Bingen (1978a) 17–18, esp. note 30; Monson (2012) 162–3.

120 P.Rev. § 24, ll. 5–10: παρὰ δέ τῶν κ[ληρούχω]ν̣ τ̣ῶ̣ν̣ στρατευομένων καὶ τοὺ[ς ἰδίους] κλήρους πεφυτευκότων, translation in Bagnall and Derow (2004) no. 95. For Bingen (1973) 220, στρατευομένων refer to cleruchs on campaign who cultivated their plots themselves; but Clarysse and Vandorpe (1998), esp. 18–25, are certainly correct to understand στρατευόμενοι in the wider sense of "belonging to the army"; the term may be a way to distinguish cleruchs who are active during part of the year from veteran cleruchs.

121 Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 57 and note 127. The policemen might seem initially to have been exempt from the salt tax, but in fact the tax was deducted from their wages (p. 54).

122 Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 57, 72–4.

123 For "men of Philae," "men of Elephantine" and "men of Aswan" as occupational designations with fiscal privileges, see La'da (2007); Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 154–5.

124 Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 61–2: "by the second century, military families might be included in *kat' ethnos* record," i.e. in the occupation or category register; see their App. A3 for army records.

125 It was once thought that cleruchs did not pay a land tax under the first four Ptolemies; see von Reden (2007) 92. But Demotic texts from the third century BC recently examined by Monson

Second, the fixed tax rate per aroura of cleruchic land was one-half artaba (*hemiartabieia*), one artaba (*artabieia*) or two artabas (*diartabieia*), the highest rate being imposed on individuals who held the largest plots.[126] These rates are attested in second-century Kerkeosiris in connection with land allotted to *ephodoi*, *phylakitai* and *machimoi*. In some cases the Ptolemies even encouraged the cultivation of cleruchic allotments by granting full tax exemptions for a few years, in the hope of increasing revenues thereafter. But some new taxes seem to appear in the second century, such as the *koinōnika*, the *grammatikon* and the *eisphora*.[127] A petition of all the *katoikoi* from Egypt (except those from the Thebaid) dated to 137 BC or slightly later indicates that at that time they paid a *diartabieia* tax, like some of the cleruchs in Kerkeosiris, but also the *epigraphē* (harvest tax) in some nomes.[128] One decree concerning cleruchic land (see Text 6.2 below, in section 6.4.1) also suggests that earlier in the second century the *katoikoi* paid the *epigraphē* as well as the *eisphora* (special contribution), but that they were then exempted from those levies.[129] A land survey from Edfu, also from the late second century, records that the few cleruchs settled in that nome paid a tax whose rate fluctuated and resembled an *epigraphē*.[130] The content of these recently published documents comes as a surprise. Previously, papyrologists thought that cleruchs paid only fixed land taxes, although Vandorpe had already identified *klēroi* in Middle Egypt and the Fayyum upon which a harvest tax was imposed in the second half of the second century.[131] In the examples she gives, all *klēroi* subject to a harvest

show 25-aroura cleruchs who paid 5¼ artabas per aroura on their *klēroi*; see P.Sorb.Dem. inv. 223+229+272 recto, and 100-aroura cleruchs at the same rate in P.Sorb.Dem. inv. 1418 verso. See also P.Lille I 39–42, regarding *ekphoria* paid by cleruchs (Arsinoite, 251 BC).

126 Keenan and Shelton (1976) Introduction, 11–12; Monson (2012) 172–3, 176–82.

127 Grenfell *et al.* (1902–38) P.Tebt. I, Appendix, 555.

128 P.Lips. II 124 (Heracleopolite or Arsinoite), ll. 36 and 64–94. The text confirms that *katoikoi* paid a fixed tax on land, here the *diartabieia*. The only document attesting the *artabieia* tax paid by *katoikoi* in Kerkeosiris is P.Tebt. I 75 (112 BC); see note 104, where Menches helped three *katoikoi* pay it (ll. 3–14). Doubts were accordingly cast on the universality of the *artabieia* on cleruchic land; see Grenfell *et al.* (1902–38), commentary on P.Tebt. I 5, l. 59 (118 BC).

129 P.Tebt. I 124 (118 BC). For the remission of taxes, see the fourth decree, esp. ll. 35–6. For the exemption from duties for those entering the *katoikia*, see the fifth decree, ll. 37–40, copied on the same papyrus after a petition in which a group of cleruchs from the Fayyum, probably the *katoikoi*, ask to be exempted from certain payments on the basis of previous decisions in decreed benefactions (*philanthrōpa*); see also Monson (2012) 176–7, 182.

130 P.Haun.inv. 407, ll. 33–246; Monson (2012) 177–8 and Monson (2007b) 260–1; Christensen (2002), esp. 156: "cleruchic holdings appear to have been assessed individually, and their calculated value fluctuates between four and seven artabas an aroura"; Vandorpe (2000) 174–5.

131 Vandorpe (2000) 197–8. For SB XVIII 13095 (Oxyrhyncha in the Arsinoite, 141 BC), see Criscuolo (1981) 264–5, and Vandorpe (2000) 197; the *epigraphē* is due on a *klēros* temporarily in the possession of the king until the orphan received it back.

tax outside the Thebaid had been taken back by the state.[132] Indeed, *klēroi* that were deserted, disputed or simply confiscated could be sold by the state, and the land was then awarded a new status, similar to that of private land. The petition of 137 BC, however, and the allusions to previous decrees in Text 6.2 make clear that the harvest tax could be levied on cleruchic land held by *katoikoi* at certain periods and in certain regions. Even so, educated guesses about the percentage of taxes paid by cleruchs in comparison with other subsets of the population continue to support the notion that the former enjoyed a fiscally privileged position. Van 't Dack supposes that cleruchs probably paid no more than 25 percent of their income in taxes, contrary to Préaux's pessimistic view.[133] If Crawford is right to estimate that average taxes on the cultivated land in Kerkeosiris represented 35 percent of farmers' incomes, the owners of cleruchic land paid less than others.[134] Indeed, the documents from that village suggest that fiscal demands on royal land were higher.[135] In the third century the status of cleruchs was certainly advantageous, since they were prepared to pay a tax called the *stephanos* (or *golden stephanos*, χρυσικὸς στέφανος) for obtaining a *klēros*. This tax was still paid in Kerkeosiris in the late second century by cleruchs promoted to the *katoikia*, generally in irregular installments.[136] In case of failure to pay, the allotment could be gradually confiscated.[137]

Finally, the *katoikoi* of the second century BC appear to be a cohesive fiscal group. Acting together, they constantly refer to favorable decisions made in previous decrees and tried to avoid overtaxation.[138] But whether they are petitioning at the "inter-nome" level, the nome level or the village level is not always clear. In the petition of the *katoikoi hippeis* dated to 137 BC, they complain that they should no longer pay the fixed amount of 234,777 artabas, but that 8,800 artabas should be substracted from that amount because some *klēroi* had been confiscated. The annual amount was due from all the *katoikoi* except those in the Thebaid and had been established by the *dioikētēs* Dioscorides.

To sum up, the fixed tax rates per aroura and tax remissions or temporary exemptions made the cleruchs a fiscally privileged group. The occasional collection of the harvest tax in addition to or in place of the land tax,

132 Vandorpe (2000) 175, 197–8.
133 Van 't Dack (1977) 87; Préaux, (1979) 473.
134 Crawford (1971) 126.
135 Shelton (1976) 114 note 10.
136 Policemen and *machimoi* probably did not pay this tax when they first obtained a plot.
137 P.Tebt. I 61 (a), commentary to ll. 1–8 and P.Tebt. I 61 (b) ll. 254–5 with commentary *ad loc.* for the προσλήψεως στέφανος: if the *stephanos* was not paid, the *klēros* was confiscated or other cleruchs who were willing to pay the tax could obtain the *klēros*. See Grenfell *et al.* (1902–38) P.Tebt. I, Appendix, 555; Lesquier (1911) 222–3; Préaux (1979) 395.
138 See P.Tebt. I 99 (*c.* 148 BC), P.Lips. II 124 (137 BC) and P.Tebt. I 124 (188 BC, see Text 6.2).

however, shows that the application of the fiscal system varied according to the nome, the political situation, and the category of cleruchs in question. To maximize the amount of cultivated land, the Ptolemies attempted to stimulate the full cultivation of small plots by charging a low fixed land tax on cleruchic land held by *ephodoi*, *phylakitai* and *machimoi*. But since the *katoikoi* had to pay a harvest tax in certain contexts, or both a harvest tax and a fixed land tax, it is unlikely that the *ephodoi*, *phylakitai* and *machimoi* were in a better fiscal situation. Further work on the taxation system in Ptolemaic Egypt is needed to clarify the extent of the privileges granted to cleruchs and the difference between the various categories.

6.4 Cleruchs as landowners?

Cleruchs received the use of their plots for life in exchange for military duties and the payment of some taxes, but the land remained theoretically the king's.[139] For fiscal purposes, allotted land was considered cleruchic land, but it could return to its initial status of royal land if confiscated or abandoned. Such a system of distribution of land to groups the state regarded as useful, which already existed in Egypt before the Ptolemies, presupposed that these holdings would pass on to the next generation, on the condition that one heir would assume a similar military service. It was certainly less expensive for the government to maintain an army by finding potential cleruchs whose fathers had already made them familiar with military life. Similarly, inheritance of *klēroi* by female family members of cleruchs should not be considered an aberration or a malfunctioning of the system, but a means of identifying the next potential cleruch in the family.[140] At the cleruch's death, the state confiscated the plot and redistributed it to another man, who was generally a son of the deceased.[141] Over generations, however, men who inherited *klēroi* from their fathers must have felt less tied to their military duties. The task of the central power was to elaborate the rules and administrative structures necessary to maintain incentives for new cleruchs

139 Préaux (1979) 463, with 463–80 on cleruchs' rights.

140 The inheritance of allotted plots by women from soldiers' families was already common in the New Kingdom; see Katary (1999). The fact that women could have a *klēros* has previously been considered evidence of the loss of military character of the cleruchic system; see Van 't Dack (1977) 88; Préaux (1979) 471–2. Clarysse has suggested to me that a woman as holder of a *klēros* might be attested as early as 212/11 BC, according to a new reading of P.Köln XI 442, ll. 11 and 21 as well as 443, l. 16 (Heracleopolite) (genitive *Agathēs* instead of *Agathōs*).

141 I discuss this much-debated question, especially the chronology of the practice, in section 6.4.1

and the descendants of previous generations to continue to perform their military service and to cultivate the land.

Rules concerning the mobilization and military duties of cleruchs have not been preserved. Our evidence overwhelmingly concerns the allotment and cultivation of the *klēroi* and suggests, rightly or wrongly, that the Ptolemies – or the cleruchs – focused more on this aspect of the system. The limited evidence concerning the military aspect suggests the demilitarization of the cleruchs, that is, a gradual decrease in their participation in military campaigns and probably in military training. The cleruchs themselves seem to have prioritized non-military activities, while the state worried more about maximizing fiscal revenues from the land allotted to soldiers than about easy mobilization and practical training. Because they devoted a large portion of their time to agricultural work or to supervising and managing it, cleruchs certainly received less military training and had less experience of war, making them less valuable in that regard than professional soldiers. But there is no clear evidence that cleruchs gave up all military activity.[142] Certain groups, such as the *machimoi*, were mobilized and stationed in garrisons for extended periods of time, suggesting that other groups, sometimes absent from their land, could still have military duties, at least in the second century and perhaps even the first, if the maintenance of military terminology reflects reality.[143] The status of the *klēros* and the *stathmos* must be examined if we are to make sense of the extent to which these grants remained tied to military service. A complete privatization of cleruchic holdings would have meant the total disappearance of the military character of cleruchic life; this happened in the Roman period.[144] But the existence of decrees stating specific conditions required to obtain a *klēros* signify, at least in theory, some continuity of military functions. Other conditions imposed on those who wished to maintain tenure of the land concerned the cultivation of the entire plot and thus affected the place of residence of some cleruchs and the need for *stathmos*.

Scholars usually interpret the sources regarding cleruchic possessions in the framework of the Ptolemies' gradual renouncement of their rights to them.[145] Royal decrees giving or confirming rights to cleruchs and their heirs in regard to their possessions are understood as part of a linear process

142 Van 't Dack (1977) 90. 143 *Contra* Oates (2001); see section 6.4.4.

144 For katoikic land in the Roman period, see now Monson (2012) 188–9.

145 This is a teleological approach to the issue, treating the private status of katoikic land in the Roman period as the predictable result of developments in the previous centuries; see Lesquier (1911) 224–54; Préaux (1979) 467–80; Launey (1949) 707–12; Crawford (1971) 55–8; Bingen (1973) 219; Lenger (1980) 199; Lewis (1986) 32–5; Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 177–83, 218–20. Clarysse (1991a) 37–9 summarizes the standard view; see also Uebel (1968) 41–2 note 2, Criscuolo (1981) about P.Med.Bar. 5 published in Balconi *et al.* (1986) 24–30 and

of privatization of the land, paralleling the weakening of state power and the king's control of the land. Préaux, for example, interprets the fact that a *klēros* is given "forever" (*r nḥḥ*) in a Demotic text dated to 202 BC as an initial hint of the transformation of the status of the *klēros* into pure private ownership.[146] The phrase was in fact standard in cessions of land in Greek contracts (ἐπὶ τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον) and did not automatically imply everlasting ownership of the grant, since it is found in the context of transfers of cleruchic land and royal land, the latter being managed in a communal system.[147] In fact, plots were still confiscated if not cultivated in Period C, suggesting that on a spectrum ranging from temporary usufruct to complete privatization, cleruchic land never reached the latter end of the spectrum, even if it was always situated near there. Rather than demonstrating a linear evolution of the status of the *klēros* in the direction of private property, the evidence allows for variation in the cleruchs' rights to their possessions according to region, period, social context and political events.[148] Monson, for example, by offering a demographic model to make sense of communal rights on royal land, pointed out that population density had an impact on the degree of privatization of land in general.[149] An analytic survey of documents regarding cleruchs and their rights shows that already at the beginning of the dynasty cleruchs treated their land as something like private property, but with many circumstantial variations, and that such land never became purely private over time, even though private ownership existed in Egypt (e.g. in P.Tebt. I 124, l. 32, Text 6.2 below). For the study of the status of cleruchic possessions, three types of documents are essential: royal decrees and other official documents concerning *klēroi* and *stathmoi*; cleruchs' wills; and documents regarding the exchange, transfer and sale of *klēroi*.

6.4.1 Decrees and official documents

The earliest decrees and official documents governing cleruchs concern the *stathmoi* and are generally interpreted as evidence of a gradual privatization

Pickering (1990) about ten papyri from the Macquarie papyrus collection (Lysimachis, Arsinoite, 244/3 or 219/18 BC).

146 Préaux (1979) 469; the *klēros* was "given forever" to Athenion, son of Artemidoros, from Aspedos; see Sethe (1920); P.Bürgsch. 7, l. 3 = SB I 4475 (Krokodilopolis, 202 BC) and commentary to §4 on p. 130; Crawford (1971) 56 note 4.

147 Monson (2007a) 374–5.

148 Lesquier (1911) 224–54 sees a linear evolution toward privatization but also shows that there were convergent advantages for the state and the cleruchs in inheritance practices; see also Préaux (1979) 468.

149 Monson (2007a).

of cleruchic possessions and its counterpart, the loss of the king's rights to them.[150] *Stathmoi* were billets provided by the state to cleruchs, but also to soldiers on patrol and visiting officials, sometimes in private houses; some were requisitioned by the state, occasionally in public buildings or in quarters built at state expense.[151] Royal decrees indicate that the Ptolemies attempted early on to prevent abuses by soldiers and officials and defined the legal status of *stathmoi* to avoid conflicts. Already between 273/2 and 262 BC, a series of royal decrees by Ptolemy II state that billets remain royal property and that, whatever the type of billet, soldiers could not sell, rent, mortgage or cede them, or have two at one time.[152] These decrees show that the king wanted to keep inexpensive billets available for moving troops or officials around, and for stationing new soldiers or cleruchs when one died or moved because of a change of status or promotion.[153] Nothing is said about bequest, but Clarysse conjectures that this was forbidden as well.[154]

But if we take an approach other than gradual privatization, it appears possible that cleruchs – as opposed to soldiers and officials – were allowed to bequeath their *stathmos* since, as far as the state was concerned, the son simply replaced the father. A few decades after these decrees, in the Petrie wills, *stathmoi* are bequeathed not just to sons but also to wives and daughters. In addition, a third-century petition from the Fayyum confirms that women from military families had rights to the *stathmoi* they inherited.[155] This was still the case in the second century within Egyptian military families: Tanoupis, the daughter of Tpheophis, was allowed "to bequeath it [i.e. the *stathmos*] to her children, her husband and her close relatives or whomever she wants to bequeath it to, as long as they are registered as relatives of those serving in the army *in the city*."[156] If these later cases initially seem

[150] Préaux (1979) 477–81.

[151] Lenger (1980) 10; Lesquier (1911) 210–12. For cohabitation in private houses, see Chapter 7, section 7.1.2.

[152] C.Ord.Ptol. 5–10 (273/2–262 BC); Lenger (1952), esp. 233–46; Crawford (1971) 55 note 1.

[153] It was cheaper and easier than constructing new houses or even huts. Lenger (1980) 18, by contrast, assumes a shortage of housing, while Préaux (1979) 387 emphasizes the limited area available for habitation in Egypt.

[154] Clarysse (1991a) 38.

[155] P.Enteux. 13 (Magdola, 222 BC). There was no trace of a male heir in any of these cases, listed by Clarysse (1991a) 38 note 58; see P.Petr.^{2} I 16, ll. 21–2, ll. 76–9, P.Petr.^{2} I 22, ll. 10–13, P.Petr.^{2} I 28, ll. 1–2, except for a bequest to a son (?) and daughter at P.Petr.^{2} I 7, ll. 6–7. In two cases the legatee is lost: P.Petr.^{2} I 3, l. 80 and P.Petr.^{2} I 24, l. 48. In addition, P.Petr.^{2} I 22, l. 23 records the bequest of a *klēros*.

[156] See the two drafts of the same document, SB XXIV 15973, esp. ll. 8–10, and SB XXIV 15974 = P.UB.Trier S 135–3 and P.UB.Trier S 135–1 (unknown provenance, 132 BC) in Kramer (1997) 328–31. The persons to whom Tanoupis could bequeath the *stathmos* had to be relatives of

surprising, they reinforce the hypothesis that women from military families were considered links in the chain to the next potential cleruchs in the family, as often happened in the case of the mothers of orphans.[157] When in 244/3 BC the soldier Agathocles gave use of part of his *stathmos* as security to an Egyptian woman, the mother of a goldsmith, for a loan of 14 silver drachmas over twenty years, either he was violating Ptolemy II's decrees, or these did not apply in the Oxyrhynchite nome, or they were by now out of date.[158] The decrees seem no longer to be valid a few decades later, at any rate, since a *taktomisthos* from the Fayyum, Theodotos, could cede his father's *stathmos* to four royal farmers.[159]

In any case, the interdictions decreed by Ptolemy II on *stathmoi* might not have concerned *klēroi* at all. While *stathmoi* could be attributed to cleruchs and soldiers, only cleruchs had *klēroi*. The decrees of Ptolemy II focused on the legal character of *stathmoi* rather than *klēroi*. The latter were mentioned only indirectly in one of Ptolemy II's decrees, in which a provision in regard to returning *stathmoi* to the state concerns cavalry settlers whose *klēros* had been withdrawn.[160] In contrast to *stathmoi*, *klēroi* brought revenues to the state as long as they were cultivated, no matter who owned them, whereas billets brought no revenues and were completely lost to the state if soldiers treated them as private property. This may initially have generated different sets of rules for *stathmoi* and *klēroi*.[161]

The decrees and official documents concerning *klēroi*, however, are generally understood in parallel to those about *stathmoi*, within the same framework of progressive privatization.[162] On that view, a *klēros* was confiscated by the state (ἀναλαμβάνειν) at the death of the cleruch until at least

those stationed in the city, i.e. Euergetis (l. 10: τῶν ἐν τῆι πόλει ἐν στρατείᾳ φερομένων). The words in italics are not translated in Mueller (2006) 134, who considers the case an example of civilian settlement. As Cohen (2006) 347–8 explains, however, "the military character of the foundation is made clear by the fact that Tanoupis was permitted to leave her property only to relatives or persons having military status (l. 10)."

157 Bingen (1983) 5 also mentions the unusual case of a mother ceding a plot to her son while the father was still alive; see BGU XIV 2442, l. 40 (Heracleopolite, first century BC).

158 P.Stras. II 92 (Oxyrhynchite, 244/3 BC) and Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 218.

159 P.Tebt. III 820 (Samaria, 201 BC); see ll. 8 and 27 παρακεχωρηκέναι; Lewis (1986) 35.

160 C.Ord.Ptol. 10, l. 2 τῶν τοὺς κλήρους ἀφειρημένων ἱππέων. We do not know whether the *klēroi* were simply withdrawn because of a change of status or promotion or were confiscated. But if the scribes followed a strict terminology, the verb expected for a confiscation would be ἀναλαμβάνειν.

161 Préaux (1979) 479. Lesquier (1911) 224, 240–1, 248 offers the opposite view, on the ground that later decrees such as C.Ord.Ptol. 71 concern all the military possessions, but on 235–6 he stresses the contrast between the rules governing the *stathmos* and those governing the *klēros* in the third century BC.

162 See note 145.

Text 6.1. *P.Tebt. I 5, lines 44–8*

P.Tebt. I 5, lines 44–8 = C.Ord.Ptol. 53 (Kerkeosiris, 118 BC)	Translation by Fischer-Bovet
[τοὺς δὲ ἐπιλέ]κ̣[τους] κ̣α̣ὶ̣ μαχ(ίμους) [[καὶ]] (δεκαρούρους) καὶ (ἑπταρούρους) κ̣[αὶ τοὺς το]ύ[τ]ων ἡ[γου]μέν[ο]υς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς φερομ̣[ένους ἐν τῆι συντ]ά̣(ξει)[καὶ τοὺς] να̣[υκ]ληρομαχ(ίμους) καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ πολ̣[. . . . .][κρατεῖ]ν ὧν κατεσχήκασι κλή(ρων) ἕως τοῦ [νβ (ἔτους) ἀκατηγορήτου]ς καὶ ἀνεπιλήπτους ὄντας.	the picked forces, and the 10-aroura and 7-aroura *machimoi*, and their leaders, and all others placed [in that class],[a] and the *nauklēromachimoi* and those who . . . shall [have legal ownership] of the *klēroi* which they have possessed up to the [52nd year, and shall not be subject to accusation] or inference.

[a] *Syntaxis* is used with no technical meaning; see commentary to P.Tebt. I 5, l. 45.

239/8 BC.[163] In this period, plots were sometimes taken over by the state when cleruchs were mobilized or absent, and they became *basilikoi klēroi* cultivated by royal farmers during that time.[164] The confiscations became temporary (κατέχειν) by 218/17 BC, and the son of the deceased was expected to replace his father.[165] Put another way, *klēroi* belonged to the cleruchs and their heirs, as is suggested by the use of the verb ὑπάρχειν in an administrative document, and at the death of the father the *klēros* was assigned to the heirs (ἐπιγράφειν).[166] Several royal decrees issued by Ptolemy VIII in the second century confirm that for both the *katoikoi hippeis* and other cleruchic classes a *klēros* could be transmitted by means of inheritance, sometimes even split between two brothers, and cessions of cleruchic land to other soldiers are acknowledged (see Text 6.1 and Text 6.2).[167]

163 P.Hib. I 81 (Arsinoite, after 238 BC); W.Chr. 335 = P.Lille I 14 (Ghoran, 242 BC) = P.Sorb. III 89 (238 BC), where the deceased is actually an officer of the cavalry mercenaries granted land near Pharbaithia (τῶν περὶ Φαρβαῖθα καταμεμετρημένων μισθοφόρων ἱππέων ἐπιλ(άρχης)), see Chapter 4, section 4.1, p. 122, esp. note 36.

164 Crawford (1971) 55–6 and note 8, on two papyri from the later period that may suggest a new development: P.Enteux. 55 (Magdola, 222 BC and commentary by Bingen [1973] 220) might indicate that the state could rent only half of the plot if the cleruch was not on the ground to supervise the cultivation. P.Frankf. 7 (Tholthis [?], after 218/17 BC) might show that a cleruch normally kept his *klēros* even when he was absent.

165 Ten papyri from the archive of an official, Demetrios (Lysimachis [Arsinoite], 244/3 or 219/18 BC), illustrate this stage of the process in the period after the Third or Fourth Syrian War; see Pickering (1990).

166 W.Chr. 336 = P.Lille I 4 (Ptolemais Hormou, 217 BC) with Wilcken (1912) vol. I.1, 282: ll. 26–7 ὧι ὑπῆρχεν ἡ γῆ αὐτῶι καὶ ἐκγόνοις and ll. 30–1, κατέχειν τὸν κλῆ[ρ]ον ἐν τῶι βασιλικῶι; C.Ord.Ptol. Serie II = Lenger (1952) 232; Crawford (1971) 56; Préaux (1979) 468–9.

167 C.Ord.Ptol. 44 (Arsinoite, after 144 BC); P.Tebt. I 5, ll. 44–8 = C.Ord.Ptol. 53 (Kerkeosiris, 118 BC), see Text 6.1 with Crawford (1971) 57 note 2. For the acknowledgement of cessions,

Text 6.2. *P.Tebt. I 124, lines 30–6*

P.Tebt. I 124, lines 30–6 = C.Ord.Ptol. 54, lines 8–14 (Tebtunis, 118 BC)	Translation by Fischer-Bovet
καὶ ἐπ(ε)ί τινες ἐξη(σθενηκότες)..[.]ν̣ σ̣τ̣ενῶς ἔχοντες [[π̣α̣ρ̣α]] π[α]ρ̣α̣κ̣εχω(ρήκασι) [[α̣λ̣]] τοῖς [. . .] ἄλλοι δὲ ἠ̣λλαγμένοι εἰσ[ὶ]ν τ̣ο̣ῦ̣ κλή(ρου), [οί] δ̣ὲ καὶ με(μερίκασι) πρὸς τοὺς συνστρα(τευομένους), ἕτεροι δὲ ἐ̣ξ̣ ἰδιοκτη(μόνων) καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων εἰδῶν μεταβεβή(κασιν) εἰς τὴν κα(τοικίαν) κατὰ τὰ πρ(οστεταγμένα) μένειν καὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐγγόνοις καὶ εἰς τ[ὸν ἅπαντα] χρ̣(όνον) κ̣α̣ὶ̣ τοὺς οἰκονομοῦντας μὴ φέρεσθαι ἐν τοῖς κατ᾽ ἀξίωμα κληρο̣ύ̣[χοις . . . . . .] μηδὲ τὰς κατὰ καιρὸν γενομένας ἐπιγρ(αφὰς) εἰσφορὰ(ς) ἀπαιτ[εῖσθαι ἀκολούθ(ως)] τοῖς προπεφιλανθρω-πη(μένοις).	and since some [cleruchs], exhausted . . . weakened, have ceded their plots, others have exchanged them, and some have divided them with their fellow-soldiers, and others have transferred into the *katoikia* from private landowners and from other categories (of cleruchs), according to the royal decrees, may they and their heirs remain forever in possession of their plots, and may those who manage the plots not be registered among the cleruchs by rank[a] . . . and may the occasional harvest taxes and contributions not be collected, according to the earlier decreed benefactions.

[a] The meaning of *kat'axiōma* ("by rank") is unclear but perhaps refer to cleruchs who do not belong to the *katoikoi*; see Monson (2012) 177.

Finally, in a royal decree similar to the amnesty decrees of his predecessors, Ptolemy XII confirmed the provision about bequests and approved for the whole of Egypt the transmission of a *klēros* to the closest kin when a cleruch died intestate, as was already the case for cleruchs settled in the Fayyum (see Text 6.3).[168] The specific mention of the Fayyum is a clear acknowledgement of the existence of regional variation in rules governing cleruchs.

The standard view of the *klēroi* is based on a rigid understanding of certain Greek terms. In fact, there might have been no systematic difference between *analambanein* ("to confiscate") and *katechein* ("to confiscate temporarily") in the minds of the authors. Standardization of rules was apparently lacking. First, the earliest wills concerning the bequest of a *klēros* are dated to the same year as an official correspondence about the *klēroi* of dead cleruchs still to be confiscated by the state.[169] There might be no contradiction here, however, if these cleruchs had not drawn up wills or had no heirs. Second,

see P.Tebt. I 124, ll. 25–7 = C.Ord.Ptol. 54, ll. 3–4 (Tebtunis, 118 BC) and ll. 30–6 = ll. 8–14 = Text 6.2. For the share of a *klēros* between two brothers, see note 175.

168 Lesquier (1911) 240, 248 believes that wills concerning the bequest of the *klēros* or *stathmos* were illegal until Ptolemy XII made this concession, although he accepts that intestate succession resulted in the legal bequest of the military possessions to one of the sons since the time of Ptolemy III or IV (p. 233).

169 Clarysse (1991a) 39 also points out the incongruity between the decrees and confiscations on the one hand, and the wills on the other.

Text 6.3. *BGU IV 1185, lines 12–20*

BGU IV 1185, lines 12–20 = C.Ord.Ptol. 71 (Heracleopolite nome, after 61/0 BC)	Translation by Fischer-Bovet
μένειν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς οὓς κατεσ[χήκασιν κλήρους καὶ τοῖς] ἐ̣γ̣γόνοις σὺν τοῖς σταθμοῖς [... ἀσυκοφαντήτοις καὶ ἀ]κατη[γορήτοις καὶ ἀνεπιλήμπτοις πάσης αἰτίας οὖσιν], (col. II) ἐὰν δέ τινες αὐτῶν τελευτήσωσι ἀδιάθετοι, ἔρχεσθαι τοὺς κλήρους τούτων εἰς τοὺς ἔγγιστα γένους καθότι καὶ ἐπὴ τῶν Ἀρσινοειτῶν ἐστιν ...	They and their descendants shall remain in possession of their plots with their *stathmoi* ... without fearing denunciation, accusation or confiscation for any reason [...], (col. II) if some of them die intestate, their plots shall go to their closest relatives, as is the case for the cleruchs of the Arsinoite ...

the case in the Zenon archive of a son sharing his father's *klēros* suggests that cleruchs' sons sometimes controlled part of their fathers' plots even before their fathers died.[170] Third, cleruchs pledged their *klēroi* already in the mid third century, although nothing shows that the practice was legal at that time.[171] Fourth, cleruchs could cede their plots to fellow-soldiers, according to one of the decrees of 118 BC (Text 6.2). Finally, the inheritance of *klēroi* by women was confirmed or ratified in the first century BC, and they already appear to be in charge of *klēroi* in the third-century Oxyrhynchite nome, at least when their husbands are absent, and in the third-century Heracleopolite nome.[172]

In my view, these decrees redundantly affirm certain restricted rights from the late third century to the first century BC, namely that *klēroi* remained in the hands of cleruchs and their heirs on the condition that one of them was related to the army. In amnesty decrees and benefaction decrees (*philanthrōpa*), these confirmations are usually accompanied by tax remissions and limitations of the duties (*leiturgia*) attached to a specific military rank or cleruchic group; if private owners were entering the *katoikia*, they were probably relatives of members of the army. In addition, *ad hoc*

170 P.Cair.Zen. I 59001, l. 24, l. 45, [l. 51] (Pitos, Memphite, 274/3 BC), in which Zipyros is "part-holder" (σύγκληρος) in a list of witnesses. The specification "with Bithys, a 60-aroura man" was written above the line, while Bithys is referred to as Zipyros' father in l. 25. Since all the witnesses belonged to the troop of Lycophron, it seems that Zipyros was already registered as a cleruch; Crawford (1971) 56–7.

171 P.Hib. I 48, ll. 2–4 (Oxyrhynchite, 255 BC); Crawford (1971) 56 note 3; Lesquier (1911) 239.

172 BGU VI 1261 = BGU VIII 1734 = SB IV 7421 (Heracleopolis, 80–30 BC) and SB VIII 9790 = Rowlandson (1998) no. 167 (Heracleopolite, mid first century BC). For the third-century cases, see Uebel (1968) 41–2 note 2 and nos. 1308, 1350, 1423 (Uebel gives 1424 by mistake [?]). For the third-century Heracleopolite, see above, note 140.

decisions, sometimes regarding cessions between soldiers, at other times regarding potential successors, were made according to circumstance and always with an eye to identifying future cleruchs, and not according to a linear process of privatization. These flexible, circumstantial decisions were a strategy on the part of the state to provide incentives to cultivate the land, rather than a zero-sum game between the king and the cleruchs concerning the ownership of the plots. The king's main concern was maximizing fiscal revenues, not his integral ownership of the land.

6.4.2 Cleruchs' wills

Cleruchs' wills constitute a second source usually interpreted as evidence for illegal appropriation of the king's property and the gradual privatization of the *klēros* and the *stathmos*. This view assumes that cleruchic possessions were not perceived as under secure ownership, and that the most prudent cleruch drew up wills.[173] But the only preserved series of wills, from the third century BC (238–226/5 BC), were made by cleruchs and men of the *epigonē* ("of the descent") who were well-to-do settlers, either cavalrymen or officers.[174] They owned non-military possessions such as houses and slaves and thus had private property in addition to their *klēroi* and *stathmoi*. The testators designated the Ptolemies and their descendants as executors (*epitropoi*), since the king and his family represented the law and thus validated the wills. In addition, these wills were drawn up by the central notary's office and were registered in the archive of the capital of the Fayyum.

I propose an alternative interpretation to privatization and a loss of rights by the Ptolemies. The effect of the wills was actually positive for the state, since they provided it with the next generation of cleruchs at low cost, even though the state's concerns were not the main concern of the testators.[175] For cleruchs, the *raison d'ētre* of the will was not to defraud

173 Kreller (1919) 344; Clarysse (1991a) 33 (quotation), 37 accepts that one reason for drawing up wills was "the rather precarious status of the military possessions (*klēros*, *stathmos* and even horse and armor)." Also Oates (1963) 126, 131–2.

174 Clarysse (1991a). For their socio-economic status, see Chapter 7, section 7.1.3. On the idiosyncratic goals of the testators, see Oates (1993) 131.

175 P.Moscow.inv. 123 (Panopolis, 69 BC) supports the idea that the inheritance of *klēroi* was useful to the state; see also Van 't Dack (1977) 88; Aly (1997) 6–7: a *katoikos hippeus*, Heti, in the only preserved will in Demotic, splits 39 arouras between two sons and bequeaths the rest of his *klēros* to three other sons, providing at least two cavalry settlers to the state. See Malinine (1967) and the reviews by Bingen (1968) and Oates (2001). The latter (p. 30) compares a contemporary Greek will by a *katoikos hippeus* of the Heracleopolite nome, Dion;

the state, but to secure the welfare of their families and avoid disputes, especially when they had children from several marriages. In other words, the father wanted to specify how his non-military possessions would be distributed and which of his sons would succeed him as cleruch and inherit his military possessions.[176] Special provisions for that son, the wife, fellow-cleruchs or women outside the family, or for the manumission of slaves, modified the traditional succession between the children, who were the legal heirs *ab intestato*, thus creating a need for a will.[177] In fact, nothing in the wills points to action directed against the state. To the contrary, as noted above, the state was the guarantor of the will, with the Ptolemies acting as honorific executors and the wills registered in the official archive. In addition, the bequest of the *klēros* was by no means the testators' main preoccupation, indicating that no insecurity was felt about the transmission of it to the closest heir. Indeed, the bequest of a *klēros* is mentioned only once in these wills, in P.Petr.^{2} I 22, l. 23 (235/4 BC) and is the second attestation known from the third century, after a slightly earlier will preserved in the Zenon archive (241 BC).[178] The bequest of the *stathmos* was more common, especially to women, probably because cleruchs wanted to ensure that their wives could live on the land until they died, or that their daughters could remain there, given that they might eventually give birth to a male heir.[179]

In general, inheritance passed into direct heirs' hands without a will. Wills were exceptional, the product of well-to-do families of Greek military settlers or soldiers who could afford to make them and/or who foresaw a

see BGU VI 1285 (74 BC) and Oates' translation (37–8). Oates interprets Heti's provisions as "a confusion arising from the amalgamation of cultures" (p. 30). I perceive Heti's action instead as that of a man using any available means to avoid disputes in the future division of his possessions between numerous children, as Oates himself suggests a few pages later (p. 32). For a similar case of property split between two brothers, by a συγγενὴς κάτοικος who must have had a very large plot in Kerkeosiris, see Crawford (1971) 65–6 and *PP* II 2576 and 2579. Two brothers, sons of the (rich) officer Leptines, also seem to have shared a 100-aroura plot; see P.Petr. III 109 (a) (Arsinoite, 250–248 BC) and Legras (1999) 200.

176 See Préaux (1979) 471 and Clarysse (1991a) 49, who explains that "such a practice may then be partly responsible for an over-representation of the military section of the population in the third century wills." Lesquier (1911) 244, on the other hand, believes that the state chose the new cleruch. But this seems a very costly effort for a low return.

177 The military possessions could not be divided, except in the few later cases discussed above in note 175; see Clarysse (1991a) 34–9; Oates (2001) 31.

178 See P.Lond. VII 2015 (Memphis, 241 BC), the only other will made by a soldier from the third century BC besides the series in P.Petr.^{2} I. In both cases the legatee is lost; see Clarysse (1991a) 38–9, 221, commentary to P.Petr.^{2} I 22, l. 23; Oates (1993) 125 note 2.

179 For the bequest of *stathmoi* to women, see note 155.

complicated succession, and were by no means limited to military possessions. Wills were thus not meant to seize state property. They remain scarce in the centuries that follow and appear almost exclusively in the military milieu, among Greek officers like Dryton in the second century BC, or among Egyptian *katoikoi hippeis* drawing up their wills in Demotic, such as Heti in the first-century Panopolite nome.[180]

6.4.3 Cessions of land

Finally, a third type of evidence – cession documents, attested only from the second century BC onward – suggests that the status of the *klēros* was moving slightly toward the "privatization-end of the spectrum" but was not private property. The term for cessions, *parachōrēseis*, can be misleading, because it neither implies nor excludes the concept of sale.[181] Cessions happened, with or without the *dioikētēs*' authorization (i.e. *chrēmatismos*), when cleruchs had financial troubles.[182] The picture that emerges from Kerkeosiris in the second century BC is complemented by documents from the Heracleopolite nome dated to the first century BC.[183] Cessions always took place between *katoikoi*; cleruchic land apparently remained within a specific population group and was thus not completely privately owned. Even the wives of *katoikoi* could be involved in cessions, with women serving as intermediaries for the next male *katoikos*.[184] Transfers never consist of the whole plot but only part of it, suggesting internal rearrangements. Bingen interprets the *parachōrēseis* as a type of will and, from a socio-economic point of view, as "part of a permanent reorganization of the katoikic space according to the persons and according to the status of the land."[185] Cleruchic (also

[180] Wills were drawn up by the upper strata of society; see Clarysse (1991a) 33. In the Petrie wills, officers outnumber soldiers by ten to three. For the socio-economic status of these Greek military settlers in the third century, see Chapter 7, section 7.1.3. For the will of Heti, see P.Moscow.inv. 123 (Panopolis, 69 BC) and above, note 175.

[181] Lesquier (1911) 237. For a recent study on the *parachōrēsis*, see Rupprecht (1984).

[182] P.Tebt. I 30 and 31, 63, l. 122; 64 (a), ll. 55, 60, 69; 65, note to l. 17; 239; Grenfell *et al.* (1902–38) P.Tebt. I, p. 556; C.Ord.Ptol. 54, ll. 8–14 = P.Tebt. I 124, ll. 30–7 (118 BC), which acknowledges a series of cessions made by cleruchs who suffered hardship; Van 't Dack (1977) 89.

[183] BGU VIII 1731–40, a series of cessions consisting of four contracts and six oaths (Heracleopolite nome, first century BC); Préaux (1979) 474–5; Bingen (1983), esp. 3–6, 9–11.

[184] See p. 232 and note 172 and Bingen (1983) 5.

[185] Bingen (1983) 10 = Bingen (2007a) 140 and e.g. P.Oxy. XLIX 3482 (Oxyrhynchus, 73 BC), where Theon, a *katoikos* of the tenth hipparchy, had borrowed money from Dionysios, of the same hipparchy, to pay his tax. With the agreement of his wife, he ceded 9½ arouras to repay his debt.

called "catoecic") land had not attained the status of private property, as Préaux believes, and *katoikoi* were still in theory responsible for military duties. The person receiving the land, and later this person's heirs, were responsible for the duties and taxes attached to the allotment and could transmit it. The state kept track of the exchanges and could still confiscate plots.

6.4.4 Demilitarization of the cleruchic system in the first century BC?

In my view, the cleruchic system still provided the army with soldier-farmers in the late second century, although one may wonder about their degree of military training. In the first century BC the sources allow us access to economic and agricultural aspects of cleruchic life only in the Heracleopolite nome. This led Oates to deny *katoikoi hippeis* any military role at any period, claiming that papyrologists assumed this because they were looking at Greek texts where the *katoikoi hippeis* have Greek names.[186] He believed that many *katoikoi hippeis* were Egyptians and that for this reason they could not be soldiers. There were in fact Egyptian *katoikoi hippeis*, such as Heti, who drew up his will in Demotic in the first century BC, as well as *katoikoi hippeis* with Greek and Egyptian ancestors. But there is no causal relation between the origin of these men and whether they could be soldiers, as Oates implicitly insists.[187] We lack positive evidence of *katoikoi hippeis* mobilized for a specific military task in the first century because our sources concern cessions of land within the group.[188] We can only surmise that some at least were on military duty when they were absent from their fields, on the basis of similar terminology used for military units until the first century.[189] It is clear, however, that the *machimoi* were still employed for military purposes in the 60s BC and were garrisoned away from their plots when necessary.[190]

In conclusion, this examination of the cleruchic system, the military institution best represented in the sources, has focused on explaining changes and has shown how the institution responded during the period of crisis to the new political and economic situation. The state began to rely on a larger and more diverse portion of the population located at the core of the state to maintain its stability. Cleruchs' possessions, notably their plots and in some cases their *stathmoi*, determined their socio-economic status and their

[186] Oates (2001) 30, 32. [187] For Heti, see notes 175, 180. [188] See section 6.4.3.

[189] Yet the units could refer to professional soldiers, not cleruchs; see Van 't Dack (1977) 89 and note 6.

[190] See note 35 above and p. 260.

involvement in military activity. The development of the cleruchic system had an effect on the economic capacities of the cleruchs, their social status, the composition of the group that enjoyed access to it and on their place of residence and the nature of their coexistence with civilians and other soldiers, which is analyzed in Chapter 7.

7 Soldiers and officers in the Egyptian countryside

An evaluation of the socio-economic status of soldiers and officers and of how they lived together with civilians and with different ethnic groups illuminates how military institutions functioned at the local level and shaped power structures within villages and between the local and central administrations. The army became a base for upward mobility and integrated different ethnic groups of the population, in particular Egyptians. This chapter examines the types of settlements in which soldiers lived, the development of marriage patterns in those settlements, and the potential force of the army as a community builder. In my view, the army developed into an engine of integration within Egyptian society.

In sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 I explore the place of residence of cleruchs and soldiers and the extent to which they lived together, and I evaluate how developments including the relative rarity of absentee landlords when cleruchs were awarded small plots, the less intrusive billeting of the second century BC and intermarriage allowed for the integration of different ethnic groups. Cleruchs, however, were only one part of the army, mobilizable when necessary, while the rest was composed of professional soldiers on duty in garrisons and garrison towns. At Raphia cleruchs constituted about half of the land army described by Polybius (5.65, Text 3.4 and Table 3.7). In what follows, cleruchs and professional soldiers are analyzed separately to determine whether they developed in parallel.

In sections 7.1.3 to 7.2.3 my analysis and comparison of military communities in different periods and regions, encompassing diverse types of soldiers – cleruchs and professional soldiers, cavalry and infantry, officers and private soldiers – aim at shedding light on how different "military life-styles" shaped the interaction of soldiers with the civilian population, often in a positive way and particularly with the upper strata of the local community. Soldiers tended to form associations that reinforced their social networks and connections to other members of the military hierarchy, often extending membership in such associations to the local elite (section 7.3). I conclude by suggesting that the type of settlement that developed in Egypt was connected to the organization of the army, and that it allowed for

socio-economic and cultural integration between ethnic groups, unlike in the Seleucid settlements.

7.1 Cleruchs in the *chōra*: socio-economic status and place of residence

7.1.1 Place of residence of cleruchs

The place of residence of cleruchs in the third century is still debated.[1] They could live in villages close to their plots, as well as in nome-capitals, and in some rare cases they may have lived in Alexandria for part of the year. Our sources do not often indicate where cleruchs lived, but cleruchs and soldiers did establish relationships with civilians, in particular with the native Egyptian population. For many years, historians believed that most cleruchs lived in the villages close to their *klēroi*, as Braunert argued in his study of internal migration.[2] Braunert's view was challenged, however, because the management of a *klēros* and the actual place of residence of a cleruch could vary according to the size of a plot. Since in the third century most cleruchs – in contrast to the second-century *machimoi* – had large plots and leased them out to others or hired workers for wages, many of these well-to-do Greeks may have been absentee landlords.[3] With 20 arouras or more a man could reasonably lease out his plot, which should have produced a year's worth of wheat for up to thirteen adult males.[4] These cleruchs had enough resources and time to devote some of it to military matters, although we do not know how often or for how long they were on active duty.

1 Van 't Dack (1977) 83 and note 6; Clarysse (1991a) 32.

2 Notably because cleruchs knew that leased-out *klēroi* could easily be confiscated by the state; see P.Petr. III 104 = W.Chr. 334 = Sel.Pap. II 392, P.Petr. III 105 and 106 (Arsinoite, 244/3 BC), with Braunert (1964) 38–40 and Uebel (1968) 19. Of the cleruchs in Uebel's list, only five lived in the nome-capital. Also Lesquier (1911) 210.

3 Leases of *klēroi* are attested almost from the beginning; see Lesquier (1911) 235–6; Préaux (1979) 464–5. For farmers hired as laborers, see Crawford (1971) 78–9.

4 One adult male consumes annually about 10 artabas (400 liters) of wheat; see Pestman (1994) 49. A plot of 20 arouras ideally provided 130 artabas per year, assuming a yield of 10 artabas per aroura, taxes at 25 percent of the revenues, and a sowing rate of one artaba of wheat per aroura, *contra* Van 't Dack (1977) 87, who suggests that only a cleruch with a small family could live on 20 arouras. Some of the land could of course be used for horse- or cattle-grazing, decreasing the amount available to support human consumption. Crawford (1971) estimated that a family could live on 5 arouras; see P.Tebt. I 56 (Kerkeosiris, late second century BC). Even if the yield was lower than 10 artabas, e.g. 8.8 artabas on average in P.Tebt. I 49 (Kerkeosiris, 113 BC), the nutritional needs of women and children were lower than 400 liters per year; see for example Billows (1995) 163–5, who estimates 300 kilos of grain as the minimum per person per year.

A few decades ago Bingen argued that Greek military settlers were often absentee landlords who tended to live in an urban milieu.[5] This thesis is supported by a series of lease contracts from third-century Tholthis in the Oxyrhynchite nome, where cleruchs with large plots let their *klēroi* to middlemen, and by documents from second-century Tebtunis and Kerkeosiris, where *katoikoi* let or sublet their *klēroi* to Egyptian farmers.[6] But Crawford reminds us that the phenomenon of absentee landlordship cannot be generalized on the basis of this documentation, even if there were clear cases, such as that of the Athenian Eupolis in Tholthis.[7] A certain Asclepiades, probably a cleruch, for example, lived with his family in the village of Bubastos in the Fayyum and hired farmers to cultivate his land (W.Chr. 198, 240 BC). In Kerkeosiris in the late second century, one-third of the *katoikoi* cultivated their plots and thus lived in the village.[8] The other two-thirds hired farmers, and it is accordingly assumed that they resided in the nome capital, although they may well have lived in villages, like Asclepiades. In contrast, cleruchs with smaller plots, such as the *machimoi*, were not inclined to let or sublet their *klēroi*. Instead, they most often appear in the land registers cultivating their plots themselves (γεωργοὶ αὐτοί).[9]

CPR XVIII and P.Petr.[2] I, which were unpublished and unsatisfactorily published, respectively, at the time of Bingen's studies, suggest that cleruchs rarely lived in Alexandria. CPR XVIII consists of two third-century rolls registering contracts drawn up in several villages of the Arsinoite nome by cleruchs, mostly 100-aroura men of the third and fifth hipparchies, and by men of the *epigonē* ("of the descent").[10] Once again, the document does not indicate where the cleruchs and men "of the descent" (*tēs epigonēs*) lived, but since the contracts were drawn up in different villages of the Arsinoite nome, the cleruchs probably lived there. Of twenty-nine cleruchs, only four were citizens of Alexandria, while six civilians out of sixty were Alexandrians.

[5] Bingen (1973); Lewis (1986) 32.

[6] Bingen (1973) 221; Bingen (1978c) 78–9.

[7] Crawford (1971) 76–8. On Eupolis, see Winnicki (1992a); A.Martin (1992). Montevecchi (1997) 721, 725–6 also suggests that military settlers in the Arsinoite lived more often in villages than did non-military settlers of the Oxyrhynchite.

[8] For the percentages, see Crawford (1971) 84.

[9] Crawford (1971) 84 and Tables III and IV, 148–59, confirmed by the publication of new texts from Kerkeosiris by Keenan and Shelton (1976) 10 and Index IX, under γεωργὸς αὐτός. Bingen (1973) 221 does not discuss the *machimoi*, because he focuses on the Greek population, as he himself explains in Bingen (1979) = Bingen (2007a) 129; and see Van 't Dack (1977) 87.

[10] Kramer (1991) CPR XVIII, list on 64–9; the two 30-aroura men (Xenon in CPR XVIII 10, ll. 201–2 and S[. . .] in CPR XVIII 32, l. 6) are infantrymen belonging to a chiliarchy; see Van 't Dack (1993) 166–7 and the editor's doubts about the reading of the abbreviation (which stands for chiliarchy rather than hipparchy) in CPR XVIII 32, l. 6.

Citizens of Alexandria could live outside the capital, of course, and non-citizens could live in it or at least in the nome-capital. Nevertheless, of a sample of men who would most plausibly have leased out their plots and who would not have lived in villages, only about 15 percent were Alexandrian citizens. Among the witnesses whose origin is preserved, about 10 percent were Alexandrian soldiers present in the Fayyum when the contracts were drawn up. Moreover, two of the Alexandrian citizens are described as not yet registered in a deme, which suggests that they did not live in Alexandria or that their mothers were not Alexandrian citizens.[11] In this case too, they probably lived in the Fayyum, where citizens were more inclined to marry non-citizens. This is confirmed by third-century tax lists that record Alexandrians living in the Fayyum.[12]

P.Petr.^{2} I consists of fifty-three wills drawn up in Krokodilopolis in the same period and suggests a similar percentage of Alexandrians (*c.* 10 percent).[13] Among the testators, forty-eight were soldiers and officers, of whom only three men, undoubtedly cleruch-officers, had a house in Alexandria, and two were Alexandrian.[14] One of the Alexandrians, Demetrios Chesterios, owned a house in the capital but also had a *stathmos* and probably other possessions in the Fayyum. Clarysse suggests that he spent most of his time in the *chōra*, since the will was drawn up in the Fayyum. Similarly, Peisias distinguished between his possessions in Alexandria, including a tenement house, and those in the Fayyum, notably another house in the village of Bubastos. Clarysse stresses that while Peisias was a "well-to-do" officer, he lived in an "ordinary Fayum village" because of his *klēros* and his military duties in the area.[15] Even if these two sets of evidence are too small to provide definitive results, they suggest that 10–15 percent of the higher strata of cleruchs were Alexandrians in the second part of the third century BC and that they lived in Alexandria only in rare cases.

To sum up, in response to Braunert and Bingen's views about the place of residence of cleruchs, I suggest a way in between, which is nonetheless closer to Braunert's opinion and is based on the relationship between the

11 Kramer (1991) 73–4.

12 P.Count 4, l. 61 with commentary on Monimos son of Cleandros; see below, section 7.1.3.

13 Clarysse (1991a) 43–4: I calculate that out of 111 witnesses, 66 have their origin preserved and seven are Alexandrian military men, while the other fourteen Alexandrians are civilians or "of the descent."

14 Clarysse (1991a) 33 and note 7 for the Alexandrians, Demetrios Chesterios (P.Petr.^{2} I 3, l. 70) and Ammonios Andromacheios or Lusimacheios (P.Petr.^{2} I 16, l. 101), and note 37 for the houses in Alexandria; see Demetrios Chesterios (P.Petr.^{2} I 3, l. 74), lost name (P.Petr.^{2} I 6, ll. 6–8), and Peisias (P.Petr.^{2} I 13, ll. 6–8) and commentaries *ad loc.*

15 Clarysse (1991a) 158, 161.

size of the *klēros* and its management. In the third century the proportion of cleruchs living in Alexandria was low. An unknown number of them lived in the nome capitals for at least part of the year. The existence of gymnasia in several villages in the Fayyum in the third century BC and in the Heracleopolite nome suggests that a significant number of cleruchs lived in villages, since they invested time and money in reproducing an essential element of Greek life and military training.[16] In the second century cleruchs who received 20 arouras or more may have preserved the patterns of residence of the previous century, whereas cleruchs with fewer than 20 arouras, who were now more numerous than in the previous period, lived in their villages and were involved in agricultural work. Those with plots of 5 or 7 arouras might be in trouble when they were mobilized for long periods, since their holdings were not large enough to be leased out.[17] In general, the majority of cleruchs lived in villages or in the nearby nome-capital, which suggests that interactions with the local elite occurred and in fact increased over time.

7.1.2 Billeting soldiers and soldiers' billets

Another aspect of the presence of military personnel in the countryside was the billeting of soldiers. This produced both negative and positive interactions with civilians, but the negative impact has usually been emphasized, especially within a framework of Greek colonists versus Egyptian subjects.[18] A critical survey of soldiers quartered in the countryside and of individual cases of soldiers billeted in *stathmoi*, especially private houses, reveals more subtle tensions not centered on ethnicity.[19]

Unsurprisingly, the garrisoning and quartering of groups of soldiers created tensions with the civilian population. This is a universal phenomenon not limited to conqueror–subject relationships, since any state could billet soldiers on its own territory, for example to control its border,[20] by establishing garrisons, quartering soldiers in huts or placing them in

[16] See section 7.3.1 and note 208. For the gymnasia in the villages of the Fayyum, see Bingen (1975) 371.

[17] See section 7.1.4. [18] E.g. Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 213–21.

[19] See Chapter 6, section 6.4.1 and note 151. For a reassessment of the issues concerning soldiers' billets, see Pfeiffer (2007). For previous descriptions of the *stathmoi*, see Préaux (1979) 477–80; Lenger (1952); Launey (1949) 695–714; Lesquier (1911) 210–12.

[20] Préaux (1979) 390, 392 conjectures that soldiers were already billeted on private householders in pharaonic Egypt, at least temporarily, since the practice is well attested for officials from the Old Kingdom.

private houses.[21] Unlike the Ptolemies, the Seleucids seem to have refrained from quartering soldiers in private houses in Greek cities.[22] Nevertheless the poleis had to handle the presence of soldiers garrisoned by many different kings. The presence of these troops could be costly to the citizens, but garrison commanders could also act as protectors and benefactors of the cities, and the soldiers sometimes married local women.[23] Cities could obtain exemptions from garrisoning or billeting troops, and such immunity was not limited to specific groups of Greeks but also included parts of the native Egyptian population.[24] The most famous example is a royal decree by Ptolemy II in which the king warns his addressee to ensure that if soldiers stayed in Arsinoe near Edfu, "none of them shall be billeted there";[25] instead, they should erect "huts" (l. 183, οἰκίδια) for themselves. Requisitioning parts of private houses was an intrusive method of stationing soldiers and state representatives, and the Ptolemies accordingly tried early on to limit the abuses that could be expected from any army toward the civilian population, be it Greek or Egyptian.[26] Although we can only speculate on the frequency and specificity of such royal orders, this decree began with general rules about the billeting (*stathmodosia*) of soldiers (*stratiōtai*, ll. 166–7) to prevent them from taking over private houses that were not assigned them by the *oikonomoi.* Soldiers should instead build barracks, and the *oikonomoi* should provide them with a *stathmos* only when necessary and ensure that they did not keep it for themselves when they left. This decree concerns soldiers on active duty, but the same general rules must have applied to cleruchs.

21 There is no evidence that the king or the soldier paid rent to the homeowner, meaning that part of the house was certainly requisitioned; see Lenger (1952) 243 note 4, *contra* Launey (1949) 703–4.

22 Welles (1974) 138.

23 Chaniotis (2005) 88–93; Cohen (1983), esp. 70–4. For the relationships between women and soldiers in garrisons, see Chaniotis (2005), esp. 104–6, Chaniotis (2002); Ma (2002); Bagnall (1976) 263–6. A royal decree of Ptolemy II, C.Ord.Ptol. 22 = SB V 8008, establishes that "all the soldiers and other settlers in Syria and Phoenicia who live with native women [whom] they have taken need not declare them" (English translation in Austin [2006] no. 260 [b]).

24 As an example of exemption from billeting granted to a city in Cilicia by the king, probably Ptolemy IV, see C.Ord.Ptol. 84 = Welles (1974) no. 30, where the soldiers and the ἔξω τάξεων were camping in disorder (ἀτάκτως κατεσκηνωκότων) within and without the walls of the city. Exemptions could also exist privately; see P.Cair.Zen. III 59341 = Bagnall (1997) no. 68 (Alexandria, 247 BC), where a citizen of Calynda tried to obtain the same exemption as his father, since he had people quartered in his house and had to provide green fodder and hay for the cavalrymen; Préaux (1979) 389–90.

25 P.Hal. 1, ll. 179–85 = Sel.Pap. II 207, ll. 166–85 = C.Ord.Ptol. 24, ll. 14–20 (Apollonopolite, after 259 BC), l. 181, μηθεὶς ἐπιστα[θ]μεύσηι; Bagnall and Derow (2004) no. 124 and Austin (2006) no. 311; see section 7.2.2.

26 E.g. the order of Peucestas under Alexander the Great; see section 7.2.2, p. 264.

Ptolemy II had previously issued similar decrees.[27] One established fines for any parties, soldiers or civilians who abused or behaved violently toward others (C.Ord.Ptol. 9). Complaints related to misbehavior offer a colorful picture of individual disputes about the *stathmoi*, including soldiers fighting one another about the same *stathmos*,[28] an Egyptian thrown out of his house by a soldier,[29] soldiers' widows wronged by Egyptian house-holders,[30] and soldiers wronged by Greek homeowners.[31] Sometimes walls were built to separate the part of the house assigned to the cleruch from that used by the *stathmouchos*, the owner. The civilian population obviously tried to avoid billeting. Some people even removed the roofs of their houses or built small altars to block the door and to make the authorities reluctant to break through it.[32] When there was ambiguity about who could stay in the house, Ptolemaic administrators sometimes supported native Egyptian owners against Greek cleruchs.[33] There is thus no reason to think that in the *chōra* all decisions were made in favor of Greeks.

The only complaint related to a *stathmos* dated to the second century BC offers an even more vivid and complex picture of the relationships that might be generated.[34] If we had only this document concerning Esoroeris, the petition would suggest the case of an Egyptian whose house was located

[27] See Chapter 6, section section 6.4.1 and note 152.

[28] UPZ II 151 (Thebaid, after 259 BC) = P.Lond. I 106, translated in Lewis (1986) 22. See also P.Lond. VII 2039 (unknown provenance, mid third century BC) and Aly (1997) 12, although this text does not explicitly mention a *stathmos* but simply a piece of waste land (τόπον ἔρημον) that Menandros, a Persian *tēs epigonēs*, obtained from Petosiris the billeting officer (τὸν σταθμοδότην) in order to build his house (οἰκίαν). It is worth noticing that the billeting officer was an Egyptian and that a Persian τῆς ἐπιγονῆς could ask him for a piece of land for a house, suggesting that he was closely associated with to the army. The Persian *tēs epigonēs* Menandros was then wronged by the cleruch Dionysodoros, who asked him for two drachmas per year as rent, built around his house and finally attacked him.

[29] P.Enteux. 11 (Polydeukia [Arsinoite], 221 BC), translated in Lewis (1986) 60.

[30] P.Enteux. 13 (Magdola, 222 BC), translated in Lewis (1986) 23, and perhaps BGU III 1006 (unknown provenance, third century BC?), regarding a woman expelled from a house after it was bought, although whether she was a cleruch's wife, an Egyptian or both is unknown.

[31] P.Enteux. 12 (Sebennytos, 244 BC), translated in Bagnall and Derow (2004) no. 121 and discussed in Lenger (1980) 242; perhaps also P.Tebt. III 933 (Syron Kome [Arsinoite], third century BC), a petition from Timocrates against Asclepiades, too fragmentary to establish whether they were soldiers and whether Asclepiades owned the house.

[32] W.Chr. 449 = P.Petr. II 12 (1) = Sel.Pap. II 413 (Krokodilopolis, 242 BC): in this case, the future occupants of the *stathmoi* were not to be soldiers but overseers of works (ἐπιστάτας τῶν ἔργων); Lesquier (1911) 211–12; Lenger (1952).

[33] P.Enteux. 14 (Magdola, 242 BC): a Thracian cleruch, Dizaporis, complains to the king that the *epistatēs* Deinias threw him out of the house where he had his *stathmos* when the house that had been taken in pledge became the property of the creditor, an Egyptian (l. 7).

[34] BGU VI 1247 (Syene or Ombos, 137 BC), in the same archive as BGU VI 1248–9, with commentary and translation in Porten (1996) D8–D10: Esoroeris is a *tēs epigonēs*, and Porten accordingly wonders whether he is the descendant of a soldier, a Hellenizing Egyptian or a debtor; see D8, note 7. His family seemed to have been closely associated with the military

in the garrison of Syene and who was wronged by his Greek *epistathmos*, Neoptolemos, the soldier who lived in his house.[35] The reasons for the dispute are actually more complex and melodramatic than this. Thanks to other documents from the same bilingual family archive, we learn that Neoptolemos was Esoroeris' stepfather. Esoroeris' mother Sennesis/Isis probably met Neoptolemos when he was billeted in the family house and married him. Soon tensions emerged from the cohabitation of the two couples, the mother and her new Greek husband, on the one hand, and Esoroeris and his wife, on the other. Esoroeris brought charges against his stepfather, and other texts reveal that Sennesis/Isis accused her son and daughter-in-law of bodily assault. Neoptolemos is no longer mentioned in the dispute between son and mother.

Petitions concerning the billeting of soldiers were probably numerous but appear more commonly in the third century, perhaps because of the survival of petitions from Magdola and Ghoran (P.Enteux.). In contrast, only one such document survives from the second century BC. The system of billeting in private houses did not vanish but may have slowed down and changed its nature in connection with the modifications taking place in the composition and organization of the army, in particular local recruits and garrisoned soldiers. *Stathmoi*, for example, could now be passed on within Egyptian families.[36] But the amnesty decree of 118 BC established that certain population groups with relatively high standards of living, such as those who bought houses and vineyards from the king, Greeks serving in the army (ll. 168–9, τοὺς στρατευομένους Ἕλληνας), priests, royal farmers and those who worked for the so-called royal monopolies were exempt from quartering men in their primary residence, and only half of their second residence could be requisitioned.[37] This and the previous cases suggest that tensions related to the requisition of *stathmoi* cannot be reduced to those between Greek and Egyptian ethnic groups. Both Greeks and Egyptians had to billet soldiers, and just as the *Hellēnes* of third-century tax lists (P.Count) were not necessary all ethnic Greeks, the "Greeks serving in the armies" were not automatically all ethnic Greeks, although many probably had Greek ancestors.[38] The houses of more Egyptians were partially requisitioned, of

milieu, with their house in the fortress. Perhaps his father was a fellow-soldier of Neoptolemos, but this is of course conjectural.

35 Thus Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 216, although she acknowledges the complexity of the case on 230.

36 See the example in Chapter 6, section section 6.4.1 note 156.

37 P.Tebt. I 5, ll. 99–101, 268–77; Préaux (1979) 389, 391; Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 220.

38 Lesquier (1911) 127–8 already suggested that Egyptians could enter this category by taking a Greek name. Wilcken (1927) 21, commentary to UPZ II 157, l. 30, discusses the case of an Egyptian belonging to the στρατευομένοι Ἕλληνες; see note 114.

course, but this is unsurprising given the double statistical convergence mentioned in Chapter 3: the fact that there were far more Egyptians than Greeks, and that they were less well represented in higher socio-economic strata.[39]

7.1.3 Communities of Greek military settlers in the third century BC

The investigation of the social networks of soldiers, their relationships with civilians, and their socio-economic status in the third century BC is limited to soldier communities from the Fayyum and the Oxyrhynchite nome, because sources from other areas are lacking. Cleruchs tried to make the best use of their social networks by bringing letters of recommendation to influential people in the areas where they were granted plots. A series of letters preserved in the Zenon archive and dating to the mid third century illustrates this process.[40] Greeks who had a relatively influential position in the administration or were good friends of the addressee would write such letters in order to increase the cleruch's chances of having his plot measured properly or to help him obtain other favors. The use of an existing social network is a universal phenomenon in migration processes and suggests a somewhat exclusive Greek milieu at that time. It also reveals that Greek soldiers were not themselves immune from abuse by the Greek administration, since those who could find a way to ensure that their plot would be correctly measured did so. When possible, cleruchs also asked their recommenders to ensure that the quality of the plot was good. One letter addressed to Zenon had a slightly different purpose and indicates that even in this Greek milieu inter-ethnic relationships developed by means of the army. The cleruch Diocles intercedes for Paris, a native Egyptian from Oxyrhynchus who has come to the Fayyum. On my understanding of the two documents related to this case, Paris wants his status as *machimos* to be confirmed so that he can obtain land, which would make his case resemble that of a cleruch.[41]

[39] See Chapter 3, section 3.1.3 note 62; even so, the fragmentary evidence does not offer us a far larger number of Egyptians wronged in *stathmos*-related case compared with the number of Greeks in the same situation.

[40] Aly (1997) 7–11; around 150 cleruchs appear in the Zenon archive, for which see Pestman and Clarysse (1981); Pestman (1980). It has been suggested that some cleruchs had their plots on the *dōrea*, but Uebel (1968) 24–6 contests this.

[41] Aly (1997) 10, following Oates (1994), interprets P.Cair.Zen. IV 59590 + P.Mich. I 82 (unknown provenance, 246/5 BC) completely differently; see Chapter 5, section 5.1 note 19. For them, Paris was enrolled among the *machimoi* against his will and tried to be released from what they regard as an onerous task. On my understanding, by contrast, the status of *machimos* was rather good. Whatever the case, this does not alter my argument regarding inter-ethnic relationships developing through the army.

Over time, a similar relationship of support and/or friendship could develop between Greek soldiers and Egyptian civilians. Two examples illustrate friendly relationships with Egyptian women. The favorable arrangement made by Agathocles with Taritys, the mother of a goldsmith, in regard to a *stathmos*, suggests a peculiar relationship left unmentioned in the document.[42] A few decades later, an Egyptian woman, Tetosiris, explains that a 100-aroura man was about to witness for her against another Greek in a dispute about a house but was prevented from doing so by intimidation.[43] This second example is usually offered as one of an Egyptian wronged by a Greek, but it also shows that another Greek might simultaneously support an Egyptian.[44] Such interactions were possible because the two groups were not living in ghettos but often side by side in the *chōra*, even in the nome-capital of the Fayyum.[45] Both patterns, Greeks with Egyptian neighbors and small groups of cleruchs settled close to one other, are found in the third and even the second century.[46]

In the third century the cleruchic milieu seems to have remained mostly Greek in these areas. In the series of wills drawn up in Krokodilopolis in the mid third century by cleruchs and soldiers, none of them or their witnesses are Egyptian, but their families and witnesses come from the entire Greek world.[47] As a result of army service, Greeks from the old Greek world but also men from Macedonia and Thrace, as well as the so-called Persians, "were thrown together and lived side by side."[48] Sometimes testators chose witnesses of their own rank or only men "of the descent" (*tēs epigonēs*), but most lists have witnesses with different ranks and companies – sometimes a father and his son – and different ethnic and deme affiliations, except for the Alexandrians, who often appear in groups of two or three.[49] If one accepts that the men of the descent belonged to military families, the sample of the population represented in the wills is completely military, with only one exception.

While immigrants married immigrants from different regions or cities, only a single marriage with an Egyptian woman is alluded to in the group of

[42] See Chapter 6, section 6.4.1, p. 229 and note 158.

[43] P.Enteux. 86 (Magdola, 221 BC), translated in Lewis (1986) 60–1.

[44] Lewis (1986) 60–1.

[45] Clarysse (1991a) 71. Outside Alexandria the only clear example of a ghetto or quarter inhabited by a single ethnic group is a Jewish community in Trikomia; see Mueller (2006) 136–8. This pattern may have been specific to Jews or to ethnic minorities, but not to Greek or Egyptian ethnic groups.

[46] Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 151.

[47] Some could have an Egyptian mother, but there is no way to know this without other documents concerning the same person.

[48] Clarysse (1998) 1.

[49] Clarysse (1991a) 42–5.

testators preserved in P.Petr.[2] I, that of Monimos the son of the Alexandrian Cleandros, who married Esoeris, with whom he lived in the Fayyum and presumably had a daughter, Demetria.[50] Clarysse points out how remarkable it is that a man with such a Hellenic background married an Egyptian woman but also warns against assuming that marriages between Greek men and Egyptian women were common in mid-third-century military settlements in the Fayyum.[51] Two other mixed marriages from the third century may belong to the military milieu. In the first case, the Cyrenean Demetrios married Thasis, with whom he had two daughters. They are said to be Cyrenean, bore double names, one Greek and one Egyptian, and dedicated a temple to the Egyptian goddess Thoueris.[52] Marriage to an Egyptian woman would naturally bring Egyptian religion into the family of a Greek man. The fact that Demetrios' daughters used their father's ethnic shows that there was more flexibility in the Egyptian *chōra* than there was in the rigid structures of the polis of Cyrene or any other Greek polis where the ethnicity could affect access to citizenship.[53] As a Cyrenean settled in the Fayyum and belonging to the well-to-do strata of society (since he could afford to have his daughters dedicate a temple, although most likely one of modest size), Demetrios may well have been a cavalry settler or even an officer. In the second case, Andronicos the son of Androsthenes and Tanachtis, a Greek born in Egypt (*Wynn ms n Kmy*), married Renpe-nofre the daughter of Horos and Naamsesis. This designation "Greek born in

[50] Clarysse (1991a) 35–6 and commentary to P.Petr.[2] I 1, l. 55, Clarysse (1992) 51–2. Monimos son of Cleandros is recorded as an *Hellēn* who pays the salt tax in a Demotic tax list from the Fayyum, P.Count 4, col. 3, ll. 61–4 (Krokodilopolis [?], 254–231 BC). The same Monimos is probably attested in I.Fayoum III 207, a very fragmentary dedication to the king; see Clarysse and Thompson (2006) vol. II, 144–5. For intermarriage and the two schools of interpretation ("acculturation" vs. "segregation"), see Mélèze Modrzejewski (1984) 362 and (1980) 58.

[51] This view was defended by Fraser (1972) I 72; Clarysse (1991a) 36. Clarysse (1992) 52 also points out that "perhaps the scarcity of mixed marriages in our third century documentation is for the large part due to the types of documents on which modern surveyance is based (in the Zenon archive for example 'irregular' filiations are totally absent from the 1700 Greek documents, but two are found in the twenty-odd Demotic texts)".

[52] W.Chr. 51 = I.Fayoum. I 2 = SB I 1567 (between 244 and 221 BC): this is the oldest attested case of a double name (Greek and Egyptian) in Egypt. Wilcken (1912) 75 suggests that the unusual way of introducing double names, as well as the name of the mother, shows that intermarriage was still rare at that time, but that the interaction between the ethnic groups had already started; see also Peremans (1981) 273.

[53] Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 225–6 and note 395 stresses that according to the constitution of Cyrene, SEG IX 1, the two girls could not present themselves as "Cyrenean," since their mother should have been a Libyan of a particular region of Libya and not an Egyptian. Mélèze Modrzejewski (1980) 58–9, 61 explains that the rule in Egypt was to take the father's ethnic but without following the laws of the city itself. Mélèze Modrzejewski does not take into account the rules of marriage set up in the Cyrenean constitution, as Anagnostou-Canas does.

Egypt" and the set of texts in which Andronicos appears connect him to the military milieu.[54] It is noticeable that he was already the child of a mixed couple and reproduced his parents' marital pattern.

Greco-Egyptian marriages must be examined case by case, because the data are too limited to quantify their frequency. Papyrologists nevertheless agree that Greek men married Egyptian women less frequently in the third century than in the later period, while no marriages between Egyptian men and Greek women are currently attested.[55] The larger number of documents from the second century may affect our view of this matter, but the unusual phrasing introducing the double names of Demetrios' daughters in the dedication perhaps confirms that such unions were uncommon in the third century.[56] From the few cases of intermarriage in the third century presented by Peremans, to which the union of Monimos and Esoeris can be added, four observations shed light on the dynamic of mixed unions and cohabitation outside the Greek poleis.[57] First, more Greco-Egyptian marriages can be detected when different types of documentation, notably in Greek and Egyptian, can be cross-checked, as in the case of Monimos. This is rarely possible and partially explains the low percentage of mixed unions attested throughout the Ptolemaic period. For example, Monimos and Esoeris' daughter received a Greek name, as anyone would expect in a society in which it was advantageous to belong to the Hellenic community, although she may also have received an Egyptian name like Demetrios' daughters. If she were to appear in other documents as Demetria, or as the daughter of Monimos, probably soon married to a soldier, no historian or

[54] P.Hausw. 18 (Edfu, 212/11 BC). This archive belonged to a "man reckoned among the men of Philae" (*ỉw=f ỉp ẖn nꜣ rmt.w pr-ỉw-rq*), and a Blemmye and a Megabarian, often used by the Ptolemies as guards or guides, also appear in it; see Manning (1997) 15–16. La'da (2007), esp. 373, suggests that *rmt pr-ỉw-rq* refers to a military or semi-military occupation, which reinforces the hypothesis that Andronicos belonged to the military milieu; in the third century BC the Greek equivalent for *Wynn ms n Kmy* is Persian *tēs epigonēs*; see Chapter 5, section 5.2.3.1.

[55] For the possibility of marriage between Egyptian men and Greek women, see Peremans (1981) 273, who follows Vatin (1970) 132 but does not know how to interpret the union of Eurete and Psenchonsis alluded to in BGU VI 1333 (Thebes, 230 BC); Rowlandson (1995) 305. Some borderline cases exist in the second century BC, such as the daughters of Dryton who married Egyptian soldiers, and two contemporary cases of women with Greek names married to men with Egyptian names; see Clarysse (1995) Table 3, nos. 18 and 19. For a list of marriage contracts in Greco-Roman Egypt, see Montevecchi (1936), (1988) 203–7, and the recent study by Yiftach-Firanko (2003).

[56] See note 52.

[57] Peremans (1981) presents 13 cases of potential mixed unions in the third century, three of which he rejects. Four cases are safely based on mention of the ethnic, including the marriages of Demetrios and Andronicos discussed above. The six others rely on abnormal filiations based on onomastic criteria and are subject to reconsideration.

papyrologist would deduce that her mother was Egyptian or that Demetria would pass on Greco-Egyptian traditions to her children, probably future soldiers bearing Greek names.

Second, Greek soldiers or military settlers predominate in the evidence for intermarriage. Peremans' view that mixed unions were more common in lower social strata is misleading, because he assumes that the individuals mentioned in the documents were relatively poor, in particular because half of the "irregular filiations" (i.e. a father with an Egyptian name whose son bears a Greek name, or vice versa) occurred in families involved in farming and breeding.[58] In fact, many of these people owned land and cattle, did relatively well socio-economically and/or were cleruchs. Integration happened in the upper strata of the local community, to which almost all Greeks belonged. Unless Peremans' point was that they were poor in comparison with the elite at the court in Alexandria, his view must be challenged.

Third, second- or third-generation immigrants born in Egypt, such as Monimos and Andronicos, were the most inclined to marry outside their ethnic group. Mixed marriages generated mixed marriages in families, a tendency likely to increase, given the initially small percentage of Greeks in Egypt, unless institutional and legal barriers were established against it. The dedication to an Egyptian goddess by Demetrios' daughters indicates how Egyptian religion or tradition might smoothly enter a Greco-Egyptian family which, from an official point of view, remained Greek, creating a discrepancy between socio-cultural and administrative realities. Finally, the place of residence of the couples, whether the nome-capital or a nearby village, suggests that mixed unions were easier outside the rigid structure of Greek city-states such as Alexandria, Naucratis or Cyrene, to which the concept of citizenship remained attached. Moreover, the absence of ghettos, in particular in the *chōra*, allowed children of different ethnic groups to interact, an element often overlooked because of a lack of specific evidence. In sum, the first hints of close interactions between ethnic groups and

[58] For irregular filiations, called "abnormal filiations" by payrologists, see Peremans (1981) 280–1 and (1974) 135, on which Lewis (1986) 28 and note 22 relies; the latter suggests that mixed unions began in the rural strata and spread to the military milieu, notably by stressing that the first mixed union was that of a poor muleteer in 250 BC (P.Cair.Zen II 59292, ll. 300–1) and that the first mixed union attested for a soldier dates to 230 BC. (Lewis makes no reference to this "recently" published papyrus.) Peremans (1981) 278 rejects the marriage of the muleteer as a case of Greco-Egyptian union, because he does not consider the name of the wife, Amamos, Egyptian. In my view, the evidence does not allow us to claim that mixed unions were mostly confined to the lower strata of the population.

involving members of the military are already visible in the final decades of the third century.

Interaction between the military milieu and native Egyptians was not limited to the private household sphere. A group of land leases from Tholthis (Oxyrhynchite nome) allows us to catch a glimpse of the socio-economic interaction between Greek cleruchs and Egyptian cultivators between 220 and 210 BC. Our sources concern only leases of land by cleruchs, and what portion of the village's cultivated area is represented, is unknown. The lessors are always cleruchs (except for the mother of a cleruch in one case), and the lessees are men "of the descent" (*tēs epigonēs*), sometimes in partnership with one or two Egyptians. Bingen points out tendencies that are relevant for understanding the socio-economic and ethnic relationships in the *chōra* where Greeks had been settled.[59] In these contracts the stronger parties are the *tēs epigonēs*, who loan money to the cleruchs and play the role of middleman, putting land into the hands of Egyptian cultivators.[60] According to Bingen, the *tēs epigonēs* are non-Egyptian civilians, but in Chapter 5 I argued that already in the third century they were closely linked to the milieu of the military settlers. Their link with the army can also be inferred from the fact that some of the lessees were cleruchs "not yet attached to a *hēgemōn*" (τῶν οὔπω ὑφ' ἡγεμόνα).[61] Many belonged to cleruchs' families and were probably cleruchs-to-be. In any case, this group of documents records two types of economic interaction between immigrants and Egyptians: immigrants leasing or subleasing their land to Egyptians, and Egyptian lessees associated with a Greek who together play the role of middlemen.

Finally, cleruchs' wills give us a sense of their socio-economic status beyond the management of their *klēroi*. As noted earlier, in the series of cleruchs' wills drawn up in Krokodilopolis in 238–226/5 BC the testators and their witnesses are representative of a "well-to-do middle class of military settlers" compared with a lower class of Greek artisans and small farmers and the population of Egyptian farmers.[62] Some testators bequeathed a few slaves or wished to free them, others owned a vineyard or houses in the Fayyum and/or Alexandria; some passed on their horse and their

[59] Bingen (1978c) and BGU X 1943–59 (Tholthis, 220–210 BC); Crawford (1971) 76–7.

[60] Bingen (1978c) 77–8 and BGU VI 1266 (Takona, 203 BC) shows that the fractions recording the share of profit on the loans (1/5, 1/5, 1/5 and 2/5) suggest that the lessees did not cultivate the field but rather provided funds or perhaps seeds.

[61] E.g. Purros in BGU X 1943 (Tholthis, 215/14 BC).

[62] See discussion in Chapter 6, section 6.4.2.

armor, and one even passed on a temple.[63] The number of slaves owned by cleruchs makes their economic means clear: a third-century tax list shows that slaveholding was more common among Greek families and that the average family had only one slave.[64] Unsurprisingly, the officers' socio-economic status was even higher, as slaves are manumitted only in their wills. Many cleruchs also owned vineyards and had fiscal privileges connected with them.[65] An *apomoira* account from the early second-century Fayyum suggests that cleruchs produced about 60 percent of the wine in the Fayyum at the time, and that wine production provided on average an annual income one-and-a-half times higher than that of an agricultural worker.[66]

7.1.4 Greek, Egyptian and Greco-Egyptian cleruchs in the second century BC

Second-century military settlers are largely known from the administrative documents of the village of Kerkeosiris in the Fayyum, whose representativeness is often implicitly assumed.[67] Three aspects of the cleruchic system tend to be emphasized: the decline, on average, of the socio-economic status of the cleruchs based on a decrease in the size of *klēroi*; the large number of 7-aroura *machimoi*, most often of Egyptian origin, settled in the village – the presence of Egyptians among the *katoikoi hippeis*, by contrast, is often overlooked; and the unfortunate state of the *machimoi*, discussed in the following subsection. How representative these tendencies are can be evaluated by comparing the situation of the cleruchs in Kerkeosiris with the third-century military settlers and with contemporary evidence from outside the Fayyum. The evidence for Kerkeosiris can also be checked against the general framework of the development of military institutions.

63 Clarysse (1991a) 33, 39, 49 and notes 60 and 61. In the first three cases concerning horse and armor, the testators also bequeathed their *stathmos* and/or *klēros*, while most of the fourth will is lost; see P.Petr.^{2} I 3, ll. 75–80; P.Petr.^{2} I 18, ll. 11–12; P.Petr.^{2} I 22, ll. 23–4; P.Petr.^{2} I 31. Préaux (1979) 214–17 suggests that cleruchs did not necessarily own their horses in the third century but certainly did so in the second.

64 Clarysse (1991a) 39–40 and P.Count 4 = P.LilleDem. III 101; Thompson (2002) 142: the slaves were of Syrian origin, usually with Greek names.

65 See Chapter 6, section 6.3.

66 P.Köln V 221 (Arsinoite, 190 BC) and Vandorpe and Clarysse (1997), esp. 72–3: on average 191 drachmas per Greek household vs. 120 drachmas per year (2 obols per day) for an agricultural worker.

67 This is one of the best-documented villages of Ptolemaic Egypt, for which I offer only a basic bibliography: Crawford (1971); Lesquier (1911), esp. 168–70; Bingen (1979); Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 190–5; Verhoogt (1998), (2005).

The decrease in the average size of plots, first of all, was not limited to Kerkeosiris and was due mainly to the large number of 7–30-aroura plots granted to policemen and *machimoi*. In addition, 100-aroura and 80-aroura men were actually given half of this amount, although we cannot be sure that this was true in the rest of the country (see Chapter 6). Assuming that this took place everywhere, the leveling of the socio-economic status of the various cleruchic categories probably had a more significant effect on society than did the lowering of the socio-economic status of some military settlers, which was still high compared with most of the population.[68] This leveling of the socio-economic discrepancies between military settlers made the cleruchic system develop into a unifying force between ethnic groups. Put another way, the number of military settlers grew in the second century, and these individuals enjoyed a decent or even comfortable living standard, but the portion of that group that enjoyed the same high living standard as the cleruchs who drew up wills in the third century decreased.

The second striking feature of the cleruchic system, closely connected to the first, is the increasing number of cleruchs of Egyptian origin. This happened in two ways: through the grant of small plots of land to *machimoi* and through the incorporation of Egyptians into the *katoikoi hippeis*. The second phenomenon, however, is often overlooked, because Egyptians in the *katoikia* tended to use Greek names. In Kerkeosiris, for example, a large number of 7-aroura *machimoi*, most of them of Egyptian origin, were granted land from 129 BC onward.[69] Their settlement was initiated by the end of the dynastic conflict between Ptolemy VIII and Cleopatra II and continued in the following decade.[70] The number of *machimoi* increased in Egypt throughout the second century, and some, called *andres* (see P.Haun.inv. 407), were even settled in the Apollonopolite nome, for which the evidence about cleruchs in the previous century is limited.[71] The phenomenon continued, since land surveys from the first-century Heracleopolite nome still record 7-aroura men.[72]

In her most recent study of the Heracleopolite cleruchic settlements, Falivene distinguishes two groups of cleruchs: those she calls "Egyptian"

[68] Van 't Dack (1977) 90 stresses that the number of cleruchs increased and their socio-economic status decreased but accepts that the *katoikoi* and some of the *machimoi* preserved comfortable living standards. I go one step further by including all the *machimoi*, since 5 arouras were enough for a family to live on.

[69] Crawford (1971) 83 suggests "some racial distinction," *contra* Launey (1949) 714–23, who sees hardly any difference between Greeks and Egyptians.

[70] Crawford (1971) 147, Table I; Keenan and Shelton (1976) 15.

[71] See Chapter 6, section 6.1. On garrisons in the Apollonopolite nome, see Winnicki (1978) 81–4.

[72] E.g. BGU XIV 2445, ll. 1–2; Falivene (2007) 210–11.

cleruchs and the *katoikoi hippeis*.[73] The former held small plots, like the 7-aroura men, were either *machimoi*, policemen or guards, had almost exclusively Egyptian names and were no doubt local Egyptian recruits. The *katoikoi hippeis*, on the other hand, have traditionally been thought to be the descendants of Greek settlers, as almost all of them bear Greek names and patronymics. Throughout Period C new men entered the *katoikia*, most of them inspectors, policemen or guards who were ascribed parcels of fossil *klēroi* (see Chapter 6, section 6.2.2). Egyptians were thus hidden behind many of the *katoikoi* with Greek names. An initial example is Nechtsaphthis son of Petosiris in late second-century Kerkeosiris.[74] He was a *phylakitēs* when he received his first grant, and then he chose a Greek name, Maron son of Dionysios, when he became a *katoikos hippeus* and received fifteen extra arouras. His father also had a Greek and an Egyptian name, but his grandfather bore only an Egyptian name.[75] Similarly, the *phylakitēs* Heraclides, whose father and grandfather were called Semtheus, appears in the list of *katoikoi hippeis* in the Heracleopolite documents;[76] his father also bore a Greek name, which is lost in a gap (BGU XIV 2443, l. 40). Falivene explains in a note that the *katoikoi* were "Greeks and Hellenizing Egyptians," while "non-hellenizing (therefore Egyptian-named) Egyptians" formed the other group of cleruchs.[77] Crawford had already stressed that in Kerkeosiris, the distinction between *katoikoi* and *machimoi* was more economic than ethnic.[78] The *katoikos hippeus* Heti, who wrote a will in Demotic, is another example of this development.[79] It was possible to be promoted to categories thought of as Greek from categories thought of as Egyptian. Egyptians entering military categories traditionally thought of as Greek tend to use Greek names, as in most of the examples above. Indeed, we cannot exclude the possibility that Heti used a Greek name in Greek documents. It has even been suggested that the state may have supervised the assignment of new names and ethnics to new recruits.[80] The phenomenon is also visible in the administration, where holders of offices thought of as Greek tend to use Greek names, while holders of offices thought of as Egyptian tend to use Egyptian names, so that Greek and Egyptian names are found in the same

[73] Falivene (2007).
[74] Crawford (1971) 63, 69; Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 116; see Scheuble (2010a), esp. 552, 557, for a similar hypothesis.
[75] P.Tebt. I 64(a), l. 107, where Maron is identified as the son of Petosiris-Dionysios, son of Nechtsaphis.
[76] BGU XIV 2443, l. 40 and Falivene (2007) 210–11.
[77] Falivene (2007) 210 note 28.
[78] Crawford (1971) 83.
[79] See Chapter 6 note 175.
[80] Scheuble (2010a) 553, *contra* Dunand (1983).

family.[81] But the extent of this practice is difficult to establish, because we rarely have multiple documents concerning the same person. Onomastics offer hints through irregular filiations, such as the *katoikos* Heraclides son of Etphemoumis in Kerkeosiris, and through a tendency for Egyptians to favor particular Greek names such as Ptolemaios, Heraclides, Apollonios and Didumos.[82] Egyptians with double names are regarded as Hellenizing Egyptians, but "Hellenization" remains difficult to define. In fact, papyrologists increasingly question the concept of "ethnic" Greeks and "ethnic" Egyptians in the second and first centuries BC (Period C). That a man bore a Greek name did not automatically mean that he was familiar with Greek culture and practiced Greek customs.[83] The degree of Hellenization in the private sphere was variable and depended on the existence of intermarriage in the family, on the number of generations involved in the administration and on the army, and on the social network. It had become difficult to distinguish Hellenizing Egyptians from Egyptianizing Greeks.[84] In the second century, in fact, many local recruits may have had Egyptian roots, in one way or another, and may have been Greco-Egyptians or Egyptians.[85]

There was thus no barrier to interaction. Instead, membership in the army increased interactions between recruits of different origins. The socio-economic differentiation among settlers was also less striking in the second and first centuries BC, as a result of the leveling process due to the smaller size of the plots of the new *katoikoi hippeis*. But the distinction between categories and naming practices bore the traces of the system of soldiers' settlements established in the third century, when plots were allotted by military rank and linked to ethnicity.[86]

7.1.4.1 Socio-economic status of machimoi

The third aspect of the cleruchic system often stressed is that the *machimoi* were poor. Reconsidered and contextualized, the sources in fact suggest a more subtle picture. As was already suggested in Chapter 5, the *machimoi* represented the lower strata of the military, not of the entire population.

[81] Clarysse (1985).

[82] Especially dynastic names (Ptolemaios) and names translating Egyptian religious notions (Apollonios, Didumos, Hierax, Acousilaos, Archibios, Lycos, Castor and Polydeuces), or homonyms (Maron for Marres, Pagkrates); see Peremans (1970) 220–3; Clarysse (1985); Scheuble (2010a) 556–7. For Heraclides, see Crawford (1971) 63.

[83] Scheuble (2010a) 557.

[84] Vandorpe (2008) 87.

[85] Intermarriage diminishes the relevance of origin, at least at the village level, and double names are used, especially in contracts, land surveys and official letters; see Crawford (1971) 134–5.

[86] Mueller (2006) 131–2, 135.

Their supposedly poor living standard has often been exaggerated. Shelton reacted in passing against the idea that they were all very low on the social ladder, noting that even in Kerkeosiris the *machimoi* received arable rather than derelict land (*hypologos*), unlike the sort that other cleruchs were supposed to obtain.[87] In addition, a 5-aroura plot was sufficient for a family to live on and corresponded to the traditional allotment granted to soldiers since the New Kingdom.[88] There is no doubt that, of the cleruchs, the *machimoi* were the most vulnerable when they had to stay away for extended periods of time, since they generally cultivated their land themselves.[89] But this problem could also affect other cleruchs or soldiers and occurred in periods of crisis that affected the entire population in one way or another.[90]

The traditionally negative picture of the *machimoi*'s condition cannot be generalized, because it relies on two sources closely connected to serious crises, the instructions of the *dioikētēs* Herodes to his subordinates concerning a complaint from various units of *machimoi* in 164 BC, and a series of documents regarding cleruchic land recorded in Kerkeosiris around 120–115 BC.[91] The petition of the picked troops (*epilektoi*) among the *machimoi*, the 5- and 7-aroura *machimoi*, and the *machimoi* serving in the fleet on guard-ships (*nauklēromachimoi*) reports that their families, who remained in their villages, could not undertake the additional cultivation required by the new royal decree while they themselves were stationed in Alexandria (see Text 7.1 below, ll. 20–34).[92] The petitioning *machimoi*, recruited in the Egyptian ch*ōra*, were probably stationed longer than initially expected in Alexandria. Indeed, the text was composed during one of the most troubled decades of Ptolemaic history, which Herodes himself describes as a *parastasis* (l. 165). Antiochus IV had just withdrawn from Egypt, coups and riots were threatening, and the Ptolemies were trying to regain control of the collection of taxes.[93] Local officials were often inclined to interpret royal

87 For the cleruchs, see the decree in P.Tebt. I 72, ll. 159–63 (Kerkeosiris, 113 BC) and Crawford (1971) 58 and 65. For the different situation of the *machimoi*, see P.Tebt. I 60, ll. 26–8 (Kerkeosiris, 118 BC) and Shelton (1976) 114 note 10.

88 See above, note 4. For the New Kingdom, see Chapter 6.

89 Crawford (1971) 83–4 and Table iv, pp. 155–9 for 119–115 BC. She suggests that the *machimoi* had been released from military duties in 116–115 BC, when almost all cultivated their land themselves.

90 Other groups of soldiers also complained about their wages in the 160s BC, e.g. the soldiers of the army camp (*hypaithron*) of Ptolemais stationed in Achmim (Diospolis Parva); see P.Grenf. I 42 = W.Chr. 447 (169/8 BC).

91 For this traditional view, see Préaux (1979) 504–8 on the petition UPZ I 110 and 473–4; to a lesser extent, see Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 190–5.

92 UPZ I 110 (Memphis [?], 164 BC): the petitioners are almost exactly the same groups as those who receive a confirmation of their privileges in P.Tebt. I 5, ll. 44–8 = Text 6.1.

93 For the historical context, see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1.

ordinances in their own interest. On the one hand, the policy of the central government, as described by Herodes, was to maximize state revenue. But at the same time, the state needed to avoid the abuse of privileged groups such as members of the army, and of vulnerable segments of the population, in order to keep discontented local elites from organizing riots with their support. For this reason, Herodes explains to his subordinates that the ordinance concerning the cultivation of land for a reduced amount does not apply to individuals who serve the state. He uses an inflated style, rhetorical questions and irony, and he exaggerates the difficulties encountered by the *machimoi* to make his point. For example, the problems some *machimoi* may have faced are generalized: "some, or rather most of the *machimoi*" (see Text 7.1 below, ll. 83–115). This section of UPZ I 110 is thus not a reliable source for the economic conditions of the *machimoi*.

Finally, it has been overlooked that by petitioning, as the *katoikoi hippeis* did in other contexts, the *machimoi* acted as a unified group to ensure that the privileges they obtained for themselves and their families through their position in the army were respected.[94] The *machimoi* even petitioned several times (UPZ I 110, col. VII). Special circumstances did not allow them to devote their time to cultivation, yet we learn from the requisitions authorized by the same ordinance that they owned cattle (col. VI). While some scholars argue that these requisitions are additional evidence for mistreatment of the *machimoi*, I note that the groups targeted by the cattle requisition – professional soldiers, *stratēgoi*, high officials and individuals who owned any categories of land (col. VI, ll. 172–8) – had a good standard of living. This must have been true of the *machimoi* as well.

In her analysis of the administrative documentation from Kerkeosiris, Préaux stressed the poor condition of the cleruchs, having in mind the *machimoi* whose mistreatment she took for granted on the basis of the petition to Herodes.[95] But a re-examination of the conditions of the *machimoi* stationed in Alexandria supports a different conclusion and suggests that the conditions of the *machimoi* in Kerkeosiris should be reconsidered. The land surveys and official documents, mostly from the Menches archive, offer us a glimpse of the land-tenure system of a Fayyum village that was gradually settled with military settlers during the second century. Kerkeosiris moves from 104 arouras of cleruchic land under Ptolemy IV to 1,582 arouras in 121 BC, which represented about one-third of the village's land. Settlement

94 See Chapter 6, esp. section 6.3.

95 See also Shelton (1976) 114 note 10, who stresses that "the poverty of smaller clerouchs is no doubt exaggerated by Préaux (1979) 473, who heavily draws on the exceptional UPZ I 110, ll. 105ff. and assumes more frequent use of sub-tenants than was the case."

Text 7.1. *UPZ I 110, petition of the* machimoi *to the* dioikētēs *Herodes*

UPZ I 110 (Memphis [?], 164 BC)	Translation by Fischer-Bovet
Οἱ παρε[φ]εδ[ρε]ύοντες ἐν Ἀλεξανδ[ρ]είαι τῶν τ' ἐπιλέκτων καὶ τῶν (ἑπταρούρων) καὶ (πενταρούρων) μαχίμων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τῶν φυλακίδων [τ]εταγμένων ναυκληρομαχίμων ἐντετεύχασιν ἡμῖν προφερόμενοι τοὺ<ς> παρ' αὐτῶν ἀπολελειμμένους ἐπὶ τῶν τόπων σκύλλεσθαι μὴ μετρ[ί]ως, τῶν πρὸς ταῖς πραγματείαις οὐ κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐγδεχομένων τὸν τοῦ περὶ τῆς γεωργίας προστάγματος νοῦν, ἀλλ' οἰομένων <δεῖν> ἕκαστον αὐτῶν γεω[ργ]ήσειν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλασσον κε(φάλαιον), τὸ δ' ὅμοιο[ν] συμβαίν[ει]ν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἐν τῶι γένει φερομένοις. κα[ὶ π]α[ρ'] ἑτέρων δ' ἡμῖν προσπέπτωκεν ἐνίους τῶ[ν οἰκ]ονόμων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐννοία[ς ..... μέν]ου[ς] οἴεσθαι δεῖν πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῆι χώ[ραι κατ]οικοῦντας γεωργήσειν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλασσ[ον] κε(φάλαιον) . . .	**cols. I–II, ll. 20–34, summary of the petition of the *machimoi* by Herodes to Dorion:** the picked troops, the 7- and 5-aroura men among the *machimoi*, and the *machimoi* serving in the fleet on guard-ships who are in garrison in Alexandria, have complained to us alleging that their family members left at home are harassed beyond all measure, because the officials do not interpret the meaning of the ordinance on agriculture properly, but believe that each man must cultivate land for the reduced amount, and that it also applies to the others who are in the same category. We have learned from other sources that some of the *oikonomoi* and of the other officials about the meaning . . . consider that all the inhabitants of the *chōra* must cultivate land for the reduced amount . . .
ll.83–115: ἐπὶ δὲ τ[ο]σοῦτον εὐγνωμοσύνης ἐληλύθατε, τάχα γὰρ οὕτως πρέπει ῥηθέν, ὥστε παιδαριώδη τὴν τοῦ προστάγματος ἐκδοχὴν ποιησαμένους οἴεσθαι <δεῖν> καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῆι πόλει καὶ διὰ νυκτὸ[ς] καὶ δ[ι]' ἡμέρας ἐν ταῖς λειτουργίαις καταπονουμένους καὶ τοὺς ἄλ[λ]ους τοὺς ἀδυνατοῦντας ἀναγκάζειν ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ τῆς γεωργίας καὶ τὰς ἀποσκευὰς τῶν ἐν τῆι πόλει περισπᾶν ὡς τοῦ διὰ τοῦ προστάγματος ὡρισμένου κε[φ]αλαίου πᾶσι τοῖς κα<τὰ> τὴν χώραν ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐπιγεγραμμένου.	**cols. III–IV, ll. 83–115, instructions from Herodes to Dorion and his other subordinates**: (we are astonished) that you have reached such a degree of "wisdom," for that is perhaps the proper word, that you thought, in a puerile interpretation of the ordinance, that you should force both those who labor in the city night and day in the public service and the others who are unfit, to undertake the work of cultivation, and that you should disturb the families of those who are in the city, as if the amount defined in the ordinance was imposed upon all those in the *chōra* unanimously.
(**l. 94**) τίς γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἀναλλητως ἢ νωθρὸς ἐν τῶι λογίζεσθαι κ[αὶ] πράγματος διαφορὰν εὑρεῖν, ὃς οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτό γε δυνήσεται συννοεῖν, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ὑποτελεῖς τῆι τε ἰχθυηρᾶι καὶ ζυτηρᾶι καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ὠναῖς ἐν τοῖς σύνπασιν ἀνθρώποις καταριθμεῖσθαι συμβέβηκε, [κ]αὶ τοὺς πλείστους δὲ τῶν ἐν ταῖς κώμαις κατοικούντων λαῶν, οἳ διὰ τὴν τῶν δεόντων σπάνιν ἐργατεύοντες πορίζονται τὰ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν τῶι στρατιωτικῶι φερομένων καὶ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφὴν μόλις ἐχόντων ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ βασιλικο[ῦ] τιθεμένων, ἐνίους δὲ καὶ τῶν μαχίμων, μᾶλλον δὲ τοὺς πλείστους οὐδὲ τοὺς ἰδίου<ς> κλήρους	(**l. 94**) Who is so foolish or dull in reasoning and in drawing distinctions that he does not understand that those in charge of the fish tax, the beer tax and the other contracts for the farming of taxes should also have been included in the expression "all men"? The same goes for most of the inhabitants of the villages who, due to their lack of the necessities, obtain their living as day laborers, and also no small number of those on the military list who barely get enough food from the royal treasury, and some, or rather most of the *machimoi* who are unable to cultivate their own *klēroi* themselves but in the winter borrow money

Text 7.1. *(cont.)*

αὐτουργεῖν δυναμένους, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ[ν] [[τ]] χειμῶνα δανει[ζομ]ένους ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκφορίοι[ς] μειζόνων διαφορῶν, οἷς [ο]ὐδὲ βουλομένοι<ς> προσι<έ>ναι πρὸς τὴν γεωργίαν π[ισ]τεύ[σει]ε ἄν τις οὐδ᾽ αὐτὰ τὰ σπέρματα κατενεγκεῖν εἰς τοὺς ἀγρούς, οὓς εἰ συναναγκάζειν ἐπιχειροίη προσδέχεσθαι τ[ὴν] τοῦ προγεγραμμένου πλή[θο]υς προστασίαν, [π]ροσεδρεύων τῶι διὰ τοῦ προστάγματος κατακεχω[ρ]ίσθαι πάντας, ἄλλ[ο] μὲν οὐθὲν ἂν ἐπείπαιμι πλὴν ὅτι κακ[ῶ]ς βεβούλευται	on their rents at higher interest rates. Even if they were willing to take up the cultivation, no one would trust them to pay back the seed for their fields. If one were to attempt to force these people to accept the portion of land mentioned in the ordinance (for it is for this purpose that "by all" is used in the ordinance), I would say nothing else but that he was badly advised . . .

was interrupted during the troubled period of the 180s–160s and resumed again in 150 BC, first slowly and then with grants of numerous small plots in the 130s.[96] In the land survey of 119/18 BC (P.Tebt. I 62), Crawford counts thirty cleruchic holdings belonging to *katoikoi hippeis*, eight by police officials, and sixty-three by *machimoi*, both infantrymen and cavalry, most of them regrouped in the *laarchia* of Chomenis (see Table 7.1, p. 260).[97] In addition to their 7-aroura plots, many *machimoi* also had a holding of royal land, often adjacent to their cleruchic allotment, allowing the whole plot to be cultivated as a unit.[98] The low flat-rate on their plot and the fact that *machimoi* were supposed to receive good land, unlike the desert land given to *katoikoi*, suggests that *machimoi* were actually among the well-to-do at the village level, although many did not enjoy a standard of living as high as some *katoikoi hippeis*.[99]

It is true, however, that in periods of crisis cultivating these plots could become difficult and that the economic possibilities of all cleruchs could diminish. Crawford showed that large-scale political events had an impact on the economic life of a village like Kerkeosiris. Some *katoikoi* had trouble paying their taxes or were unable to obtain their *klēroi* because they could not pay the *stephanos* tax (see section 6.3). Comparison of land surveys in 119/18, 118/17 and 116/15 BC reveals that both *katoikoi hippeis* and

96 Crawford (1971) 59 and 60–75 for a detailed survey; see above, note 70.
97 Crawford (1971) 83 and note 3, with slightly different numbers on 71.
98 Crawford (1971) 74–5 and those marked ∗ in Table VI, 163–8; Keenan and Shelton (1976) introduction, 8.
99 Bingen (1979) = Bingen (2007a) 124 suggests that Crawford's interpretation of Kerkeosiris as a place with "a standard of living consistently low, that even dropped further" (Crawford [1971] 130) is exaggerated. For the quality of the land, see above, note 87.

Table 7.1. *Distribution of cleruchic land in Kerkeosiris (119/18 BC) based on Crawford (1971) Table II*

	Number of cleruchs	Arouras	Total of arouras per category
Katoikoi hippeis	30	965	total for *katoikoi*:
Police officials	8	142	1107 ar.
Machimoi hippeis	8	120	total for *machimoi*:
Machimoi	55	354	474 ar.
Total	101	1581	1581

machimoi employed farmers, the former in approximately 60 percent of cases and the latter in 40 percent, confirming the tendency for holders of larger plots to lease out their land. In the third survey only one *machimos* leased out his plot, leading some historians to pinpoint this as the moment of drastic economic decline and lack of available labor. But Crawford correctly connects this phenomenon with the end of a period of crisis caused by dynastic conflicts during which the *machimoi* had been mobilized.[100] Land surveys published subsequently confirmed her hypothesis.[101]

The type of arrangement that cleruchs obtained for their families when they were on campaign for extended periods of time remains unclear.[102] The cleruchs themselves received wheat rations during campaigns and when they were displaced for several months. This happened, for example, in the case of the 408 *machimoi* from the Thebaid – called *pentarouroi* in the documents – who were transferred to the Heracleopolite nome in the first century BC.[103] The wages of these *machimoi* were to be paid for ten months, at a monthly rate of 2 artabas of wheat and 3,000 copper drachmas, a wage that seems higher than the one paid to the soldier Apollonios in Memphis in the 150s BC, even if we compensate for inflation.[104] This generosity probably served to compensate these men for the agricultural work they were unable to perform as a consequence of being stationed away from their plots for ten months. Their families, who had to live on the rent collected from their

[100] Crawford (1971) 84–5.

[101] P.Tebt. IV 1114 and 1115 (Kerkeosiris, 113/12 BC and 116/15 BC); Bingen (1979) = Bingen (2007a) 129–30; Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 194 and note 225.

[102] Crawford (1971) 128.

[103] BGU VIII 1749 and BGU VIII 1750 (64/3 BC, Heracleopolite); Salmenkivi (2002) 71. For barley delivered to the horses of cavalrymen stationed in the nome, see BGU VIII 1747 and BGU VIII 1748 (64/3 BC, Heracleopolite).

[104] For Apollonios, see section 7.2.3.1. Between 130 and 30 BC, the price of one artaba of grain varied between 1,000 and 1,800 copper drachmas. Their wages in cash thus allowed them to buy two extra artabas for their families.

plots when they were leased to farmers, thus received some support. During Period C other groups of cleruchs seem to have been employed mostly near or in their villages: policemen and guards were used to accompany officials for the survey of the fields just before the harvest in the village, and soldiers residing in the area were also employed for this type of function.[105] The extent to which *katoikoi hippeis* were away because of military activities is less clear, since the two Kerkeosiris land surveys available for this group report about the same number of *katoikoi* cultivating their plots themselves. By contrast, there is considerable variation in the case of *machimoi*. *Katoikoi* thus do not seem to have been mobilized, while those of them not cultivating their plots were likely to have been supervising the cultivation of their land and managing diverse businesses in their villages or the nome-capital.[106] To sum up, the distinctions between *katoikoi* and *machimoi* concerned military functions and socio-economic status. Even so, becoming a *machimos* was already a means of moving up in the socio-economic hierarchy and was probably more accessible than, for example, holding a scribal office, which could initially be costly to obtain.[107]

7.2 Professional soldiers in the *chōra*: socio-economic status and coexistence

7.2.1 Garrisons in the third century BC

This section explores the socio-economic status of professional soldiers garrisoned in Egypt, their coexistence with civilians and their familial and

[105] Crawford (1971) 30 and P.Tebt. III 831 (Ibion Argaiou, second century BC), for the "guards who are also the harvest guards for the seed" (l. 6, [φ]υλακιτῶν τῶν καὶ γενη(ματο)φυ(λακούντων) τὸν σπόρον). For the soldier used to guard the harvest (ll. 48–9, γενηματοφυλακίας), see P.Tebt. I 27 = W.Chr. 331 (Kerkeosiris, 113 BC) ll. 47–64, translated in French in Préaux (1979) 126–7, esp. note 3, where she suggests that the soldiers (l. 49, στρατευομένων) were cleruchs rather than professional soldiers. Samuel (1993) 175 suggests that settlement of soldiers in the countryside was primarily implemented "in order to facilitate the collection of rents and taxes."

[106] Bingen (1979) = Bingen (2007a) 129–31 assumes that the *katoikoi* were not sensitive to political events and that most were absent from the countryside. But the differences we perceive are not due to "the different behaviour of Greeks and Egyptians in the country" (p. 130) but to the difference between *katoikoi* and *machimoi*, as noted above in this section.

[107] The village scribe Menches was probably from a family of Greeks who settled in Egypt generations earlier and married Egyptian women. He had to make a financial investment to obtain his function, or at least use his social network to find someone who would pay the fee for the office for him, and he had to cultivate 10 arouras of royal land; see Verhoogt (1998) 50–69. Cleruchs – but not the *machimoi* – also had to pay a fee when they inherited their father's *klēros*; see Chapter 6, section 6.3, or sometimes a sum of money to "enter the 'ownership' of a *klēros*"; see Mueller (2006) 133 and P.UB.Trier S 125–21 (137 BC) in Quenouille and Willms (2001).

social relationships. Section 7.2.1 sketches what we know from the small amount of evidence about the geographical distribution of garrisons, their development over time and the internal organization of the army. We assume that the men stationed in garrisons were professional soldiers, while the extent of the use of cleruchs in garrisons remains unclear.[108] In a period of crisis such as the 160s BC, groups of *machimoi* complained because they were stationed for an unexpectedly long time in Alexandria. By contrast, we can conclude, in peacetime cleruchs served in garrisons for only a few weeks or a few months per year, sometimes nearby, sometimes far away.[109] Cleruchs probably constituted a small percentage of garrisoned soldiers. A combination of literary and documentary sources suggests that in the third century most professional soldiers were immigrants or immigrants' descendants, whereas after the Great Revolt most had Greco-Egyptian or Egyptian roots, the main exceptions remaining Jewish and Idumean military immigrants.

A major difficulty for understanding the development of garrisons in Egypt is the lack of information about the third century. Alexander set up garrisons in Pelusium and Memphis (Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.5.3) and was able to send prisoners to Elephantine (*Anabasis* 3.2.1), which suggests that he controlled the Nile Valley as far as the southern border (see Map 2).[110] Pelusium and Memphis were both among the most important garrisons in the pre-Ptolemaic period, and Alexander used the same military system of defense and control.[111] It is thus unsurprising that one of the earliest Greek papyri comes from a garrison established near Memphis, in Saqqara.[112] Documentary sources also confirm an early Greek presence in Elephantine, perhaps civilians but also soldiers. An early third-century dispatch sent to the king from Elephantine by Pertaios son of Arnouphis, most likely the garrison commander, and "two brothers" during a siege by the Ethiopians, shows that a garrison was continuously maintained in this strategic area.[113]

108 The large number of sources for cleruchs in the Fayyum led Winnicki (1978) 7 note 2 to wonder whether they were organized differently from professional soldiers.

109 See section 7.1.4.

110 Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 162; Winnicki (1978) 88; see also Chapter 3, section 3.1.1.

111 On Pelusium and the border between Egypt and Syria, see Verreth (2009), esp. 202–3, 206–8, and Carrez-Maratray (1999).

112 See the order of Peucestas in Chapter 7, section 7.2.2, p. 264. For a list of payments to soldiers, see SB XIV 11963 (fourth century BC, Saqqara) in Turner (1975) and Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 163–4.

113 SB I 5111 = SB III 6134 (Elephantine, early third century BC); Porten (1996) 386–9 and D 7, follows Schubart in considering Pertaios a garrison commander. He also reminds us that in the earliest documents Greeks did not use a patronymic and military designation, "not yet assuming the identity of professional soldiers" (387). Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 198 and

It is worth noting that Pertaios was an Egyptian, even at this early date, as his name and patronymic make clear.

In the third century BC the main garrisons in the Delta were in Alexandria and Pelusium, with smaller ones probably spread throughout the Delta. In the Nile Valley there were garrisons with professional soldiers in Memphis, Thebes, Hieraconpolis and Edfu, and in the tight geographical unit formed at the southern border by Assuan, Elephantine and perhaps already Philae (see Map 2).[114] Smaller army camps were set up in the eastern desert and on the Red Sea, notably for elephant hunts and trade.[115] In addition, it is almost certain that the first Ptolemies established a garrison in Ptolemais.[116] The same might be conjectured for the Fayyum, since professional cavalrymen were found in third-century tax lists, but there is no clear evidence for this.[117] It seems instead that the cleruchs who were settled in the Fayyum performed their active service in garrisons in Alexandria or in the contiguous nomes.

7.2.2 Soldiers as intruders in Egyptian temples

Another type of garrison, often used temporarily during significant politico-military events, was the space within the enclosure wall of a temple or the temple precinct. Some studies have stressed the negative impact of garrisoned soldiers on Egyptian society, in particular because of their intrusion into sacred spaces.[118] The quality of the relationship between the army and Egyptian temples is indeed central to evaluating the nature of the coexistence of soldiers and civilians and the impact of the army on the Egyptian *chōra*. But this is only one side of the relationship, as this chapter aims to demonstrate. Moreover, intrusion was exceptional and its impact limited.

Winnicki (1978) 94 also believe that Greeks found early on in Elephantine (see P.Eleph. 1–5) belonged to the army. For the Jewish garrison in Elephantine, which had disappeared by the end of the fifth century, see Chapter 2, section 2.2.4.4.

114 There are only two sources concerning a garrison in Thebes in the third century: (1) UPZ II 157, ll. 12–17, 30–2 (241 BC) is a list regarding the *corvée*, soldiers being exempted. Wilcken (1927) 21, commentary on l. 30, suggests that an Egyptian had been promoted and belonged to the group of the στρατευομένοι Ἕλληνες; (2) UPZ II 162 = P.Tor.Choach. 12, col. V, ll. 27–9 (117 BC) shows that a garrison existed in Thebes at the end of the third century; see Winnicki (1978) 55–6. For Hieraconpolis, see SB I 1104, l. 3 (278–270 BC). As for the southern border, La'da (2007) 375–6 emphasizes the military importance of this area since the Old and the Middle Kingdoms.

115 For elephants, see Chapter 4, section 4.2.6.

116 But evidence comes only from the second century BC. Some of the first settlers, under Ptolemy, were almost certainly soldiers; see Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 199 and note 249.

117 See Chapter 6, p. 202, note 21: only the second-century guard-post on the Moeris canal may have been set up earlier.

118 E.g. Anagnostou-Canas (1989) and, to a lesser extent, Thiers (1995).

First, the few cases of military intruders known from the Ptolemaic period generally belong to a specific political and social context.[119] Second, the victims of such incidents are from a small and privileged social *stratum*: priestly families; and soldiers could bring trade and economic stimulus to the other inhabitants of an area, for example by sponsoring temple-building activities (see Chapter 9). Third, the response from the authorities reveals a constant, conscious policy on the part of the Macedonian rulers to avoid hurting priestly families.

The most famous example of this policy is a short note from North Saqqara dated to the period directly after Alexander's conquest of Egypt: "(Order) of Peucestas. No one is to pass. This is the room of a priest."[120] Peucestas was one of the two *stratēgoi* left behind in Egypt by Alexander.[121] This note shows that he wanted to protect the precincts of the priests around temples and the animal necropoleis from Greek troops, either because incidents had already occurred or in order to prevent them. Applying a similar policy of protecting the Egyptian temples, Ptolemy I forbade the alienation of sacred precincts and temples by a *prostagma* in 304 BC.[122]

Unsurprisingly, most intrusions occurred in time of conquest and war. In his survey of illegal occupation of sacred space by soldiers or civilians, Thiers collects eight documents from the time of Ramses XI until Tiberius, most of them from the Persian and Ptolemaic periods.[123] Since the army used temple precincts as fortresses, soldiers may easily have exaggerated their rights in these areas, and priests may have been disturbed by their presence. Thiers shows that when soldiers lived within temples (e.g. in those raised by Udjahorresnet or Djedhor; see below), religious tasks could not be performed, whether the intruders were soldiers or civilians, and in both cases their departure was followed by purification ceremonies.

The first document reporting a complaint about soldiers settling in a temple comes from the biography of Udjahorresnet, an Egyptian naval officer who became one of Cambyses' main counselors after the Persian conquest (525 BC).[124] This text is a sort of archetype. Since the complaint about the ejection of foreigners from the temple of Neith in Sais was made to

119 Of course, intrusions of soldiers in temples may have happened without leading to formal complaints.

120 Turner (1974); Hölbl (2001) 88 and note 57 and on Peucestas, 12 and note 1; Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 163. For inscriptions regarding the interdiction on entering a room belonging to a larger sanctuary, see Nachtergael (2005) 9–11.

121 Arrian, Anabasis 3.5.5.

122 SB XVI 12519; Hölbl (2001) 88 and note 58; Rigsby (1988); Hagedorn (1986).

123 Thiers (1995), esp. 513–14 regarding purification ceremonies; Zivie-Coche (2001) 399.

124 Vatican 22690.

Cambyses, Revillout argued that the men in question were Greek mercenaries of the Egyptian king Amasis.[125] But this hypothesis can be excluded, because the soldiers had time to take all their goods with them when they left. They must have been Persians or some other western Asian group fighting for the Persians. In Thiers' view, they were not part of the regular army, since in that case they would have been re-settled.[126]

About two hundred years later, probably under Philip Arrhideus, Greek soldiers were expelled from a temple in Athribis (Delta), as reported by Djedhor/Teos (the Savior) in the biographical text carved on his cult statue.[127] He built a large wall around the temple of the falcon god *Iat-Maat* and the *wabet*-sanctuary but found soldiers within the walls. He gave them money and other land next to the temple in compensation, but apparently the soldiers built their houses again within the temple precinct. Djedhor/Teos finally destroyed their buildings and transported them to the south of the Athribite nome.

This very brief account leaves the extent to which the soldiers' living quarters prevented the priests from performing the daily cultic service unclear. It seems instead that building a new wall was a good reason (or a good excuse) for the priests to clear out the precinct. There is no mention of royal approval, but it is obvious that the king agreed. Djedhor/Teos took care to compensate the soldiers, since he claims that he paid them with his own money. In any case, the Greek invader probably stationed soldiers in the best-fortified place in the area. Since temple precincts could be used as garrisons – at least temporarily, and surely in the Persian period – the Macedonians did not take care to remove their soldiers afterward. From their point of view, they were not stationed there illegally. Realizing the tensions that could occur, however, the king found it appropriate to remove his troops to satisfy the priests of Athribis.

At the same period, Horos, a prophet and *mr-mšʿ* carried out some building work in the temple of Herishef in Heracleopolis.[128] He also demolished "something," but because of a gap in the text we can only suppose that habitations, perhaps of soldiers, are in question.[129] On the other hand, the individuals from whom Horos bought gardens on the temple estate were civilians.

125 Révillout (1880) 62, 71.

126 Thiers (1995) doc. 3 and p. 499 for a summary of the various hypotheses.

127 Cairo JE 46341; Jelínková-Reymond (1956), esp. 101–5; Thiers (1995) doc. 4 and notes *ad loc*; Gorre (2009) no. 70.

128 Louvre A 88, ll. 2–3; see Chapter 8, sections 8.1, 8.4, and Chapter 9, section 9.3; Vercoutter (1950), esp. 89, 96; Thiers (1995) doc. 5; Gorre (2009) no. 41, esp. discussion (a).

129 If they were soldiers, it is usually admitted that they must have been Greeks.

These texts can be connected with Ptolemy II's royal decree forbidding soldiers to expel Egyptians from their houses and, more specifically, forbidding giving quarters (*stathmoi*) to soldiers in Arsinoe (Middle Egypt). As Thiers points out, the king probably wished to protect the city and the temple of Arsinoe from the soldiers' abusive behavior.[130] According to his funerary stele, Chaapis, a Memphite of Phoenician origin who was prophet of several gods and commander of the *matoi* (i.e. soldiers) under Ptolemy III and IV, had control over his soldiers on royal orders.[131] Gorre links this reference to a background of abusive behavior by soldiers.[132]

Later intrusions by soldiers into temples occurred during the Great Revolt and mostly involved rebels but also royal troops stationed in Egyptian temples.[133] The presence of rebels presumably explains the interruption of the construction of the Edfu temple between 206 and 186 BC.[134] In general, official documents issued immediately after the revolt condemn the damage suffered by Egyptian temples. This is clear from the Decree of Philae II (186 BC), which describes how the rebels caused destruction and how the king placed Greek soldiers in the temple of Isis to protect it from the rebels and paid for workers to restore what had been destroyed.[135]

The end of Period B is marked by Antiochus IV's invasion of Egypt (170–168 BC). Unsurprisingly, some of his soldiers camped in an Egyptian temple. A funerary stele of the Bukhis Bull found in Hermonthis (Thebaid) indicates that when the Seleucid king invaded Egypt, he had soldiers garrisoned within the temple of Amun in Thebes.[136] The people of Hermonthis thought it was safer for the sacred bull to be transferred to Hermonthis, only a few kilometers south of Thebes. The Seleucid presence was thus not very

130 Thiers (1995) 508; see section 7.1.2 note 25.

131 *PP* II/VIII 2139 = *PP* III/IX 5856; see Chapter 8 note 61; Sethe (1904) 162–6; Thompson (1988) 91–3; Vittmann (2003) 70 and pl. 33; Gorre (2009) no. 46.

132 We do not know if his statement responds to specific incidents nor whether these orders were specific edicts (*prostagmata*) or general ordinances (*diagrammata*) from the king, see Gorre (2009) no. 46.

133 Thiers (1995) 508.

134 Hölbl (2001) 263; Véïsse (2004) 14–15, 226, and 209 for the interruption of the work in other temples.

135 Sethe (1904) 222–3; Sethe (1917); Müller (1920) trans. 724; Alliot (1951) trans. 439–40; Hoffmann (2000) 16972. In the view of Alliot and Sethe, Ptolemy added Greek troops to the Egyptian troops who rebelled and occupied the temple and then obtained mercy at the time of the decree, an interpretation followed by Eldamaty (2005) 38–42, 82–3. In Müller's view, the king placed Greek troops and repentant Egyptian soldiers (called "loyal" by Hoffmann) in the temple to protect it against the rebels. Also Hölbl (2001) and note 52; Véïsse (2004) 13–14, 135–6, 141: other Egyptian temples also suffered damage during the dynastic wars, for which the mention of temple reconstructions in C.Ord.Ptol. 53, 137.

136 Thiers (1995) doc. 6.

threatening, as Thiers points out. Another inscription shows that the bull returned to Thebes in 157 BC, once the "foreigners of Yahou" left. It is tempting to suggest that Antiochus' troops and the "foreigners of Yahou" are the same soldiers, Jewish mercenaries, although it is unlikely that they stayed there for over ten years.

Around the same time but at Moeris in the Fayyum, the president of an association of cleruchs called the *Ammonion* complained in a petition about the destruction of the temple by Antiochus' soldiers.[137] The temple was quickly rebuilt but was then attacked again by Egyptian rebels. The first editor wonders why the rebels chose to "single out a temple for so vicious an attack," but it now seems clear that some of Ptolemy's soldiers were stationed there.

During the final two decades of the second century BC, after a period of civil war, the priests of Isis in Philae complained about frequent visits of the *stratēgoi*, various officials and troops and claimed that they impoverished the temple to such an extent that the dynastic cult was discontinued.[138] This negative effect on the dynastic cult was often an argument – true or not – used by petitioners.[139] The priests inscribed a copy of their petition, in both hieroglyphs and Greek, on the pedestal of an obelisk in front of the temple of Isis. The first text on the obelisk was the positive response by Ptolemy VIII, his sister Cleopatra II and his wife Cleopatra III, who ordered the *stratēgos* of the Thebaid to put an end to such troubles in order to prevent further disturbance of the dynastic cult. But even if many soldiers visited the strategic island of Philae, very close to the garrisons of Elephantine, they were not the only or the worst type of visitor. *Stratēgoi* and civil officials might also encourage violence against the temples and their personnel. Among the three examples given by Bernand of soldiers asking for the protection of temples and for *asylia* rights in the Fayyum, the text concerning the temple of Heron in Magdola denounces abuses by officials and individuals in charge of the royal revenues (*hypoteleis*).[140] These military men were close to the royal court and promoted the king's respectful policy toward the temples, as Bernand suggests. But they also had social and in some cases family connections with the local temple milieu,

137 P.Tebt. III 781 (*c.* 164 BC); see Véïsse (2004) 136. The association is called the *Ammonion* of the 45–aroura cleruchs, probably because they met near or within a temple dedicated to Amun; see also Chapter 9, section 9.4, p. 349 and note 84.

138 I.Philae I 19, esp. l. 26 and commentary *ad loc.* 188–90. The obelisk is now in Kingston Hall (Dorset, England); see Dietze (1994) 75 and note 41; Dietze (2000) 84 and note 16.

139 Fischer-Bovet (in press a).

140 I.Philae I 19, 189–90: SB I 5827, SB III 6236 and 7259, respectively; I.Fayoum II 114, II 135 and III 152, all from the first century BC; see Chapter 9, section 9.4 and note 89.

even if their Greek names and profession prevent us from seeing them; they were genuinely worshipping the local gods and sometimes controlled plots of land nearby.[141]

The final attestations of priests expelling intruders are hieroglyphic biographical texts found in Tanis and dated to the first century BC.[142] The text of the dorsal pillar of one of the statues of Panemerit (D 88 = Cairo JE 67094), prophet and *mr-mšʿ* describes his actions toward foreigners in the temple: "I have requested the king to expel the foreigners who commit abominations toward the gods and settled in the temple of Amun of Opet and its pylon, which have been replaced by brick-built habitations (?), for many years they have been there. May this august god receive satisfaction from this" (line 10).[143] Brick houses for soldiers had thus replaced the temple and the pylon. An inscription on an anonymous statue recently discovered (Sân 91–200, OAE 3003) illuminates this reference, specifying that the intruders were Judeans.[144] Since they are named specifically, it is not a *topos* but, as Zivie-Coche points out, the first attestation of a community of Judeans in Tanis, even if we know next to nothing about them.[145] The archaeology of the site, however, shows that there was no longer a temple where the Judaeans had settled.[146] It seems instead that the priests still considered the place sacred because a temple stood there in the past.

The evidence for soldiers intruding on Egyptian temples allows three important conclusions. First, the presence of Judean troops, notably in the second and first centuries BC, underscores their role in Hellenistic armies. In the second century BC they were hired as professional soldiers, no longer as cleruchs. More central to our investigation, most expulsions of soldiers occurred in postwar and post-rebellion contexts. In addition, some

141 Fischer-Bovet (in press a).

142 Thiers (1995) 516 note 132; Zivie-Coche (2001) 396–9, 426; Zivie-Coche (2004), esp. 277–9, 286–7; Gorre (2009) no. 83. For Panemerit and Pichaas, see Chapter 9, section, 9.5, p. 353 and note 112.

143 English translation based on Zivie-Coche (2001) 377–80 and note to line 10 on 396–9 = Zivie-Coche (2004) 256–9.

144 Zivie-Coche (2001) 396, 426 and (2004) text and French translation 277–9. The beginning and end of line 3 are missing: "prophet of Amun-Ra, Lord of To-Bener, Panemerit, to ask the king that he may order to expel forever from the settlement that is on your territory the foreigners who are called Judeans . . . "

145 They were not Gabinius' soldiers, for three reasons, for which see Zivie-Coche (2004) 286–7: (1) the Judeans had been settled there for a long time; see archaeological evidence in Zivie-Coche (2001) 398; (2) the inscription is from before 55 BC; (3) Ptolemy Auletes would not let allied troops be expelled by Panemerit.

146 The cult of Amun of Opet continued in this period, probably in a new temple nearby (but not yet located); see Zivie-Coche (2001) 397.

documents suggest that their presence was not always temporary and that garrison troops might be stationed in temples or precincts not only in Upper Egypt but also in the Fayyum and the Delta. Finally, the agency of the king is often attested, or at least his agreement can be deduced. This suggests a coherent policy by the Ptolemies: respect for the priestly milieu and for sacred spaces and involvement in indigenous temple-building, notably through officers and soldiers who became socio-economically and culturally integrated into the local population of the Egyptian *chōra*.[147]

7.2.3 Soldiers in garrisons after the Great Revolt

The bulk of the sources on garrisons and professional soldiers, if the specific cases of soldiers intruding into sacred space are left aside, are from the Nile Valley and the Thebaid after the Great Revolt. Because archaeological excavations rarely focus on Ptolemaic material, and survey archaeology is only beginning in Egypt, many aspects of the Ptolemaic settlements have not yet been revealed. We must rely on papyrological and epigraphical material and extrapolate from archaeological and documentary evidence for the periods preceding and succeeding Ptolemaic rule, assuming that the military strategic areas remained broadly identical over time.[148] Similarly, it is plausible that some garrisons known in the second century already existed in the third, although their size could have been different and they may have disappeared momentarily during the period of crisis.

From Period B (*c.* 220–*c.* 160 BC) emerged a new system, under which the Ptolemies used primarily professional soldiers recruited in Egypt, whom they stationed in garrisons or new garrison towns. The list of garrison commanders (*phrourarchoi)* in the *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* now provides a clearer picture of the network of garrisons than it does in the third century.[149] In the mid 150s Ptolemy VI undertook repairs of the old fort (*phrourion*) in Heracleopolis and construction of a new one in the harbor, representative of his policy at that point of restructuring the army.[150] But the archive of the *hēgemōn* and *phrourarchos* Dioscorides, perhaps the first *phrourarchos* of the new garrison, reveals little about his military functions and instead suggests that power was concentrated at that time in the person

[147] See Chapter 9. [148] Winnicki (1978) 9.

[149] *PP* II/VIII 2051–2066, with only one attestation in the third century in Hieraconpolis; see note 114; Cowey *et al.* (2003) 11–15.

[150] McGing (1997) 293 links this construction to the revolt of Dionysios Petosarapis; see Chapter 3, section 3.2.2, p. 100 and note 181.

of the garrison commander.[151] Dioscorides was active in the legal civilian sphere, and was responsible, for example, for keeping someone in custody in the garrison, presenting a case in court and summoning and punishing defendants.[152] Unfortunately, the archive sheds no light on the connection between the cleruchs of the Heracleopolite nome of the second century and those of the first century BC, although there were garrison commanders in Heracleopolis during the entire period, at least until 50/49 BC.[153] Far less is known about garrisons in other villages of the Heracleopolite nome, where cleruchs may have received some training, or about the contemporary garrison commander in Memphis.[154] The main garrison in the north remained Alexandria, where elite troops and the royal guard but also other professional soldiers and *machimoi* were stationed.

The reorganization of the army, and in particular of professional soldiers in garrisons, is even more striking as one moves upstream toward the Thebaid. Winnicki devoted a detailed study to the material regarding garrisons preserved in each nome, from the Hermopolite to the Ombite and the southern border in the second and early first centuries. He estimates the number of garrisons (*phrourai*) at around forty, located in nome-capitals and strategic areas, as well as in smaller villages where the postings are harder to explain. Winnicki identifies five main centers: Hermopolis, Ptolemais, Thebes, Krokodilopolis and the southern border (see Map 2).[155] Most of the nome-capitals already had defensive walls from previous periods, but

151 P.Diosk. 1–18 (158–140 BC, Heracleopolite nome) and Cowey *et al.* (2003), esp. 1–10. For the construction of this garrison by the *stratēgos* Ptolemaios, see P.Berl.Zill. 1 (156 BC, Heracleopolis) and P.Berl.Zill. 2 (156/5 BC, Heracleopolis).

152 P.Diosk. 1, 6, 7 and 11, and Cowey *et al.* (2003) 7–8 note 28. The extension of the functions of the garrison commanders to the civilian sphere in the second century BC has already been emphasized for other *phrourarchoi*, notably in Philae; see Dietze (1994), (1995).

153 The final attestation concerns Adrastos; see BGU VIII 1844, l. 22 (50/49 BC, Heracleopolite nome).

154 For a garrison in the villages of Papa (SB XVIII 13304, unknown provenance, 138 BC), Hiera Nesos (P.Hels. I 6, l. 6, Heracleopolite nome, 164 BC) and Techtho Nesos, perhaps El-Hibeh, see Cowey *et al.* (2003) 9. For the garrison commander in Memphis, see Cowey *et al.* (2003) 12. For the local division of Dexilaos, outside Memphis, where Apollonios was enrolled, see section 7.2.3.1 and note 163. For the *machimoi* in Alexandria in the 160s, see section 7.1.4.

155 Winnicki (1978) 100–1. There were already cleruchs in Hermopolis in the third century BC; see Chapter 6, section 6.1. The garrison still existed in the first century BC and at least some of the soldiers were members of an association; see section 7.3.2. More is known about troops from Ptolemais transferred to other garrisons during the dynastic conflicts of the late second century than about the garrison itself. An officer is transferred to Thebes, probably with his troops, in UPZ II 207 (130 BC). For a dedication to Pan in Philae by the infantrymen, cavalrymen and marines stationed in Ptolemais, see I.Philae I 20 = SB I 3448 (*c.* 118/116 BC) and Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 200. A group of soldiers from the army camp (*hypaithron*) of Ptolemais, i.e. a military station near the city, was stationed in Achmim (Diospolis Parva) in the early 160s BC and complained about their wages; see P.Grenf. I 42 = W.Chr. 447 (169/8

soldiers were posted on city walls only in case of danger or siege and generally remained in the garrisons.[156] In the Thebaid, the fortresses (*phrouria* or *ochyrōmata*) inside the cities often used Egyptian temple walls, for example in Hermopolis, Medinet Habu, Diospolis Magna (Thebes), and perhaps Pathyris and Thinis, although new construction must also have been undertaken, as in Heracleopolis.[157] In some cases, soldiers' or civilians' houses were built or included within the fortified areas.[158]

These main garrisons are the best source for detecting change within the army after Period B. Thebes and the entire southern area, including Edfu, Kom Ombo, Syene, Elephantine and Philae, were restructured, and new garrisons were established in Pathyris and Krokodilopolis.[159] In Thebes, for example, a second garrison was set up at the Memnoneia in the 160s BC, immediately after the period of crisis and at the same time as the first *katoikoi hippeis* were settled in the area.[160] The subsection that follows evaluates the wages paid to a soldier in Memphis, while the final subsection assesses the status and standard of living of soldiers and their families, the impact of local recruitment, and the frequency of intermarriage in two garrison towns, Akoris in Middle Egypt and Pathyris in the Thebaid.

7.2.3.1 Soldiers' wages: the example of Apollonios, brother of Ptolemaios the recluse

Ptolemaios was a recluse at the Serapeum in Memphis whose archive has been preserved.[161] He was the eldest of the four sons of Glaucias, a cleruch who belonged to "the relatives of the *katoikoi hippeis*" in the Heracleopolite nome and died in 164 BC during the troubles.[162] Ptolemaios seems to know

BC). The cavalryman Dryton was dispatched from there to Pathyris. For Thebes, see below. For Krokodilopolis, see section 7.2.3.3 on Pathyris.

156 During the period of crisis, the king had to besiege several nome-capitals with his army; the best known are Lycopolis in the Busirite nome in 197 BC and Panopolis between 168 and 164 BC. See Winnicki (1978) 102; Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 199.

157 Winnicki (1978) 102; Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 199; see Chapter 9 for other examples.

158 In Syene; see section 7.1.2 and note 34. On the *ochyrōma* of Pathyris, see P.Lond. III 1204 = M.Chr. 152, l. 19 (113 BC), P.Lond. VII 2191, l. 39 (116 BC) and Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 200. A civilian house adjacent to the *phrourion* was attacked by rebels in the third century BC; see BGU VI 1215 (unknown provenance); Préaux (1936) 529–30 with a French translation; Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 200. For soldiers' houses within temple precincts, see section 7.2.2.

159 The abundant epigraphical material from this area is examined at length in Chapters 8 and 9.

160 For the new dating of the Memnoneia garrison, see Winnicki (2001b) regarding P.Erbach, and Chapter 3, section 3.2.1.4 note 170. For the *katoikoi*, see Chapter 6, section 6.1 and note 34.

161 See Thompson (1988); Lewis (1986) 69–87; Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 209.

162 The two other brothers of Ptolemaios and Apollonios and perhaps also a sister still lived in the village of Psichis in the Heracleopolite, south of Memphis; the military status of the συγγενεῖς

that a cleruch's son has the right to obtain a position in the army, although six years passed between the death of Glaucias and Ptolemaios' petition to Ptolemy VI and Cleopatra to secure the enlistment of his younger brother Apollonios. Ptolemaios hopes that the rations his brother will obtain may be enough for both of them to live on. A long report records the administrative meanders that led to Apollonios' enrollment in the local division of Dexilaos "on full and regular pay."[163] The text gives Apollonios' monthly wage in cash and kind: "150 drachmas and 3 artabas of wheat, of which one came in kind and the two others in cash, at the equivalent of 100 drachmas per artaba."[164] In practice, he received 1,800 copper drachmas per year as a cash salary (*opsōnion*), 12 artabas of wheat, and the other 24 artabas at a low rate of 100 drachmas per artaba. For this reason, Apollonios' wage is usually interpreted as very low, hardly above subsistence level, because the price of an artaba of wheat had increased during the troubled period of the 160s BC and in 159 BC had a value that fluctuated between 250 and 340 artabas.[165]

On the other hand, there are several reasons to think that Apollonios received a decent wage for the time and that the condition of soldiers was still socio-economically appealing. First, since a man consumed about 10 artabas per year, Apollonios could support one extra family member by buying some extra wheat with the cash he received.[166] Second, Apollonios was enrolled as an *epigonē* of the garrison at Memphis and was thus a young recruit with no experience.[167] Third, the tenacity of the brothers in attempting to secure Apollonios a military position, even a modest one, strongly suggests that entering the army was valuable: the process of decision-making involved in enrolling Apollonios took five months, and he had to make thirty-two trips between Memphis and Alexandria.[168] Finally, as the evidence for the development of prices throughout the second century is limited and still not fully understood, it remains unclear whether the state used such an

(τῶν) κατοίκων ἵππεων is unclear but they were probably granted *klēroi* since they appear in the Kerkeosiris land surveys; see P.Tebt. I 32, note to l. 9, and *PP* II/VIII 2575–85.

163 UPZ I 14 (Memphis, 158 BC); Thompson (1988) 248–52 (248 for the quotation).

164 UPZ I 14, ll. 47–9, 71–8; Wilcken (1927) ll. 73–5, commentary.

165 Legras (2011b) 206, 209 = Legras (2011a) 172, 187. According to Thompson (1988) 248–9 and note 235, an artaba of *olyra* was priced around 300 drachmas at that time (O.Pisa 234, l. 5) and the ratio "*olyra*: wheat" was 5:2, see P.Lond. VII 1994 (Philadelphia, 251 BC), 130, 173; Clarysse and Lanciers (1989) 117, 123;

166 For the annual rate of consumption, see note 4.

167 For comparison, Ptolemaios received 12 artaba of *olyra* per year; see Thompson (1988) 238, which is far less.

168 The inquiries about wages were made in the department of Demetrios, the "chief bodyguard and scribe of the forces" (*UPZ* I 14, ll. 94–5, [το]ῦ ἀρχισωματαφύλακος καὶ γραμματέα τῶν δ[υ]νάμεων).

excessively low equivalent between drachmas and artabas of wheat to pay soldiers and guards, a group who could easily riot.[169]

In practice, Apollonios seems not to have been paid regularly and he was initially stationed outside Memphis, contrary to his hopes and those of his brother.[170] One-and-a-half years later he was transferred to the Serapeum as a police informer working for the *archiphylakitēs*, the chief of police, perhaps on Ptolemaios' demand, and thanks to his good relationship with the *stratēgos* of the Memphite nome.[171] Such a position could bring extra economic benefits, for example rewards for locating fugitive slaves.[172] But Apollonios' military career did not end well. The final hint of him is a complaint from the *epistatēs* to Ptolemaios, noting that Apollonios abandoned him when brigands attacked.

7.2.3.2 Akoris and Pathyris: bilingual archives of soldiers' families

The creation of the garrison towns of Tenis-Akoris and Pathyris was part of the program of military reform undertaken by the Ptolemies in response to the crisis of the early second century BC. The first of these garrisons was located at the northern entrance to the Hermopolite nome, which had strategic value because of its location in the north of the Thebaid, while the second was established in the heart of the Thebaid. The town of Tenis and its harbor, renamed Akoris around 141 BC, had played a crucial role in 187 BC at the end of the Great Revolt: a prominent member of the Egyptian local elite called Hakoris (Demotic *Hgr*) son of Herieus, perhaps the *stratēgos* of the nome, gave logistical support to Comanus, the commander of the army who finally defeated the rebels.[173] Tenis had been loyal to Ptolemy V throughout the revolt, since several years before this Hakoris dedicates a chapel of the local Isis to the king in a rock-cut monumental inscription

169 In his survey of the consumption basket in the ancient world based on unskilled civilian workers' wages in wheat, Scheidel (2010) 443–4, 452–4, and table 4, shows that Egypt between the 160s and the 120s BC presents one of the lowest rates out of thirty-four cases, at 1.6–1.9 liters of wheat per day, whereas the "core" data range from 3.5–6.5 liters of wheat. Scheidel suggests that we can give little weight to this result, given the limited amount and quality of the available data, but surmises that real wages in Egypt were lower in the second century than in the third. In comparison, Apollonios earns 1.3 liters of wheat and 11.5 drachmas per day. In the third century a soldier could expect around 30 silver drachmas a month with an additional wheat ration, while Ptolemaios in the second century received the equivalent of 800 copper drachmas (450 + 350) per month, which is less than 2 silver drachmas; see Legras (2011b) 209 = Legras (2011a) 187. For wages, see also Chapter 3, section 3.1.4.3 note 93.

170 UPZ I 15 (156 BC) and Thompson (1988) 250.

171 Legras (2011b) 210 = Legras (2011a) 188.

172 UPZ I 121 (156 BC).

173 Rowlandson (2007a) 42–3. On the name (H)akoris and the reinterpretation of SB V 8257 (187 BC) and P.Köln IV 186 (second century BC), see Clarysse (1991b).

carved on the cliff above the town.[174] By contrast, it took more time to establish new garrisons in the south, since the garrisons in Krokodilopolis and its subdivision in Pathyris developed after the 160s BC. These garrisons controlled an area where internal trouble had often started and aimed at blocking potential enemies coming from the south. Both were abandoned after rebels besieged them in 88 BC.[175] The military organization in Akoris was a mix of new professional soldiers recruited in Egypt, who were now used extensively, and of what had been most common in the Fayyum area, namely cleruchs. Only professional soldiers, on the other hand, were employed in Pathyris. In both cases it is apparent that the men who joined the army and their families enjoyed a comfortable life. The bilingual archives of three soldiers' families shed light on their ethnic background and social networks, and demonstrate that integration occurred within the military milieu or through access to it. In the second century Greco-Egyptian and Egyptian families played a leading role in the garrison towns of the *chōra* and in local economic activity.[176]

The archive of Peteharsemtheus son of Panebkhounis from Pathyris records the history of an Egyptian family over five generations.[177] The earliest known member of the family, Horos, was perhaps the first to enrol in the army, in the late third century. Many Egyptians were hired at that time, and some may have had Greek ancestors, including Horos. All members of the family bore Egyptian names and had the ethnic *Wynn ms n Kmy*, "Greek born in Egypt," which by the second century had become a specific designation attesting military status (see Chapter 5). The successive members of Horos' family were professional soldiers and also held land. They were not allotted a *klēros* by the state, however, but belonged to the new type of professional soldiers the Ptolemies began hiring during Period B. When these soldiers were involved in military operations, for example around 95 BC in Diospolis Parva because of trouble in the Thebaid, they did not have to cultivate their land. Indeed, in his letter to his brothers Peteharsemtheus and Phagonis in Pathyris, Petesouchos insists that his men do not need to worry about agricultural work, suggesting that they were sufficiently well

174 I.Akôris 1 = OGIS I 94, between 197 and 194/3 BC; see now Suto (2003), esp. 5–12 and pl. 5 = Kawanishi and Suto (2005) 199–206 and fig. 30; Suto (2005) 17–18.

175 Pestman (1965) 49–51; Vandorpe (1995) 233; see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1.4 note 169; Chauveau (1997) 223–4.

176 On the archives of soldiers in Pathyris, see now Vandorpe and Waebens (2009).

177 On the archive of Peteharsemtheus, see Pestman (1965); Lewis (1986) 139–52; and new documents published in Chauveau (2002), (2008); Vandorpe and Waebens (2009) 163–89. For his brother Phagonis, see Chauveau (1997) 219-22.

compensated when mobilized.[178] But he does discuss the management of a few fields with his brothers.

Panebkhounis (163–99 BC) is the best-represented individual in the archive, and the receipts, tax payments in Greek or Demotic, and business transactions reveal a privileged lifestyle earned through membership in the army and a combination of military and business revenues. Even if his elder son, Peteharsemtheus, the keeper of the archive, was not a soldier himself, the military tradition continued through Peteharsemtheus' brother Petesouchos and their sister, who married a soldier *Wynn ms n Kmy*. Marriages among members of the same profession were common, and even more so when the profession secured privileges for subsequent generations, as in the case of both soldiers and priests.[179] This behavior also reveals the social network of these bilingual soldiers' families, interacting with one another, whatever their ethnic affiliations, and with the Egyptian elite of the town or village. The soldiers' social networks were not only built on the daily interaction in the garrison town but reinforced when soldiers were on campaign, as is apparent from the correspondence between two units from Krokodilopolis and Pathyris, who were sent away during the War of the Scepters at the very end of the second century.[180]

Perhaps surprisingly, these observations are also valid for officers in garrison towns, who enjoyed a higher standard of living. The family of Dryton, a Cretan cavalryman and citizen of Ptolemais whose father probably immigrated into Egypt under Ptolemy III and IV, has interesting similarities and shows the army at work as a community builder.[181] Dryton's second wife was Apollonia-Senmonthis, whose father was an infantryman in Pathyris. Apollonia-Senmonthis was a local Egyptian woman who bore the ethnic "Cyrenean" because her family had obtained the status of *Hellēnes* through service in the army.[182] Most studies stress the economic advantages Apollonia-Senmonthis obtained from this union, but marriage within local

[178] P.Phil.E 16743 and Chauveau (2008), esp. 28–32.

[179] Sons and daughters of mortuary priests in Thebes, for example, had economic and social incentives to marry their neighbors, themselves the children of mortuary priests; see Muhs (2005).

[180] See Chapter 3, section 3.2.3, p. 106 and note 212, and chapter 7, section 7.3.1.

[181] There is an extensive bibliography concerning Dryton, including most recently: Vandorpe and Waebens (2009) 102–13; Vandorpe (2002b), (2002a); Gonis (2006); Chauveau (1997) 214–19; Lewis (1986) 88–103; Mélèze Modrzejewski (1984); see also the Leuven Homepage of the *Papyrus Archives of Graeco-Roman Egypt* at www.trismegistos.org/arch/index.php.

[182] Vandorpe and Waebens (2009) 106. Yet Vandorpe (2002b) 326 had earlier suggested that one of Apollonia's ancestors was a Cyrenean who immigrated into Egypt. It has been argued that Apollonia was either a Hellenized Egyptian or an Egyptianized Greek. For Mélèze Modrzejewski (1984) 365, the union was "moderately mixed". Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 228

families could also bring Greek immigrants economic opportunities such as access to temple land.[183] Dryton and Apollonia's daughters all had double names, married men – at least two of them soldiers – with Egyptian names, followed Egyptian customs and laws by drawing up Demotic marriage contracts and gave only Egyptian names to their children.[184] As in the case of Peteharsemtheus' family, the son joined the army and the daughters remained within the military community. It is worth noting that one of Dryton's daughters married one of Peteharsemtheus' brothers, Phagonis, a herdsman and servant of the god Harsemtheus (P.Dryton 9).[185]

Lists of witnesses are especially useful for tracing the social network of Dryton, who was promoted to cavalry commander (*hipparchos*) in Pathyris. Unsurprisingly, the witnesses of his first two Greek wills, drawn up around the time of his weddings, one before and one when he settled in Pathyris, were Greek soldiers or cavalrymen (P.Dryton 1 and 2). The third will was drawn up shortly before Dryton's death in 126 BC, leaving no time for waiting for six Greek witnesses (P.Dryton 3).[186] Four of the witnesses could sign only in Demotic, as the scribe notes, because there were not enough people who could write in Greek at that moment. These were all prominent persons in Pathyris: the *hypepistatēs* and three priests, among them Patous, who was closely connected with Dryton's family. The fifth witness – a sixth could not be located – Ammonios-Pakoibis, was the son of the *agoranomos* Areios and would later replace his father in that function, using only his Greek name. His son Psenenoupis later married one of Dryton's daughters.[187] Dryton's family was clearly close to the Egyptian milieu, drawing up Demotic contracts with Egyptian witnesses and lending money or grain to Egyptians (e.g. P.Dryton 12).[188] Unsurprisingly, this interaction, in particular with the local Egyptian elite of scribes, priests and soldiers, increased when Dryton left the polis of Ptolemais, where he had married a citizen woman, and moved to Thebes and then Pathyris, where he married a woman from a local Egyptian family.

believes that Apollonia was Greek and that her marriage with Dryton was not inter-ethnic but intercultural.

183 Rowlandson (1995) 309–10.

184 One was a cavalryman, Herienoupis; see Chauveau (1997) 216. On the mixed marriages in this family, see Mélèze Modrzejewski (1984), (1980) 59–60.

185 For Phagonis, see also Chauveau (1997) 219–22.

186 The year of Dryton's death has been confirmed by Gonis (2006).

187 Vandorpe (2002a) 43, 96.

188 For example P.Dryton 12, a Demotic loan of money (5,230 drachmas) by Dryton to a shepherd and servant of Amun in Thebes (171 BC), when he had not yet been promoted to the rank of *hipparchos*.

The archive also allows us a glimpse of the socio-economic status of a cavalry officer in the *chōra*. Accounts show that Dryton traded not only in Pathyris but also in Thebes (P.Dryton 39) and reveal sources of income such as leasing out land and a wagon (P.Dryton 40), in addition to his military pay. In the wills (P.Dryton 1–4), both Dryton's immovable and movable property are listed: a vineyard and a house in the Pathyrite nome, real estate in Perithebas, military equipment, four domestic slaves, the wagon, a cow, *symbola* of grain and money, a dowry and furniture. *Symbola* were probably acknowledgements of soldiers' wages to be paid in grain or money rather than loans in kind and cash, and must have been valid for more than a month, since they could be bequeathed.[189] Esthaldas, Dryton's oldest child from his first marriage and his only son, inherited half the property and half the *symbola*, as well as the military equipment, in accord with Greek and Egyptian customs, which privileged the eldest son. The content of the wills and the involvement of Dryton and his wife in financial transactions reveal their comfortable standard of living, similar to that of the Greek cleruchs who drew up wills in the third-century Fayyum.

The bilingual archive of Dionysios-Plenis son of Kephalas, from the garrison town of Akoris, complements the picture of the new type of military community that developed in the second century BC and suggests that the material from Pathyris is representative of garrison towns in the Egyptian *chōra* of Middle and Upper Egypt.[190] As in Peteharsemtheus' family, Kephalas and two of his sons were professional soldiers (*misthophoroi*), who combined revenues from the local priesthood and small business ventures. Their part-time military service as professional soldiers supports Vandorpe's conclusion that in the second century Persian *tēs epigonēs*, a designation borne by many of these soldiers, denotes that they were inactive at that time.[191] As a result, they could earn income from a variety of other activities but kept the socio-economic and probably financial privileges associated with a position in the army. Like Peteharsemtheus' brother Phagonis, who was a priest, for example, Dionysios son of Kephalas was a priest of Thoth, the ibis god, even while he bore the designation "Persian *tēs epigonēs*."[192] Dionysios' bilingual archive also makes it clear that his family was involved in business activity and agricultural work. For example, he leased out sacred land that belonged to the ibis god and some that belonged to him, he speculated by borrowing and selling wheat and he was also a royal farmer. Chauveau

189 Vandorpe (2002a) 39–40, following Launey (1949).

190 Chauveau (1997) 207–13; Lewis (1986) 124–39; Boswinkel and Pestman (1982); Winnicki (1978) 18–23.

191 See Chapter 5, section 5.2.3.1.

192 See Chapter 8, section 8.5.1.

suggests that the instability produced by some of Dionysios' activities may have led him to enroll in the army as a *misthophoros* when he was around thirty years old, in 106 BC.[193] The archive ends shortly after his enrollment, perhaps because he was mobilized for the War of the Scepters and never returned.[194]

Unlike in Peteharsemtheus' family, in which there may have been no Greeks and in which no Greek names appear, many members of Dionysios' family used double names, either because they had a Greek ancestor not far removed genealogically or because this was a more common practice in this area, where Greek immigrants had been more numerous than in Pathyris.[195] Dionysios-Plenis' wife also had a double name, Isidora-Tasis. Anagnostou-Canas concludes that the ethnic identity of these people cannot be determined and questions the mixed character of their union. In fact, the ambiguity demonstrates the existence of Greco-Egyptian communities in villages, towns and cities with a strong military presence. In addition to the professional soldiers (*misthophoroi*), both cavalry and infantry, to whom Dionysios, his father and his brother belonged, some *katoikoi hippeis* were settled in Cleopatra near Akoris, at least from the mid second century onward.[196] These men were organized in a unit (Demotic *stn*, Greek *sēmeion*) separate from the *hēgemonia* of the *misthophoroi*, and were probably under the command of the *hipparchos* in charge of all *katoikoi hippeis* of the Hermopolite nome.[197] But they interacted with professional soldiers in daily life, for example as witnesses in the contracts in Dionysios' archive, and some professional soldiers even received *klēroi*.[198] Within the army, soldiers of different ranks, units and socio-economic backgrounds worked together as members of the same community. This community also interacted with the local civilian population and formed a closely linked group with the local priestly and scribal elite, with whom they intermarried and did business. Some soldiers also made extra money by lending grain or leasing land to farmers. On the whole, soldiers, whether Greek, Greco-Egyptian or Egyptian, enjoyed a comfortable standard of living compared with the mass of small farmers and unskilled workers. They were the people in the village who could afford to draw up contracts and have archives. Officers enjoyed an even more comfortable life and even drew up wills.

[193] Chauveau (1997) 210.
[194] See Chapter 3, section 3.2.3, p. 106 and note 212, and Chapter 7, section 7.3.1.
[195] For the genealogy of the family and the use of double names, see Boswinkel and Pestman (1982) 4.
[196] Winnicki (1978) 22–3.
[197] Boswinkel and Pestman (1982) 42–5.
[198] See Chapter 5, section 5.2.3.1 note 122.

To sum up, the socio-economic status of soldiers in the *chōra* and their coexistence with civilians illuminates the development of Greco-Egyptian communities within towns and villages in which the army had a significant presence. The members of these communities were usually bilingual and stressed their privileged status in the state when necessary, be it through belonging to the army or to the local priesthood. Lewis and other scholars assume that Greek and Egyptian cultures coexisted but generally did not blend, and at most deplore the Egyptianization of Greek soldiers.[199] I suggest instead that the evidence regarding the army shows interaction, a leveling process and even hybridization of at least two groups, the immigrants who originally belonged to the army and their descendants, on the one hand, and the local families who entered the army, on the other. The latter enjoyed upward mobility or confirmation of their existing socio-economic position within their towns and villages.

7.3 Socio-military and cultic associations

The nature of the social networks of soldiers and officers has emerged in the previous sections. Relationships between soldiers were also reinforced by more formal institutions, such as the gymnasium and socio-military associations revolving around the royal cult. These associations allowed soldiers not only to expand their social networks but to develop what Tilly calls "trust networks" or "interpersonal connections" that make cooperation easier and less risky.[200] In recent studies of religious associations in Ptolemaic Egypt, Monson, building on Tilly's approach, demonstrates that "by joining an association, members signal to others that they are trustworthy and share the values of their peers."[201] The associations examined by Monson had rules that emphasized ethical conduct and group activities – essential elements to generate trustworthiness – as well as entry fees paid by each member and fines for disrespect of rules. Even if no rules are preserved for soldiers' associations, we have hints that the members of the gymnasium, or at least new members, paid a contribution. Similarly, members who made offerings

199 Lewis (1986) 154 and most of the studies of Préaux, Bingen, Peremans, Mélèze-Mondrzejeski and Anagnostou-Canas. Mélèze Modrzejewski (1980) 59–60, for example, stresses that the interaction of Greeks with the Egyptian local elite, be they priests or soldiers, did not cause the "conqueror's downfall." For Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 229–30, despite what she calls the Egyptianization of Dryton's daughters, the status distinction between Greeks and Egyptians was maintained, and the divorce of two of Dryton's daughters from their "Egyptian" husbands might be connected to this situation.

200 Tilly (2005), esp. 12 for his definition.

201 Monson (2006) 233–4.

or contributed to the cost of festivals organized to honor the king or other benefactors reinforced their image as trustworthy peers.

The evolution of these social and trust networks was beneficial to soldiers in their daily non-military activities as well as on the battlefield. Through the army, average soldiers had access to officers closer to royal power, to the local elite and to other ethnic groups. The development of these associations also benefited the state, because they developed an *esprit de corps*, or a capacity for collective action, through communal activities devoted to expressing loyalty to the king and the dynasty. I use this concept in accord with Turchin's theory of "asabiya," defined as "the capacity of a group for collective action."[202] For Turchin, groups in agrarian societies were based on ethnicity and socio-economic status. Groups varied in their capacity for collective action, and Turchin conjectures that the success or stability of a state depends on the capacity of its elite for collective action. The variation can be measured, for example, by the willingness to provide recruits or pay taxes. In the case of Ptolemaic soldiers, the collective acts of honoring the kings, sometimes in association with local gods, show a readiness to invest time and to some extent wealth. Such actions illustrate the degree of loyalty to the king and the state, and the degree of positive involvement in local communities. Some soldiers, for example, used part of their wealth to build temples dedicated to the king and Egyptian gods, as discussed in Chapter 9. The subsections that follow explore how the gymnasium and other soldiers' associations may have played an integrative role in unifying soldiers from different socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds.

7.3.1 The gymnasium, the **neaniskoi***, and the associations of* **basilistai** *and* **philobasilistai**

There are currently two opposed views regarding the gymnasium. One regards it as an institution that reinforced segregation between Greeks and some other immigrants, on the one hand, and Egyptians, on the other. The other view sees the gymnasium as an institution that might include Egyptians. At one end of the spectrum, Launey and Anagnostou-Canas reject the idea that Egyptians were ever members of the gymnasium.[203] More often, scholars admit that some evidence attests the presence of Egyptians in

[202] Turchin (2003) 43 and his Chapter 3, where he borrows the term "asabiya" from the fourteenth-century historian Ibn Khaldun.

[203] Launey (1949) 836–69, esp. 865–9; Bingen (1975) 371; Lewis (1986) 26–7, for whom the gymnasium "resisted invasion by Egyptians to the very end of the Ptolemaic era"; Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 223, 235.

the gymnasium but stress the limited number of cases and the exceptionality of the phenomenon.[204] At the other end of the spectrum, finally, a few scholars argue that Egyptians took part in gymnasium activities and that elements of both cultures met there.[205]

The gymnasium and other soldiers' associations were micro-organizations within the army that could admit non-military members. They developed in Egypt by private initiative, often on the part of officers, combined with state approval. This mix of private and public initiative can also be observed in the financing of Egyptian temple-building by soldiers and officers discussed in Chapter 9. In return, officers and *stratēgoi* played the role of *gymnasiarchoi* (directors of the gymnasium) or of protectors of the associations. In addition to their military and educational functions, these local organizations had socio-cultural and religious purposes, such as implementing the dynastic cult and various festivals, which strengthened the fraternal links between soldiers but also consolidated the network of the local upper strata at the village and inter-village level. The committee or the head of such associations sometimes asked for and obtained favors or support from the king, who could only have been pleased at expressions of loyalty emanating from such groups, producing unity and stability.

The framework sketched out in Part I showed how political and economic developments modified the organization and composition of the army. This outcome finds parallels in the gymnasium and in soldiers' associations. In the second century these institutions had become flexible enough in the *chōra* to adjust to the new context and to allow some new members of the army to join, even if they were not connected to earlier groups of immigrants. Consequently, at least from Period B onward, the gymnasium and soldiers' associations developed as unifying forces between Greeks and Egyptians. They had played a similar role in the third century BC within the different groups of migrants that belonged to the army.

A critical survey of the evidence shows that from the second century Egyptians and Greco-Egyptians who belonged to the army could become members of the gymnasium. This is suggested mainly by dedications to local Egyptian gods by members of the gymnasium and by their involvement in local associations revolving around local gods; in addition, some members bore Egyptian names or Greek names favored by Greco-Egyptian and Egyptian families. The specific geographic setting of the gymnasium

[204] Delorme (1960), esp. 429–31; Legras (1999), esp. 214–16.

[205] Brady (1936), esp. 14–17, 20; Mehl (1992); Habermann (2004), esp. 342–3, notably restating Schubart's view that "the *neaniskoi* of the *Osireion* are a paradigm of the mixture of Greek and Egyptian elements, of Greek education and Egyptian worship"; see Schubart (1912) 375.

in Egypt partially explains this outcome. Gymnasia were established in the three poleis but spread beyond their traditional institutional framework and were found in some villages where cleruchs settled. Redon made a similar observation about the spread of baths in Ptolemaic Egypt through the settlements of cleruchs and their coexistence with Egyptians.[206] Habermann emphasizes the presence of gymnasia throughout Egypt during the three centuries of Ptolemaic rule and suggests that every nome-capital, and many villages as well, may have had a gymnasium.[207] In addition to the sources that mention a gymnasium, the combination of evidence for *gymnasiarchoi* and *kosmētai*, for *epheboi* and *neaniskoi*, and perhaps also for *basilistai* and *philobasilistai* (members of associations devoted to the cult of the king), sheds light on the spread of this institution and its adaptation to an Egyptian context.[208]

The gymnasium was an institution that implied the existence of members, generally called "those of the gymnasium" (οἱ ἐκ τοῦ γυμνασίου) in the Ptolemaic period. These men formed an association, sometimes called *koinon* in the documents. In the poleis of Egypt, all gymnasium members were citizens or became citizens when accepted as members.[209] All male citizens were ephebes for one year when they turned fourteen, and in theory they remained members of the gymnasium, even if they did not become soldiers. Consequently, in the poleis the gymnasium was an association of military and civilian citizens and was not limited to soldiers.

The evidence examined below suggests that the situation was different in the *chōra*, where the concept of citizenship did not apply and where Greek

206 Redon (2009), esp. 408–10, 434–6.

207 Habermann (2004) 336–7 provides a map with the locations of attested *gymnasiarchoi*.

208 Delorme (1960) limits his investigation to the gymnasium. For the *gymnasiarchoi* and *kosmētai*, see *PP* VI 17127–83a. For lists of gymnasia with sources, see Zucker (1930/1). For village gymnasia, see Launey (1949) 836–69; Maehler (1983b) 195; Legras (1999) 209 note 58. In addition to the gymnasia of Alexandria and Ptolemais and of the new polis of Euergetis in Upper Egypt, there is positive evidence in the nome-capitals of Thmuis in the Delta, Krokodilopolis in the Arsinoite, Aphroditopolis and perhaps Heracleopolis in Middle Egypt, and both Thebes and Ombos in Upper Egypt. Village gymnasia are found in Philadelphia, Theadelphia, Euhemeria, Muchis, Tebtunis, Samaria and perhaps Pharbaithos in the Arsinoite, Adulis on the Red Sea, Thilothis in the Heracleopolite nome, and Sebennytos and Psenamosis in the Delta. See now the unpublished dissertation by Paganini (2011).

209 E.g. SEG VIII 641= SB V 8031, l. 9, κοινόν (Ptolemais [?], 104 BC); Habermann (2004) 339 explains that in the Roman period the members of the gymnasium appear as οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ γυμνασίου, which refers to an endogamous status group. This would suggest that access to membership relied on genealogy but was far more open under the Ptolemies, when new members were admitted, as can be seen in the same inscription. Habermann may be right, but the transition was not made visible by the change of preposition, for in the Oxyrhynchite and Hermopolite nomes the expression οἱ ἐκ τοῦ γυμνασίου was still used in the Roman period; see Nelson (1979) 35.

military settlers set up gymnasia for physical training. Whether Greeks who did not join the army were also ephebes for one year and remained members of the gymnasium, is perhaps contingent on the existence of a gymnasium in their village. The link between the gymnasium and the army appears stronger in the *chōra*, where it was not related to the concept of citizenship in one of the Greek poleis of Egypt. The relationship between military training and the gymnasium in the Hellenistic period has been debated, but recent studies affirm that a type of military training took place in the gymnasium.[210] In the gymnasium of Beroia in Macedonia, for example, military training was the main goal of the *ephēbeia* and of participation in gymnastic activities in subsequent years.[211] In the gymnasium of Egypt there is no evidence for the use of javelins, bows and arrows, or even catapults, but several elements make it clear that soldiers were given physical training there.[212] As soon as there was a sufficiently large and organized body of cleruchs in one of the villages where they settled, activities implying the existence of a gymnasium seem to have occurred. Different types of races, including horse races, armed races and torch races (lampadarchies), as well as boxing and wrestling competitions, were organized in the *chōra*, and the organizer of the games (*agōnothetēs*) sometimes had the victors' names and ethnics carved on stone.[213] In third-century Philadelphia, for example, cleruchs were responsible for paying for the lampadarchy.[214] Unsurprisingly, village gymnasia were most numerous in the Arsinoite, because it featured the largest settlement of cleruchs (see Chapter 6). Soldiers are attested in the papyrological documentation as members of the gymnasium there, and in addition to physical training they may have received their military training in the gymnasium.[215] As has already been noted by Montevecchi, third-century Greek settlers in the Arsinoite and Heracleopolite nomes tended to belong to the military and to settle more frequently in rural areas, whereas the more educated settlers of the Oxyrhynchite nome, who were most often civilians, settled in urban areas.[216] To sum up, in the third century most Greek soldiers and some foreigners trained in the gymnasium, and their involvement as members after their *ephēbeia* depended on the proximity

210 Hatzopoulos (2004); Chankowski (2004).

211 For the mid-second-century rules of this gymnasium, see Gauthier and Hatzopoulos (1993).

212 For weapons used in the gymnasium outside Egypt, see Launey (1949) 815–35. Delorme (1960) thinks there was no training with weapons in Egyptian gymnasia.

213 SEG XXVII 1114 (267 BC) = Austin (2006) #294; Koenen (1977); McKenzie (2004) 101–2.

214 See below, note 229.

215 Clarysse and Thompson (2006) 133 with notes 37–41. The list of gymnasia is given above, note 208.

216 Montevecchi (1997) 720–1, 725.

of such an institution and perhaps also their socio-economic status, since membership required a financial contribution, at least in the poleis.[217] From the second century onward, Egyptians appear in the gymnasia, a development that parallels the increasing internal recruitment of troops. By the end of the century there may even have been Egyptians or Greco-Egyptians among the twenty-five new members of the gymnasium of one of the poleis, probably Ptolemais, since they were drawn from men who were not citizens.[218] The children of these new members would then become ephebes and have access to the same training as the Greek soldiers living there. We do not know whether all soldiers received military training at the gymnasium, but probably only the wealthiest among them, such as the officers and the cavalry settlers, remained members.[219]

The ephebic institution in Egypt is known from eleven documents dating from the mid second to the first century BC, most of them from the Fayyum, two from Alexandria, one from Gizeh and two from Philae.[220] Many are dedications by ephebes or former ephebes who still formed groups, probably through the army. The two dozen names of ephebes, pre-ephebes or former ephebes preserved are Greek.[221] It is well known, however, that onomastic criteria had become ambiguous by that time and that the context of the army and the gymnasium would encourage individuals with double names to use their Greek names, making Greco-Egyptians and Egyptians almost impossible to identify. In fact, about one-quarter of the ephebes bear names often chosen by Egyptians or Greco-Egyptians, and one patronymic is Idumean (Kosalenos).[222] Of the two names preserved in Thebes, one is Ptolemaios and the other, Masullos/Masulleus, is Idumean. In addition, the proliferation of the names Hermes and Heracles – the traditional gods of the gymnasium – among the "Greeks" in Thebes has been interpreted by Clarysse as an onomastic hint of the entrance of new families into the gymnasium.[223]

217 See SEG VIII 641= SB V 8031, l. 8 (Ptolemais [?], 104 BC) regarding the sums paid by new members in the inscription.
218 This possibility has been suggested by Delorme (1960) 428.
219 The soldiers in the garrison and the members of the gymnasium in a town do not seem to have always been identical; see note 230.
220 Habermann (2004) 341; Legras (1999) 133–42, 216–17; Brady (1936) 12–13.
221 Legras (1999) 134–9.
222 I.Louvre Bernand 17 (134/3 BC) and SEG XX 671 (116–108 BC) with Legras (1999), esp. 134–5 note 4: Apollonios son of Herakleides, Apollonios son of Apollonios, Asclepiades son of Dionysios, Ptolemaios son of Sonikos. For these names, see above note 82.
223 Clarysse (1995) 7.

Unsurprisingly, many of the ephebic dedications are offered to Hermes and Heracles; Amun, Pan and Apollo are associated with them in Thebes, Isis alone is honored in Philae, and most important, the local crocodile gods Souchos and Soknebtunis receive small plots of land (*topoi*) in the Fayyum.[224] On these steles, the king is shown worshipping the crocodile god lying on an altar, with a table with offerings in between.[225] The association of Egyptian gods with the gymnasium supports the notion that the members of the gymnasium felt it necessary to include local gods in the gymnasium, suggesting the presence of Greco-Egyptians and Egyptians there. In fact, if some aspects of Egyptian religion were entering the gymnasium in the Fayyum, where up to 30 percent of inhabitants may have been of Greek origin, one can expect that this happened elsewhere in the *chōra* as well, where the Greek population was much smaller.

The *neaniskoi* make the presence of Greco-Egyptians and Egyptians in the gymnasium even clearer. Their identity has been debated at length because of the many contexts in which they are involved, such as the army, the cleruchs and the gymnasium.[226] The standard view is that the *neaniskoi* belonged to an association of some sort, because in Theadelphia they formed a *synodos* of the *neaniskoi* of the *Osireion*.[227] The *Osireion* was either the name of the gymnasium or, more likely, the place where this particular group of members of the gymnasium and the army gathered to perform the cult of Osiris.[228] The involvement of the *neaniskoi* in decision-making regarding the gymnasium indicates that they were the members of the administrative council or committee in charge of the affairs of the gymnasium, as well as members of the gymnasium and soldiers. This role is unambiguous throughout Egypt, from Philadelphia to Hermonthis and Kom Ombo. In Philadelphia an 80-aroura man asked that his request for exemption from the lampadarchy, a liturgy that consisted of paying for the organization of a torch race, be transmitted to the *gymnasiarchos* and the *neaniskoi*.[229]

224 SEG XX 671 (Thebes, 116–108 BC); I.Philae 32 and 33 (Philae, 89 BC); I.Fayoum III 200 = SB V 8885 and I.Fayoum III 201 = SB V 8887 (Krokodilopolis or Euhemeria, 98 and 95 BC), and I.Fayoum III 202 = SB V 7784 (Tebtunis [?], 94 BC); see also Chapter 9, section 9.4 and note 79.

225 I.Fayoum III 201, pl. 34.

226 Habermann (2004) 343–4; Legras (1999) 196–216; Launey (1949) 859–62; Brady (1936) 13–14.

227 I.Fayoum II 119 = SB I 5022 (Theadelphia, second or first century BC).

228 Brady (1936) 14 surmises that the *Osireion* could be the gymnasium. Delorme (1960) 428 is not sure whether the *Osireion* is a gymnasium; see also Legras (1999) 214–16.

229 BGU VI 1256 (Philadelphia, 147/6 or 136/5 BC); see Legras (1999) 209–12 and Habermann (2004) 342–3.

In Kom Ombo, the *neaniskoi* sent a request, the content of which is lost, to Ptolemy VIII, his sister Cleopatra II and his wife Cleopatra III.[230] The king and queens answered positively, asking the *stratēgos* Boethos to act as the members of the gymnasium (οἱ ἐκ τοῦ γυμνασίου) requested. The preeminent role of the *neaniskoi* in the community made them the logical protagonists in the celebration of a peace agreement between the villages of Hermonthis and Krokodilopolis in Upper Egypt.[231] Nine *neaniskoi* selected in Krokodilopolis accompanied their chief commander, Apollonios alias Phabi, for an *agapē* (a meal to celebrate friendship) in Hermonthis. This example also reveals the use of Greek traditions linked to the gymnasium in Egyptian villages, where at least some Greco-Egyptian or Egyptian soldiers, plausibly officers, were members of the gymnasium.

The *neaniskoi* may have served on the council only for a short period of time, for the term *neaniskos* probably referred to an age-class. Their former members formed associations that could have a religious tone, as in Theadelphia, where their association was devoted to Osiris and was led by a high priest (*archi-hiereus*), Phanias, and a president (*prostatēs*), Petosoronophres, clearly an Egyptian.[232] In addition, the *neaniskoi* and the former *neaniskoi* were well connected to the *katoikoi hippeis* and thus belonged to the upper strata of the local military elite.[233] The presence of Egyptians and Greco-Egyptians among the *neaniskoi*, as in Theadelphia, Hermonthis and probably other places, has important consequences for this investigation. From the second century Egyptians and Greco-Egyptians could be full members of the gymnasium and belong to its committee. This suggests once again that more Egyptians than has generally been thought

230 I.Th.Sy. 189 = C.Ord.Ptol. 48–9; Legras (1999) 212–14. Dietze (2000) 86–9 explains that the names of Ptolemy VIII and Cleopatra III were erased from this inscription, suggesting that the members of the gymnasium were on Cleopatra II's side at some point during the dynastic conflicts, whereas a dedication to the Egyptian gods by the men of the garrison in Kom Ombo between 131 and 124 BC (see Chapter 9, section 9.3) is only addressed to Ptolemy VIII and Cleopatra III. Thus (p. 88) "army membership did not automatically lead to membership of the local *gymnasion*."

231 W.Chr. 11A + B (Krokodilopolis [Pathyrite], 123 BC), esp. A, ll. 46–53; Legras (1999) 203–4; Habermann (2004) 342.

232 See notes 227 and 228; Launey (1949) thinks that only a few of the *neaniskoi* worshiped Osiris, perhaps those living close to the temple, because he cannot conceive that such a mixture of Greek and Egyptian cultural elements occurred within the gymnasium. Legras (1999) 214–16, on the other hand, accepts that Osiris and Harpocrates, who also appear on the stele, had important religious functions for the *neaniskoi*. The existence of an *Osireion* (AD 98) in the gymnasium quarter in Oxyrhynchus confirms a link between the two spheres.

233 Several papyri from the third-century Fayyum show that the *neaniskoi* belonged to the *katoikoi hippeis*; see Legras (1999) 196–203; Habermann (2004) 342. They may have been candidates for positions in the administration, probably within the army; see Legras (1999) 206–7.

were *katoikoi hippeis*, as in the cases of Maron son of Dionysios and Heti discussed in section 7.1.4. Consequently, the genealogical relation between those called "the *katoikoi* from the total of 6,475 *Hellēnes* in the Arsinoite" in the Roman period – a privileged fiscal class known as the gymnasial class in other nomes – and the third-century Greek settlers was probably looser than is generally assumed.[234]

In another document found in Pathyris that belonged to the dossier of the War of the Scepters, Porteis, the *hēgemōn* "of the men in selection" (*tōn en procheirismōi*), and the *neaniskoi* wrote to Pates and Pachrates and the other soldiers, called *philobasilistai* in the initial address, to announce that they had appointed the president (*prostatēs*) of the great god Nechtpharaus.[235] In Pathyris this god was a local version of the crocodile god Souchos, who was worshiped by an association whose members apparently belonged to the army. All the officers mentioned in this letter are Egyptian, as is the man appointed president, whom the original editors surmise was Panobchounis son of Phmois, the author of another text in the same corpus.[236] The connection between this local association, the *neaniskoi* and the *philobasilistai* is undeniable, but its nature requires explanation. First, there was a link between the former ephebes and the god Souchos in at least two villages of the Fayyum, and the *neaniskoi* were involved in the cult of Osiris in Theadelphia. Moreover, the *philobasilistai* and *basilistai* can be described as members of "a kind of royalist association, often made up of soldiers,"[237] and appear in the context of the dynastic conflicts of the second century BC. The following scenario can thus be proposed: the sons of the well-to-do families of these towns were the core members of the local religious associations. Many belonged to the strata of the population that enrolled in the army in the second century, regardless of whether a Greek soldier had entered their family at some point. Some of these Greco-Egyptians and Egyptians were included in the Greek structures connected with the army or more specifically the gymnasium. This is not to say that the gymnasium,

234 SB XII 11012 (Arsinoite, AD 55). There is an abundant bibliography on this privileged group: for different views, see Nelson (1979); Mélèze Modrzejewski (1989); Van Minnen (2002). For the question of the third-century settlers as ancestors of the 6,475 *Hellēnes*, see, for example, Montevecchi (1997), esp. 724–5, and (2001), where Montevecchi suggests that the Greeks were outnumbered and had gradually disappeared by the Roman period.

235 P.Amh. II 39 and P.Grenf. I 30 (= C.Jud.Syr.Eg. 1, found in Pathyris, 103 BC) have often been interpreted as evidence for the participation of the *neaniskoi* in the athletic games (*agōnes*) of Hermonthis; see, for example, Legras (1999) 204–6; Delorme (1960) 428; Launey (1949) 866–7, 1028–9. But Clarysse and Winnicki show that the problematic word ἀγών refers instead to the well-known strife between the inhabitants of Pathyris and Hermonthis; see Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 38–49, 134, esp. 44–5 for ἀγών.

236 C.Jud.Syr.Eg. 3.

237 Clarysse and Winnicki in Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 48.

the *philobasilistai* and the guild of Nechtpharaus overlapped entirely, but to emphasize that some of their membership did. Consequently, the partial merging of these organizations worked to generate solidarity between Greek, Greco-Egyptian and Egyptian soldiers.

The links between the army, the gymnasium and the dynastic cult, on the one hand, and the army, the *basilistai* and the dynastic cult, on the other, are apparent in our sources. But the connections between the members of the gymnasium and the *(philo)basilistai* are only visible through their membership in the guild of the local god in the document related to the War of the Scepters discussed above.[238] Only three other documents from Egypt mention the *philobasilistai* and the *basilistai*, but similar associations were found in third-century Thera, which belonged to the Ptolemies, and in Cyprus.[239] The difference between the two groups is not evident, but Van 't Dack suggests on the basis of the letter discussed above that the *philobasilistai* were officers supporting their soldiers, who were the *basilistai*.[240] Given the lack of evidence to confirm this hypothesis, it is safer to assume that the terms were equivalent and that either could be chosen.

Other examples of *basilistai* and *philobasilistai* in the Thebaid shed no light on the distinction Van 't Dack tried to establish but do make clear their connection with the army. In a text from the trial of Hermias in Thebes, the Egyptian officer Sesoosis held the title of "*hekatontarchos* of the eager *philobasilistai*."[241] There was a gymnasium in Thebes, but the sources preserve no hint connecting it with the association of *philobasilistai*.[242] There are indications, however, of a link between the *basilistai* of Elephantine and the gymnasium through their *prostatēs*, Papias son of Ammonios, who also was a *kosmētēs*, if we accept Bernand's reading of the word once carved beneath *prostatēs*.[243] The dedication of the stele and the sacrifices that took

238 For the link between the gymnasium and the dynastic cult, see Launey (1949) 853–6.

239 The earliest attestation of *basilistai* in Egypt dates to the third century; see Rubensohn (1913) 158. All others date to the second century. The sources for soldiers' associations were gathered by Launey (1949) 1001–36, esp. 1023–31 for the *basilistai* in Egypt and its possessions.

240 Van 't Dack (1969) 163. For Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 23, the *basilistai* worshiped the king and thus were Greek, whereas the *philobasilistai* worshiped the pharaoh and thus were Egyptian. But this section shows that these terms did not correspond to an ethnic division.

241 ρ φιλοβασιλιστῶν προθυμῶν, with ρ for *hekatontarchos*; see UPZ II 161 = P.Tor.Choach. 11bis, l. 4 (Thebes, 119 BC) and commentary by Wilcken, p. 54. Peremans and Van 't Dack (1950–81) confirm that ρ stands for the rank of *hekatontarchos*; see *PP* II/VIII 2330; Launey (1949) 1029–30; Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 224–5.

242 P.Dryton 39, l. 7; Clarysse (1995) 7.

243 I.Th.Sy. 303, l. 16 (Elephantine/Satis, 143/2 BC) and commentary *ad loc.* If this is correct, there was a gymnasium in Elephantine or Syene; see Launey (1949) 1027–8. For this inscription and I.Th.Sy. 302, see Chapter 9, section 9.3, pp. 338–9 and notes 30–4.

place during the monthly meetings were made by Herodes, the garrison commander of Syene and now *stratēgos*, and by the *synodos* of the *basilistai* to Ptolemy VIII and Cleopatra III and a series of Egyptian gods, whose Greek names are added. The names and patronyms of the *basilistai* are Egyptian and Greek and include Greek names favored by Egyptians as well as irregular filiations, as is typical of a mixed community of Egyptians, Greco-Egyptians and Greeks.[244] The gods have double names, Greek and Egyptian, as one might expect in such a community. By combining the information from this inscription with that from a similar one made by the same group of people a few years earlier, in which it is resolved to celebrate the annual festivals for the king as well as Boethos' birthday, we can conclude that the members of this association of *basilistai* were soldiers and priests of the local gods, and that some, such as Papias,[245] were probably also members of the gymnasium. The evidence concerning the *(philo)basilistai* thus shows that Launey's view of the *(philo)basilistai* and the members of the gymnasium as two exclusive groups, the first made up of Egyptians and the second of Greeks, must be revised.[246] The dedications from Elephantine confirm that the associations of *basilistai* could include members of the gymnasium, of local religious associations and even priests, and that they thus played an important unifying role.

To sum up, a number of elements support the conclusion that the gymnasium became an engine of integration, including recruits of Greco-Egyptian or Egyptian origin, probably those belonging to wealthy local families. In the *chōra*, as in any non-Greek setting, some of the Hellenic character of the gymnasium remained and was combined with local social and religious practices.[247] Even in Ptolemais, non-citizens belonging to the highest socio-economic strata could obtain a membership and become citizens despite not being Greek. The integration of Egyptians into the gymnasium can also be observed in the genealogies of families belonging to the gymnasial class in the Roman period. The Egyptian names of their ancestors and of many

244 For Egyptian names, e.g. Petearoeris son of Phanuphis, Psenpoeris son of Petesis. For Greek names, e.g. Dionysios son of Socrates, Pelaias son of Pelaias. For abnormal filiations, e.g. Psenchnubis son of Pelaias, Pelaias son of Zmenichnubis. For Greek names favored by Egyptians and Greco-Egyptians, e.g. Asclepiades son of Ptolemaios.

245 I.Th.Sy. 302; Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 224. For Boethos, see Chapter 9, section 9.3 and note 29.

246 Launey (1949) 866–7, already contested by Delorme (1960) 428 and Clarysse and Winnicki in Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 48.

247 Delorme (1960) 479 compares the reception of the gymnasium by different societies, in particular the Romans, who took the philosophical and intellectual facet of the institution and neglected its athletic part.

women certainly reveal their origin and the openness of the gymnasium.[248] This section suggests that that openness goes back to the second half of the Ptolemaic period.

The final attestation of a village gymnasium dates to AD 2.[249] Bingen interprets the disappearance of the gymnasium from the villages of Roman Egypt as evidence for its exclusively Greek character in Ptolemaic Egypt.[250] In his view, this parallels the fading of Greek ethnic groups from the countryside, where the gymnasium was "artificially" settled and whence it must thus logically have disappeared. I suggest instead that this development was a result of the different nature of the Roman army. As there was no longer a cleruchic system, and as the Romans had a more systematic way of quartering soldiers in forts, there was no longer a need for gymnasia in the Egyptian villages.[251]

7.3.2 From saber-bearers' associations to **politeumata**

The dynastic cult played a unifying role within the army. Soldiers gathered on a regular basis to honor the king and sometimes local gods as well, and to take part in sacrifices and libations or festivals organized for the king's birthday or those of local *stratēgoi*. When in the second century non-Greeks became more numerous in the army in Egypt, some joined the gymnasium, while others, mainly professional soldiers, formed the core of socio-military associations with a religious tone. Some of these were called *koina* or *politeumata*, "associations" or "communities," followed by an ethnic denomination.[252] Who the members of these organizations were, how ethnically exclusive they were, when and why they appeared, and what kind of agency can explain their formation is debated.

248 See e.g. the genealogy presented in two *epikrisis*-returns from Oxyrhynchus, P.Oxy. XII 1452 (127/8 AD). For the Egyptian roots of an important part of the katoikic group in the Fayyum in the Roman period, see Bagnall (2000) 28–9, who concludes that "most of the Greek-speaking inhabitants of the region, and especially of its elite, saw themselves as *both* Greek and Egyptian." The katoikic declarations filed in the Fayyum seem similar to the gymnasium declarations of the Oxyrhynchite and Hermopolite nomes; see Nelson (1979) 378; Ruffini (2006) 75 note 14.

249 BGU IV 1201; see Braunert (1964) 220 note 98. Bowman and Rathbone (1992) 121 believe that they were closed down under Augustus.

250 Bingen (1975) 371.

251 For quartering, see Redon (2009) 410.

252 Because of their socio-military character in Egypt and the Ptolemaic possessions and the absence of any real political meaning (see Thompson [1984] 1075), I do not use expressions such as "corporate body of citizens." Launey (1949) 1081 distinguishes the *koinon* (private club) from the *politeuma* (official association in contact with the military administration). But the evidence shows that the terminology was not used so systematically, so that e.g. the participle *synpoliteumenoi* was employed for members of *koina* and *politeumata*.

Launey's view has been updated by recent reconsideration of the evidence and by the publication of a corpus of texts regarding the *politeuma* of the Jews in Heracleopolis (P.Polit.Jud).[253] A critical survey of the most explicit evidence sheds light on the fundamental role of soldiers as the core members of these associations, but also as intermediaries between civilians and the king. It also suggests that the *koina* and *politeumata* originated in associations of soldiers such as the *synodoi*, which grouped elite troops around cultic activities. Over time, these groups lost some of their exclusive quality and their membership expanded, becoming less "selective" than the gymnasium.

The saber-bearers (*machairophoroi*), an elite unit of the royal guard, seem to have been the most inclined to form associations. They sometimes called themselves simply *synodoi*, and had high priests, priests, *prostatai* and secretaries, like the associations of *basilistai* and the *synodos* that met at the *Osireion* of Theadelphia; at other times, they included the First Friends and the *chiliarchoi* (chief commanders of the infantry) in their associations.[254] The connection between the *machairophoroi* and a *politeuma* is apparent in a decree dated to 112/11 BC, in which "those of the *politeuma* and the Idumeans of the polis" thank Dorion, the *syngenēs* (relative), *stratēgos* and priest of the *machairophoroi*, for having paid to restore their temple in Memphis.[255] "Polis" stands here for Memphis, even if the place did not actually have the status of a polis. The temple in question was no doubt the Upper Temple of Apollo (*Apollonieion*), where these men met to vote on the decree and where the stele was to be set up. Two observations can be made about Dorion, the benefactor.[256] First, he was a pre-eminent member of the *politeuma* but also a prophet of Horus-Khenty and of Osiris of Athribis, according to his mother's hieroglyphic funerary inscription.[257] He belonged

[253] Launey (1949) 1064–85. Anagnostou-Canas (1989) 225 and Launey (1949) 1031 think that the *politeumata* and the *koina* in Egypt had a national aspect that excluded Egyptians. Their work needs to be updated by reference to more recent studies discussed in this section, such as Thompson (1984) and Goudriaan (2000) 50–2. For the *politeuma* of the Jews, see Honigman (2003) with regard to the recent publication of P.Polit.Jud. by Cowey and Maresch (2001); earlier Zuckerman (1989) and Lüderitz (1994).

[254] See Chapter 4, section 4.2.5 note 161.

[255] I.Prose.Pierre 25 = OGIS I 737 = SB V 8929, ll. 1–4 ἐπὶ συναγωγῆς τῆς γενηθείσης ἐν τῶι ἄνω Ἀπολλ[ω]νιείωι τοῦ πολιτεύματος καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως Ἰδουμαίων, "during the meeting that took place in the Upper *Apollonieion* of the association and of the Idumeans of the city." Dorion is the priest of the *plēthos* of the *machairophoroi*, meaning either an association or a unit; Thompson (1984), (1988) 99–103; Launey (1949) 974, 1072–7, 1107–8 on this inscription, 556–9 on the Idumeans.

[256] For Dorion, see Chapter 9, esp. section 9.5, esp. p. 353, note 108.

[257] CGC 22137; Gorre (2007) 242–5 and (2009) no. 54. There may be a connection between the function of Dorion as prophet of Horus in Athribis and his involvement with the cult of its

to the category of persons discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, who were involved in both the Egyptian temples and the army. Second, although he came from an Egyptian family, his career in the army allowed him to attain the elevated function of *stratēgos*, and he was the priest of an association of professional soldiers who came mainly from Idumea and whose temple was that of Apollo.[258] The combination of Egyptian, Greek and Idumean elements already suggests that in terms of ethnicity, the situation was not as clear-cut within the *politeumata* as Launey and Anagnastou-Canas imagined on the basis of the associations' names.[259]

Two dedications to Apollo, Zeus and the gods who share their altars by the "*Apollōniatai* mercenaries stationed in Hermopolis and the founders who share their community" confirm the link between the Idumeans and Apollo, who was perhaps associated with the Idumean god Qōs. It is likely that the *Apollōniatai* formed an association devoted to Apollo/Qōs.[260] The names of the members with their patronyms, the lists of which are only partly preserved, are in large part Idumean or more broadly Semitic, but their diversity suggests that professional soldiers had many different origins, from Crete to Arabia, from Thrace to Egypt, and from Illyria to Anatolia. The grouping of the soldiers by unit makes explicit the military tone of the association, and the earlier of the two inscriptions shows that this type of association could develop from a *synodos* of *machairophoroi*, since the *machairophoroi* are also inscribed as a separate group of soldiers (ll. 239–56). The origin of the names of the *machairophoroi* was as diverse as for the rest of the soldiers. Soldiers' associations were thus not ethnically exclusive but instead helped to bind diverse ethnic groups together. This was probably also true for the *politeuma* of the Idumeans in Memphis, since it included *machairophoroi*. The religious activities of these associations involved an unlimited number of gods, as often in Egypt, avoiding exclusivity. As Honigman puts it in her

Greek and Semitic equivalents, Apollo and Qos, in Memphis. For the worship of Apollo in Egypt, see Henri (2013).

258 Edom, the region to the south of the modern Dead Sea.

259 For the combination of elements: the form of the decree and the god's name are Greek, the *machairophoroi* could belong to different ethnic groups, and Dorion had Egyptian roots (his parents were Dorion and Heranch-Heracleia, herself a priestess). Another document concerning a similar group in Hermopolis (see note 260), P.Giss. 99, ll. 8–18 (Hermopolis, second century BC), mentions the sacrifice of sheep, which is not Egyptian but Semitic, and services in a foreign tongue, see Thompson (1984) 1071.

260 I.Herm.Magn. 5 = SB I 4206 (80/79 BC) and I.Herm.Magn. 6 = SB V 8066 (78 BC), ll. 2–3 οἱ παρ[ε]φεδρεύοντες ἐν Ἑρμοῦ πόλει ξένοι Ἀπόλλ[νιᾶται] καὶ οἱ συνπολειτευόμενοι [κ]τίσται and commentary to l. 2 by E.Bernand (1999): the ξένοι Ἀπόλλ[νιᾶται] could be Idumeans from the city of Apollonia or Ἀπόλλ[νιᾶσ ται] can be restored for "the members of an association devoted to Apollo." I favor the second possibility because of the similarity to the Memphis inscription discussed above; see Zucker (1938); Launey (1949) 1024–5; Honigman (2003) 689.

discussion of military *politeumata* in Alexandria, "cultic bonds prevailed over common ethnic stock."[261] These socio-military associations could also extend outside the army, building a community around the initial core of soldiers and creating a more direct connection between individuals and officers of the king.

This final observation leads to the question of when and why *politeumata* and *koina* of ethnic groups emerged, and what agency explains their formation. Until recently, such organizations were known in Egypt only from the second century BC.[262] But in 2009 excavations led by the Supreme Council of Antiquities of Egypt in the Bubasteion of Alexandria uncovered a dedication (still unpublished) of a *koinon* of Trales from Thrace and Masyles from Libya together with Persian and Cyrenean soldiers dated to Ptolemy IV.[263] The members of the *politeumata* and *koina* were in large part "*xenoi*" (mercenaries). They did not belong to the earlier, larger wave of immigrants of the late fourth and early third centuries, who mostly became cleruchs, but were soldiers who immigrated into Egypt from the time of Raphia onward, in smaller groups and when needed. Indeed, the reorganization of the army during the period of crisis (Period B) favored the use of professional soldiers in garrisons. Even if recruitment was mainly internal to Egypt, foreigners were also hired at times; soldiers were needed, for example, during dynastic conflicts. But the magnitude of this immigration was far smaller than the earlier one. The migrants came mostly from Judea and Idumea. The sons of Ptolemy V employed Jewish generals, and Jewish immigration into Egypt was also stimulated by the troubles that followed the Maccabean revolt in the 160s. Later, Idumeans fled to Egypt after the Jewish conquest of Idumea by John Hyrcanus in 125 BC.[264]

There are several competing hypotheses as to the agency behind the emergence of the *politeumata*. At one end of the spectrum, the king is seen as controlling and organizing them, choosing their officials and deciding who could be members. This is close to Thompson's suggestion that "the grant of *politeumata*, now stripped of any real political meaning, would serve to reinforce the loyalty of the mercenaries towards the country which they now served."[265] At the other end of the spectrum, the view is that groups of people who most probably emigrated at the same time from the same place

261 Honigman (2003) 86 and SB VIII 9812, ll. 3–7 (112/11BC or 76/5 BC).

262 Honigman (2003) 69–70, 76, 95 demonstrates that the Jewish *politeuma* of the time of Ptolemy II in the *Letter of Aristeas* 310 is an anachronistic projection, and that the first attestations date to the rule of Ptolemy VI; also Thompson (1984) 1075.

263 I thank Jean-Yves Carrez-Maratray for mentioning this text to me, see Abd el-Fattah *et al.* (forthcoming).

264 Honigman (2003) 83–4; Thompson (1984) 1071–2.

265 Thompson (1984) 1071–2.

organized themselves and had their own officials handling their problems and supporting them. The latter thesis resembles Honigman's interpretation of the evidence from the *politeuma* of the Jews in Heracleopolis, which supposes that "the jurisdictional powers enjoyed by the *archontes* of the *politeuma* seem to parallel the powers enjoyed by the *phrourarchos* himself."[266] I imagine that there were variations from one *politeuma* to another, but that generally this was a bottom-up process. Units of soldiers recently hired and garrisoned in the same place formed associations to reinforce their social networks and their feeling of belonging to the same community. They chose influential officers as heads of their associations to protect their interests and to gain "access to those in positions of authority," as Thompson puts it when describing the soldiers' interest in the existence of such associations.[267] The king simply gave his approval to the existence of a *politeuma*, for the same reasons as those previously described with regard to other types of associations. The active members decided who was accepted as a new member, much as in the case of the gymnasium. There was also some flexibility within these communities. As Honigman explains with regard to the *politeuma* of the Jews in Alexandria, which she assumes worked in a way similar to other *politeumata*, not all Jews living in Alexandria were formal members, and even Jews who were not members might benefit from its institutions.[268]

The promotion of the *ephodos* Asclepiades son of Ptolemaios, who bore the ethnic "Macedonian," may shed light on the functioning of the *politeumata*.[269] Asclepiades was one of the 500 men granted membership in the *politeuma* of the Cretans. He was now promoted to the status of *katoikos hippeus* by the *epistatēs* and secretary of the *katoikoi hippeis* and joined the fifth hipparchy. As was suggested in Chapter 5, at this time the designations "Macedonian" and "Persian" attached to individuals reflected different military statuses. I suggest that Asclepiades' membership in the *politeuma*, regardless of whether he had strong Cretan roots, may have accelerated or secured his promotion to the status of *katoikos hippeus* through the intervention of two officials said to be "appointed by the *politeuma* of

266 Honigman (2003) 64.
267 Thompson (1984) 1074–5.
268 Honigman (2003) 85. In other words, groups of Jews who emigrated earlier to Egypt could join this new type of organization if they wished to.
269 P.Tebt. I 32 (Kerkeosiris, after 145 BC) has received different and contradictory interpretations: Honigman (2003) 74, 94 explains that officials of the *politeuma* had "administrative duties on military settlers of non-Cretan origins"; Zuckerman (1989) 177–8 doubts that any official of the *politeuma* could have had an official status; Launey (1949) 1068–72 misleadingly believes that all members of the *politeuma* were *ephodi* and that the government asked the *politeuma* to remove Asclepiades from their list because he has been promoted to the *katoikia*.

the Cretans" (l. 9). These men transmitted the orders of the *epistatēs* and secretary to the *pros tē syntaxē* as if they wished to ensure that their man obtained what had been decided.[270] The two officials were so well connected to the military administration that they perhaps played a double role, as members of both the *politeuma* and the royal administration. Dorion is the paradigm of this duality, as *stratēgos*, priest of the core-members of the association (the *machairophoroi*) and member of the *politeuma* of the Idumeans of Memphis. The multiple roles played by some members of these *politeumata* partially explain the advantages attached to membership in them and illustrate the fuzzy borders between members of the royal administration and of *politeumata*. In other words, thanks to the close personal networks they created, the *politeumata* allowed their members to gain support in the administration through the double position of some of the members.

Our understanding of the *politeumata* and *koina* followed by the name of an ethnic group in Egypt remains conjectural. The emergence of such groups may be linked to the general framework of the evolution of military institutions in Egypt. Like other types of soldiers' organizations, they reinforced the *esprit de corps* among soldiers, but the sophistication of their administration seems to have surpassed that of the *synodoi* or the associations of *basilistai*. The membership was certainly larger, including civilians living in the neighborhood, notably the soldiers' families. In addition, even if the ethnic character was initially more visible and might remain real in some *politeumata*, particularly those that originated from a large group of mercenaries of the same provenance, it was more flexible than is often thought, in that it included individuals of diverse ethnic backgrounds. As in the case of the gymnasium, the military character of the *politeumata* disappeared in the Roman period, when they retained only their cultic practices and in some cases some of their former civilian functions.[271]

7.4 Comparing Ptolemaic and Seleucid settlements: long-term consequences

Chapter 7, and Part II more generally, has examined the socio-economic status and the social networks of soldiers and officers in Ptolemaic Egypt. It demonstrated how the army developed as a generator of group solidarity beyond ethnic barriers among the upper strata of local communities as well

[270] It could be similar to the letters of recommendation brought by cleruchs to local top men in the third century BC; see section 7.1.3.

[271] Honigman (2003) 67.

as among members newly included in these strata thanks to their enrollment in the army. In what follows, I propose an explanation of the development of the army into an engine of integration in Egypt.

The different settlement strategies used by the Ptolemies and the Seleucids have been noticed and their significance debated, but the long-term effects have been widely disregarded. The different types of sources preserved from the two kingdoms make comparison difficult. The cleruchic settlements of the Egyptian countryside are well documented, while on the Seleucid side we have mainly official documents carved on stone and emanating from city-states, notably from poleis the Seleucids founded or re-founded. But it is misleading to regard Egypt as a world of villages, and the Seleucid kingdom as one of cities. Bingen reminds us that Egypt was already urbanized in Ptolemaic times, a fact sometimes overlooked because far more published material comes from the Greek settlements.[272] In fact, the fundamental difference between Egypt and the Seleucid kingdom in terms of new settlements is the almost total absence of poleis in the former case, and their abundance in the latter.

In her study of the Ptolemaic settlements, Mueller summarizes the different explanations for what has been interpreted as a lack of interest in "Greekness" on the part of the Ptolemies.[273] Préaux, considering poleis and urban centers to be synonyms (something only partially true), suggests that the Ptolemies had no interest in increasing urbanization.[274] Tcherikover and Walbank propose that the autonomy of the city-state did not fit the central state the Ptolemies were trying to build.[275] Finally, Hansen points to the large number of Egyptian settlers in the new foundations, a population unacquainted with the institutions of the city-states.[276] The first hypothesis reflects a tendency to ignore the level of urbanization already found in most nome-capitals. It is also paradoxical, since the Ptolemaic capital became the largest polis in the Mediterranean for centuries. In fact, the Ptolemies and the Seleucids applied the same strategy but in a different ecological and geographical setting and to different pre-existing bureaucratic structures. They did not create new cities where urbanization had already reached a certain level, except for "doublet-cities" for political reasons, such as Ptolemais to counterbalance Thebes, and Seleucia-on-the-Tigris to counterbalance Babylon.[277] As Aperghis shows, no city-states were founded in the Persian heartland, the most urbanized and densely populated area of the Seleucid kingdom, and only small foundations or re-foundations in Asia Minor,

[272] Bingen (1975). [273] Mueller (2006) 139–40. [274] Préaux (1978) 407–8.
[275] Tcherikover (1959) 25–6, 107–8; Walbank (1993) 114. [276] Mueller (2006) 140.
[277] Préaux (1978) 407.

which was already urbanized.[278] This situation can be compared with the Nile Valley in Egypt. Elsewhere, the Seleucids founded numerous city-states, whereas the Ptolemies could rely on an existing centralized bureaucracy.[279]

The level of urbanization and population density may also explain the nature of these settlements. Aperghis suggests that the relative lack of space in Asia Minor may have led the Seleucids to create *katoikiai*, "colonies," in this area rather than poleis.[280] Implicitly, for Aperghis, the size and type of settlements are linked, the Seleucid poleis varying between 10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants (Greeks and non-Greeks) and the *katoikiai* being smaller. If applied to Egypt, this reasoning suggests that there were only a few poleis because of the previously existing population density and the small number of Greeks who immigrated into Egypt compared with those immigrating into the Seleucid kingdom.[281] Closely related to that is the puzzling question of the composition of the Seleucid *katoikiai*. Because of a lack of documentation, the prevailing view has been that they were similar to the cleruchic settlements. As mentioned in Chapter 3, recent re-evaluations of the sources question the idea that the Seleucid *katoikoi* were all members of the cleruchic army and even suggest that they were only exceptionally soldiers.[282] In addition, if the purpose of the colonies was defensive, as has been thought, one wonders why they were not found in other border areas of the kingdom. It seems instead that the majority of the population of the *katoikiai* was civilian, and that the Seleucids kept their soldiers in garrisons elsewhere. This is a starting point for arguing that the limited presence of Greco-Macedonian soldiers outside the structures of the city-states prevented the army from becoming an engine of interaction between ethnic groups in the Seleucid kingdom to the extent that it did in Egypt. The constant presence, however, of regular soldiers in garrisons or on campaign kept them better trained than Ptolemaic soldiers were.

The second and third hypotheses offered to explain the Ptolemies' strategy of settlements, involving tension between the potential autonomy of city-states and the central power, and the number of non-Greeks (in this case Egyptians) in the settlements, might provide an answer, although these features are not specific to Ptolemaic Egypt. In fact, the presence of non-Greeks does not seem to have prevented the foundation of poleis such as

278 Aperghis (2004) 90–2, 95–6.

279 On the Ptolemies, see Mueller (2006) 140.

280 Aperghis (2004) 96.

281 Scheidel (2004) 24–5 estimates that there may have been twice as many Greek settlers in the Seleucid empire as in Egypt; Fischer-Bovet (2011) suggested about 65,000 adult Greek males in Egypt.

282 Chapter 3, section 3.1.4.4, p. 82 and notes 115–16.

Alexandria and Ptolemais, but relations between Egyptians and new settlers were of a different nature within and without the poleis, as argued below. City-states could cause trouble for the central power, as the Alexandrians sometimes did. But on the whole they do not seem to have done so, because the Ptolemies founded or re-founded cities outside Egypt, and the Romans later relied on the metropoleis of each nome.[283] Most poleis probably had no effect on the power of larger political entities, mainly because of their incapacity to compete militarily with larger states. Some Aegean city-states, however, sought independence, and the Ptolemies may have consciously avoided having to deal with more than a few of them in Egypt. Aperghis notes that in the case of the Seleucids, the most difficult groups to control were the Greeks, in particular the elite.[284] Similar problems involving the mob in Alexandria and the role of the military elite were discussed in Chapter 3.

The most plausible explanation is in fact that the early Ptolemies, although just as concerned with maximizing revenues as the Seleucids were, had to develop different strategies to do so. The Ptolemies did not found cities to which they would have to give territory that could be taxed but instead granted large plots of land to the members of the cleruchic army, diminishing the cost of the land army to compensate for that of the fleet. It was less expensive for the Ptolemies to spread cleruchs throughout the *chōra* and to use the military administration and the existing Egyptian bureaucracy for taxing land, than to create polis-institutions from scratch everywhere, unless they had political reasons for doing so, as in the case of Alexandria and Ptolemais.

The absence of the rigid structure of the polis as a means to transmit citizenship, combined with the presence of a large percentage of Egyptians in the new settlements, suggests that the type of settlement that developed in Egypt had a long-term effect of increasing the level of integration between groups.[285] Integration was indirectly stimulated by the organization of the military institutions that depended on state funds and occurred through the agency of soldiers who represented at least half of non-Egyptian settlers. Even if the Seleucid foundations were inhabited by non-Greeks, these people were presumably not citizens, just as they were mostly excluded from citizenship in Alexandria and Ptolemais in Upper Egypt. Throughout this chapter I have argued that over time the situation developed very differently in Egypt, with intermarriage engendering more intermarriage in the *chōra*.

[283] For new foundations and re-foundation, see Mueller (2006) 79–83.
[284] Aperghis (2004) 89–90 and Chapter 3, section 3.2.1.3.
[285] For the different marriage patterns in poleis and the *chōra*, see Ogden (1996) 343–61.

In addition, citizen-soldiers such as Dryton who married female citizens while living in their polis tended not to do this any longer once they lived in garrison towns in the *chōra*.

Put another way, there are three main reasons why soldiers played a fundamental role in the process by which the different groups in Egypt, particularly Greeks and Egyptians, became integrated. First, soldiers represented the largest part of the foreign population settled in the *chōra*. Second, military service gave them a privileged status similar to the one they would have obtained through citizenship. Third, regardless of whom they married, they could transmit their privileged status to the next generation, while there was a limitation on the transmission of citizen status, which constrained citizens' marital behavior. The army became an even more active engine of integration through the hiring of local recruits in the second century BC. While city-states tended to slow down the integration of different ethnic groups, the army in Egypt and its specific type of settlement accelerated it. Integration of ethnic groups within the upper strata of Egyptian villages and towns brought a higher level of stability and unity to the Ptolemaic state than complete segregation would have done and, although this is not the only reason, contributed to the longevity of the dynasty.

PART III

The army and Egyptian temples

Part III examines the connection, rarely emphasized, between the army and Egyptian temples and considers the army as a point of interaction not only between Greek and Egyptian soldiers, but through the relationship of soldiers to local priestly elites and local communities. The recruitment of Egyptians, Greco-Egyptians and Greeks whose families had settled in Egypt generations earlier changed the nature of the army and diversified the involvement of soldiers and officers in local communities. Chapter 8 assesses the tendency among Egyptian priestly families to have members in the army. The chronology and geography of the phenomenon suggests that the Ptolemies benefited from this traditional pattern among Egyptian families to reassert control over certain areas after the period of crisis (Period B). They promoted some of these families in the army so that they could rely on a group of people with a foot in both milieux. In Chapter 9 the dedications of soldiers and officers to Egyptian gods for temple-building are shown to reflect an extension of the army's functions in society following the Great Revolt. Soldiers played an economic role by taking over a large share of financing temple-building, and their involvement in local religion, which was associated with the cult of the king, also benefited the state. Their behavior illustrates how the army became a unifying force between different ethnic groups. By becoming more connected to Egyptian temples through some of its members and through soldiers' dedications, the army broadened its ideological function within Egypt.

8 Priests in the army

A politico-ideological explanation

This chapter explores how the Ptolemies favored the concentration of military and religious power in the same individuals. Using this strategy to secure the loyalty of the elite and to be able to rely on local power, the Ptolemies encouraged the recrudescence of a pre-Ptolemaic social pattern, the tendency among certain Egyptian priestly families to have military functions. This understanding is in accord with a new approach to Egyptian society that no longer considers areas such as religion, the army, and administration to be the domains of completely distinct professional or ethnic groups.[1]

The first section below assesses the Ptolemies' relationship with Egyptian elites and the extent to which they relied on them. After some remarks on methods and sources, the second section turns to the tendency among Egyptian military families to hold indigenous priestly functions. The third section shows that in the pre-Ptolemaic period 20–30 percent of the military elite had priestly responsibilities (see Figure 8.1). In the following sections a survey of the Ptolemaic sources reveals that almost all officers with religious functions were of Egyptian or Greco-Egyptian origin, whereas the case is slightly different for lower-level soldiers. It is remarkable that about 38 percent of Egyptian officers and commanders held priestly offices in the Ptolemaic period, although Egyptians represented only around 10–15 percent of the officers in the army.

The distribution in time and space of members of the army with priestly functions suggests that the Ptolemies used this pre-Ptolemaic pattern to control the country in the second and first centuries BC, after the period of crisis. Whether this practice among the Egyptian elite continued without interruption during the Persian period (525–404 BC) and the third century BC is difficult to say, because of problems in dating our sources. If the practice did continue, the implication is that the Ptolemies did not interfere much with the native elite's traditions and sources of power, and it may suggest a weak central state. If, on the contrary, the tendency almost died out under the Persians and the first four Ptolemies, the implication is that

[1] Coulon (2001) 85 and Chevereau (2001) 363, regarding members of the military who are also priests.




Figure 8.1 Percentage of soldiers with priestly functions in the Egyptian army

the foreign rulers controlled the country without the active cooperation of a large number of native elite individuals in the fifth century and then again in the third century BC. Whether the Ptolemies were no longer capable of resisting local elite families in the second and first centuries BC or simply regarded it as advantageous to rely more on the Egyptian elite after a period of intense trouble is a matter to debate. The developments traced in the previous chapters suggest a reliance on the Egyptian elite on the part of the Ptolemies with an eye to regaining control of the south of Egypt in the second century BC. After another revolt in the Thebaid between 91 and 88 BC and the bequest of Egypt by Ptolemy X to the Romans, the last Ptolemies

seem to have benefited from the support of local families relatively loyal to the dynasty to handle certain domestic matters.

8.1 The Ptolemies and Egyptian temples

Two antagonistic aspects are perceptible in relations between the Ptolemies and Egyptian priests over three centuries.[2] On the one hand, collaboration between the Ptolemies and the priests is clear, for example, from the priestly decrees.[3] On the other hand, part of the Egyptian clergy was involved in the Egyptian revolts in the second and first centuries BC. The standard view until recently, based on Habicht's and Mooren's studies, was that after initially relying on the Egyptian elite in the fourth century BC, the Ptolemies excluded them for most of the third century BC, although scholars like Welles suggest that the Egyptian elites continously played a role from the beginning. Increasingly, Egyptologists such as Derchain and Lloyd and historians like Legras emphasize the Ptolemies' reliance on Egyptian elites as royal councilors, although on a far smaller scale than on the Greek elite.[4] Chevereau favors this view as well.[5] But Egyptologists such as Guermeur and Gorre point out that there is little positive evidence for collaboration with the Egyptian elites in the early Ptolemaic period.[6] For the second and first centuries BC, especially from the reign of Ptolemy VI, an increasing number of Egyptians held high positions in the administration and the army.[7] On the other hand, the priestly local elites (outside Memphis), especially in the south, have long been thought to have sided with the indigenous

[2] See Huss (1992), (1994) 182–6; Huss (2000).

[3] For a recent article with an updated bibliography on the priestly decrees, see Véïsse (2005), who also points out (220 notes 22–4) the new interpretations of the *Demotic Chronicle* put forward by Johnson (1984), Johnson and Ritner (1990), and Felber (2002), and that of the *Oracle of the Potter* put forward by Koenen (2002); see also Clarysse (2000a).

[4] See Habicht (1958), Mooren (1975) (1977) and Welles (1970). Derchain (2000) analyzes the autobiographies of four individuals from the late fourth and early third centuries BC to show that the link between the Egyptians and the Greeks was closer than the general consensus of "coexistence with only a few contacts," but Guermeur (2003) questions most of his arguments. Legras (2002) demonstrates the importance of the Egyptian experts (i.e. Egyptian elite) for the Ptolemies and argues against what he presents as "theories of rejection of the Egyptian elite by the Ptolemies" supported by Habicht and Mooren. Lloyd (2002b) questions the standard view that the Egyptian elite had to confine its highest aspirations to priestly activities.

[5] Chevereau (2001).

[6] E.g. Guermeur (2003); Gorre (2009), esp. 495–511.

[7] See e.g. Yoyotte (1969) for the family of Pachou/Pashaï in Edfu discussed below.

revolts that occurred in the second and first centuries BC.[8] That involvement has recently been reconsidered, however, by scholars reinterpreting the prophetic literature as not specifically anti-Ptolemaic and especially by Véïsse, who asserts that at least some of the Egyptian elite supported the Macedonian government.[9]

My position in this debate can be summarized as follow. First, there are a few attested cases of Egyptians with important functions in the early Ptolemaic state, and some may have played a military role. Second, a renewal and increase of the configuration "soldier-priests" takes place in the second part of the second century BC. Third, and most important, the priestly milieu was still playing a part within the Ptolemaic state and was one source of recruitment by the Ptolemies. In other words, whatever the role of the local priestly elite in the indigenous revolts, the Ptolemies found priestly families favorable to the government. It was convenient to promote them within the military, sometimes even as high as a regional governorship (nome-*stratēgoi*), at least from the 120s BC onward.

In many cases military men with priestly functions came from Egyptian families that traditionally held hereditary priestly functions. This was the case in pre-Ptolemaic Egypt and, according to Chevereau, continued later, if less frequently.[10] Sometimes such men received additional priestly offices in connection with their other functions, as their career advanced. In other cases officers who were not from priestly families obtained priestly offices in Egyptian temples as part of their military career. According to Gorre, the Ptolemies did not recruit from among Egyptian priestly families in the second and first centuries BC but chose new men.[11] This argument is based on the frequent absence of priestly titles next to the parents' names of these soldier-priests, and on the fact that they held priestly offices where they carried out military or administrative functions rather than in their native towns. But our sources generally do not allow us to quantify the alternatives precisely, especially because a lack of priestly ancestors is merely deduced from a lack of evidence. My own analysis of the corpus suggests that only about twelve officers with priestly functions – less than

8 For a survey of opinions concerning the causes of the so-called "revolts of the Natives," see Véïsse (2004) XI–XVI, esp. notes 1, 5, 6, for scholars who support a nationalist explanation with a pre-eminent role played by the clergy, e.g. Eddy (1961), esp. 299–300, 313–20, and even to some extent Peremans (1978) 39–49, esp. 49.

9 See note 3. Huss (1994) 181–6 and Huss (2000) stress both the collaborative aspect and the opposition or resistance of part of the priesthood.

10 Chevereau (2001) 365–71, esp. 367.

11 Gorre (2009) 535 and no. 50, Dioscorides, discussion (b).

half – come from outside the priestly milieu, two of them being the only Greeks.[12]

The case of Horos (**1** in Table A.1 in the Appendix), from the late fourth century, illustrates the complexity of distinguishing hereditary transmission of priestly offices from royal favors, as there is often a mixture of both. Horos was governor of the Heracleopolite nome just before the Macedonian conquest or at the beginning of the Macedonian era, and he became priest of Harsaphes because he was governor. At the end of his life he held religious offices in the Delta, which suggests that he initially came from a priestly family there.[13]

8.2 Methodology and sources

The sources for establishing a prosopography of priests who had both military and religious functions, or who had each at different points of their career, are inscriptions and papyri from pre-Ptolemaic and Ptolemaic Egypt written in Greek and hieroglyphs or Demotic Egyptian. The material was collected in Chevereau's prosopographical work on Egyptian officers and in the *Prosopographia Ptolemaica*, especially volumes I, II/VIII and III/IX.[14] Finally, my corpus of soldier-priests of the Ptolemaic period was checked against Gorre's prosopography of eighty-six priests from the Ptolemaic period, thirty-seven of whom (43 percent) had military titles.[15]

I have adopted two approaches. The first is statistical: I aim to quantify the phenomenon and to identify the chronological and geographical distribution, social background and origin of soldiers and officers with indigenous religious functions. The second is analytical: my goal is to shed light on the opportunities that the combination of military careers with priesthoods of indigenous gods offered to both local elites and the Ptolemies.

8.2.1 Presentation and biases of sources used by Chevereau

For the pre-Ptolemaic and Ptolemaic periods, Chevereau uses sources of various kinds – steles, statues, sarcophagi and *ushabtis* – that concern military officers, but does not include the Greek documents for the Ptolemaic period. The quality of the sources is variable, as *ushabtis* give far less information

[12] The clearest cases are the two Greek officers; see **7** and **38** in Table A.1 in the Appendix, as well as **16**, all in Philae; **32**, **33** and **34** in Tanis; **42**, **56** and **58** in the Tentyrite; and **43** and **44** in Panopolis. Gorre (2009) includes a few more cases.

[13] Vercoutter (1950), esp. 114; criticized by Gorre (2009) no. 41, discussion (a).

[14] Chevereau (2001); Peremans and Van 't Dack (1950–81).

[15] Gorre (2009).

than some statues.[16] A series of *ushabtis* from the fourth century BC (Chevereau, nos. 241–59), for example, gives only the name and military title of the owner. But even with longer autobiographical material it is difficult to decide what can be taken at face value in funerary autobiographies and what cannot.[17] Moreover, the biographies have no systematic chronological order and no *cursus honorum*, and a single title does not automatically refer to the same function over time.[18] The functions can therefore be contextualized only when several datable documents relate to the same priests and priestly families. This is to some extent possible for Ptolemaic soldier-priests, but for the Late period the statistics presented below only show a tendency – or reflect what was thought to be an ideal career – since in some cases military titles may have been honorific.[19] Finally, the nature of the sources (mainly statues) limits our investigation to elite groups. Individuals of lower status, including some priests, could not afford statues and would only be found in Demotic papyrological material not included in Chevereau's corpus.[20]

8.2.2 Striding draped male figures: dating by art historians and by Chevereau

The dating of the statues is also problematic. Yoyotte, in his preface to Chevereau's book, recognized that some of his choices regarding the dating of documents, especially *ushabtis* from the fifth to the second centuries BC, might be contested.[21] Egyptologists can often rely only on stylistic criteria and relative dating, which may be modified when a statue of one particular style is dated on the basis of other criteria.[22] Different styles also exist in the same period, even if art historians often assume that they do not overlap in time.

Many statues dated to the third century BC by Bothmer and Riefstahl in their *Egyptian Sculpture of the Late Period* – the dating used by Chevereau and by the *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* – have been re-dated to after the

16 *Ushabtis* or *shabtis* were small funerary figurines that served the dead in the afterlife.
17 Derchain (2000); Guermeur (2003) col. 328 notes 2–4 gives further bibliography.
18 De Meulenaere (1959) 17; Quaegebeur (1979) 721–3.
19 For the Ptolemaic period, see Gorre (2009) XXII–XXV.
20 Baines (2004) 37. De Meulenaere (1995) 84–5 faces the same difficulty in his Theban prosopography of the Ptolemaic period, which focuses on the personnel attached to the temples. He did not find any civil administrator or military officers there.
21 Chevereau (2001).
22 E.g. Chevereau no. 287 or 293; see the *Addenda and Corrigenda* by Collombert added to Chevereau (2001), as well as the new dates suggested by Kaiser (1999), (2002).

120s BC by recent editors of the texts and by an art historian.[23] Indeed, Kaiser gives later dates (after 125 BC) to a series of "striding draped male figures" thanks to a precise new dating of some of them (e.g. Petimouthes), combined with the fact that the group shows marks of age on the heads.[24] The dating is definitive only when we can clearly link the soldier-priest to a historical event, but it is true that Egyptian nome-*stratēgoi* did not hold the aulic title *syngenēs* before this date.[25] On the other hand, there may be some circular argumentation when scholars accept that no Egyptians were high-ranking military officers before the 120s BC.

In connection with the precise dating of all these "striding draped male figures" of Late and Ptolemaic periods with a black pillar usually inscribed in hieroglyphs, art historians have debated to what extent stylistic innovations suggest Greek influence.[26] Bianchi argues for a pure Egyptian style.[27] Baines, however, shows that what was essential about these statues was "that there were such innovations and combinations, which could have been internal Egyptian changes or could have responded to Hellenistic forms, either by adopting them or by adapting existing Egyptian conventions."[28] In any case,

23 Here is a list of the statues that Chevereau (2001) dated to the third century BC, following Bothmer and Riefstahl (1969), esp. 68, along with their new dating: (1) Amphiomis II (*PP* I/VIII 210a = *PP* II/VIII 2109b = 2189a = *PP* III/IX 5437a; statue Cleveland 1948.141; Chevereau no 298,1) must be dated after 125 because of the style, but most of all because the aulic title *syngenēs* is only attested for an indigenous nome-*stratēgos* from the 120s BC; see Ranke (1953) esp. 196–7; (2) consequently Amphiomis II's father, Pelaias (*PP* II/VIII 2131b; CGC 687; Chevereau no 298,2), must be given a lower date, along with (3) Amphiomis I (*PP* II/VIII 2109a = *PP* III/IX 5437), Pelaias' father; (4) Petimouthes (*PP* II/VIII 2112a; statue Turin 3062; Chevereau no. 287) took part in the War of the Scepters in 103–101 BC as explained by Quaegebeur in Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 88–108 and Kaiser (1999), esp. 245–6; (5) Phommous (*PP* I/VIII 202 = *PP* IX 5685a; Louvre E 15546; Chevereau no 320) also took part in the War of the Scepters, see Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) no. 6 and pp. 70, 73, 131–2; (6) Aristonicus (no *PP*; JE Cairo 85743) is dated after 125 BC, see Kaiser (1999), Kaiser (2002) and Guermeur (2000).

24 Kaiser (1999), esp. 245–7; Kaiser (2002) 341–2. For the difficulty of dating these statues and the existence of regional styles, see e.g. Zivie-Coche (1997) 68–70.

25 Bothmer and Riefstahl (1969) 124, against Ranke (1953).

26 For a description, see Bothmer and Riefstahl (1969), esp. 98, and figs. 59–60: "The striding attitude with the left leg advanced, the weight of the body supported by the firmly planted right leg, the right arm rigidly extended alongside the body, the muscles which do not respond to the shifted body weight that would normally result from a stride, and the stark frontality of the figure are characteristics of Egyptian art which are further emphasized by the presence of a back pillar, often inscribed in hieroglyphs."

27 Bianchi (1978).

28 E.g. Baines (2004) 51 and note 55: "the study of Bianchi (1978) is problematic here, because it seeks antecedents, however remote and inaccessible they may have been in Ptolemaic times, rather than asking about the ensemble and how it relates to its context." In pages 52–5, Baines suggests that there was a Hellenistic stimulus and "a radical yet subtle departure from convention" in the case of late Ptolemaic indigenous statuary such as the statues of Panemerit

all statuary material for military officers with priestly functions of the corpus discussed here belongs to this type. This adds some specific information to the socio-political context in which these statues must be considered. This is how Egyptian priests of indigenous gods with high functions in the Greek administration and army chose to present themselves. These priests simultaneously encouraged the sculptors to incorporate Greek elements into Egyptian statues of the kings and themselves.[29] As in the case of the members of Pachou/Pasas' family in Edfu, these men played with multiple ethnic identities and their representation, to the extent that the Egyptian temple setting allowed this.[30]

8.2.3 Presentation and biases of sources used by the **Prosopographia Ptolemaica**

The evidence collected in the *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* (*PP*) raises certain difficulties. Because an individual's name may be different in the Greek and the Egyptian documentation, we are sometimes unaware that two names refer to the same person. Moreover, new information based on the Egyptian material collected by Chevereau had to be added to the corpus because some military officers were not known as priests in the *PP*.[31] Another issue raised by the *PP* is the representativeness of the material. On the one hand, this is a larger and therefore more representative sample of Ptolemaic society than Chevereau's was. Over a period of *c.* 800 years, Chevereau inventories about 400 military officers, while the *PP* (online) registers 21,290 entries for the entire Ptolemaic period, namely all individuals with a known function or profession, including military personel who were not high-ranking officers.[32] With Chevereau we access only the highest strata of the population, perhaps the top 3–5 percent. The *PP* depicts a broader spectrum of the population, and the results presented in the following subsections must be considered in this light. The *PP* online lists 3,310 individuals with military or police functions, 15 percent of the total number recorded with a function in the Ptolemaic period. But the actual percentage of the population

(see Zivie-Coche [1987], [2001], [2004]), that of Aristonicus (see note 23), and those from the first century in the Tentyrite nome (see Table A.1 and De Meulenaere (1959)).

29 R. R. R. Smith (1996), esp. 210.

30 On this family, see pp. 326–7 with note 104.

31 E.g. Chevereau (2001), no. 299 (*PP* II/VIII 2112b) and no. 315∗ (= *PP* II/VIII 2133a).

32 This would represent 0.5 percent of the population at one time, but our sources are of course not evenly distributed over time.

involved in these professions at any one time was probably closer to half this many.[33]

Finally, the identification of soldier-priests intersects with two difficulties that the editors of the *PP* encountered but Chevereau did not consider: how to distinguish "military *stratēgoi*" from "nome-*stratēgoi*" (governors of a nome) in the Greek and Egyptian terminology, and how to understand the category labeled "officers with other titles" in the *PP*. These issues are discussed in section 8.5.2.

8.3 Pre-Ptolemaic Egypt: statistics by period

In his preface to Chevereau's *Prosopography*, Yoyotte warns against Herodotus' division of Saito-Persian society (2.164–6) into professional classes.[34] As is clear from Chevereau's prosopography, such division has been overstated. Many warlords of the Third Intermediate period were also prophets of Amun, while soldiers of the Late and the Hellenistic periods were endowed not only with the prebends of prophets, but with hereditary priestly offices that involved performing religious rituals.[35] For example, one of the Egyptian chief commanders of the Greeks during the Twenty-sixth dynasty mentioned in Chapter 2, Bakenrenef, belonged to an Egyptian priestly family from the Delta.[36]

Table 8.1 and Figure 8.2 are based on Chevereau's prosopography. As the Third Intermediate period (1069–664 BC) and the Late period excluding the fourth century (664–404 BC) each lasted more than a century, percentages are used to draw comparisons with the later periods. Before the Ptolemaic period, between one-fifth and one-third of officers also held priestly offices. Of course, Chevereau's material refers only to the upper strata of the Egyptian army, where priestly offices were more common than among simple soldiers. Of the 159 military officers for whom evidence has been preserved in the Late period (Twenty-sixth and Twenty-seventh dynasties), only four belong to the Twenty-seventh or Persian dynasty (525–404

33 Greek soldiers and their families in the third century BC represented around 3 percent of the Egyptian population; see Fischer-Bovet (2011) 153. Policemen in the Fayyum counted for about 3 percent of the population; see Clarysse and Thompson (2006) 169.

34 Chevereau (2001), preface by Yoyotte, and Chevereau himself, 363–4; see also Chapter 2, section 2.3 and Fischer-Bovet (2013).

35 See Chapter 6, notes 4–5, for the close connection between soldiers and priests already in the New Kingdom.

36 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.4.1 note 63.

Table 8.1. *Egyptian officers with priestly function(s) based on Chevereau*

	Total number of soldiers	Soldiers with religious functions	% of soldiers with religious functions
Third Intermediate period (1069–664 BC)	162	53	33
Late period (664–400 BC)	159	33	21
Fourth century BC	78	22	28
Ptolemaic period (III cent. BC)	17	7	41
Ptolemaic period (II–I cent. BC)	31	20	65




Figure 8.2 Egyptian officers with priestly function(s) based on Chevereau

BC). Two have several religious functions, suggesting that the configuration "soldier-priest" persisted. Once again, it is difficult to tell whether our perception of the Persian dynasty is biased by the accidents of preservation or whether there were almost no Egyptian officers during that time.[37] In addition, Chevereau looked only at Egyptian texts (Hieroglyphs, Hieratic and Demotic) and did not survey the Greek material for the Ptolemaic period, which will lead to some corrections in the next section. In fact, the small sample available to Chevereau for the Ptolemaic period makes the statistical significance of the results in the final two columns of Figure 8.2 and the final

[37] In the view of Chevereau (2001) 308, Darius tried to gain the support of the Egyptian priests and officers by maintaining their privileges. But the only evidence for this is the participation of the Egyptian fleet in the Second Persian War (Herodotus 7.89 and 8.17).




Figure 8.3 Distribution of soldiers and officers with priestly functions

two rows of Table 8.1 minimal.[38] The absolute numbers in Table 8.1 suggest that the combination soldier-priest almost died out in the third century BC, especially because of the small number of Egyptian commanders in the army.

8.4 Distribution of soldiers and officers with priestly functions over time and space

The Ptolemaic sources attesting soldier-priests are unequally distributed over time. Figure 8.3 and Table 8.2 below display the distribution of data, this time including Greek sources and papyri, by century and divided among the four main regions of Egypt and the town of Memphis. Because the sources are largely hieroglyphic inscriptions on statues, the first century BC is better represented than periods for which only papyrological material is available.

Map 3 displays the geographic distribution of soldiers and officers with priestly functions throughout Egypt: the smallest dots represent smaller

[38] The statistical significance for the third century BC is between 26 percent and 57 percent and for the second and first centuries BC is between 50 percent and 79 percent. Different statistical tests (χ^2, the student's t-test, and Fisher's exact test) suggest that the small size of the samples means we cannot assert that these two results are different. I thank Eric and Pascal Bovet for their help with these calculations.

Table 8.2. *Distribution of soldiers and officers with priestly functions*

	Thebaid	Nile Valley	Fayyum	Memphis	Delta	Total
III cent. BC	0	1	0	2	4	7
II cent. BC	10	3	3	3	11	30
I cent. BC	13	2	2	2	3	22
No date	0	0	0	1	2	3
Total	19	10	5	8	20	62

numbers of attested soldier-priests. The names of the sixty-two soldiers and officers with priestly functions and their exact location and references are given in chronological order in Table A.1 (in the Appendix). Sources for the late-fourth and third centuries are scarce. Only three cases belong to the period around Alexander's conquest:[39] Horos (**1**), already mentioned above, and Nectanebo II's nephew (**2**) and son (**3**) in the Delta (Tanis and Sebennytos).[40] The latter were "first chiefs of his majesty" (*mr-mšʿ wr tpy n ḥm.f*). The son was a servant (*ḥm*) of Isis, while his cousin had other military titles and was a prophet of Ptah. Chevereau thinks that the latter may have commanded the Egyptian troops at Gaza in 312 BC, but in Gorre's view Nectanebo II's son and nephew were no longer soldiers under the Ptolemies but retained their functions as prophets. If so, the first Ptolemies relied on Greeks and gave Egyptians important functions only exceptionally, as Guermeur and Gorre suggest.[41] Yet as scholars attempt to combine Greek and Egyptian sources and to refine the dating of documents, more Egyptians may surface as experts or royal councilors of the first Ptolemies. Among experts not in the military, for example, Smendes, a member of an eminent Theban priestly family, played an essential role in the implementation of the royal cults under Ptolemy II.[42] Esiout II/Petobastis I, a high priest in

[39] They were previously nine, but six statues have changed dates from the third century to the period after 125 BC; see above, section 8.2.2 and note 23.

[40] For a new understanding of the royal family's genealogy, see Engsheden (2006), esp. 65, 68, who suggests that the name of Nectanebo's son was Tjahapimou, matching his grandfather's name, and thinks that he disappeared during the second Persian occupation (343–333 BC); Gorre (2009) no. 74; Chevereau no. 229 and p. 354. For the statue, see Clère (1951). For Nectanebo's nephew, also called Nectanebo (*PP* I/VIII 285 = II/VIII 2122), see Chevereau (2001) no. 230 and p. 354 (Nakhtnebef); Gorre (2009) no. 79. Engsheden (2006) 69–70 questions whether Nectanebo was a general of Ptolemy I but marshals no strong evidence against this possibility.

[41] See Guermeur (2003); Gorre (2009), esp. 495-511.

[42] The inscription was initially dated to the Saite period; see now Quaegebeur (1995) 146–9; Rowlandson (2007a) 43–4.

Memphis, was also honored by Ptolemy II, presumably for his cooperation in developing the royal cults.[43] Finally, Senou/Zenon of Coptos was governor of Coptos and courtier of Ptolemy II as intendant of the harem in Alexandria, a very high position. That he was Greco-Egyptian is suggested by his biographical inscriptions in hieroglyphs on the dorsal pillar of two statues.[44] It would be impossible to identify him as such if we had simply found a Zenon son of Jason as a courtier in a Greek source. It thus remains uncertain how many Greco-Egyptians hide behind Greek names, even at an early date. If we return to Egyptian officers with priestly functions, it is currently impossible to demonstrate the continuity of specific families maintaining military and priestly titles over generations. But the existence of this pattern in the second and first centuries suggests that the accumulation of military and priestly offices was possible.

The distribution of soldier-priests is far more concentrated in the south and the north, with almost no evidence from the Fayyum or Middle Egypt. One might accordingly suggest that the pattern displayed in Figure 8.3 and Table 8.2 is biased. Because many of the sources are inscriptions on hard-stone statues (or steles and sarcophagi), the Delta is better represented than places for which we must rely on papyri. But hard-stone material, probably the most prestigious, could also have been preserved in the Fayyum and Middle Egypt. Figure 8.3 thus represents quite accurately the distribution of soldier-priests, but only those who could afford this kind of material – high officers with priestly functions in Egyptian temples. As will be seen in section 8.5.1, lower-ranking soldiers should be found everywhere, but attestation of them is biased by the lack of papyri from the Delta.[45]

High-ranking officers with priestly functions are localized mainly in areas where internal revolts arose: the Delta and Upper Egypt. On the other hand, the Fayyum, along with Heracleopolis and Akoris in the Nile Valley and Pathyris in Upper Egypt, does not display such a (proportionally) significant number of soldier-priests, and the social background and origin of these people is very different. Distribution over time and space may be examined

43 Thompson (1988) 127–31; Gorre (2009) no. 59 calls him Esisout I/Petobastis I.

44 BM 1668; CGC 70031; Gorre (2009) no. 27, discussion (b) summarizes the diverse hypotheses about Senou's parents' ethnicity, Jason and Philoous/Phila (?). On Senou and the early Egyptian royal councilors, see Legras (2002); Rowlandson (2007a) 44.

45 Almost no papyri have survived from the Delta, except those sent from there and a few carbonized papyri found in the French excavations in Tanis. See Chauveau and Devauchelle (1996) regarding the Demotic papyri (probably dating to 400–250 BC) and one ostracon (dated to Nectanebo II).




Figure 8.4 Social background of soldiers and officers with priestly functions

against the diversity of the social background and origin of these individuals to understand whether there were specific reasons for combining offices and at what level in the hierarchy.

8.5 Social background of soldiers and officers with priestly functions

A classification of the sixty-two military men with priestly offices according to military rank provides some hints as to their social background. Figure 8.4 and Table 8.3 display four main categories. The first three were established by the *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* but are somewhat problematic, as explained in section 8.5.2: (1) officers or commanders (military *mr-mš*ʿ), (2) territorial governors, that is, nome-*stratēgoi*, (3) those belonging to these two groups simultaneously, according to the *PP*, and (4) lower-ranking soldiers (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). The first three categories are particularly important in the Thebaid and the Delta. But nome-*stratēgoi* are more frequently attested in the Thebaid, while in the Delta *mr-mš*ʿ-officers prevail. The chronological distribution shows that

Table 8.3. *Social background of soldiers and officers with priestly functions*

	Officers (*mr-mš*ʿ)	Regional governor (nome-*stratēgoi*)	Both	Lower-level soldiers	Total
Thebaid	0	3	11[a]	4	18
Nile Valley	1	2	0	3	6
Fayyum	0	1	0	4	5
Memphis	4	0	1	0	5
Delta	10	1	3	0	14
Total	15	7	15	11	48
%	24.2	11.3	24.2	17.7	77.4

[a] Two military *mr-mš*ʿ*.w* from the Thebaid should also be included in the category of nome-*stratēgoi* but were not considered as such in the *PP*; see Gorre (2009) no. 1, discussion (c) and no. 32 discussion (a): (**7**) Herodes (*PP* II/VII 2059 = 2083, 2114, 4927, 4300, 4963 = *PP* III/IX 5583 = *PP* V 13081 = *PP* VI 16266) and (**57**) Pachompsais (no *PP*) (see also Appendix Table A.1 below).

officers with priestly functions appear earlier (third century) than nome-*stratēgoi* (mid second century) and were probably an initial step toward this development.

Finally, simple soldiers or cavalrymen holding local priestly offices, whom I call "lower-level soldiers," represent 18 percent of the data, while the three higher categories represent 60 percent. The 22 percent of soldier-priests the *PP* left out of the above categories are, with a few exceptions, actually high-ranking military officers who should be included in the first three categories (see 8.5.2). The small sample limits the validity of a statistical analysis, but what is most relevant is the identification of two groups in the army who could hold priestly offices: lower-level soldiers and high-ranking officers or commanders.

8.5.1 Lower-level soldiers

The eleven soldiers of lower rank with priestly functions are found in all parts of Egypt except the Delta, from the second century BC on (**9**, **20–3**, **25–9**, and **45** in Table A.1).[46] The type of documentation might be

[46] They are difficult to identify, as e.g. (**25**) Dionysios son of Kephalas is not recorded among the lower clergy in the *PP*.

decisive, since such men appear exclusively in papyri (except for one Greek inscription) in Greek,[47] Demotic[48] or both.[49] As for origin, the two soldiers from Thebes in this group seem to be Egyptian (**22** and **23**).[50] The two soldiers from Pathyris (**20** and **21**), Dionysios son of Kephalas in Akoris (**25**), and the two cavalrymen from the Fayyum, Apollonios prophet of Souchos (**28**) and Harmodios *lesonis* of Amun (**45**), may have been from a mixed background.[51] Dionysios son of Purrhichos, who had an *Iseion* (temple of Isis) on his *klēros* in Kerkeosiris (**29**), may also have been of Egyptian ancestry, despite his Greek name, since he was one of the men transferred into the *katoikia*.[52] Heliodoros son of Ammonios (**9**), who purchased religious offices in an Egyptian temple, was *misthophoros klērouchos* and bore the ethnic "Cyrenean." Finally the last two, both *katoikoi hippeis* living in Heracleopolis, were probably of Greek origin: Thearos (**26**) and Dion (**27**). To sum up, three remarks can be made: first, Demotic papyri and bilingual archives attest that soldiers could also obtain priestly functions – something that would not automatically be inferred from their profession and from the Greek sources. Second, such cases were probably frequent from the second century onward wherever garrison troops or cleruchs were settled, since they are found in every area where papyri were preserved. Third, Egyptians and Greco-Egyptians in the army may often have come from village family elites serving local cults.

Economic interest drove these people to participate in these two milieux, as they earned money from both their military service and their priestly functions. Both could be part-time professions and were thus easily reconciled, although in some cases the functions were carried out during different periods of their lives (**20**, **21**, **25**). Involvement in both milieux also provided such individuals with a higher status and a larger social network.[53] This

[47] See Table A.1; in the Fayyum: (**9**) Heliodoros (*PP* II/VIII 3687 = *PP* III 6625 = *PP* X E1156; Uebel (1968) 68, no. 124); (**29**) Dionysios (*PP* II/VIII 2632 = *PP* III/IX 6611 = *PP* IV 8883); (**45**) Harmodios (*PP* II/VIII 2616 = *PP* III/IX 5380 = *PP* X E1438); in Heracleopolis: (**26**) Thearos (*PP* II/VIII 2656 = *PP* III/IX 6628 = *PP* IV 10746); (**27**) Dion (*PP* II/VIII 2568 = *PP* III/IX 6612 = *PP* IV 9225 = *PP* X E378; Mooren (1975) no. 259); in Thebes: (**22**) Petosiris (*PP* II/VIII 4061a = *PP* III/IX 6696c); (**23**) Harsiesis (*PP* II/VIII 3216 = *PP* III 6603).

[48] (**28**) Apollonios son of Hermias in the Fayyum (*PP* II/VIII 2864a = *PP* III/IX 5453b); Erichsen (1962).

[49] (**25**) Dionysios-Plenis in Akoris (*PP* II/VIII 2544, 2553a = *PP* IV 8141 = *PP* X E519); (**20**) Horos (*PP* II/VIII 2659, 4145 = *PP* IV 11152; *PP* X E546) and (**21**) Peteharsemtheus (*PP* IV 10939, 11626 = *PP* X E2036) in Pathyris.

[50] See note 48.

[51] See notes 48, 49, 50. For Harmodios, see Chapter 9, section 9.4 note 105.

[52] We can only offer the hypothesis that he used a Greek name as a consequence of his transfer, as e.g. Maron son of Dionysios did; see Chapter 7, 7.1.4 note 74.

[53] Manning (2003) 87, describing the case of Horos in Pathyris (**20**), points out that "this linking of military and religious status is an important fact of land tenure, and of local elite behavior in

suggests a certain flexibility in social and ethnic structures. To cite only one example, Apollonios son of Hermias (**28**), a cavalryman, is also a prophet of Souchos and appears in a Demotic document involving the repayment of a loan to a *lesonis*.[54] In contrast, political issues are also at stake in the other categories discussed in the following section.

8.5.2 Mr-mšʿ*-officers, nome-*stratēgoi *and Egyptian commanders*

As noted above, the military *mr-mšʿ*, whom I also call "*mr-mšʿ*-officers," were an important group of officers holding religious offices (see Figure 8.4 and Table 8.3). They are listed in the section oddly entitled "officers with other titles" in the *PP*.[55] They represent thirty of the sixty-two soldier-priests I recorded for the Ptolemaic period, 48 percent of the corpus, fourteen of whom are also included in the category "nome-*stratēgoi*" in the *PP*.

The category "officers with other titles" was in fact artificially created in the *PP*, as Clarysse suggested in a note to one of Peremans' articles.[56] Many bore the title *mr-mšʿ*. Clarysse warns that *mr-mšʿ* in hieroglyphs (often *pꜣ ḥrj n pꜣ mšʿ* in Demotic) has various meanings, such as "officer" or "commander of the troops," and can also be the equivalent of *stratēgos*, either as military *stratēgos* (general) or territorial governor (nome-*stratēgos*).[57] Indeed, in some cases the Demotic *pꜣ srtykws*, the nome-*stratēgos*, was used as equivalent to the hieroglyphic *mr-mšʿ*.[58] *Mr-mšʿ* could also designate the leader of a religious association, but usually the context distinguishes this use from the first two.[59] When *mr-mšʿ* is followed by the name of the nome, it designates a nome-*stratēgos*, although in a few cases the term refers to a nome-*stratēgos* even without a geographical specification. In fact, the *PP* could have created in the volume on the army a category called "people holding the hieroglyphic title *mr-mšʿ* or similar term followed by a complement" (e.g. *mr-mšʿ wr tpy n ḥm.f*, i.e. "chief commander of the

the last two centuries of the Ptolemaic period in the Thebaid." My data suggest similar behavior outside the Thebaid.

54 See note 49. 55 "Officiers portant divers autres titres."

56 Clarysse in Peremans (1977) 181 note 15. Peremans (1978) 45 also notes the heterogeneity of the group. The category's name was not intended to mean that these officers had other non-military functions such as priestly offices, but Johnson (1986) 82 interprets it that way.

57 In two cases, at least, Gorre (2009) no. 31 and no. 37 translates *mr-mšʿ* by *laarchēs*, in the second case considering this a religious title. None of the seven *laarchai* attested in *PP* II/VIII 2044–50 is found in a Demotic document, so the equivalence cannot be established with certainty. Yet Horpaisis, the *mr-mšʿ* attested in Theadelphia under Ptolemy VIII, may have been the equivalent to the Greek title *laarchēs*.

58 In the corpus, only in the first century BC: (43), (54), (56), (57), (58).

59 Gorre (2009) 455–6.

royal army").[60] This category would have regrouped many of the "officers with other titles" and a few men only included in the category "nome-*stratēgoi*" because they held the title *mr-mšʿ*. This would have made more visible a group of officers, all of Egyptian or in some cases Greco-Egyptian origin, such as Dioscorides (**11**), Dorion (**30**) and Apollonios-Pachou/Pasas II (**18**).[61] In the case of Apollonios, only his maternal grandfather was Greek. Even the men also included in the "nome-*stratēgoi*" by the *PP* held a military command at some point in their career, with a few exceptions such as Panemerit and Pikas in Tanis.[62]

Fourteen soldier-priests not among the lower-level soldiers are not included in the categories "officers with other titles" or "nome-*stratēgoi*" in the *PP*, whereas most should have been.[63] Two, Herodes (**7**) and Pachompsais (**57**), probably became nome-*stratēgoi* at the end of their military careers, although Pachompsais may be regarded as a representative of Caesar rather than a nome-*stratēgos*.[64] Peteesis (**16**) in Philae, as we will see below, was a *mr-mšʿ*-officer.[65] Aristonicus (**50**) in To-Bener was probably a *mr-mšʿ*-officer as well.[66] Finally, if the anonymous son of Nectanebo II (**3**) was indeed incorporated into the Ptolemaic army, he was certainly a commander.

Three of these fourteen soldier-priests, attested in Memphis, had functions similar to or even more important than those of *mr-mšʿ*-officers and nome-*stratēgoi*. Horos (**10**) was a chief commander of the royal army, like other officers included among the "officers with other titles" in the *PP*.[67]

[60] The *mr ssmt*, "chief of the cavalry," e.g. Amphiomis in Mendes (**36**) (*PP* I 210a = *PP* II/VIII 2109b = 2189a = *PP* III/IX 5437a?); *the mr mnfyt* "chief of the troops" or "chief of the infantry," e.g. Mencheres (**40**) (*PP* I/VIII 283 or 284?, 742 = *PP* III/IX 5640 or 5641?) and Ousimarres (**60**) (*PP* II/VIII 2124b = *PP* III/IX 5679 = *PP* IX 5566g, 6083b); the *ḥry n mšʿ.w n mḏy*, "the commander of the soldiers of the *matoi* (or police)," e.g. Chaapis (**4**) (*PP* II/VIII 2139 = *PP* III/IX 5856); the *wr ʿ3 m-ḥ3.t rḫy.t* "superior at the head of the men," e.g. Pamonthes-Plenis (**54**) (*PP* II/VIII 2125 = *PP* III/IX 5690; *PP* VIII 292c; Mooren (1975) no. 129).

[61] For the last two, see Gorre (2009) 531–2.

[62] See Chapter 4, section 4.3.2. For the exceptions, see Panemerit (**48**) (*PP* I/VIII 294, 988 = *PP* II/VIII 2128 = *PP* III 5717) and Pichaas (**47**) (*PP* I/VIII 306 = *PP* III/IX 5775, 5778a, 6207 = *PP* V 13783) in Tanis, and perhaps Pamenches (**53**) in Edfu (*PP* VIII 292b = *PP* VIII 2124d = *PP* III/IX 5688, 7433). In addition, Psais (**43**) (*PP* I/VIII 343 = *PP* III/IX 5421) and his son Petiminis (**44**) (*PP* I/VIII 305 = *PP* III/IX 7440) in Panopolis were not *mr-mšʿ*-officers according to the *PP*, but **43** was *srtykws*, the Demotic for nome-*stratēgos*, and **44** was *stratēgos* according to a Greek adoration act. Yet they might have been soldiers at some point of their careers, like Ptolemaios (**59**)**;** see Chapter 4, note 204.

[63] See Table A.1, from south to north: Philae: (**7**) Herodes and (**16**) Peteesis; Edfu: (**39**) Psais; Thebes: (**41**) Callias; Tentyrite: (**57**) Pachompsais; Memphis: (**10**) Horos, (**11**) Dioscorides, (**46**) Petosiris; Sebennytos: (**3**) Nectanebo's son and (**13**) Djedhor; Sile: (**15**) Petamenophis; To-Bener: (**50**) Aristonicus; unknown provenance: (**61**) Ankhapi and (**62**) Neferouadji.

[64] See note 46. [65] See section 8.6.2. [66] See below, note 80.

[67] Gorre (2009) no 48: *mr-mšʿ wr tpy n ḥm.f.*

Dioscorides (**11**) was the *dioikētēs* whose military role as *mr-mšʿ* was recently noted by Collombert.[68] Petosiris (**46**) was the "superior of the sailors of the house of Pharaoh" in the fleet.[69] Like the other two commanders of the fleet with priestly functions, he had a status at least equivalent to that of the other *mr-mšʿ*-officers. Finally, Petamenophis (**15**) in Sile also belonged to the fleet as "commander of the sea-borders."[70]

The final cases, from the little we know about them, may also involve *mr-mšʿ*-officers. Ankhhapi (**61**) and Neferouadji (**62**) were certainly *mr-mšʿ* and prophets.[71] As for Pachou/Pasas III (**39**) in Edfu, the situation is clearer, since he was the grandson of Apollonios-Pachou/Pasas II, who fought in the War of the Scepters.[72] But his functions in the army and in Edfu are less important than those of his ancestors, since he was only a cavalry officer. Finally, Djedhor in Sebennytos (**13**), a scribe of the army, and Callias (**41**) in Thebes, a staff-officer (*hypēretēs*), have lower positions in the military administration compared with the officers and commanders.[73] With the exception of Djedhor and Callias, therefore, all the soldier-priests discussed in this section, almost all of them of Egyptian origin, may join the category "officers with other titles," since they too are officers or commanders.

8.6 Greek and Egyptian backgrounds

Areas such as religion, army and administration were not entirely distinct professionally or ethnically. On the one hand, the Egyptian priestly milieu was involved in the administration and the army. On the other hand, officers and soldiers of Greek or mixed origin were also involved in the cults of Egyptian gods.[74] Véïsse has already pointed out the complex composition of the Egyptian priesthood and the existence of individuals with a "double face," that is, either descendants of both Greek and Egyptian ancestors or "culturally Hellenized" Egyptians.[75] Discussing the self-presentation of the Egyptian elite, Baines acknowledges how difficult it is "to assess the ethnic character of many works and their protagonists," and for this reason he

[68] *PP* I 27 = *PP* II/VIII 4293; Collombert (2000); Gorre (2007) 240–2 and Gorre (2009) no. 50.
[69] *PP* III 5769 = *PP* V 13782; Gorre (2009) no. 57.
[70] Chevereau (2001) no. 316; *PP* III/IX 5723.
[71] Chevereau (2001) no. 291 *bis* and 292 *bis*.
[72] Gorre (2007) no. 7 "chief of the valiant cavalrymen of the king's company" (*mr kn̩ ỉswt nsw*).
[73] Djedhor: Chevereau (2001) no. 296; Callias: *PP* II/VIII 2445 = *PP* III/IX 6378 = *PP* VI 16568.
[74] For royal officials and officers with functions in the Egyptian temples, see Gorre (2009) 513–603.
[75] Véïsse (2005), esp. 219–20.

abandons a corpus-based approach.[76] As noted earlier, we cannot always be sure of the origin of individuals, since criteria such as names are no longer a clear marker from the second century BC onward.[77] Yet when onomastic analysis can be checked against other evidence, especially when several documents are preserved regarding the same person, more plausible hypotheses can be formulated. Priests of Egyptian gods with Egyptian names, for example, whose parents had Egyptian names and Egyptian priestly titles, certainly had primarily Egyptian ancestors. Someone with an Egyptian name serving in the army was probably of Egyptian or mixed origin. Finally, someone with a Greek name serving in an Egyptian temple could be of Greek origin but most often was of Egyptian or mixed origin. From the survey of the various categories of soldier-priests in the previous section, it appears that most were of Egyptian or Greco-Egyptian origin. The *dioikētēs* Dioscorides (**11**), for example, had an Egyptian mother and probably a Greek father.[78] Among the officers who had Egyptian priestly functions, only two were Greek, Herodes (**7**) and Eraton (**38**) in Philae, whereas the case of Aristonicus (**50**) in To-Bener is uncertain, as he may have been Greco-Egyptian.[79]

8.6.1 Greeks as priests of Egyptian gods

Regardless of whether Aristonicus (**50**) was of Greek or Greco-Egyptian origin, the reading of *mr-mšʿ* is not clear in the hieroglyphic inscription on the dorsal pillar of his statue. By contrast, Herodes the son of Demophon of Pergamon and a citizen of a Greek city in Egypt (**7**) and Eraton (**38**) are each found as *stratēgos* and relative (*syngenēs*) in Greek inscriptions and are usually considered Greek.[80] The small island of Philae had a temple to Isis and a garrison and was an important strategic point on Egypt's southern border.[81] Herodes and Eraton were probably included in the Egyptian priesthood of Isis because they were officers.[82] Yet Herodes, certainly born in Egypt, had already demonstrated real piety toward the Egyptian gods through a dedication to Harbaktes and the associated gods in 163 BC, in which he appears as an officer on active duty (*hēgemōn ep' andrōn*) and administrator of the mines (*epitropos tōn metallōn*, SB III 6045). About ten years later he had

76 Baines (2004) 36.

77 See discussion in Chapter 7, section 7.1.4.

78 Collombert (2000) 55–6.

79 Guermeur (2000), esp. 75 note e, and Gorre (2009) no. 75: at least one of his parents could be Egyptian.

80 For Eraton, *stratēgos* is restored in SB I 4087 because of his aulic title as *syngenēs*.

81 Dietze (2000) 82 argues that the temple precinct served as a garrison since it was the only safe structure there.

82 Gorre (2009) no. 1 discussion (b) and no. 2 discussion (b), pp. 531–2, 534–5.

become *hēgemōn ep' andrōn*, *phrourarchos* of Syene, and guardian (*gerrophylax*) of the southern frontier; in other words, he was in charge of the *Dodekaschoinos* (150–145 BC).[83] By 150–145 BC he had also become a prophet of Khnum in Elephantine and *archistolistēs* in Elephantine, Abaton and Philae. All along he held the lowest aulic title "of the Diadochi" (*tōn Diadochōn*). Between then and 143/2 BC, he was promoted to *stratēgos*, now with the aulic title "chief bodyguard" (*archisōmatophylax*).[84] Mooren believes that this aulic title indicates that Herodes was a governor of several nomes and had become nome-*stratēgos* at the end of his career, although the *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* does not include him in that category.[85] Herodes' career thus makes clear that nome-*stratēgoi* were military men or had previously had a military career, at least those in Upper Egypt. About two generations later, the *stratēgos* at Philae, Eraton, bore the highest aulic title of "relative" (*syngenēs*), as is usual for nome-*stratēgoi* from around 120 BC onward, and as high priest and prophet of Isis, he had higher priestly functions than Herodes did.[86] Because Herodes no longer referred to his priestly functions once he was *stratēgos*, whereas Eraton is mentioned as *stratēgos* and priest on two *proskynemata* (adoration acts), Gorre supposes that officers of the king had more power within the temples by Eraton's time.[87] Whether or not Eraton was a nome-*stratēgos*, he also had military functions, since his nome was a border nome and the garrison was on the island of Philae.

8.6.2 The Egyptian priestly elite within the Ptolemaic army

Egyptian priests with military functions are also attested in Philae but at a slightly lower level in the military hierarchy. Peteesis (**16**) stresses different private and professional elements in the hieroglyphic and Demotic sections of his stele in Philae.[88] In the hieroglyphs he presents himself as the son of Pakhnumis and Takhnumis, prophet of the house of Khnum and Isis as well as the first flag-bearer of the first nome. In Demotic he again indicates that he is the first flag-bearer but adds other military functions, those of

83 See note 46; Gorre (2009) no. 1, Texts 1–3 (163–145 BC); see also Dietze (1994), esp. 76, (2000) 83.

84 I.Th.Sy. 303.

85 Mooren (1977) 127–8, 130; Gorre (2009) no. 1, discussion (c).

86 Mooren (1977) 132–4; I. Philae I 14 = SB V 8657b and I. Philae I 23 = SB I 4087 (90 and 89 BC or 82 and 81 BC); *PP* I/VIII 252 = *PP* III/IX 5522, 5385.

87 Gorre (2009) no. 2 discussion (b).

88 *PP* III 5740; Assuan stele 1057; see Texts (a) in hieroglyphs and (b) in Demotic in Ray (1987b), (1989) and Gorre (2009) no. 3. Winnicki (1996) acknowledges that the meaning of the Demotic terms remains obscure, although they refer to military functions.

"the first of five companies" and *gl-šr* (*kalasiris*). The Demotic inscription also describes the work Peteesis ordered in different temples. He gilded a doorway, completed a bed of ebony for Hathor and ordered two gold harps, one for Elephantine and one for Philae. Winnicki suggests that he was the representative of the king in all the temples in Nubia and the subordinate of Herodes in the military hierarchy.[89] According to Gorre, his functions were similar to a nome-*stratēgos* because of his accumulation of military and religious offices within one nome, but no evidence confirms this hypothesis. In any case, Peteesis' important position in the army allowed him to obtain a priestly office.[90] It certainly seems that his priestly office was not inherited, since no priestly offices are attached to the name of his parents.

When we turn to men of higher rank than Peteesis (**16**), the *mr-mšʿ*-officers, all of Egyptian origin, found in the section of the *PP* called "officers with other titles," of the seventy-nine cases collected in volumes II and VIII of the *PP*, thirty (*c.* 38 percent) were also priests (see above, Figure 8.1). Fifteen of these men were also nome-*stratēgoi* according to the *PP*. In addition, seven other nome-*stratēgoi* were of Egyptian origin, including the *epistratēgos* Phommous (**24**), but were not among the *mr-mšʿ*-officers.[91] As most Egyptian officers are found in the category "officers with other titles" – there are a few exceptions, such as Peteesis (**16**) and Petosiris (**46**) – *c.* 38 percent of priests among the Egyptian officers of the Ptolemaic army seems a plausible figure. In other words, one Egyptian officer in three also had priestly functions. This category is comparable in terms of social strata to the cases collected by Chevereau for pre-Ptolemaic Egypt, where *c.* 25 percent of officers were also priests. Egyptian families traditionally linked to the temples must thus have been successful in securing positions in the army.

During the Persian period and at the beginning of the Ptolemaic period, however, there is little trace of Egyptian officers in the army, and thus little trace of soldier-priests, because when foreigners ruled Egypt, they seemed to have used primarily foreign officers. For the entire Ptolemaic period, for example, Egyptians represent *c.* 10–15 percent of the total officers and were thus far less numerous in absolute numbers than in the preceding period of Egyptian independence examined by Chevereau.[92] This figure is of course an approximation based on the *PP* and should be regarded as a minimum, since an indeterminate number of officers of Egyptian and

[89] Winnicki (1996) 133. [90] Ray (1987b); Winnicki (1996); Gorre (2009) no 3, discussion (b).
[91] See Table 8.3 and the names marked with three stars in Table A.1.
[92] About 600 officers are attested in the *PP* (volume and online), of whom about 80 are of Egyptian origin.

Greco-Egyptian origins may hide in the list of preserved officers. As was noted in Table 8.2, only seven soldier-priests out of sixty-two are attested in the third century BC, almost exclusively in the Delta. In comparison, from the second century BC onward, the number of Egyptian soldier-priests is significantly augmented in parallel with the increase in local recruitment. As argued in Chapter 3, at this time the Ptolemies were reshaping their state and reorganizing their army to regain control of the core of their state after the Great Revolt. The revival of the tendency for Egyptian priestly families to have members in the army can be explained as a strategy on the Ptolemies' part to rely on men with a foot in both milieux.

Teos I (**5**) and his descendants belonged to a military family that traditionally held priestly titles and was still functioning according to the same socio-cultural institutions as in pre-Ptolemaic times, although we cannot trace this family so early in our sources.[93] Teos I, Apries (**6**) and his son Teos II (**12**) – the grandson of Teos I – were members of an important local priestly family who moved up within the military hierarchy.[94] They were prophets of a dozen gods in Tanis (ritual functions) and also had administrative functions within the temples.[95] They dedicated statues of the type discussed above in section 8.2.2, with biographical hieroglyphic inscriptions carved on the pillar.[96] On the military side, Teos I was "great general" (*mr-mšʿ wr*) and Teos II was "first chief general of His Majesty" (*mr-mšʿ wr tpy n ḥm.f*). Both had aulic titles and thus belonged to the royal hierarchy. On the dorsal pillar, Teos I gave more weight to his activity within the temples, while Teos II, whose career belongs to the first half of the second century, emphasized his military functions. Teos II moved up in his military career in comparison with his ancestors, which suggests that the Ptolemies relied on men like him to retake control of their state during and after the period of crisis.

Both Teos I and II (**5** and **12**) had territorial functions. Teos I, for example, was in charge of the administration of justice and collecting taxes, although it is unclear if these were temple or state taxes.[97] They may have been nome-*stratēgoi*, although the title *mr-mšʿ* is not followed by the geographical designation expected for a nome-*stratēgos*, and there is no clear evidence

93 Teos I (*PP* VIII 2138b = *PP* III/IX 5839, 6243, 7613 = *PP* VI 16663: indigenous physician), wrongly put in the pre-Ptolemaic section in Chevereau (2001) no. 293; Zivie-Coche (1997).

94 Apries (*PP* II/VIII 2111b = III 5455); Teos II (*PP* VIII 2138a = *PP* III 5835, 6233); Gorre (2009) nos. 81.

95 Teos II may have been a *lesonis*, since a golden ring is mentioned in the inscription, l. 1; see Gorre (2009) nos. 81, 415, note 1207.

96 Teos I in CGC 700 and Teos II in CGC 689; full descriptions and plates in Zivie-Coche (1997).

97 See Gorre (2009) no. 80, CGC 700, l. 2.

for nome-*stratēgoi* of Egyptian origin before the late second or the first century BC.[98] Lloyd describes the career of Teos I as that of "a traditional Egyptian nomarch with wide-ranging military, administrative, and priestly functions, all of which will have conferred substantial resources on his personal exchequer and guaranteed a high level of wealth, and many of which will have been hereditary."[99] Whether or not they appointed these men as nome-*stratēgoi*, the Ptolemies chose them as loyal *mr-mšʿ*-officers in charge of the army and of religious and administrative matters in a strategic nome in the Eastern Delta. In addition, the economic advantages of priestly functions were obvious to their holders, just as they must have been to each of the soldier-priests in the corpus.[100]

Of known soldier-priests, twenty-one reached the high office of nome-*stratēgos*, and more than two-thirds were clearly military men at some point in their career. The number of Egyptian nome-*stratēgoi* who were officers and occupied priestly offices increased greatly beginning in the mid second century in Upper Egypt and perhaps one or two decades later in the Delta and Memphis. In my view, this development is linked to the political situation in a period full of revolts and dynastic wars, during which the Ptolemies consciously relied on such people, as they did for example on Hakoris son of Herieus in the Hermopolite nome.[101] The Ptolemies maintained and used Egyptian socio-religious institutions to control these areas, relying on families that can sometimes be traced for three generations.[102]

The functions of a family of soldier-priests in Edfu resemble those of Teos' family in Tanis. Pachou/Pasas I (**8**) and his son Ptolemaios-Pamenches (**17**) were in charge of the Edfu nome around the mid second century BC, a few decades after the end of the Great Revolt in the Thebaid.[103] The grandson Apollonios-Pachou/Pasas II (**18**) was a cavalry officer who died during the War of the Scepters and perhaps for this reason never became nome-*stratēgos*.[104] Their Egyptian names and priestly titles in Edfu are known

[98] Hakoris son of Herieus could be the earliest evidence for an Egyptian nome-*stratēgos* as early as the 180s BC; see Chapter 7, section 7.2.3.2.

[99] Lloyd (2002b) 128–9.

[100] Johnson (1986) 81–2 on the concentration of wealth coming from regular incomes from temples, notably in the case of a large number of Egyptians with high military and administrative titles; see also Clarysse (1979a), esp. 732.

[101] See note 98.

[102] See Chapter 3, from the Great Revolt in the Thebaid (206–186 BC) to dynastic tension under Cleopatra III (116–101 BC).

[103] Yoyotte (1969); E.Bernand (1969) no. 5; Clarysse (1985) 62–4; Dietze (1994) 75; Dietze (2000) 83; Gorre (2009) no. 4; Véïsse (2005) 220.

[104] Suggestion from Clarysse on the basis of his study in Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 84–8. The *PP* considered him a nome-*stratēgos*; Gorre (2009) nos. 5–6.

from hieroglyphic funerary steles; they were *inter alia* prophets of Horus and appear as “great general” (*mr-mšʿ wr*) and “brothers of the king” (an aulic title). Greek inscriptions display their Greek names and their military and aulic titles. The family seems to have been from Upper Egypt, and its members used double names from the second generation on as a mark of “cultural” Hellenization. Yet it is possible that Greek blood entered the family at some point, perhaps through Ptolemaios-Pamenches’ wife. Finally, in terms of military activity, both Ptolemaios-Pamenches and Apollonios-Pachou/Pasas II fought for the Ptolemies in Syria.

8.7 Conclusion

From the second century BC the Ptolemies recruited among the Egyptian families who traditionally held military and priestly offices when Egyptians ruled Egypt. But Egyptian officers were a minority in the Ptolemaic army, at least 10–15 percent from the second century onward, and far fewer in the third century. The sources, although scarce and difficult to date, suggest that the tradition of holding military and priestly offices almost died out in the third century. Then, from the second century BC, the kings began to take advantage of the double position of Egyptian local elites. In some cases, the Ptolemies recruited new men and reproduced the pattern of soldier-priests by granting them priestly offices in the Egyptian temples in the towns where they exercised military and administrative functions. In this way the king’s Egyptian officers could have some weight in the priestly milieu and could act to support the Ptolemaic regime at the local level. The nature of Ptolemaic rule after the period of crisis (Period B) suggests that the Ptolemies were again strong enough to choose whom they wanted to promote in the military hierarchy in order to obtain loyal allies. At the same time the army was a means for the Egyptian elite to integrate themselves into the Ptolemaic state.

The status of individuals at the crossing of social networks has been examined by scholars as a means of better understanding the Hellenistic world, but the role of natives has been neglected. Describing the Hellenistic world as horizontal and vertical sets of networks, Davies shows that some individuals bridged the gap between the higher horizontal networks (the king and his family, Friends, army) and the lower networks (communities of subjects, individuals, inter-community alliances).[105] But Davies’ approach focuses only on Greek individuals and the expansion of a Greek and

[105] J. K. Davies (2002).

urban-based system. The officers with priestly offices discussed above, most of them Egyptian, bridged the gap in a similar fashion. Their status had the same qualities as that of men given as examples by Davies: it "allowed the sources of power to have very fuzzy and indeterminate edges; it allowed powers to overlap and to merge on the ground while remaining formally distinct; it gentled the dominance and ruthlessness of the monarchic regimes while not subverting their authority."[106] If some Egyptians holding priestly and military offices maintained their position in the third century BC, the percentage of such men was very low. Then the percentage of Egyptian or Greco-Egyptian priests holding military offices increased in certain areas and at certain times, such as in the Thebaid after the Great Revolt and in the Delta after internal revolts and Antiochus IV's invasion. Because of its particular patterns, we can explain this recrudescence in Period B as a specific policy on the part of the Ptolemies to regain control of these areas. A striking aspect of this policy is the nome-*stratēgoi* – who very often had a military career – with many religious offices in Lower Egypt and in Upper Egypt, for example in the Apollonite and Tentyrite nomes.[107] Families belonging to this local upper elite can sometimes be traced over two to three generations. Finally, access to priestly offices in Egyptian temples was even extended to a few Greeks in the same areas and periods: Herodes (**7**) and Eraton (**38**) in Philae.

[106] J. K. Davies (2002) 11 gives as an example the garrison commanders at Rhamnous and Eleusis after the Chremonidean War, because they were simultaneously Macedonian officers, Athenian commanders and Athenian citizens.

[107] De Meulenaere (1959); see note 103 for the family of Ptolemaios-Pamenches (125–75 BC). In the Tentyrite the phenomenon lasted until Augustus; see Blasius (2001).

9 | The army and Egyptian temple-building

This chapter investigates how the army, as an institution of the Ptolemaic state, and its members were involved in Egyptian temple-building and argues for a broadening of the army's functions beyond the military sphere. It offers new insight into the debate over who decided and/or funded the construction of Egyptian temples, by taking into account officers' and soldiers' dedications to Egyptian gods referring to temple construction. From the second century onward the evidence clearly shows that officers and soldiers, the latter often grouped in associations, played an increasing role in financing temple construction to complement royal and temple funds. They probably sometimes supervised the construction, and already in the third century BC they served as a convenient institutional structure to implement royal building policy. Soldiers enlarged their own political and social capital as *euergetai* (benefactors), expanding the army's functions to the ideological and religious domains.[1] This process was facilitated by the positions held in temples by some members of the army and by the establishment of garrison troops in close proximity to temple walls or even within temple precincts.[2] The presence of soldiers in villages and towns throughout the country thus cannot be reduced to a source of tensions and a burden on the civil population, as has been argued already in Chapter 7.

The corpus of soldier-priests discussed in Chapter 8 overlaps with the sources for the involvement of the army in Egyptian temple-building. Thirteen cases from the dataset used in Chapter 8 deal with construction or restoration within temple precincts (see in italics and bold in Appendix Table A.1): six in the Thebaid, two in the Nile Valley, one in Memphis and three in the Delta.[3] Those from the Thebaid date to after the Great Revolt (186 BC) or to the first century BC, while those in the Delta date exclusively

1 I take "social capital" with its individual focused meaning, defined by Lin (1999) 39 as "investment in social relations by individuals through which they gain access to embedded resources to enhance expected returns of instrumental or expressive actions."

2 On the precincts of temples used as fortresses, see Dietze (2000) 82; Thiers (1995) 507.

3 Petimouthes (**51** in Table A.1) is included among the cases from the Thebaid, although he is from the Delta, because he was involved in the construction of a magazine in Thebes; see note 57.




Figure 9.1 Traditional model of financing Egyptian temple-building

to the first century BC. Military men not known to have exercised religious functions were also involved in temple-building in both areas and in the Fayyum. Decision-making and financing of temple-building by soldiers and officers display some chronological and spatial patterns, although it was not of course exclusively members of the army who were involved in such activities. After a survey of earlier hypotheses regarding the role of the king and the priests in temple-building, a new model of financing Egyptian temple-building with the army as a source of private, semi-private and local funding is proposed. The model also sheds light on the "blurry borders" between state, temple and private sources of funding.

9.1 Previous views on temple-building and euergetism in Egypt

Historians generally assume that the king funded Egyptian temple construction.[4] Recent scholarship asserts that Ptolemaic domestic policy was to build indigenous temples in the south, partially with the king's money and often with that of the temples, officials or other individuals.[5] Figure 9.1 above schematizes this view. The various labels are defined in Table 9.2 (see p. 334).

Gorre extrapolates a model for financing temple-building from the cases of the *stratēgoi* Dorion (**30**) and Pikas (**47**).[6] The *stratēgoi* were in charge of financing cults and restoring buildings. They had some royal money at their disposal, which was to be supplemented with temple money or that of private *euergetai* – often their own wealth. Gorre suggests that royal and private financing were even more necessary for sponsoring the cults of soldiers' associations than it was for helping Egyptian temples, which had

[4] Stead (1984) 1051. Huss (1994) thinks that the funds often came from the king, because for him private dedications do not always mean that individuals paid for the structure.

[5] Dietze (1994) 72–4 uses as evidence the fact that the kings gave money for building temples; see note 15 below; also Dietze (2000); Huss (1994); Hölbl (2001); Thiers (2006); Gorre (2009).

[6] Gorre (2009) no. 54, Dorion, discussion (d). For Dorion and Pichaas, see section 9.5.




Figure 9.2 Quaegebeur's model of financing Egyptian temple-building

revenues from sacred land and the collection of some taxes in agreement with the government.

Looking at the Thebaid, Quaegebeur had previously stressed the role of temples and their adherents in financing temple-building (Figure 9.2 above). For Quaegebeur, the king was concerned with temple-building only to some extent. He suggests that royal funding remained limited and that the population devoted to the local gods covered most of the costs for large-scale temple-building.[7] Quaegebeur bases his assertion primarily on the idea that the Ptolemies usually tried to save money. In his opinion, biographical texts on statues show that the initiative for building came from the priesthood. But these biographies are those of *mr-mšʿ*-nome-*stratēgoi* with priestly office(s), such as Dorion and Pikas, who usually acted as representatives of the king. This group thus seems to have played a more important role as royal officials (and officers) than as priests.

In his recent study of euergetism. Thiers argues that large-scale Egyptian temple-building was organized and sponsored by the priesthood and that priests also received royal support, although only on particular occasions and when the king could foresee benefits from it.[8] Above all, Thiers emphasizes a gradual increase in individual euergetism during the Ptolemaic period, especially in regions where the priesthood and the state were not actively building temples, namely the Fayyum in the second and first centuries BC and the Delta in the first century BC.[9] Christensen too stresses the importance of euergetism, but in Upper Egypt, for the construction of the Edfu temple. In his opinion, this construction was uninterrupted from the mid second century BC until 70 BC, because the funding was

[7] Quaegebeur (1979) 713 and note 20, and earlier Préaux (1979) 51. Two texts from the Milon archive support this model; see my discussion on Edfu in section 9.3.

[8] Thiers (2006), esp. 276–80: his corpus consists exclusively of building dedications to Egyptian gods. He expands Huss' corpus, which included fifty-one Greek inscriptions and one Demotic inscription; see Huss (1994) 19–25.

[9] Hölbl (2001) 271 notes 57–9 also contrasts the south with the Fayyum, where private dedicatory inscriptions are found. For the Delta, see my discussion of Tanis in section 9.5.

private and no longer royal.[10] Since a large number of dedicants were in fact officials and officers, Thiers calls this "euergetism *ob honorem*," that is, linked to their function, and regards this as a continuation of the euergetism common in Greek poleis.[11] In his eyes, Greeks and the Hellenizing portion of the population groups tended to advertise their acts of generosity by means of dedications, a model thought of as traditionally Greek. Heinen, on the other hand, understands euergetism as an institutional practice modeled on royal euergetism because euergetism was in its essence royal.[12]

In fact, Greek immigrants did not yet have a "standard version of euergetism" when they came to Egypt. Later, Greek inscriptions often display a bicultural attitude or the mixed origin of the dedicants. In addition, members of the Egyptian elite could also act as generous donors, although they usually expressed this in a different medium, recording their restoration and construction of temples in hieroglyphic biographical texts, using pharaonic *topoi* that gradually entered the private domain. The texts were legible only to other priests, but everybody could see the statues on which they were inscribed. This suggests that the concept of euergetism, broadly defined as generously using one's own wealth for the welfare of the community, was not exclusively the continuation of a practice found in Greek poleis. Moreover, the actions recorded on Egyptian statues follow the definition of euergetism given by Van Minnen, as standard, basic expenses according to a man's capacity as magistrate – as one of his routine functions – or as expenditures made more or less spontaneously by magistrates, with both alternatives contributing "to the 'natural leadership' of the elite practicing it."[13] In Van Minnen's view, if one looked for individuals acting only in a private capacity, there would be almost no evidence of euergetism, and in Egypt only Callimachus (section 9.3) could be considered an example. Even so, he believes that euergetism existed only in the Fayyum, perhaps because he looks mainly at Greek inscriptions. In my judgment, both private euergetism and euergetism *ob honorem* occurred in Upper Egypt and the Delta as well and were not restricted to Greek ethnic groups.[14] The Greek tradition adapted itself to a new environment, in which the king was a central figure and Greek and Egyptian elites both tended to imitate him in similar ways.

10 Christensen (2002) 206, and below on Edfu in section 9.3.

11 Thiers (2006) 287–9 bases this concept on Veyne (1976) 214, who defines donations *ob honorem* as a practice of officials who use their money to pay part or all the expenses related to their function.

12 Heinen (1994) 161–2.

13 Van Minnen (2000) 437–8, 440.

14 See the survey of sources in sections 9.3 and 9.5.

Semi-private
Private
Public
Soldiers in their private capacity
King
Officials and priests in their private capacity
Temple

Figure 9.3 New model of the multiple sources of financing Egyptian temple-building

9.2 New model of financing Egyptian temple-building: the role of the army

Both royal and private funding of temple-building existed in Egypt but cannot be quantified because of the nature of our sources.[15] When we have no private dedication, we can assume that the king and/or the temples themselves funded construction. On the other hand, when there are private dedications, the individuals who made them actually paid for what they dedicated, even if they only rarely mention the payment explicitly. In the new model of financing Egyptian temple-building proposed in Figure 9.3, the army is added as a source of private and local financing because of the striking presence of soldiers and officers among the dedicants. The various sources of funding are connected to illustrate the complexity of the phenomenon. The sources of funding could thus be public (the state or the temples) or purely private (the wealth of officers, officials or priests in their private capacity). But in most cases the situation was more complex than this: both private and public funds were often used to build a temple or part of one. The central area in Figure 9.3 represents the combination

[15] For royal funding, see the decree of Karnak in Wagner (1971) 19–20, ll. 14–20, under Ptolemy V, and the Demotic graffito from the Satis temple in Elephantine (called text of Oureshy by Thiers [2006] 294, note 91), according to which Ptolemy VI paid the stone-cutters working to build the temple of Satis in Sais; see Vittmann (1997) 263–81. See also the Canopus decree, ll. 5–8 (Greek edition in A. Bernand (1970) 989–1036), in which the Ptolemies "bestow many and great benefactions on the temples in the country . . . ," trans. in Bagnall and Derow (2004) nos. 164, 265. For private funding, see the five clearest examples collected by Thiers (2006) 294, among them I.Fayoum III 145 in section 9.4.

Table 9.1. *Types of euergetism*

Type	Definition	Types of funding for a given building
Private euergetism	generous donation made with one's own wealth for the welfare of a given community, without displaying or holding any titles or offices	Private funding = private wealth only
Euergetism *ob honorem*	generous donation made by people acting as magistrates for the welfare of a given community and for displaying their own excellent performance in a given function	Private funding = private wealth only Semi-private funding = partly private wealth, partly state or temple funds Public funding = state or temple funds only

Table 9.2. *Model of the sources of funding for Egyptian temple-building*

Soldiers	private wealth of soldiers or officers
King	state taxes: the most cost-efficient way was likely to use directly part of the taxes collected in the nome for temple-building in that nome
Officials	private wealth of the officials
Temples	temple revenues: revenues from sacred land and from the collection of some taxes in agreement with the government as well as income from the *syntaxis*[a]

[a] The *syntaxis* was a source of income for the temples that was given by the Ptolemies, perhaps to compensate for the appropriation of some temple revenues by the state, e.g. the *apomoira*; see Stead (1984) 1047; Préaux (1979) 49, 481. For the *apomoira*, see Clarysse and Vandorpe (1998). For some new attestations of the *syntaxis* in the Roman period, see Lippert and Schentuleit (2006) 13, no. 61 with commentary on p. 209, and no. 69 with commentary on pp. 233, 236.

of funding sources for a single building, which I call semi-private funding. I explain my terminology for the types of euergetism in Table 9.1 and the sources of funding in Table 9.2.

Soldiers and officers left an abundant record of their involvement in Egyptian temple-building, as can be seen in the forty-nine documents listed in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Map 4 shows that the army was involved in temple-building all over Egypt, even if soldiers' dedications are not attested in each of the temples built in this period.[16] While temples were constructed

[16] Kurth (1997) estimates at more than 100 the number of temples built during the Greco-Roman period, which offers a useful figure for comparison for the Ptolemaic period.

Table 9.3. *Distribution of building dedications by soldiers to Egyptian temples*

	Thebaid	Nile Valley	Fayyum	Memphis	Delta
Ptol. I–III (304–221 BC)	0	1	0	0	1
Ptol. IV–V (221–180 BC)	3	0	0	0	0
Ptol. VI–IX (180–107 BC)	15	0	7	1	1
Ptol. X–Cleopatra VII (107–30 BC)	7	1	9	0	2
Total	25	2	16	1	4

throughout the three centuries of Ptolemaic rule, the increasing number of cases of euergetism in the first century BC, already noted by Thiers, and already even in the second century, suggests that the king began to rely more on private and semi-private sponsoring on the part of his officials and officers. As can be seen from the distribution in time and space of acts of euergetism by soldiers (see Table 9.3 and Figure 9.4), their involvement in a private capacity to help finance temple-building was almost non-existent under the first three Ptolemies. The phenomenon barely began in the Thebaid under Ptolemy IV and V, when soldiers were stationed in the area during the period of crisis (Period B). The survey by region makes clear the increasing number of acts of euergetism by soldiers throughout Egypt, as well as the regional variations between the Thebaid and the Nile Valley, the Fayyum, Memphis and the Delta. The chronology of the dedications and the military ranks of the dedicants are also examined.

9.3 Thebaid and Nile Valley

Philae. Dedications by soldiers and officers in Egyptian temples were found even in the extreme south of Ptolemaic Egypt. The Macedonian rulers initiated the construction or restoration of Egyptian temples in this area and certainly paid for them. Indeed, the Ptolemies were careful to show their involvement in the Dodekaschoinos even before the Great Revolt.[17] The dedication of Ptolemy III and his family engraved on the lintel of the temple of Isis is likely to be connected with his visit to the Thebaid in 236 BC.[18] The temple of Arensnuphis in Philae was probably built under

[17] Swinnen (1973); Huss (1994) 26–32; Arnold (1999) 154–79, 320–1.

[18] I.Philae I 4 on the *pronaos* of Isis and commentary 79–80. For Ptolemy III's visit to Edfu in 236 BC, see Clarysse (2000b) 45.




Figure 9.4 Distribution of building dedications by soldiers to Egyptian temples

Ptolemy IV.[19] During the revolt, when the Ptolemies temporarily lost control of Philae, the Nubian king applied the same policy.[20] After the revolt, the Ptolemies continued using temple-building and restoration to enhance their image in the area. Ptolemy V built a small temple to Asclepius in Philae to celebrate the birth of his son in 186 BC and probably to emphasize that he controlled the area again. His dedication might also be connected with a visit in Philae.[21] He also expanded the temple of Arensnuphis, which needed to be rebuilt after the revolt because garrisons (*phrouria*) were located in the space between the outer enclosure walls and the inner walls of sanctuaries.[22] The reconstruction of this temple was achieved under Ptolemy VI (172 or 146 BC), as the dedication by the garrison commander and the members of

19 I.Philae I 11 and commentary on p. 119.

20 Dietze (1994) 109. For the Dodekaschoinos and the relation between Kush and the Ptolemies, see Török (1987), esp. 152–62; Török (2009) 377–411.

21 I.Philae I 8 and the suggestion of a royal visit in the commentary on pp. 102–3.

22 Thiers (1995) 509; Dietze (2000) 82. The shape of the temple enclosures suggests that they could be used as fortification walls for garrisons already in the Middle Kingdom; see the example in Kom Ombo in Lawrence (1965) 88 note 1.

the association (*synodos*) of Heracles – the Greek god to whom Arensnuphis was assimilated – was made in his honor.[23] Finally, Ptolemy VIII made a dedication to Hathor on the lintel of the cornice of her temple, probably on the occasion of his visit.[24] There are hints of the involvement of soldiers already from the time of Ptolemy VI, as the members of the association of Heracles were obviously soldiers. In fact, among the remaining twenty-six dedications collected by Bernand in Philae, all dating to the reigns of Ptolemy VI and VIII, eleven of the twelve dedicants belonged to the military:[25] *stratēgoi* or *epistratēgoi*, garrison commanders (*phrourarchoi*), infantry and cavalrymen (Table A.2, nos. 1–11).[26] The pre-eminent role of the garrison commanders is noteworthy in five cases from Philae. Their dedications to different gods and to the Ptolemies are often made on behalf of their superiors, *stratēgoi* or *epistratēgoi*.[27] The best illustration of this activity is the reconstruction of the temple of Arensnuphis mentioned above. These actions were thus part of the reorganization of Upper Egypt by the Ptolemies after the Great Revolt. Political, military and religious affairs overlapped in such undertakings, the role of the army extending to the maintenance of indigenous temples.

Elephantine. The situation was similar in Elephantine, although on a smaller scale (Table A.2, nos. 12–15).[28] Of the three dedications preserved on the island, two were made by the *phrourarchoi* of Elephantine, while the

[23] I.Philae I 11 and commentary on p. 119: "On behalf of King Ptolemy, (lacuna), and Queen (lacuna), the sister, of Ptolemy and Cleopatra, to [Aren]snou[phis], (lacuna), *phrourarchos* and the members of the Heracles-association having reconstructed (ἀνοικοδομηκότες) the sanctuary"; English translation in Dietze (2000) 80–2: we know the name of several *phrourarchoi* in Philae around that time, notably that of Herodes discussed in Chapter 8, note a in Table 8.3, but the name is completely lost on the inscription. See Dietze (1994) 77; Thiers (2006) 286–8, 291 and no. 27.

[24] I.Philae I 17 (127–116 BC). For Ptolemy VIII's visit in the *chōra* in 127 BC, see Clarysse (2000b) 49.

[25] Twenty dedications are mentioned in Dietze (1994) 78 and note 50, to which I add I.Philae I 11, 18, 25 and the three dedications of statues below. The clear cases involving dedicated objects are the following, given in chronological order within each category. For dedications of statues, see I.Philae I 10, 12, 13. For dedications of altars, see I.Th.Sy. 309, I.Philae I 18, I.Th.Sy. 325, 316, I.Philae I 20, 25. For dedications of a temple, I.Philae I 11. For the architrave of a *pronaos* or an altar, I.Philae I 16, perhaps I.Philae I 1 (stele found in the temple of Hathor); perhaps for a colonnade, I.Th.Sy. 314. For an honorific decree in honor of a *phrourarchos*, see I.Th.Sy. 322.

[26] *Epistratēgoi* and *stratēgoi* often had a military career, as these inscriptions make clear. One can add the case of the First Flag-bearer Peteesis, discussed in Chapter 8, section 8.6.2, who made donations to the temple of Philae and Elephantine. See also Thiers (2006) nos. 62, 286–7, 291.

[27] I.Th.Sy. 314; I.Philae I 15; I.Th.Sy. 318; I.Th.Sy. 320, see Table A.2, respectively nos. 3, 5, 7, and 9.

[28] Dietze (2000) 79 interprets the smaller scale of the building program as evidence of the Ptolemies' preference for Philae and Kom Ombo to the detriment of Elephantine, the old

name of the dedicant of the other is lost. The two inscriptions were both made on behalf of the *stratēgoi* and dedicated to the king and the queen as well as to Khnub, the god of the First Cataract, and to a series of Greek and Egyptian gods.[29] This seems to indicate the importance of the *stratēgoi* in this region in supervising the state of the garrisons often located in the temple precincts. Yet the modest effort expended, in comparison with building or rebuilding an entire temple, suggests that the initiative emanated from the *phrourarchos*, who paid for everything with his own money. Private funding is even more likely in the case of collective dedications.

In addition, we find Herodes son of Demophon on the nearby island of **Es-Sehel (Satis)**.[30] In an initial inscription dating to the time of Ptolemy VI (I.Th.Sy. 302), he is *phrourarchos* of Syene, an officer on active duty (*hēgemōn ep' andrōn*) and a prophet of Khnub. He makes the dedication to the royal family, Amon-Khnub and a series of gods with double (bilingual) names, on behalf of Boethos. This time the *phrourarchos* is joined by the priests of Khnub and the royal cult belonging to the fifth *phylē*, which suggests intermingling between the army and the Egyptian temples, especially since Herodes himself had a foot in both milieux. During the meeting of their association (*synodos*), they decided to celebrate an annual festival in honor of Ptolemy, his wife and their children, as well as Boethos' birthday. By the time of the second inscription (I.Th.Sy. 303), Herodes is *stratēgos* and is acting with the thirty members of the *synodos*, who present themselves as *basilistai*.[31] They dedicate the stele as well as the sacrifices and the libations carried out during their monthly meetings to Ptolemy VIII, Cleopatra III, their children and the same gods as in the first inscription (with three more added). The stele was found in a small temple where the group certainly met and whose construction they had no doubt decided on and paid for. The existence of this association sheds light on the partnership or even overlapping of military and religious institutions, as seen in Table 9.4 below.[32]

I suggest that soldiers joined the original members mentioned in the first inscription. Alternatively, some may already have been members as priests,

pharaonic nome-capital. But if the temple was better preserved than those of Philae, that might also explain the smaller scale of the construction.

29 The *stratēgoi* were Boethos (under Ptolemy VI) in I.Th.Sy. 242, and Ptolemaios and his three sons (under Ptolemy VIII) in I.Th.Sy. 243. On Boethos, see Kramer (1997); Heinen (1997), (2000).

30 I.Th.Sy. 302, 303; also note 23 and Chapter 7, section 7.3.1 notes 243–5. The same man dedicated a libation table in Dendera; see I.Portes 23.

31 On the *basilistai* and *philobasilistai* and this inscription, see Chapter 7, section 7.3.1.

32 For Heinen (1996) there is in fact no conceptual opposition between the state and the temples in I.Th.Sy. 302, 303.

Table 9.4. *Association of the* basilistai *in Satis*

Organization of the cults performed by the association of the *basilistai*	
Royal cult	indigenous cults
Herodes as *stratēgos* / *phrourarchos*	Herodes as prophet of Khnub
Soldiers as members of an association of *basilistai*	priests of Egyptian gods (and royal cult) as members of an association of *basilistai*

or the presence of soldiers at the first meeting was simply not recorded on the stele. Only the list of members, lost for the first inscription, could resolve the question. As already noted in Chapter 7, the preserved list includes both Egyptian and Greek names characteristic of a mixed community.[33] This association thus included Egyptians, Greco-Egyptians and Greeks, priests and soldiers, at least one soldier-priest, and members of the gymnasium. Apparently institutions and memberships in associations were more flexible in terms of ethnicity and profession than usually thought.[34] All these inscriptions from the Dodekaschoinos are inscribed in Greek alone, as Dietze pointed out.[35] Yet they celebrate the king and Boethos for a Greek-speaking audience not limited by ethnic barriers.

Kom Ombo. In a dedication like the one of Philae by the garrison commander and his soldiers (I.Philae I 11), the infantrymen together with the cavalrymen and other individuals stationed at Kom Ombo dedicated a chapel to Haroeris-Apollo and associated gods on behalf of Ptolemy VI and Cleopatra II, to thank them for their benevolence (Table A.2, no. 16).[36] For Bernand, the initiative is that of the men rather than of the royal power, and he apparently thinks they paid for it themselves: “The text seems to have been written in an *esprit de corps*, in order to show that it is the army who worships the king.”[37] Thiers also emphasizes that the initiative comes from a military unit.[38] Taking another approach, Dietze believes that the soldiers

33 See Chapter 7, section 7.3.1 note 244.

34 E.g. Launey (1949) 1026–30, esp. 1029, for whom the associations of *basilistai* outside the gymnasium have mainly indigenous members because in his opinion they lack access to the gymnasium, the main place of the royal cult; see Chapter 7, section 7.3.1.

35 Dietze (1994) 77.

36 I.Th.Sy. 188 (*c.* 160 BC): “On behalf of King Ptolemy and Queen Kleopatra, the sister, the mother-loving gods, and their children, to Haroeris, the great god, Apollo and to the *synnaoi theoi*, this chapel [was dedicated] by the infantry and cavalry soldiers and the others stationed in the Ombites because of their being well-disposed toward them”; English translation in Dietze (2000) 79. “The others” probably belong to the military administration.

37 A. Bernand (1989) 128, translated by Fischer-Bovet.

38 Thiers (2006) 287.

had to build the chapel for Ptolemy VI, and that the initiative was the king's in accord with his general policy after the revolt, notably in the creation of the Ombite nome.[39] In her view, it was the king and the queen who were well disposed toward the soldiers, while Bernand thinks it was the gods. In fact, the situation is ambiguous, for initiative and funding were both private and public. The soldiers lived there and could see the royal policy in action by looking at construction being undertaken in the city. They were in fact an element of this policy but could take a more active part in it by financing the building of a chapel. Since the garrison was close to the temple, perhaps even within the temple precinct, one might suspect that they were readily available to supervise the work and that this might have been among their responsibilities as soldiers.

A few decades later, the infantrymen with the cavalrymen and other people dedicated an altar to Ptolemy VIII and Cleopatra III on behalf of the *hipparchos* and *epistatēs* of the Ombite nome (Table A.2, no. 17).[40] Dietze believes that the chief of the garrison in Kom Ombo (not the priests) explicitly took the initiative of building an altar, as a representative of the King Ptolemy VIII. Whether it was the garrison commander or his men, the dedications make the link between the government, the army and the Egyptian temples clear. In addition, all these constructions reveal the region's importance for the king.

Hermopolis. It is worth comparing the dedications in Kom Ombo with a similar earlier dedication engraved on the lintel of the temple in Hermopolis in Middle Egypt (Table A.2, no. 18).[41] The occasion for the inscription of this dedication may have been the journey of Ptolemy III throughout the *chōra* mentioned above in connection with Philae.[42] The *katoikoi hippeis* (cavalry settlers) of the Hermopolite nome dedicated statues, the temple and all the construction inside the *temenos*, as well as a portico, to Ptolemy III and

39 Dietze (2000) 79–80, 85–6, although there is no reason to link it to a desire to replace the old Elephantine Ombitou nome and its capital, Elephantine; see note 28 above.

40 I.Th.Sy. 190; Dietze (1994) 77 and note 48, Dietze (2000) 86; Thiers (2006) 286–8, 291 and no. 26. The dative is used for the king and queen and translated "to," and it is preferable to ὑπέρ, which is translated "on behalf of," as in I.Philae I 11 and I.Th.Sy. 188. Here the ὑπέρ governs Menandros, the *hipparchos*. In Upper Egypt ὑπέρ or the dative appear in almost equal proportions according to my data-set, while in the Fayyum only ὑπέρ is used. For the difference between the dative and ὑπέρ, see A. Bernand (1989) 288 (I.Th.Sy. 314), who translates the latter "in the name of, on behalf of, in favor of." Bingen (2007a) 274–6 = 30–2 gives the preposition the sense of "in favor of," but points out the mental gap involved in understanding this expression, which is specific to Greek inscriptions in Egypt and is perhaps designed to express a deep solidarity with the king, as traditionally in Egypt.

41 I.Herm.Magn. 1; Dietze (2000) 80 note 6, and esp. 87 note 22; Suto (2004) = Kawanishi and Suto (2005) 192–8.

42 Suto (2004) 8.

Berenice II, because of their benevolence toward them. This suggests that the dedicants were sufficiently organized to come to a collective decision. As seen in Chapter 6, in the second century BC they still form a group cohesive enough to petition to secure their privileges.[43] There is no mention in the dedication of a superior officer leading the project, although one expects the name of the *phrourarchos* or at least the dedication of the construction "for" (*hyper*) their *hipparchos*, as in I.Th.Sy. 190. A second peculiarity of this inscription is that it was 11 meters long and engraved on one of the few temples built in a Greek style in the *chōra*. Finally, the dedication was only to the deified Ptolemies (the *theoi euergetai* and *adelphoi*) and not to any Egyptian gods.

All these discrepancies can be explained if this mid-third-century Greek inscription, much earlier than the others discussed in this section, is understood as a prototype. The soldiers (or at least some of them) funded the work and perhaps supervised it, which is unsurprising given that the temple precinct is called a *phrourion* (garrison).[44] Dedicants in the second century BC in Upper Egypt and in the second and first centuries in the Fayyum adapted this behavior to a different context, namely the increasing number of Egyptians in the Ptolemaic army, the growing interaction between Greeks and Egyptians there, and perhaps the more powerful influence of Egyptian religion in the south. Their constructions were accordingly dedicated not only to the king but also and even primarily to traditional deities.

The problem of financing remains to be discussed. In the case of Hermopolis, it has been proposed that the benevolence of the king mentioned in the dedication consisted of bonuses distributed after the Third Syrian War, which might have been used to pay for the construction.[45] Suto has recently argued that the soldiers did not participate in funding or building the temple and the other construction, primarily because the project must have taken years to accomplish, and argued that the kings or the priests funded the construction instead.[46] In his view, the soldiers cooperated with the Egyptian priesthood only to engrave the dedication. Were that the case, however, the priests should at least be mentioned in the dedication. Moreover, the involvement of Egyptian priests in building a Greek-style temple is unlikely. More likely the *katoikoi hippeis* as a group funded the construction for years, which also explains the absence of a superior officer leading the project. Given the importance of the buildings, royal funding may have complemented that provided by the cavalry settlers.

43 See Chapter 6, section 6.3, p. 224 and note 138.

44 Suto (2004) 8 suggests that the garrison was near or within the sacred precinct.

45 Fraser (1972) 234; A. Bernand (1999) 17 note 23.

46 Suto (2004) 6–8.

Edfu (Apollonipolis Magna). The construction of the temple of Edfu started at around the same time as the Hermopolite temple-*phrourion* was built. Its construction is the best documented of all the temples in Ptolemaic Egypt, thanks to the texts engraved on its walls.[47] In addition, two papyri from the Milon archive suggest local funding for the construction.[48] The first alludes to sums paid to the Horus temple by the bankers of the other temples in Edfu and by the treasury officials (οἱ πρὸς τοῖς θησαυροῖς), while Milon, a royal official, is asked to provide a list of all payments made to the temple "since the very beginning" (ἀπὸ τοῦ πρωτίστου χρόνου).[49] This expression no doubt refers to the beginning of construction in 237 BC, fourteen years earlier. In the second document Milon is again ordered to provide an account of what was paid, but this time the expressions "per payer" (κατ᾽ ἄνδρα) and "per year" are preserved, suggesting to the original editor that private individuals paid for the building, not necessarily voluntarily. Temple accounts, however, were typically organized by payer, year and month.[50] Rather than private individuals making generous donations for the building project, these individuals are more plausibly paying sums they owe the temple (for taxes, leases, etc.), with at least some of the money used for construction. This dossier is thus good evidence of local funding for temple-building, but of public (i.e. by the temple itself) rather than private expenditure.

Further evidence for local financing of temple-building by soldiers in the Edfu nome has recently come to light in a late-second-century BC land survey, P.Haun.inv. 407 (Table A.2, no. 19): "And the land ceded (παρακεχωρεμένης) by the *andres* to the temple in Apollonipolis Magna of Horus of Bakhthis, the great God, Lord of the sky, the Greatest (God), for the completion of the building (εἰς τὰ συντελούμενα ἔργα), of that before year 50" (ll. 150–3).[51] Seventy-seven arouras of fertile land were ceded,

47 See Cauville and Devauchelle (1984) and also more recently Kurth (2004).

48 P.Eleph. 10 = W.Chr. 182 and P.Eleph. 11 (223/2 BC); see also note 7.

49 In W.Chr. 182 (223/2 BC) Wilcken considers the τραπεζίται οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς (l. 2) to be royal bankers, in contrast to Rubensohn (1913); Clarysse (2003), esp. 21 and nos. 18 and 20; Christensen (2002) 206–7. For banks in Ptolemaic Egypt, see Bogaert (1994), (1998).

50 The use of the phrase *kat' andra* and its Demotic equivalent are common in temple accounts. Andrew Monson pointed out to me the similar system in the wine account of the temple of Edfu; see Schentuleit (2006) 370–1, 387–8, 541–6 (Table 18) for the wages in wine received by workers, including those involved in temple-building.

51 Christensen (2002), unpublished dissertation, 17–18 (for the text dating to 119–118 BC), 33 (for the translation), 70–2, 201–8 (for the commentary). Additional evidence for the involvement of the military in the temples in Edfu is the dedication of a libation table by Ptolemaios, secretary of the forces of the region of Elephantine (I.Portes 105, 145 or 136 BC, less plausibly 250 BC), probably at his own expense.

representing a little more than one aroura per cleruch, on Christensen's calculations. In his judgment the land remained in the possession of the Egyptian infantrymen, but the revenue of these arouras was used to fund construction of the temple, "possibly the exterior enclosure wall, the forecourt and the pylon gateway which must have been under construction when the land survey recorded in P.Haun.inv. 407 was carried out."[52] Christensen concludes that the second stage of construction (152–70 BC) was not interrupted during dynastic conflicts, because the financing was local and not royal. The army was used as a means to organize building and even pay for it. It became an active element of the royal temple-building policy and contributed to the local, semi-private sources of funding. Finally, if the revenue from the cleruchic land ceded to the temple in fact served to build the enclosure and the pylon, this strongly suggest that troops used temple enclosures as garrison space.

A similar case is attested in the land surveys of the 120s BC in **Kerkeosiris** (**Fayyum**, Table A.2, no. 30), where eight cavalrymen and thirty Egyptian infantrymen (7-aroura *machimoi*) serving under the *laarchēs* Chomenis dedicated 130 arouras to the god Soknebtunis in Tebtunis out of the 341 arouras total they were granted.[53] In addition, the 20-aroura men were in fact getting only 19 arouras and the 7-aroura *machimoi* only 6½ arouras, for a total of 23 dedicated arouras. In total, the soldiers dedicated on average three times more than the *andres* from Edfu, and Crawford sees no evidence that they kept their land. Even if this example is not as clear-cut as the case of Edfu, the revenue from this land might have been used to maintain the cult and the temple in general, perhaps including restoration work.[54]

North of Edfu. Military personnel involved in Egyptian temple-building in the Thebaid and the Nile Valley generally recorded their benefactions in biographical hieroglyphic texts inscribed on the dorsal pillar of statues or in bilingual inscriptions similar to those from the Delta (marked in bold in Table A.2). All but one are among the soldier-priests discussed

52 Christensen (2002) 207, 71 suggests that the cession might have ended in year 50, the date of the completion of this work. Payments to the Horus temple were also made by other temples (see P.Eleph. 10 and 11, above).

53 They dedicated 100 arouras in 130–129 BC and 30 arouras in 129–128 BC, probably from an additional land grant from the king; see Crawford (1971) 96–8; Keenan and Shelton (1976) Introduction, 13.

54 See especially P.Tebt. I 63, ll. 18–23 and 61(a), ll. 51–105, and appendix I, § 2, p. 543: "the practice of dedicating land to the temples seems to have been widely spread among those who had themselves received grants from the Crown." Crawford (1971) 96 note 5 gives other examples: BGU IV 1200, 4–5 (2–1), BGU IV 1216, 116 (119) and I.Prose.Pierre 24 = SB V 8883, in which the king grants the Island of Pso to the clergy of Khnum in Elephantine as sacred land. See also Dietze (1995); Piejko (1992).

in Chapter 8, *mr-mšʿ*-nome-*stratēgoi* with priestly functions (see section 8.5.2) and lived in the late second and first centuries BC. Thiers discusses this group and explains that "regarding the small number of dedications by priests, it seems that it was rather as royal officials that they made them."[55] In my opinion, these men must still have taken some initiative and paid for it, at least in part. The king could thus gain some indirect benefit from their double position. Their actions correspond to what was described above as euergetism *ob honorem* using a combination of state funds and the dedicants' own wealth, providing a semi-private source of funding for temple-building.

Hermonthis. One of the *stratēgoi* attested with many religious functions in Egyptian cults, Pamonthes-Plenis son of Mencheres, undertook the restoration of the temple of Tannet (statue Louvre E 20361) and inaugurated the portico of the temple of Djeme (Demotic graffito, Medinet Habu no. 44, Table A.2, no. 20).[56]

Thebes. While Petimouthes (Table 10.2, no. 21) was "great commander" of the army (*mr-mšʿ wr*) and a prophet of Amun-Ra and other gods in Diospolis Kato (Tell el-Balamun) in the Delta, he (re)built a storehouse of Amun in Thebes (Diospolis Magna).[57] Cleopatra III probably promoted him there after his exploits during the War of the Scepters, in accordance with her policy of placing loyal men in the Egyptian temples of Upper Egypt.[58] The initiative for such building must have been Petimouthes' in the king's name. As financing the construction may have been the condition for having one's statue in the temple, he probably paid for it.[59]

About half a century later, the priests of Amun-Ra honored Callimachus (Table A.2, no. 22), who was *stratēgos*, in charge of the finances of the Peri-Theban nome, *gymnasiarchos* and *hipparchos*, in a bilingual decree.[60] A member of a powerful family well established in the area, he reached the highest ranks of the Ptolemaic administration and military hierarchy, receiving extraordinary honors for his benevolence during periods of

55 Thiers (2006) 285.

56 See *PP* II 2125 = *PP* III 5690 = *PP* VIII 292c, my Table A.1, **54**; Thiers (2006) nos. 55 and 56 (actually the same person), 285, 294.

57 Table A.1, **51**; *PP* VIII 2112a. Date and place, as well as name Harsiesis, now corrected by Quaegebeur in Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 88–108 (Turin, Museo Egizio, cat. 3062 + Karnak, Karakol no. 258); Thiers (2006) nos. 40, 291–2, 295.

58 For another example of this policy, see Phommous (*PP* I/VIII 202 = *PP* IX 5685a and my Table A.1), another soldier-priest who became *epistratēgos* of the Thebaid under Cleopatra III. For the War of the Scepters, see Chapter 3, section 3.2.3, pp. 106 and 108 and notes 212 and 219.

59 Quaegebeur in Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 108.

60 I.Prose 46; Thiers (2006) nos. 57, 279, 287 and esp. 290.

political crisis and famine.[61] In addition to the standard generous actions traditionally described in honorific decrees, he built the terrace of the sanctuary of Amon-Ra "in the name of the state" (δημοσίαι, l. 31). The term shows that he acted in accordance with his function when building the terrace and, as a *stratēgos* and official in charge of finances, he was probably able to use royal money. He also alleviated some of the city's burdens, either by paying for imported food during the famine or by exempting the Thebaid from taxes, a prerogative that should have belonged only to the king (l. 5).[62] Finally, he spent his own money to protect the sanctuaries and help their priests when people took refuge in the temple (see l. 7). In addition, among other honors voted him he is proclaimed "savior of the city" (σωτήρ τῆς πόλεως, l. 26), which makes him the only "authentic" *euergetēs* in Egypt if we follow Van Minnen in comparing this honorific to the official title *euergetēs* granted by Greek cities.

Tentyrite nome.[63] Panas and his son Ptolemaios were *stratēgoi* of the Tentyrite nome at the end of the Ptolemaic period and under Augustus.[64] They were also prophets of many gods in Dendera and were in charge of the administration of the temples. They may be among the few nome-*stratēgoi* of the first century BC for whom no military career is attested before their accession to the rank of nome-*stratēgos*. As directors of the finances of Hathor, Isis and Horus, they were in charge of restorations and construction, divine offerings, sacred animals and payments to the priests. But since they were also in charge of the nome's finances, one can only speculate whether they undertook temple-building with royal money and/or temple money. They may also have added their own contributions to the cost of the portable chapel of Hathor, statues or the daily offerings. The dedication of land on behalf of the emperor Augustus to Isis-Thermouthis recorded on Ptolemaios' trilingual inscription must likewise have come from his own property.[65] Finally, Ptolemaios' interaction with the *lesonis*

61 Callimachus was also "overseer of the Red and Indian Seas," and his brother was *stratēgos*; see Ricketts (1982–3).

62 Van Minnen (2000) 444–5.

63 See Table A.2 nos. 23–6. For Herodes' dedication in Dendera, see note 30.

64 On the indigenous *stratēgoi* of the Tentyrite nome, see the extensive study by De Meulenaere (1959); La'da (1994b); Blasius (2001); Gorre (2009) nos. 30–1; Gorre (2009) no. 29 discussion (a) accepts De Meulenaere's dating that is followed here, *contra* Blasius and Farid. On Panas, see Thiers (2006) nos. 53, 285, 291–2. On Ptolemaios, see Vleeming (2001) nos. 157–68.

65 CGC 50044. For the Demotic and Greek texts, see Vleeming (2001) no. 163. For the Greek text only, see I.Portes 24, 12 BC. Meeks (1979) 656 considers this a private donation, as Bowman and Rathbone (1992) 107 do too, stressing the differences between the final dedications made according to the Ptolemaic custom and those made later under Roman rule. See also Gorre (2009) no. 31, discussion (e).

and the members of the associations of Harsomteus and Hathor, as well as his involvement in the building of the refectory (?) of Isis (in her chapel) in collaboration with the *lesonis* and an association is recorded in three other Demotic steles.[66]

The construction of chapels at Dendera was led by Pachomis-Hierax and his son Pamenches, who lived in Edfu around 50–30 BC and were also nome-*stratēgoi* with priestly functions.[67] The construction Pamenches undertook not only in Edfu and Dendera but also in Elephantine, Bigeh, Elkab and Hieraconpolis shows that these nome-*stratēgoi* exercised control over several nomes.

Panopolis. Psais, *stratēgos* of the Panopolite nome around the mid first century BC, prophet, and agent of the temple of Min, was involved in the exploitation of quarries of the eastern desert – Min's territory – and built a jetty for the gods of Panopolis.[68] As he belonged to the temple administration, the royal administration of the nome, and probably the army, it is difficult to know on whose behalf he undertook this activity, and there is probably no point in trying to draw such distinctions here.

According to a Demotic inscription found in the Gebel Sheikh Haridi, Psais acted on behalf of the house of Pharaoh (*n Pr Pr-ʿ3*) along with his brother, three other men and their children. Psais was also the agent (*p3 sḥn*) of Min and Triphis. Gorre suggests that Psais used temple personnel to exploit the quarries, since he led his expedition as the general of the troops of the falcon (*p3mr mšʿ n p3b3k*). According to Gorre, this was a religious function, perhaps the head of an association. Although the short inscription does not mention soldiers, the exploitation of quarries was normally protected or supervised by the army, as is well attested for the Roman period.[69] It seems more likely that Psais led soldiers – perhaps also members of a religious association – than that he used temple personnel to supervise and guard the quarries. This specific task of the army can also be deduced from the activity

66 Vleeming (2001) nos. 165, 166, 159. For the final inscriptions of this kind at the end of the period of transition under Augustus, see the *stratēgos* Tryphon, I.Portes. 25 and Vleeming (2001) nos. 169–73.

67 For Pachomis-Hierax (*PP* I/VIII 265, 301, 990 = *PP* II/VIII 2130c = *PP* III/IX 5711), see De Meulenaere (1959) 13; Gorre (2009) no. 9; Thiers (2006) nos. 61, 285, 291. For Pamenches (*PP* I/VIII 292b, 2124d = *PP* III/IX 5688; 7433), see De Meulenaere (1959) 4–5, doc. B; Gorre (2009) no. 10; Thiers (2006) nos. 54, 285. For the economic role of the Egyptian elite, in particular in connection with quarrying activities, see Spiegelberg (1913); Quaegebeur (1979) 728.

68 Table A.2, no. 27; *PP* I/VIII 343 = *PP* III/IX 5421; Gorre (2009) no. 37; Thiers (2006) nos. 51, 282, 285.

69 Préaux (1979) 247–9. For the Roman period, e.g. Alston (1995) 79–86, particularly in Mons Claudianus.

of Ptolemaios-Pamenches, *stratēgos* in Edfu and a prophet of the god Min, who was certainly in charge of quarrying expeditions in the eastern desert at a time of intense building in the temple of Edfu.[70] In exchange for the gods' collaboration, probably in connection with the work in the quarries, Psais built a jetty that also served the temple. Gorre interprets the quarrying activity as the extraction of raw material for temple-building, which would indicate a combined action of the state and the temple led by a man with a dual function.[71]

Tenis-Akoris. An earlier dedication from Tenis-Akoris in the Hermopolite nome also contains hints of a close connection between the army, quarrying and temple-building (Table A.2, no. 28). Hakoris son of Herieus, who was perhaps the *stratēgos* of the nome, dedicated a chapel to the local goddess Isis Mochias in honor of Ptolemy V.[72] Hakoris was an influential member of the Egyptian elite who provided help to the general Comanus during the Great Revolt and was thus somehow connected to the army. Suto demonstrated that the main purpose of the rock-cut monumental dedication was to display Hakoris' loyalty to the king, as well as that of his community.[73] The chapel was located on the cliff above the town where quarrying took place; in fact, the chapel itself was altered by later quarrying activity.[74] Akoris' harbor was not only a strategic military point, but also the place where boats heading for Alexandria were loaded with limestone blocks from nearby quarries. This is reminiscent of the mention of the building of a jetty by Psais in Panopolis. The importance of the harbor and the placement of the chapel near the quarries make it almost certain that Hakoris was in charge of supervising the quarrying and organizing the transport of rock with the help of soldiers. But the clearest evidence of the link between the army and quarrying in Akoris is from the Roman period, when a centurion in a dedication recently found in Akoris states that he provided stones for

70 Gorre (2009) no. 4, discussion (d). For the family of Ptolemaios-Pamenches, see Chapter 8 section 8.6.2 and note 103.

71 Collaboration and exchange between rulers and temples to build temples is very plausible: a long text from Elephantine, I.Th.Sy. 244, contains in ll. 39–50 a request by the σκ[ληρουρουργοί], i.e. the stonecutters or stonemasons, working in the mountain of Syene – assuming the restitution is right; see commentary l. 39 – to Cleopatra and Ptolemy IX. See also C.Ord.Ptol. 57–60, esp. p. 174, although Piejko (1992) does not retain this restoration in his new edition of the text without comment. The same inscription contains letters of the queen and king to the priests of Khnum, dedicating land (ἀνιερω[μένης]) to Khnum and his priests, ll. 42, 59. On that text, see also Dietze (1995).

72 I.Akoris 1 = OGIS I 94, between 197 and 194/3 BC, see Chapter 7, section 7.2.3.2.

73 Suto (2003) esp. 5–12 and pl. 5 = Kawanishi and Suto (2005) 199–206 and fig. 30.

74 Suto (2003) 6 = Kawanishi and Suto (2005) 199.

the pavement of Alexandria.[75] The involvement of soldiers in quarrying is well attested for the Roman period, but further study is needed to make sense of the hints of similar tasks ascribed to Ptolemaic soldiers.[76]

Heracleopolis. According to inscriptions preserved on the statues of Horos, *mr-mšʿ* and prophet, which are among the earliest to mention temple-building in the Ptolemaic period, Horos undertook many restorations in the temples and built a large portico to the god Herishef.[77] Horos may have undertaken some of this work on behalf of Nectanebo and then acted independently under the Persians. On line 3 of the Louvre statue (A 88) he explains that he used his own money to recompense the people from whom he took some gardens to give them to the goddess Heneb. The inscription on a similar statue in Alexandria, moreover, shows that he provided the cult with wine. He thus contributed some of his own funds, but the autobiographical text is unclear about whether he financed the portico.

9.4 Fayyum

The dedications from the Fayyum are summarized in Table A.2, nos. 30–45. I have already discussed the dedication of land to Soknebtunis by the soldiers settled in **Kerkeosiris**.[78] This resembles the land donations to Souchos and Soknebtunis by groups of ex-ephebes, although the plots (*topoi*) were much smaller,[79] since the dedicated land was urban. The temple and the gymnasium probably had contiguous land, which partially explains these donations. So too, the members of an association whose president was Helenos, perhaps a soldier, donated land to Isis-Esenchebis in 68 BC. The same Helenos had already built the enclosure wall (*peribolos*), but whether the other members of the association, no doubt mostly soldiers, financed the

75 Suto (2003) 11 = Kawanishi and Suto (2005) 203.

76 See above, note 69.

77 See Table A.2, no. 28; Gorre (2009) no. 41; Thiers (2006) no. 0, pp. 285, 291, 294. See Chapter 7, section 7.2.2, p. 265, note 128 on Horos and the need to remove soldiers' residences before undertaking the construction (also mentioned in Chapter 8, sections 8.1 and 8.4).

78 See above, discussion on Edfu.

79 13 *pēcheis* in one case, 14 by 22 in another, *c.* 70–80 square meters, see I.Fayoum III 200–2 (90s BC). In I.Fayoum III 200 and 201 the gymnasium could be that of either Krokodilopolis or of Euhemeria, where the god Souchos had a temple, and in I.Fayoum III 202 that of Tebtunis; see Chapter 7, section 7.3.1. Thiers does not take these inscriptions into account, since they concern land. The army as an institution could own immovable property, see the "vineyards of the troops of the Greeks in Egypt" in a Demotic (re-)lease of temple land by two *Persai tēs epigonēs* and a "man of the Fayum" in Clarysse and Vandorpe (2006).

construction is not specified.[80] The temple was perhaps that of Theadelphia, for which a *chiliarchos* of the *machairophoroi* requested the right of asylum.[81]

Two of the earliest sources for soldiers involved in temple-building in the Fayyum, dated to the reign of Ptolemy VI, are further evidence of collective decision-making. The first is a petition written around 164 BC and connected with the previous years of political crisis. The president (*prostatēs*) of the *Ammonion* of the 45-aroura cleruchs at **Moeris** reminds the *stratēgos* of the destruction of the temple by Antiochus' soldiers and of its restoration.[82] Presumably he carried out the restoration along with other cleruchs. The second case is certainly a collective effort. The *chiliarchos* Horos son of Horos, along with another officer whose name is lost and their soldiers, dedicated a *pronaos* in **Karanis** (Heraclides *meris*).[83] These examples display what Launey called "esprit de corps," much as in the case of the dedications preserved in Hermopolis (I.Herm.Magn. 1) and Kom Ombo (I.Th.Sy. 188 and 190).[84]

In addition to these collective dedications, the army's role is apparent in other dedications from the second and first centuries BC. When temple-building in the Fayyum began under Ptolemy I and II, however, the financing may have been royal or have come from the temples themselves and their followers.[85] Among the twenty-seven dedications recorded by Thiers for the Fayyum (all but one in Greek), at least eleven are by members of the army.[86] In two cases the dedicants are priests, while in the others their function is not mentioned.

Three inscriptions concern Heron, a god imported by Thracian cavalrymen who had taken on Egyptian elements by the time of the dedications.[87] In the two inscriptions from Magdola (Polemon *meris*), a *hipparchos*

80 I.Fayoum III 204 (68 BC, unknown provenance) = Thiers (2006) nos. 50, 288, 291.

81 I.Fayoum II 114 (70 BC, Theadelphia); Fischer-Bovet (in press a).

82 τοῦ ἐμ Μοήρει [Ἀμμωνιείου τ]ῶν (τεσσαρακονταπενταρούρων), P.Tebt. III 781, ll. 2–3; Thiers (2006) nos. 25, 288, 292; see Chapter 7, section 7.2.2, note 136.

83 I.Fayoum I 83, probably the temple of Pnepheros and Petesouchos. Traces on the inscription suggest that the second dedicant or his father was a *hipparchos*; Thiers (2006) nos. 23, 286, 291.

84 Launey (1949) 1010–12.

85 Huss (1994) 26–8; Arnold (1999) 155, 158–9, appendix 320–3: temple-building in the Fayyum began under Ptolemy I in Tebtunis (Soktebtunis temple) and Ptolemy II in Arsinoe (Sobek temple), Theadelphia (Pnepheros temple), and Bacchias (?) (Sokanobkonneus temple), but no private dedications have yet been found.

86 See Table A.2, nos. 34–47. If the association of Isis Esenchebis in I.Fayoum III 204 is indeed composed of soldiers (see note 81), then twelve dedications come from the military milieu.

87 One of them, I.Fayoum III 152 (see note 89), is not a dedication and is not included in Thiers' corpus or in mine. On Heron, see Launey (1949) 959–74; Nachtergael (1996) 136 and note 36. E. Bernand (1975) 32–3 describes the temple and its Egyptian style.

dedicates a stone construction ([τὰ λ]ιθικὰ ἔργα), probably the *propylon* and the *pronaos*, to the god Heron (118 BC).[88] Two decades later, after a request by two members of the royal guard, the temple received the right of asylum – in this case a fiscal immunity – from Ptolemy X.[89] But the cult was not restricted to this part of the Fayyum. The third text comes from **Theadelphia** (Themistos *meris*, 67 BC), where Petosiris son of Heracles, with his wife and his children, dedicates a *propylon* to Heron.[90] The stele has the traditional Egyptian winged disc at the top, Heron on a horse in the middle, and the Greek dedication at the bottom. Petosiris was almost certainly a soldier, as in a parallel case from Theadelphia (I.Fayoum II 107), and his name suggests that he was from an Egyptian or Greco-Egyptian family.[91] His father's name might even reflect a connection with the local gymnasium. Were these three initiatives and their financing purely private? Nothing proves the contrary. The involvement of a *hipparchos* can be interpreted as a hint that temple precincts could be used as garrisons, since he would then have been responsible for maintaining the temple in good order.

The mention of family members probably indicates that the initiative and the financing in this case were private. This pattern also appears in dedications to another god of Theadelphia, Pnepheros (*c.* 137 BC). First, Agathodoros, an Alexandrian and a member of the second hipparchy, along with his wife and children, dedicated a *propylon* and a paved *dromos* (λίθινον δρόμον).[92] Later the same man, now serving as the cavalry officer of the cavalry settlers (ἱππάρχης ἐπ' ἀνδρων κατοίκων ἱππέων), and his family dedicated the door and the bar for closing it to the same god.[93] This is one of two cases attesting to members of the army taking continuing care of an Egyptian temple. The construction was probably privately financed and may have been motivated by the prospect of future promotions within the military hierarchy.[94]

88 I.Fayoum III 151 = Thiers (2006) nos. 34, 286, 291.

89 I.Fayoum III 152; see Rigsby (1996) no. 220, and generally on *asylia* in Egypt, 540–4. See Chapter 7, section 7.2.2 note 140 and below note 112; Bingen (2007a) 266–74 = Bingen (1989) 24–30.

90 I.Fayoum II 115, pl. 26: since the temple already had a *propylon*, presumably opening into the *peribolos* (see I.Fayoum II 105), this must have been the second *propylon*.

91 Thiers (2006) nos. 48, 279 on the mixed ethnic background of dedicants, 291; Nachtergael (1996) 136 and note 36.

92 I.Fayoum II 107; Thiers nos. 29, 281, 286, 291.

93 τ[ὴν] θύρα καὶ τὸ κλεῖθρον in I.Fayoum II 108; Thiers nos. 30, 286, 291. The right of *asylia* was requested by the priests of the same temple, through the *prostatēs* Socrates, in the first century BC; see I.Fayoum II 116.

94 A clear case of private initiative is that of the daughters of a *stratēgos* making a dedication to an Egyptian goddess (Bubastis); see I.Fayoum III 197, 175–170 BC. Because family members were not strictly speaking members of the army, I have not included them in my corpus.

The link between Egyptian temples and members of the army was strong in Theadelphia. Of eight dedications connected with construction in local temples, six are by members of the army, and the title of the dedicant is not mentioned in the other two.[95] In the only dedication in Demotic found in the Fayyum, also dated to the reign of Ptolemy VIII, Horpaisis son of Djedhat and his children dedicate the *propylon* of the temple of Harmotnis.[96] The fact that he was a *mr-mšʿ*, in this case perhaps an officer of the *machimoi* called a *laarchēs*, like Chomenis in Tebtunis, shows that Egyptian and Greek officers behaved similarly and reveals that the army was a place of cultural interaction.[97] *Laarchai* could also use Greek to display their euergetism, as for example one who dedicated an *Iseion* at Tebtunis (80/79–69/8 BC).[98] This dedication is one of the rare examples in which the dedicant clearly states that he paid for the construction himself ([*ek tōn i*]*diōn*).

Overlap of cultures and professions – the latter too strictly thought of as ethnically constrained – is manifest in the dedication of a *propylon* to the local crocodile god Pnepheros by Heliodoros son of Ptolemaios (Theadelphia?), a cavalryman with 100 arouras of land, in 107–101 BC.[99] In addition to his army position, Heliodoros accumulated the functions of *epistatēs*, *archiphylakitēs* and *grammateus* of the village, the latter a position usually held by Egyptians.[100] His mother Aunchis was Egyptian, although he may have had Greek ancestors, given that he was a member of the army and the local administration.[101] This background was probably common in the late second- and first-century Fayyum among the local Egyptian elite,

95 Thiers (2006) table. In my opinion, no. 39 (I.Fayoum II 111), the dedication of a sacred enclosure by Apollonios, son of Apollonios, and his children to Premarres is a close parallel to I.Fayoum II 107–8 discussed above.

96 Thiers (2006) nos. 33, 279, 285, 291, 295: this is the only Demotic inscription collected by Thiers for the Fayyum, although not all the dedicants in the other texts are of Greek origin. Outside the Fayyum, only one-third of his corpus is in Greek; see also Farid (1993) no. XXII.

97 For *mr-mšʿ*, see Chapter 8, note 57.

98 I.Fayoum III 145; E. Bernand (1971) no. 3; Thiers (2006) nos. 49, 286, 291, 294: the man's name is lost.

99 Cairo Museum no 89050 = SEG XXXIII 1359, found in Bacchias but perhaps from the temple of Pnepheros in Theadelphia; see Wagner and Leblanc (1983) with photo of the lintel on pls. LV–LVI; Aly (1997) 3. Thiers (2006) nos. 37, 286, 291 simply gives Bacchias as origin.

100 According to Wagner and Leblanc (1983) 339 and note 6, there is no parallel for the accumulation of these three functions, and only five other Greeks accumulated the functions of *epistatēs* and *archiphylakitēs* among ninety-five *epistatai* of villages and seventy-one *archiphylakitai*.

101 The second text in the inscription, ll. 5–6, adds his father, one or two brothers, their mother and another man as dedicants: "Ptolemaios also called Mestasytmis, son of Didumos, and . . . and their mother Aunchis, and Orsenouphis, son of Orsenouphis . . . " The fact that Heliodoros is "Macedonian" points to his status in the army (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.3.1), *contra* Wagner and Leblanc (1983) 339, who understand this as a real ethnic designation.

especially priestly families, who mixed with the Greek immigrants over the centuries, creating an ethnically and culturally mixed elite that dominated the most important offices. The financing of this *propylon* shows that this group had significant financial means.

Chiliarchoi are also attested among the private benefactors of Egyptian temples, as noted earlier with regard to Karanis. According to a stele found in **Euhemeria** (69 BC, Themistos *meris*), Apollophanes son of Bion from the city of Antioch, one of the first friends and spear-bearing commanders, restored the temple of the crocodile gods Psosnaus, Pnepheros and Soxis and obtained from the king the right of *asylia* for the sanctuary.[102] As usual, the petitioner stressed that the dynastic cult might be disturbed because of the decrepit state of the temple. He also insisted, as in other similar texts mentioned earlier, that the *stratēgos* be ordered not to allow anyone to forcibly enter the temple or harass the priests within it.[103] Lines 29–30 report that the king gave this order to the *stratēgos*. The text shows once again that soldiers were involved in temple-building and suggests a close relationship, even perhaps intermarriage, with the local priestly elite. That Harmodios, the administrator of the temple (*lesonis*), was a *katoikos hippeus* also illustrates this relationship between army and temple.[104] Harmodios was perhaps Egyptian or Greco-Egyptian, while his ethnic "Macedonian" referred to his status in the army.[105]

Van Minnen and Thiers have already pointed out that wealthy Greeks played a pivotal role in the relationship between the local population and the authorities.[106] I would go one step further by stating that these were mostly military men, often of a mixed ethnic background. The officers initiated the work, presumably for professional reasons and for socio-political "capital," but no doubt also out of devotion to the local gods.

9.5 Memphis and the Delta

Canopus. The Chief Admiral Callicrates constructed the temple of Isis and Anubis in Canopus on behalf of Ptolemy II.[107] Callicrates' personal political

[102] I.Fayoum II 135; C.Ord.Ptol. 69; Heinen (1994); Rigsby (1996) no. 224; Thiers (2006) nos. 46, 286, 291, 292–3; Fischer-Bovet (in press a).

[103] See Chapter 7, section 7.2.2 note 140, and this chapter, notes 89 and 112; Bingen (2007a) 266–74 = Bingen (1989) 24–30.

[104] See Chapter 8, section 8.5.1 and note 48.

[105] Heinen (1994) 160b; see also Launey (1949) 326; Boswinkel and Pestman (1982) 34–56.

[106] Van Minnen (2000) 447; Thiers (2006) 292–3.

[107] See Table A.2, no. 46; *PP* III 5164 = *PP* VI 14607; A. Bernand (1970) 232; Dietze (2000) 80 note 6; Thiers (2006) nos. 6, 285–6, 291.

interest in undertaking this construction is obvious, but once again the nature of the financing for the building is left unmentioned and we can only speculate whether royal funds were used as well.

Four nome-*stratēgoi* also took part in temple-building in Memphis and the Delta. All were priests at the very end of the second century or in the first century BC, and only Dorion in Memphis was clearly connected to the military. These men undertook temple restoration and construction as high officers of the king, probably using royal funds as well as their own. These acts of euergetism by members of the Egyptian priestly elite working at the highest levels of the Ptolemaic administration and/or army, and the lack of evidence for simple soldiers involved in either the labor or contributions, hint at some specific characteristics of temple-building finances in the Delta.

Memphis. In Memphis, Dorion is a perfect example of the integration of Egyptian priestly families into the most powerful strata of the ruling elite through the army.[108] Dorion was a *mr-mšʿ*, *stratēgos*, prophet of Horus-Khenty and Osiris of Athribis, priest of the company of the *machairophoroi* (saber-bearers) and royal scribe. He had probably been a *machairophoros* earlier in his career.[109] He paid for the restoration of the temple used for the Semitic cult of the Idumean *politeuma* and received in return the honors any *euergetēs* could expect: a crown, songs and an honorific decree inscribed on a stele in the sanctuary. The decree suggests that he bore some of the expense himself.[110]

To-Bener. In the Delta, Aristonicus was involved in the erection of statues in front of the temples of Amun in To-Bener (Matbul), probably to glorify the Ptolemaic dynasty.[111] This can be considered a minor undertaking, and Aristonicus certainly paid for it.

Tanis. Panemerit and Pikas, each of them prophet and *mr-mšʿ* in the first century BC, were both involved in the reconstruction of the temple of Horus of Mesen in Tanis.[112] They differ from the soldier-priests anterior to

108 See Table A.2, no. 47; SB V 8929 = OGIS II 737 (112/11 BC); Thompson (1988) 113. For the *politeuma* of the Idumeans, see Chapter 7, section 7.3.2; *PP* I/VIII 248 = *PP* II/VIII 2113b = *PP* III/IX 5519, 6337. Dorion is indeed Egyptian by his mother Harunchis-Heracleia, prophetess of Horus in Athribis, and has a Greek cultural background; see Gorre (2007) 242–5 and (2009) no. 54, discussion (a). The name Dorion is very common among Hellenized Egyptians; see commentaries to P.Count 6, l. 256; 26, l. 6; 47, l. 123; and vol. II, 326.

109 Fischer-Bovet (in press a).

110 But since the Greek decree shows that he acted as nome-*stratēgos* and priest of the *politeuma*, Gorre (2009) thinks that he also received royal money.

111 See Chapter 8, note 63 and Table A.2, no. 48.

112 The temple was discovered in 1991 in the central area of the mound; see Zivie-Coche (2004) 282. See Table A.2, nos. 49 and 50; Panemerit = *PP* I 294, 988 = *PP* II 2128 = *PP* III 5717 (statues D 88 = Cairo JE 67094, D 87 = Louvre E 15683, D 26 = Louvre E 15685); Pichaas = *PP* I/VIII 306 = *PP* III/IX 5775, 5778a, 6207 (statue Cairo JE 67093 and a lost statue);

the reign of Ptolemy XII in three ways.[113] First, they do not appear to be priests performing the daily ritual but administrators. In this period, the title "prophet" without specification of a geographical place seems systematically attached to the titles *mr-mšʿ* and *mr-mšʿ wr*. Their activity within the temples consisted of the administration and management of temple (re)building.[114] Second, both men were worshiped in their own chapels, which contained their statues, and were considered blessed (*ḥry*) after their death. Third, they mention no military activities. Thus the title *mr-mšʿ* refers instead to their office as nome-*stratēgoi*.[115] Normally *mr-mšʿ* should be followed by a geographical indication when it designates a nome-*stratēgos*, but this was not consistent, especially in the late Ptolemaic period.

We are left with questions about the identity of the initiator of the building projects in Tanis. The inscriptions make Panemerit and Pikas appear to be the initiators as part of their public functions. Indeed, references to the king at several points suggest at least some royal intervention and financing, which supports Gorre's interpretation of these nome-*stratēgoi* as representatives of the king, acting for him and on his orders.[116] Mention of the construction of their chapels and the erection of their statues, probably by local elites, on the other hand, appears in the middle of the text describing their achievements. They were thanked for their generosity by a local cult devoted to them, as they seem to have had considerable financial means. Zivie-Coche interprets them as autonomous local "top-men" and *euergetai* but may go too far in describing them as independent of the king.[117] Even if

Zivie-Coche (1987), (2001); Gorre (2009) nos. 83 and 84. Thiers (2006) nos. 42 and 43, 285, 291–2, 295 thinks that private initiative replaced state support during the rule of Ptolemy XII, since political difficulties prevented the king from supporting indigenous temples. But Lenger (1980) (C.Ord.Ptol. 68, see Chapter 7, section 7.2.2 note 140 and section 9.4 note 89) and Cauville and Devauchelle (1984) 46 argue that Ptolemy XII had a generous policy toward the Egyptians, basing their conclusion on the grant of *asylia* rights. The latter, however, cost the king nothing.

113 Panemerit began his career under Ptolemy X but reached his *acme* under Ptolemy XII.

114 Zivie-Coche (2004) 287–9.

115 The mention of the expulsion of the soldiers from the temple precinct (see Chapter 7, section 7.2.2) initially suggests that Panemerit had military or police functions. Quaegebeur in Van 't Dack *et al.* (1989) 102 believes that Panemerit was from a military family. But the phrasing suggests that it was the king who took care of the expulsion; see Chapter 7, section 7.2.2 and note 143.

116 See section 9.1.

117 The interpretation of Panemerit's statue D 88 = Cairo JE 67094 depends on the philological analysis of whether the pronouns refer more often to the king (thus Gorre) or to the god (thus Zivie-Coche); see Gorre (2009) no. 83, discussion (e). If the case of Panemerit is parallel to that of Pichaas, in which the sentences are less ambiguous, they both act in the name of the king and according to his orders.

we cannot be sure about the financing of the project, the sources of funding for the construction undertaken by Panemerit fall into the category I have labeled semi-private funding. Royal funds were probably used, since Panemerit had important financial functions in the administration as treasurer of Ptolemy XII. He added some of his own wealth when he wished, in order to enhance his political and social capital.

9.6 Conclusion

Soldiers' and officers' dedications to Egyptian gods for temple-building shed new light on two sets of issues. First, they make it clear that soldiers were among those who decided to undertake construction and funded it. A new model for financing Egyptian temples can be proposed that includes soldiers as a source of funding. In addition, regional variations in the chronology of acts of euergetism and the military ranks of the dedicants are noticeable. Second, soldiers' involvement in financing temple-building reveals new types of interaction between soldiers and civilians and between soldiers from different and/or mixed ethnic groups. Officers played the intermediate role between local communities and the king.

The magnitude of Egyptian temple-building under the Ptolemies as recorded by Arnold and Huss suggests that the kings initiated the overall policy.[118] Their program of temple construction had two main purposes: to obtain legitimacy by working in collaboration with the Egyptian priesthood, and to keep temple garrisons in good condition.[119] In the third century soldiers dedicated a Greek sanctuary in Hermopolis to Ptolemy III, and only a few dedications by soldiers to Egyptian temples are attested. From the second century BC onward, however, the royal building program, established in agreement with the prominent priesthood and supervised by court officials but also officers, was complemented in practice by individual initiatives, often by soldiers and officers. Prospects of promotion may have encouraged officers and soldiers to go beyond their formal responsibilities for supervising construction, by initiating and ultimately even financing indigenous temple-building.[120] Moreover, other similar phenomena such

118 Arnold (1999) appendix, 320–3; Huss (1994) 26–39.

119 As mentioned in note 54, dedications of land could be connected to land grants to soldiers by the king; see also the temple-building in Hermopolis in 9.3.

120 Two cases suggest promotion as an incentive: first, Herodes, on the island of Satis (Elephantine), rose from *phrourarchos* to *stratēgos* (I.Th.Sy. 302–3, Ptolemy VI and VIII), see




Figure 9.5 Proportion of soldiers' acts of euergetism

as requesting asylum rights for Egyptian temples from the king appear in the later period and were often initiated by members of the army, suggesting that soldiers were becoming the protectors or benefactors of local sanctuaries.[121]

As for the sources of funding, soldiers and officers contributed a large share of this when they were stationed near the temples or when, as in some cases, the temple precincts were used as garrisons. The role of the army compared with other groups within Egypt can be evaluated against Thiers' corpus of acts of euergetism (Figure 9.5 and Table 9.5). His dataset contains

note 30; second, Agathodoros in the Fayyum twice dedicated a temple in Theadelphia and rose from member of the second hipparchy to *hipparchos* (I.Fayoum II 107 and 108, Ptolemy VIII); see note 92.

121 For a similar interpretation, see Bingen (2007b) 272; Fischer-Bovet (in press a).

Table 9.5. *Proportion of soldiers' acts of euergetism*

	Total dedications	Dedications by soldiers	% of dedications by soldiers
Thebaid and Nile Valley	25	12	48
Fayyum	27	12	44
Delta and Memphis	11	3	27
Total	63	27	43

sixty-three cases of euergetism involving Egyptian temple-building, forty-one in Greek, twenty-one in Egyptian, and one bilingual. In addition to state and temple funding, some of the building projects were the result of euergetism *ob honorem* by those who supervised the work for the king: twenty-seven of these individuals were from the military sphere, sometimes with priestly functions, and five were only officials.[122] There were also nine priests. Another part of the building projects relied on private euergetism, since in twenty-two cases the functions of the *euergetēs* are not noted, or in some cases not preserved.[123] If one looks only at the Fayyum, twelve of twenty-seven dedications (44%) were by members of the army, two by priests. The function of the other dedicants, who have both Greek and Egyptian names, is either not inscribed or lost.

Soldiers were probably even more prominent as dedicants than this examination of Thiers' corpus suggests. To the twenty-seven cases involving members of the army recorded by Thiers, I would add twenty-one soldiers' dedications probably related to temple-building. Since the object of the dedication is not mentioned or is lost, Thiers did not take them into consideration. I include them because they are dedicated to Egyptian gods and are found within Egyptian temple precincts. They mostly come from Philae and Elephantine and represent further evidence for the important role played by the army at the southern border. I have also incorporated a few dedications of land in the Fayyum and in Edfu. Thiers did not consider these "constructions," but they add a unique aspect to our understanding of the relationship between the army and Egyptian temples.

[122] For officials, see Thiers (2006) no. 1, director of the work; no. 8, estate agent of the *dioikētēs* (Zenon); no. 11, director of the harem; no. 18, preceptor of the nome; no. 60, *epistatēs* of the village.

[123] I consider Thiers (2006) no. 48 to be soldiers, although they have no function attested.

Table 9.6. *Ideal types of the sources of funding of Egyptian temple-building*

Single sources	
A	Private wealth of the soldiers and officers only
B	Private wealth of the officials only
C	Temple revenues only
D	State taxes only
Two sources	
E	Private wealth of the soldiers and officers + Private wealth of the officials
F	Private wealth of the officials + Temple revenues
G	Temple revenues + State taxes
H	State taxes + Private wealth of the soldiers and officers
Three sources	
I	Private wealth of the soldiers and officers + Private wealth of the officials + State taxes
J	Private wealth of the soldiers and officers + Private wealth of the officials + Temple revenues
K	Private wealth of the officials + Temple revenues + State taxes
L	Private wealth of the soldiers and officers + Temple revenues + State taxes
Four sources	
M	Private wealth of the soldiers and officers + Private wealth of the officials + Temple revenues + State taxes

The model of the multiple sources of financing Egyptian temple-building sketched at the beginning of this chapter aims to schematize the information, frequently ambiguous, left by dedications and biographical texts. It highlights two aspects of the financing that are often overlooked. First, the borders between state, temple and private funds were blurry. An ideal type for each source of funding and the many possible combinations for financing a given building is listed in Table 9.6 and schematized in a diagram below (Figure 9.6). Each ideal type is attested in our sources in one way or another: the dedications by the kings in Philae illustrate area D, those by the administrators mentioned above might exemplify area B, and those by priests who do not belong to the army might be located in C-F-G-K.[124] The most common scenarios for the financing of Egyptian temples – which I called semi-private – are represented in areas F-H-I-J-K-L-M, a combination of public and private funding generally gathered by individuals with a foot in several milieux.

Second, soldiers (Figure 9.6) form the group of *euergetai* whose profession was most heavily represented in the sources. Soldier-priests who were

124 For kings, see note 24. For administrators, see note 122.




Figure 9.6 Sources of funding of Egyptian temple-building

also nome-*stratēgoi* were responsible for many acts of euergetism *ob honorem* recorded in hieroglyphic biographical texts on their statues.[125] Their position in the hierarchy suggests that they could easily use several sources of funding (M).[126] Yet some of them had less clear military functions at the time of the dedication (K).[127] Apart from the highest strata of command involved in temple-building, mostly Egyptians, officers and their troops played an immensely important role in the second and first centuries BC in terms of private funding, represented by area A.[128] They reported their contributions in Greek dedications engraved on part of monuments and on steles, just as a group of cleruchs did in the third century for the Greek temple of Hermopolis (Table A.2, no. 18).

By focusing on the army, I do not wish to suggest that the king did not finance Egyptian temple-building. Arnold's appendix and Huss' table show that the scope of temple-building under the Ptolemies was far more extensive than was accomplished by the army.[129] The role of temples was significant as well. If Thiers did not find many dedications by priests, it is probably because their actions were internal to the temples. Even so, soldiers and officers were an important source of local, private and semi-private funding, regardless of whether they financed what they dedicated completely, or whether they had some temple or royal assistance. The king

125 See the data-set for Upper Egypt and above all the Delta.

126 See Table A.2, nos. 20–2, 25–7, 29, 47–9. In chronological order: Horos (Heracleopolis), Dorion (Memphis), Petimouthes (Thebes), Psais (Panopolis). We can probably add Aristonicus (To-Bener) and Pamonthes-Plenis (Hermonthis), as well as Callimachus, whose acts of euergetism are attested in a bilingual inscription.

127 See Table A.2, nos. 23–4, 49–50. In chronological order: Panemerit and Pichaas (Tanis), Panas and Ptolemaios (Tentyrite nome), all from the first century BC or even first century AD.

128 See Table A.2, nos. 1–17, 19, 30–45; = 38 of 49 cases.

129 See note 8.

relied on the army because the soldiers were stationed in close proximity to the temple walls or even within them, and because they also played a role in the exploitation of quarries for building material.[130]

If the model sketched out above correctly displays the complex combination of sources of funding, only a careful examination of the individual sources can allow us to identify variations by time and place. Dedications by soldiers in Egyptian temples first appear in the Thebaid in the second century BC. Their share of the financing can be seen as a contribution to the temple-building program led by the kings after the Great Revolt (Period B) and throughout the second century. The dedicants were often garrison commanders (*phrourarchoi*) who dedicated their work to the king and the indigenous gods on behalf of the *stratēgos* or *epistratēgos*. This specific phrase, not found elsewhere, suggests that in the southern Thebaid *stratēgoi/epistratēgoi* supervised the construction more closely than they did in other regions. In addition, units of soldiers demonstrated *esprit de corps* by dedicating sections of temples. In the first century BC, however, this type of evidence disappears in Upper Egypt. Instead, nome-*stratēgoi* with military careers become the typical *euergetai*, active almost exclusively in the nome-capitals (Thebes, Dendera, Panopolis). Sources recording temple-building in the Delta are scarce compared with those from Upper Egypt but are similar in some ways to the second waves of euergetism seen in the nome-capitals of the Thebaid in the first century BC. The *euergetai ob honorem* in the Delta, however, were *stratēgoi*-administrators rather than soldiers. In the Fayyum the king probably also had a less aggressive building policy.[131] But he relied on military men, even if less directly and systematically than in the south. The many dedications in the Fayyum reveal private and semi-private funding of Egyptian temples already under Ptolemy VI, immediately after Period B. They display euergetism *ob honorem* by officers, with dedications sometimes made collectively with their troops or members of their families. The military ranks of the dedicants, mainly *chiliarchoi* and *hipparchoi*, are lower than in other regions and the construction certainly more modest. Even so, soldiers' interest in the local gods and their temples is remarkable in the Fayyum at this period, whereas in the third century the euergetism of cleruchs was directed instead toward founding gymnasia.

The dynamic behind soldiers and officers' dedications and acts of euergetism allows us to identify developments in the soldiers' role in the *chōra* and the use to which their position between local and central institutions

130 For the quarries, see the role of Psais and Ptolemaios-Pamenches in Panopolis and Hakoris in Tenis-Akoris (section 9.3).

131 See Arnold (1999) appendix, 320–3.

was put. Acting as *euergetai*, they increased their own political and social capital by demonstrating loyalty to the king and the temple and legitimated their power through their connections to these institutions. Such behavior, which spread during the second century BC, indicates a new ideological development among the members of the Ptolemaic army that is not found – or is at least not expressed in the same way – in other Hellenistic armies. By showing concern for the cults of indigenous gods, soldiers were increasingly integrated into the life and culture of the Egyptian countryside, while some of them in this period were simply of Egyptian origin.

Complete units or members of soldiers' associations often dedicated temple-buildings in company with their officers and commanders.[132] Sometimes the former even acted without the latter. *Esprit de corps* was an essential psychological element to be encouraged among soldiers. Their capacity for collective action in support of Egyptian culture and religion, as revealed by these dedications, is central to my thesis about the role of the army in Egypt.[133] The Ptolemaic state was able to consolidate mixed groups of Egyptians, Greeks and foreigners by using the army as a place where men could reveal their loyalty to the king by displaying concerns for local matters. Dedications by troops stationed in a single place, sometimes including groups beyond the institutional boundaries of the army, also reveal investment and interaction with the community with an eye toward its welfare. In between the lines we can see the integration of soldiers into the life and culture of the *chōra* and the integration of Egyptians into the army, both of which were necessary for the stability of the Ptolemaic state. If collective action is often motivated by ethnic identity, socio-economic strata and professions play a role as well. Soldiers and officers joined the higher economic strata of Egyptian society in the *chōra*.

In conclusion, a study of Egyptian temple-building funded by soldiers yields two main results regarding the evolution of the role of the army within the Ptolemaic state and society. First, from the mid second century BC onward the king increasingly relied on private and semi-private sponsorship by his officials and officers. This strongly suggests that the army's functions were becoming more diverse in this period and were by no means exclusively military. Second, Egyptians were integrated into the army, and soldiers were integrated into the local elite. Some examples suggest the formation of a local elite that comprised both Greek and Egyptian soldiers acting in

132 See Table A.2, nos. 4, 6, 14–17, 19, 26–7, 29–32 = eleven of forty-nine cases.

133 I use this concept according to Turchin's theory of "asabiya" defined as "the capacity of a group for collective action"; see Turchin (2003) 43 and his Chapter 3. I explain it in Chapter 7, section 7.3, p. 280.

support of the local gods. This sheds new light on professional and ethnic divisions, which are often over emphasized by Hellenistic historians. The army's role in society changed between the third and the second centuries BC, and the soldiers' new style of behavior was made possible by the ethnic interaction that occurred within the army, and by their own socio-economic and ideological integration into local populations.

10 Conclusion

Apollonios son of Hermias was a cavalryman in the Ptolemaic army, probably a cleruch, who lived in Tebtunis in the Fayyum in the mid second century BC.[1] But he was also a prophet of the local god Souchos and had to pay back a loan to the chief administrator of an Egyptian temple, as we learn from a Demotic document. Around the same time in Upper Egypt, the dedication of a chapel on behalf of Ptolemy VI and Cleopatra II by the infantrymen, the cavalrymen and other people employed by the army and stationed at Kom Ombo resembles the way in which Greek soldiers worshiped their king.[2] The soldiers in the Kom Ombo garrison, however, dedicated their chapel to Haroeris-Apollo and the associated gods in the Egyptian temple of Sobek and Haroeris in thanks for their benevolence. These two examples, out of many, challenge the idea that the Ptolemaic army was merely a colonial tool that served to expand and maintain coercive power over the largest possible territory. Instead, military institutions and their functions developed in subtle ways in Egypt after Alexander's conquest.

This book has proposed a new approach to understanding changes in the organization and composition of the Ptolemaic army, and changes in the role of soldiers as socio-economic actors interacting with civilians throughout Egypt as well. Some soldiers had been intruders in private houses or in temples, especially during the first decades of Ptolemaic rule and the period of crisis that lasted from *c.* 220 to *c.* 160 BC (Period B). Without neglecting this obvious aspect of military power, a critical survey of the sources suggests that the situation was different in the time of Apollonios and the soldiers who honored Haroeris-Apollo. The Ptolemaic army had helped to transform Egypt into a site of complex cultural interaction and of the emergence of an ethnically mixed population within the upper strata of local communities.

The army emerges as a unifying force between different groups in three areas, at least from the second century BC onward. The first is cultural and ideological. Soldiers were involved in local religious activity and interacted

[1] *PP* II/VIII 2864a = *PP* III/IX 5453b, see p. 318 and note 48. [2] I.Th.Sy. 188.

with the indigenous community. Some units financed Egyptian temple-building, while at other times officers took a leading role as benefactors of their communities, as was established in Chapter 9, expanding the army's functions beyond the military domain. Officers also served as intermediaries between local and central structures, by promoting the image of the king at festivals that were organized by military associations but were accessible to individuals who did not belong to the army. The cult of the king and the communal activities it stimulated also reinforced solidarity between soldiers and cohesion with the other members of soldiers' associations (Chapter 7).

The second sphere is political, as was argued in Chapter 8. After the Great Revolt, the Ptolemies reasserted control over certain parts of the country by relying on members of the Egyptian priesthood who accumulated military functions. This was part of a larger reshaping of the Ptolemaic state during and after the period of crisis (Period B). The fact that Egyptians and Greco-Egyptians served as intermediaries between local and central state institutions in the Hellenistic world has often been overlooked, because studies tend to focus on Greek individuals within the Greek urban system.

The third area in which integration occurred, explored primarily in Chapters 6 and 7, was socio-economic. Bilingual families' archives from garrison towns offer a glimpse of the social networks and marriage patterns of military groups. Officers enjoyed a comfortable standard of living, and that of professional soldiers was fairly good as well. Moreover, all had opportunities to increase their income by leasing out their land or agricultural items, or by borrowing and lending grain or money. Whether officers or soldiers, cavalrymen or infantrymen, they married one another's sisters and daughters and acted as witnesses in contract documents. These relationships created a strong sense of solidarity between soldiers of different ethnic backgrounds. Another military group examined in Part II was cleruchs. For many men, military service was in fact above all else a way to acquire land. In the *chōra* Greek cleruchs who had been settled on land in the third century gradually integrated into the local Egyptian elite. In the second century the grant of land was extended to a considerable number of Egyptians and Greco-Egyptians, and very large plots were no longer allotted, leveling the social differentiation of the previous century, which reflected soldiers' origins. Most *machimoi* were Egyptians, and the fact that a significant portion of the *katoikoi hippeis* from this period were of Greco-Egyptian or Egyptian origin has often been overlooked.

The reasons for these developments in the composition, organization and role of the army between the third and the second centuries BC were

explained in Part I. Many of the immigrants who came to Egypt after Alexander's conquest were Greek soldiers, although the percentage of Greeks was often exaggerated and the presence of Egyptian soldiers early on overlooked (Chapter 5). Changes in the composition of the army can be detected by examining the use of ethnic designations by the military administration. The disappearance of many ethnics was an obvious consequence of the end of large-scale immigration. Moreover, the small number of ethnic designations widely used in Period C, *Persēs* and *Makedōn*, took on a special meaning in the army. They were in fact mainly ascribed to professional soldiers recruited locally, and thus to Greco-Egyptians and Egyptians. The large-scale reshaping of the Ptolemaic state after the period of crisis also included reforms in the army's structures, notably in the cavalry and infantry units (Chapter 4). The main factors driving this change were the loss of external possessions and their revenues, the high cost of the fleet and of mercenaries needed to compensate for the drawbacks of the cleruchic system, and the difficulty of dealing with soldiers who were to be demobilized or who were dissatisfied with their pay after a war (Chapter 3).

Greek troops already played a role in Egyptian society in the three centuries preceding the Ptolemaic dynasty (Chapter 2). They had brought with them the best weapons and strategies available in the seventh and sixth centuries BC and were the last in a series of foreign soldiers to join the Egyptian army and integrate into local communities. Their numbers were limited, however, and their role was amplified by ancient Greek authors. The Ptolemies reused the main garrisons from the Late period army, and probably some of their soldiers and part of the fleet as well.

As was noted in Chapter 1, this study has been influenced by the work of historical sociologists on state formation, in particular Mann, Tilly and Turchin. This approach connects the evolving role of the army in Ptolemaic Egypt with the political, economic and social spheres. First, pressure was exerted on the king by the elite, both Greek and Egyptian, and in particular by the military elite. Second, bargaining power became an important issue between the king and the soldiers: in the third century the king had to attract the best soldiers with large *klēroi*, whereas in Period C recruitment was mainly domestic, reducing its cost and pressure on the kings. Third, warfare had a positive effect on the economy and society, through what Austin and Chaniotis have characterized as "the redistribution of material goods, land, and money,"[3] and generated a high degree of social mobility, especially for men. It was not only soldiers who benefited from war, but

[3] Austin (2001) 90; Chaniotis (2005), esp. 139, 149.

many other groups as well, including men who constructed fortifications and weapon manufacturers. This was also true for individuals involved in economic activities stimulated by the presence of the army, such as trade, the provision of supplies, and even rebuilding after damage caused by troops. In the case of the Ptolemies, invasions of their external possessions and of Egypt, as well as the Great Revolt, were of course harmful, but Ptolemy V's sons were able to reorganize the state, and rebuilding went on afterward.

The underlying factor that drove changes in the army's structure, however, was the endless competition between almost equal military powers, the Ptolemies, Seleucids and Antigonids. As most of the Ptolemies' wars were against the Seleucids, my framework compares the resources and strategies of the two states, although these evolved in a larger system that can be described as an "anarchy interstate system."[4] In the third century BC the Ptolemies' most significant expenses on the military side were for maintaining the fleet, but such expenses were difficult to sustain and created internal pressure unless the investment resulted in hegemony over other states within a short period of time. This led the Ptolemies to try to lower expenditures for their land army, demobilizing earlier than their enemies did and creating a regular army of cleruchs. Ptolemy III's decision was probably also based on an evaluation of the stability of his empire, and perhaps on the false belief that his main rival, Seleucus II, was weakened by internal conflicts and no longer a serious threat. The Ptolemaic state became an easy target, or, for Eckstein's terminology, moved closer to a "status-quo" type of state, satisfied with its situation, rather than a "revisionist" state seeking expansion.[5] When the Seleucids attacked in 219 BC, this led to a power-transition crisis.

This study has attempted to show that the Ptolemaic army developed into an engine of socio-economic and cultural integration for Greeks and Egyptians from the second century onward as a result of external factors (pressure from the Seleucids and the subsequent intervention of Rome) and internal factors (settlement and marriage patterns). The settlements of cleruchs in the *chōra*, where the transmission of privileges to children was not restricted as it was in the poleis, I suggested in Chapter 7, facilitated the interaction of the immigrants with the local Egyptian population, notably through intermarriage and soldiers' associations. The extent to which the Seleucids were a threat had an effect on the organization of the Ptolemaic army, the number of soldiers in garrisons, and the need to rely on an extensive cleruchic system. The most plausible counterfactual to test this

[4] Eckstein (2006) 25. [5] See Chapter 3, note 2.

causal chain is to evaluate what might have happened had Ptolemy III been able to keep all the Seleucid territories against which he campaigned in 245 BC and take control of the Seleucid empire, and had he not lost the naval battle at Andros against the Antigonids. He might have obtained supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean and then have relied mainly on his fleet and on the second or third generations of Greco-Macedonian soldiers who belonged to his army and the Seleucid army. At that point, he could have reduced the number of his soldiers to lower his military costs, but in any case he would have had far more resources, and the bargaining power of the soldiers would have diminished. Ptolemy would have left a few troops in Egypt, as the Achaemenids did before him and as the Romans did afterward. The settlement of Greek soldiers in the *chōra* would never have reached the scale it did, and most of them would have been stationed in the garrisons in the poleis. If intermarriage had truly been infrequent in the early third century BC, no mixed Greco-Egyptian local elite would have emerged. Finally, there would have been no major threat such as the Fourth Syrian War to drive the enrollment of a large number of Egyptians into the army. Nor would there have been a need to rely on men with a foot in both the army and the Egyptian temples, or to enroll Egyptians as professional soldiers in the south, because this new eastern empire would have been strong enough to send troops stationed elsewhere to repress a revolt in the Thebaid, as the Romans did in the early 20s BC. As a consequence, the army would not have become a unifying force between ethnic groups. There would have been no cavalryman prophet of Souchos, like Apollonios son of Hermias, and the dedication of a chapel in the temple of Haroeris and Sobek by a group of soldiers would have been highly unlikely. The point of this counterfactual is not to go on speculating about the likely outcome of an encounter between this imaginary eastern empire and the Romans. Instead, this is a heuristic tool to trace the effect of warfare on the emergence of hybridized population groups and on the development of a hybrid culture.

The study that comes to a close at this point aims to illustrate why and how war functioned as a cultural and social force in Ptolemaic Egypt. It may stimulate new ways of thinking about the army in Ptolemaic Egypt and, more broadly, about state ideology and the nature of ethnic interaction in the Hellenistic states. The decisions that were taken by the Ptolemies in terms of organization and composition of the army had a real effect on the Egyptian society. The Ptolemies did not try to maintain a Greek military society within Egypt but to rely on various population groups according to their needs. The inclusion of Egyptians into the army has

often been considered a weakness of the Ptolemaic state, but in fact it was a strength that shows the adaptation of the Ptolemies to the demographic situation in Egypt, which may have contributed to the long-lasting rule of the dynasty. The army became a tool of ethnic interaction that indirectly produced multicultural elites at diverse levels of society and, through this process, created some political stability in the state. It is not to say that Egypt became uniformly multicultural, but rather that multiculturalism operated within population groups that were for a large part connected to the army. In fact, Egypt developed into an ethnically more integrated society earlier than commonly thought. The descendants of these groups would later play, through different means, an important role in the metropoleis of Roman Egypt.

Appendix

Table A.1. *List of soldiers and officers with priestly functions*

In chronological order and from south to north.
Soldier = lower-level soldier.
* = *PP* II/VIII 2110–2145 = category of officers with other titles.
** = *PP* I/VIII 207–355 = nome-*stratēgoi*.
*** = belonging to both categories above.
Text in bold + italic: involvement in temple-building (see Chapter 9).

	Name	Reference in *PP*, Gorre (G) or Chevereau (C)	Region	Place
	330–300 BC			
1	***Horos****	2142; G41	Nile valley	Heracleopolis
2	Nectanebo***	285 = 2122	Delta	Tanis
3	Nectanebo's son (no name)	G74 (no *PP*)	Delta	Sebennytos
	300–250 BC	–	–	–
	250–200 BC			
4	Chaapis*	2139; G46		Memphis
5	Teos I*	2138; G80	Delta	Tanis
6	Apries* (father of **12**)	2111b	Delta	Tanis
	200–150 BC			
7	Herodes	2059; G1	Thebaid	Philae
8	Pachou/Pasas I*** (father of 292a)	301b = 2130e	Thebaid	Edfu
9	Heliodoros (soldier)	3687	Fayyum	Krokodilopolis
10	Horos	G51 (no *PP*)	Delta	Memphis and Letopolis
11	Dioscorides	27; G50	Delta	Memphis and Alexandria
12	Teos II* (son of **6**)	2138a; G81	Delta	Tanis
13	Djedhor	C296 (no *PP*)	Delta	Sebennytos
14	Petemiusis*	2133a (fleet)	Delta	Leontopolis
15	Petemenophis	5723	Delta	Sile
	150–100 BC			
16	Peteesis	5470; G3	Thebaid	Philae

(*cont.*)

Table A.1. (*cont.*)

	Name	Reference in *PP*, Gorre (G) or Chevereau (C)	Region	Place
17	Ptolemaios-Pamenches*** (son of **8**, father of **18**)	292a = 2124c = 2134b; G4	Thebaid	Edfu
18	***Apollonios-Pachou/Pasas* II** *** (son of 292a)	301c = 2130f; G6	Thebaid	Edfu
19	***Pachomis*****	300a; G8	Thebaid	Edfu
20	Horos (soldier)	4145	Thebaid	Pathyris/Hermonthis
21	Peteharsemtheus (soldier)	10939	Thebaid	Pathyris/Hermonthis
22	Petosiris (soldier)	6696c	Thebaid	Thebes
23	Hersiesis (soldier)	3216	Thebaid	Thebes
24	Phommous (*epistratēgos*)	202; G23	Thebaid	Thebes
25	Dionysios-Plenis (soldier)	2544	Nile valley	Akoris
26	Thearos (soldier)	2656	Nile valley	Koma, Heracleopolis
27	Dion (soldier)	2568	Nile valley	Heracleopolis
28	Apollonios (soldier)	2864a	Fayyum	Tebtunis
29	Dionysios (soldier)	2632	Fayyum	Kerkeosiris
30	***Dorion******	248 = 2113b; G54		Memphis
31	Apollonios-Apernyas-Pehernefer*	2111a; G55		Memphis
32	Amphiomis I* (father of **33**)	2109a	Delta	Tanis
33	Pelaias* (son of **32**)	2131b; G82	Delta	Tanis
34	Pensi* (father of **48**)	2133	Delta	Tanis
35	Onnophris*	2124a	Delta	Mendes
36	Amphiomis II**	210a = 2109b; G76	Delta	Mendes
37	Horos*	2112b; G71	Delta	Sais
	100–50 BC			
38	Eraton**	252; G2	Thebaid	Philae
39	Pasas III (grandson of 301c)	G7	Thebaid	Edfu
40	Mencheres*** (father of **54** and **55**)	283 = 2121; G11	Thebaid	Pathyris/Hermonthis
41	Callias	2445	Thebaid	Thebes
42	Korax-Georgios***	237 = 2113 = 2119; G29	Thebaid	Tentyrite nome
43	***Psais***** (father of **44**)	343; G37	Nile valley	Panopolis
44	Paniskos-Petiminis ** (son of **43**)	305	Nile valley	Panopolis

Table A.1. (*cont.*)

	Name	Reference in *PP*, Gorre (G) or Chevereau (C)	Region	Place
45	Harmodios (soldier)	2616	Fayyum	Euhemeria
46	Petosiris	5769 (fleet); G57		Memphis
47	Pikas*** (or fourth cent. BC?)	2133c = 13783 (fleet); G56		Memphis
48	***Panemerit**** (son of **34**)	294 = 2128; G83	Delta	Tanis
49	***Pikas****	306; G84	Delta	Tanis
50	***Aristonicus***	G75 (no *PP*)	Delta	To-Bener
51	***Petimouthes****	2112a; G73	Delta	Diospolis Kato? and Thebes
	50–25 BC			
52	***Pachomis-Hierax**** (father of **53**)	265 = 2130c; G9	Thebaid	Edfu
53	Pamenches*** (son of **52**)	292b = 2124d; G10	Thebaid	Edfu
54	***Pamonthes-Plenis**** (son of **40**)	292c = 2125; G12	Thebaid	Pathyris/Hermonthis
55	Kalasiris*** (son of **40**)	266 = 2118; G12	Thebaid	Thebes
56	***Panas**** (father of **58**)	293; G30	Thebaid	Tentyrite nome
57	Pachompsais	G32 (no *PP*)	Thebaid	Tentyrite nome
58	***Ptolemaios-Psenpchuis**** (son of **56**)	300 = 2135; G31	Thebaid	Tentyrite nome
59	Ptolemaios**	319	Fayyum	Krokodilopolis
	No date			
60	Zmanres or Ousimarres*	2124b		Memphis
61	Ankhhapi	C292*bis*	?	?
62	Neferouadji	C291*bis*	?	?

Table A.2. *List of acts of euergetism dedicated by soldiers to Egyptian temple-building*

No. 18 is in italic because it is a dedication from a Greek temple and was not included in the statistics.
Text in bold concerns soldier-priests (Chapter 8), generally hieroglyphic biographical texts.

	Inscription	Name	Title/Function	Type of work	Dating	Place	Thiers
1	I.Philae I 5	Socrates, son of Apollodoros, Locrian	soldier (?)	block in the temple of Isis	Ptolemy IV	Philae	
2	I.Th.Sy. 309	x	elephant hunter(s) (?)	altar for the safety of the elephants to Isis, Sarapis, Harpocrates, Amun	Ptolemy IV (?)	Philae	
3	I.Th.Sy. 314	Cleon, son of Diogenes	*hēgemōn* and *phrourarchos*	block in the colonnade of the temple of Isis; dedicated to Isis; for Ptolemaios, master of the Royal Hunt, his wife and his son, *archikynēgos* and master of the Royal Hunt	Ptolemy V	Philae	
4	I.Philae I 11	x and the members of the association of Heracles	*phrourarchos*	construction of the temple of Arensnuphis	Ptolemy VI	Philae	no. 27
5	I.Philae I 15	Apollonios	*phrourarchos* of Philae	block in the pavement of the temple of Arensnuphis; dedicated to the gods of Philae; second text is an act of adoration to Isis by Ptolemaios son of Ptolemaios; for Boethos, *epistratēgos, stratēgos, Thebarchos* of the Thebaid	Ptolemy VIII	Philae	
6	I.Philae I 20	Demetrius and the troops stationed in Ptolemais, infantrymen, cavalrymen and sailors, Apollonios being *phrourarchos*	*epistratēgos* and *stratēgos*	block found in the walls of the court of the temple of Isis	Ptolemy VIII	Philae	

7	I.Th.Sy. 318	Philotas, son of Genthios, from Epidamnos	*phrourarchos*	block reused in the *dromos*; dedicated to Isis, Sarapis, Horus, and to the gods of the Abaton and of Philae; for Parthenios, *stratēgos* of the Thebaid (?)	Ptolemy VIII	Philae	
8	I.Th.Sy. 319 and I.Philae 64	Hermias, son of Platon	*stratēgos* and in charge of the finances	block reused in the *dromos*; dedicated to Khnum, Isis, Hera, Athena, and to the gods of the Abaton	Ptolemy VIII	Philae	
9	I.Th.Sy. 320	Nestor, son of Melanippos, from Phaselis	*phrourarchos* of Syene, Elephantine and Philae, *gerrophylax* and *stratēgos* of this nome	block re-used in the exterior walls; dedicated to Isis, Sarapis, Horus, and to the gods of the Abaton; for Athenaios, *stratēgos* of the region of Elephantine	Ptolemy VIII	Philae	
10	Assuan 1057	Peteesis	first flag-bearer (military), *kalasiris* (*gl-šr*), prophet	donations to the temples of Philae and Elephantine (harp, bed, doors)	Ptolemy VIII (?)	Philae	no. 62
11	I.Philae I 25	Philoxenos	secretary of Phommous (the *epistratēgos*?)	small altar	Ptolemy IX	Philae	
12	I.Th.Sy. 242	Chaireas, son of Melas, Boeotian	*phrourarchos* of Elephantine	altar dedicated to Khnub *et al.*; for Boethos, *archisōmatophylax* and *stratēgos*	Ptolemy VI	Elephantine	
13	I.Th.Sy. 243	Asclepiades, son of Ammonios, Macedonian	*phrourarchos* of Elephantine	monument dedicated to Khnub *et al.*; for Ptolemaios, *stratēgos*, and his sons	Ptolemy VIII	Elephantine	

(*cont.*)

Table A.2. (*cont.*)

	Inscription	Name	Title/Function	Type of work	Dating	Place	Thiers
14	I.Th.Sy. 302	Herodes, son of Demophon, and the priests of the 5th *phylē*	*phrourarchos* of Syene, *hēgemōn ep' andrōn*, prophet of Khnub	inscription dedicated to Amun-Khnub *et al.*; for Boethos and for the annual festivals for the royal family and Boethos' birthday	Ptolemy VI	Elephantine-Satis Island	
15	I.Th.Sy. 303	Herodes, son of Demophon, and the association of the *Basilistai*	*stratēgos*	inscription dedicated to Amun-Khnub *et al.*	Ptolemy VIII	Elephantine-Satis Island	
16	I.Th.Sy. 188	group of troops	the infantrymen, the cavalrymen, and the other persons stationed in the Ombite nome	construction of the chapel of Haroeris-Apollo	Ptolemy VI	Kom Ombo	no. 26
17	I.Th.Sy. 190	group of troops	the infantrymen, the cavalrymen, and the other persons stationed in the Ombite nome	altar dedicated to Souchos and other gods of the temple; for Menandros, of the *archisōmatophylakes*, *hipparchos* in office, *oikonomos* of the royal land and *epistatēs*, his son Micros, among the *hipparchoi* in office serving in this unit, and for Ptolemaios	Ptolemy VIII	Kom Ombo	
18	*I.Herm.Magn. 1*	*group of* katoikoi hippeis	*katoikoi hippeis*	*statues, all the constructions inside the* temenos, *and the portico; dedicated to Ptolemy III*	*Ptolemy III*	*Hermopolis*	

19	P.Haun.inv.407	group of cleruchs	*andreis*	land to Horus for the construction of his temple	Ptolemy VIII (119–118 BC)	Edfu	
20	***PP* II 2125**	Pamonthes-Plenis, son of Mencheres	*stratēgos*, "Superior at the head of the men," servant, and prophet of many gods, great priest	construction of the Ptolemaic portico and construction in the temple of Montu (Bucheum?)	Cleopatra VII	Hermonthis	nos. 55 and 56
21	***PP* VIII 2112a**	Petimouthes	*stratēgos*, scribe of the temple of Paiouenamon, prophet of many gods	reconstruction of a magazine of Amun	Ptolemy X	Thebes	no. 40
22	I.Prose I 46	Callimachus	*stratēgos* and in charge of the finance of Peri-Theban nome, *gymnasiarchos, hipparchos*	benefactions in the temple of Karnak, notably construction of the terrace of Amun-Ra	Cleopatra VII	Thebes	no. 57
23	***PP* I/VIII 293**	Panas, son of Psenobastis	*stratēgos*, prophet of many gods	construction of the temple of Hathor and many monuments and temple of Isis and its *dromos*	Cleopatra VII/Augustus?	Dendera	no. 53
24	**I.Portes 24**	Ptolemaios-Psenpchuis, son of Panas	*stratēgos*, prophet of many gods	dedication of land to Isis-Thermouthis on behalf of Augustus	Augustus	Dendera	
25	***PP* I/VIII 265**	Pachomis-Hierax	*stratēgos* (of several nomes), prophet of many gods	construction of a chapel	Cleopatra VII ?	Dendera	no. 61
26	***PP* I/VIII 292b**	Pamenches	*stratēgos* (of several nomes), prophet of many gods	construction (?) in the temples of Edfu, Dendera, Elephantine, Philae, Bigeh, Elkab, and Hieraconpolis	Cleopatra VII ?	Dendera	no. 54
27	***PP* I/VIII 343**	Psais, his son Padimin, his brother Patriphis, Pollis, Kolanthos, Hermias, his brother with their children	*stratēgos*, agent of Min, prophet, the others have religious offices	opening of the quarries for the temples of the Panopolite nome	Ptolemy XII?	Panopolis	no. 51

(*cont.*)

Table A.2. (*cont.*)

	Inscription	Name	Title/Function	Type of work	Dating	Place	Thiers
28	I.Akoris 1 = OGIS I 94	Hakoris son of Herieus	*stratēgos* (?)	rock-cut monumental dedication for a chapel of Isis Mochias	Ptolemy V	Tenis-Akoris	
29	***PP* II 2142**	Horos	general, governor and prophet	construction of a portico in front of the temple of Herishef	pre-Ptolemaic or Ptolemy I	Heracleopolis	no. 0
30	P.Tebt. I 63, ll. 18–23; P.Tebt. 61a, ll. 51–105	group of troops	*katoikoi hippeis* and 7-aroura *machimoi*	dedication of 130 arouras of land to Soknebtunis	Ptolemy VIII	Fayyum: Kerke-osiris	
31	I.Fayoum III 200	group	ex-ephebes	donation of land to Souchos	Ptolemy X	Fayyum: Krokodilopolis or Euhemeria	
32	I.Fayoum III 201	group	ex-ephebes	donation of land to Souchos	Ptolemy X	Fayyum: Krokodilopolis or Euhemeria	
33	I.Fayoum III 202	group	ex-ephebes	donation of land to Soknebtunis	Ptolemy X	Fayyum: Tebtunis?	
34	I.Fayoum III 204	Helenos	president of the association	construction of the *peribolos* (and donation of land by the association)	Ptolemy XII	Fayyum	no. 50
35	P.Tebt. III 781	x	president of the association of the 45-aroura cleruchs at Moeris	reconstruction of the *Ammonion* after the destruction of 168 BC	Ptolemy VI	Fayyum: Moeris	no. 25
36	I.Fayoum I 83	Horos, son of Horos, Artem[. . .], and their soldiers	*chiliarchos*	construction of the *pronaos* of a temple in Karanis	Ptolemy VI	Fayyum: Karanis	no. 23
37	I.Fayoum III 151	x	*hipparchos* of the *katoikoi hippeis*	construction of the *propylon* and all the stone buildings of the temple of Heron	Ptolemy VIII	Fayyum: Magdola	no. 34

38	I.Fayoum II 115	Petosiris, son of Heracles, his wife, and his children	not mentioned	construction of the second *propylon* of the temple of Heron	Ptolemy XII	Fayyum: Theadelphia	no. 48
39	I.Fayoum II 107	Agathodoros, Alexandrian, his wife, and his children	member of the second hipparchy	construction of the *propylon* and of the dromos of the temple of Pnepheros	Ptolemy VIII	Fayyum: Theadelphia	no. 29
40	I.Fayoum II 108	Agathodoros, Alexandrian, his wife, and his children	*hipparchos*	construction of the door and the bar for closing it	Ptolemy VIII	Fayyum: Theadelphia	no. 30
41	I.Fayoum II 111	Apollonios, son of Apollonios, and his children	not mentioned	construction of the sanctuary of Premarres	Ptolemy X	Fayyum: Theadelphia	no. 39
42	Farid, no. XXII	Horpaisis, son of Djedhat, and his children	*mr-mšʿ* = general/*laarchēs*	construction of the temple of Harmotnis	Ptolemy VIII	Fayyum: Theadelphia	no. 33
43	I.Fayoum III 145	x	*laarchēs*	construction of an Iseion	Ptolemy XII	Fayyum: Tebtunis	no. 49
44	Cairo Museum no. 89050 = SEG XXXIII 1359 = I.Fayoum III 209 (only l. 5)	Heliodoros, son of Ptolemaios, Macedonian	100-aroura cleruch, *epistatēs, archiphylakitēs*, and *kōmogrammateus*	construction of a *propylon* to Pnepheros	Ptolemy X	Fayyum: Theadelphia	no. 37
45	I.Fayoum II 135	Apollophanes, son of Bion, from the city of Antioch	one of the First *Philoi* and of the spear-bearing *chiliarchoi*	ask for the reconstruction of the temple and wall of the crocodile-gods Psonaus, Pnepheros, and Soxis	Ptolemy XII	Fayyum: Euhemeria	no. 46
46	***PP* III 5164**	Callicrates	chief admiral	construction of a temple of Isis and Anubis	Ptolemy II	Canopus	no. 6
47	***PP* I/VIII 248**	Dorion	*mr-mšʿ*, *stratēgos*, prophet of Horus-Khenty, and priest of the *machairophoroi*	restoration of the temple of the Semitic cult of the Idumean *politeuma*	Cleopatra III	Memphis	

(*cont.*)

Table A.2. (*cont.*)

	Inscription	Name	Title/Function	Type of work	Dating	Place	Thiers
48	**Cairo JE 85743**	Aristonicus	prophet, *stratēgos* (?)	erection of statues in front of the temple of Amon	late II BC?	To-Bener	
49	***PP* I 294**	Panemerit	governor, *stratēgos*, prophet, Chief of the Royal Treasure	construction of the sanctuary-*mesenet* and of the monumental door of the temple of Horus of Mesen; enclosure wall	Ptolemy XII	Tanis	no. 42
50	***PP* I/VIII 306**	Pichaas	governor, *stratēgos*, prophet	construction of the sanctuary-*mesenet* and of four doors and of the enclosure wall of the temple of Horus of Mesen	Ptolemy XII	Tanis	no. 43

Glossary of technical terms

agēma: “royal guard” composed of elite troops
archiphylakitēs: chief police officer
aroura = 2,756 square meters, *c.* a football field (100 arouras = 27.5 hectares)
artaba = 38.78 liters
artabieia: grain tax on land of one artaba per aroura
asylum or ***asylia***: inviolability (of a temple)
chiliarchos, ***chiliarchoi***: infantry officer leading 1,000 men; also *chiliarchēs*
chōra = countryside: the whole of Egypt except the three Greek poleis
diartabieia: grain tax on land of 2 artabas per aroura
dioikētēs: minister of finances in Egypt
dōrea: gift estate granted and taken back by the king
drachma = 6 **obols**: if in silver, it corresponds to the wage of a soldier in the third century BC
epibatai: armed soldiers on a warship
epigonoi: men of the descent = *tēs epigonēs* = *ms n Kmy*, lit. “born in Egypt”; see Chapter 5, section 5.2.3.1
epigraphē: harvest tax in grain, also called *ekphorion* or *sitikē misthōsis*
epilektoi: picked troops; when specified, “picked troops among the *machimoi* at the court”
epistatēs: overseer, super-intendant, director; different types of *epistatai* are found, either in the civilian and temple administration or in the army
epistratēgos: “chief-governor” of the Thebaid
euergetēs, ***euergetai***: donor, benefactor
gymnasiarchos: director of the gymnasium; also *gymnasiarchēs*
grammateus, ***grammateis***: secretary, scribe
hēgemōn, ***hēgemones***: commander, officer
hekatontarchos: officer in a *syntagma*, commanding 100 men
Hellēn, ***Hellēnes***: tax-Greek (in fiscal context)
hipparchos, ***hipparchoi***: cavalry officer; also *hipparchēs*
hipparchia or **hipparchy**: unit composed of cavalrymen of about 400–500 men
ilē: cavalry unit of about 200–250 men

katoikia: in second- and first-century BC Egypt a group made up of the upper class of the cleruchs
katoikos hippeus: cavalry settler
klēros: plot of land given to soldiers in exchange for military services
kōmogrammateus: village scribe
kontōta: barges, ships used to transport troops
laarchia or **laarchy**: military unit including *machimoi*
laarchos: commander of a *laarchia*; also *laarchēs*
lesonis: chief administrator of a temple
machairophoros: saber-bearer
mr-mšʿ (mer-mesha): (1) officer or commander of troops; (2) *stratēgos*, either as military *stratēgos* (general) or as territorial governor (or nome-*stratēgos*); (3) leader of a religious association
misthophoros: mercenary, professional soldier. In the third century BC many *misthophoroi* are immigrant soldiers, whereas in the second and first centuries BC they are recruited locally and appear in Demotic texts as *rmt iw=f šp hbs*: "man receiving pay," translated "professional soldier"
machimos: soldier or guard with a land allotment of 5, 7 or 10 arouras, or with 20 or 30 arouras in the case of a cavalryman (*machimos hippeus*), most often of Egyptian origin
men of the descent, see *epigonoi*
mina = 100 drachmas
nauklēromachimos: *machimos* serving in the fleet
nome-*stratēgos*: governor of one of the forty administrative subdivisions in Egypt (one of the meanings of the Demotic title *mr-mšʿ*)
obol = 8 *chalkoi*
opsōnion: salary in cash
phrourarchos: garrison commander
phylakitēs: policeman
phylē: tribe, in Ptolemaic Egypt, group of priests (four until 237 BC and then five)
prostagma: royal decree of a certain type, stating clearly the king's will (vs. *diagrammata* and *nomoi*, which are anonymous rules on a specific topic)
satrap: governor of a province
stathmos: billet given to soldiers in exchange for military services (sometimes part of a house)
stathmouchos: owner of a house where the king requisitions a *stathmos*

stratēgos: general, commander, and sometimes also governor of a nome; see nome-*stratēgos*

syntaxis: contribution; in specific contexts, revenue distributed to temples from the state

talent = 6,000 drachmas

triērēs: trireme, galley

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